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“Drawing lines on a map”:  
English Regionalism and Regional Identity in Post-War Yorkshire and Humberside 
Robert Patrick Doherty 
 
 
Abstract 
The failure of either a regional tier of government, or a strong and coherent regional 
political movement to emerge in England – in contrast to the Post-war devolution 
developments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, not to mention Europe – has led 
to the general dismissal of regionalism as a significant political force in England, and led 
to its characterization as the ‘dog that never barked’; merely the preserve of a handful of 
committed regionalists. This thesis builds on recent scholarship in Post-war British 
history, broadly categorized as the ‘new political history’, to challenge these traditional 
narratives. It explores how regional identities were constructed and articulated in a 
number of official, semi-official and unofficial spheres. It also considers how these 
interacted with central government and other interests. It does so through a number of 
case studies, or ‘core samples’, exploring various dimensions of regional action in 
different contexts. These include regional economic development and industrial 
promotion agencies; local government; airports and other transport considerations; and 
regional arts policy. The thesis focuses on Yorkshire and Humberside, a region that has 
not received much scholarly interest with regards to regionalism, but which has been 
considered prominently on literature exploring ‘the North’. Through this case study, this 
thesis highlights not only the potency of regionalism and regional identity, but also its 
complexities, contingencies and constraints. Through its core samples into economic 
planning, regional boosterism, local government reorganisation, transport and arts policy, 
this study adds additional perspectives to on-going historical discourses in contemporary 
British and European history. It also provides some insight into contemporary political 
concerns around the re-emergence of identity politics. It argues that complex, pluralist 
and distinct regionalisms – as were articulated and mobilized in Yorkshire during this 
period – form an important and often neglected dimension of contemporary British 
history that requires more concerted study. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This thesis explores how individuals, institutions and organisations have responded to 
regional initiatives, or articulated a collective regional identity or purpose, broadly from 
the end of the 1950s – when the British government began to debate and implement 
reforms on a regional basis – through to the mid-1990s; a time when the New Labour 
government sought to refocus on a new ‘wave’ of ‘regional policy’. It will do so by 
considering various economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of several focused 
case studies, or ‘core samples’, as a means of re-evaluating general assertions regarding 
the relative ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of regional initiatives and action. In doing so, the thesis 
seeks to empirically establish certain aspects of the nature of regional identity in 
England. It applies the ‘regional’ paradigm to consider broader historiographical debates 
on-going within historical scholarship on twentieth-century British politics and culture. 
These include issues surrounding perceptions of national ‘decline’; the challenges and 
paradoxes of increasing ‘affluence’ in the late twentieth-century; the erosion of popular 
trust in traditional political parties and political processes, and the increasing 
‘privatisation of politics’; as well as the supposed increase of ‘post-materialist’ and anti-
modernist sentiment amongst the general population. It will also assess the role of the 
regional in the context of the increasing literature on conceptions of national identity in 
the UK; namely constructions of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Englishness’. 
As a means to analyse these broad themes, this study focuses on the ‘region’ of 
Yorkshire and the Humber; also referred to as Humberside. This region has produced 
some scholarship largely focused on regional institutions and actions, though relatively 
  12 
little in comparison to other accepted regions in England. This thesis focuses on the 
region itself, rather than as part of a comparative study. More specifically, this thesis 
primarily explores – through the prism of ‘regionalism’ – how the city of Kingston-Upon-
Hull and the area of Humberside, as sub-regional centres of population, have engaged 
with the idea of a regional framework for government, economy and all aspects of life – 
from transport to the arts – over the latter part of the twentieth century. The regional 
framework adopted by Hull and Humberside differed from the ‘great city-regions’, such 
as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Liverpool, Leeds, and Newcastle, because of its 
unique location on the River Humber, relating both to Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. 
This introductory chapter will focus first on discussing the broad theoretical 
considerations and issues related to the terms ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ as used in the 
scholarly literature across a number of disciplines. In doing so, it will establish how 
‘regionalism and ‘regional identity’ are defined and problematised in the context of this 
research. It will then look at the particular British – or rather English – context for regions 
and regionalism, and evaluate how regions have been perceived; not only in scholarship 
on regional issues, but also in studies concerned with national territorial politics and 
identity.  
This Introduction then moves on to explain why Yorkshire and Humberside have been 
chosen for an historical exploration of regionalism and regional identity; the relative 
merits of such an endeavour; and why a sub-regional focus on Hull and East Yorkshire (or 
Humberside) forms the basis for several of the dimensions explored within this thesis. As 
these regional case-studies are also intended as a means to consider wider questions, 
trends and themes of modern British history, this introduction provides a wider context 
for the themes covered by this thesis. 
  13 
The Introduction concludes with an overview of the content of each of the chapters to 
follow, alongside the methodology adopted, and summarises some of the key findings 
and arguments emerging from this research. 
 
1.2 In search of the ‘region’,  ‘Regionalism’ and ‘regional 
identity’  
 
I 
‘Region’ remains a highly fluid and contentious term for delineating forms of spatial 
organisation, but it is also practically necessary for both academics and policy-makers. 
‘Regions’ and ‘regionalism’ can variously be applied to huge transnational areas; formal 
and informal trading blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, Mercosur, and the European Union.1 Defining trans-
national ‘regions’ as ‘a group of countries with a more or less explicitly shared political 
project’ has proved useful in analyses of an increasingly multipolar and globalised 
political economy.2  
In the sense used here, however, ‘regions’ are conceived of as a subnational territorial 
unit. This in itself provides little assistance in definition. Defined ‘negatively’, as Michael 
Keating terms it, the region is conceptualized as ‘intermediate between state and 
                                                            
1 For examples, see Morten Boas, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), The 
Political Economy of Regions and Regionalisms (Basingstoke, 2005). 
2 Bjorn Hettne, ‘Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation’, in 
Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism 
(Basingstoke, 1999), 1, 6-7; Marie-Claude Smouts, ‘The region as the new imagined 
community?’, in Patrick Le Galés and Christian Lesquesne (eds.), Regions in Europe (London, 
1998), 30-31. 
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municipal government’.3 It is generally accepted that regions themselves – as economic 
and cultural phenomena – are not given shape by, or do not relate easily to formally 
designated administrative boundaries; but formalized spaces and institutions are not 
irrelevant to defining regions. As Keating remarks:  
Regions cannot be delineated simply by topographical criteria. Their extent and 
shape will depend on what functions they are to fulfil, and on patterns of political 
mobilization which give political issue in itself, since the drawing of the boundaries 
can alter not only the social context of regionalism, but the political power balance 
in regional institutions.4 
 
Regions are thus multidimensional constructions, which gives them a chimerical quality. 
As Adrian Green and A. J. Pollard summarise, ‘regions are slippery, their definition varying 
with perspective and subject, and this kaleidoscopic quality makes them difficult to grasp 
historically’.5 This fluidity, and a certain vagueness in the manner by which the term 
‘region’ is applied in a British context, has led to the argument that ‘it is now virtually 
impossible to isolate an unambiguous definition of [either the city or] the region’.6 
This slippery quality, particularly in the English context (discussed further below), has 
meant that regions have been considered by academics from a variety of economic, 
social, political and cultural perspectives. As in studies on the nation state and 
nationalism, the region has been identified and defined for both its material qualities, 
and its more imaginative cultural aspects. In Britain and Western Europe, the economic 
diversity of regions and their functional distinctions have been a focus of much 
                                                            
3 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change (Cheltenham, 1998), 79. 
4 Ibid., 80. 
5 Adrian Green and A.J. Pollard, ‘Introduction: Identifying Regions’, in Adrian Green and A.J. 
Pollard (eds.), Regional Identities in North-East England (Woodbridge, 2007), 4. 
6 John B. Parr, ‘Cities and regions: problems and potentials’, Environment and Planning A, 40 
(2008), 3009. 
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scholarship on the inheritance of early industrialization,7 particularly the extent to which 
regions have been remade by the post-Fordist reorganization of national and local 
economies through processes of globalization and the increasing power of international 
institutions.8 These questions have been fundamentally informed by the ‘problem’ of 
increasingly uneven growth that has provided the context for regional economic policy 
since the 1930s.9  
This literature has struggled to engage with cultural studies in a discourse on the region; 
or with studies that have focused on identity and belonging as influenced by place. This 
failure to relate studies of policy to studies of culture has been in part influenced by the 
desire of those in the humanities to avoid the possible generalizing tendencies this 
would entail – eschewing any notion that ‘a region consists of a certain clutch of features 
that mark everyone from the region in the same way’, and avoiding monolithic definitions 
of place and coherent social groups.10 The result has been that regions have been 
defined and explored through an eclectic range of dimensions and perspectives. Yet, 
outside of various edited collections bringing together several distinct studies, there are 
few multidimensional interdisciplinary studies of a single regional case study.11 In Britain, 
                                                            
7 For example, Pat Hudson, ‘The regional perspective’, in Pat Hudson (ed.), Regions and 
Industries: A perspective on the industrial revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989), 13-18; 
Christopher M. Law, British Regional Development Since World War I (London, 1980); Gerald 
Manners, David Keeble, Brian Rodgers and Kenneth Warren, Regional Development in Britain 
(Chichester, 1980). 
8 For example, Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, 136-160; Neil Brenner, New 
State Spaces: Urban Government and the Rescaling of Statehood (Oxford, 2004); Andrew Popp 
and John Wilson, ‘Business in the Regions: ‘Old’ Districts to ‘New’ Clusters?’, in Richard Coopey 
and Peter Lyth (eds.), Business in Britain in the Twentieth Century: Decline and Renaissance 
(Oxford, 2009), 65-81. 
9 Allan Cochrane, ‘Spatial Divisions and Regional Assemblages’, in David Featherstone and Joe 
Painter (eds.), Spatial Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey (Chichester, 2013), 88. 
10 Wendy J. Katz and Timothy R. Mahoney, ‘Introduction: Regionalism and the Humanities: 
Decline or Revival?’, in Timothy R. Mahoney and Wendy J. Katz (eds.), Regionalism and the 
Humanities (London, 2008), xiv. 
11 Such collections on region and on specific regions have been produced by historians, historical 
geographers and other professionals in the humanities – particularly in the early to mid-2000s, 
and particularly focused on Northern England or North East England: See Bill Lancaster, Diana 
Newton and Natasha Vall (eds.), An Agenda for Regional History (Newcastle, 2007); Green and 
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disciplinary pluralism has characterised regional studies, which has tended to add to the 
lack of clarity in defining regions and regionalism. As James Hopkins argues, pluralism in 
approach was a central feature of the Regional Studies Association, established in the 
1960s against the Regional Science Association’s more theoretical foundations.12 
The eclectic nature of territorial organisation and power – whether expressed through a 
self-conscious regionalism or not – has produced several classificatory theories and 
frameworks through which to study and define regional space. These have tended to be 
primarily underpinned by economic analysis; such as John Meyer’s typologies of 
‘homogeity’, ‘nodality or polarization’, and as ‘programming or policy-orientated’.13 
Researchers such as John B. Parr have attempted to problematize and update these 
types further, through topographical distinctions such as ‘city-regions’ and 
‘policycentric/pluricentric urban regions’.14 In some cases, other dimensions have been 
used to provide classifications: Peter Aronsson, for example, posits categories of regional 
articulation in cultural forms – such as ‘winning regions’, ‘resisting regions’, or ‘attraction 
landscapes’ – in the context of Sweden.15  
Within such conceptions of the region and regionalism, scholars also consider 
acknowledged power dynamics between the regions themselves, drawn primarily in 
economic terms but also extending to social, cultural and political dimensions and 
structures. Ascendant in this order are the truly globalized regions, almost uniformly 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Pollard (eds.), Regional Identities; Christoph Ehland (ed.), Thinking Northern: Textures of Identity 
in the North of England (Amsterdam, 2007); Katharine Cockin (ed.), The Literary North 
(Basingstoke, 2012); Neville Kirk (ed.), Northern Identities: Historical Interpretations of ‘The 
North’ and ‘Northernness’ (Aldershot, 2000). 
12 James Hopkins, ‘Translating the Transnational: American ‘Science’ and the British Regional 
Problem’, Contemporary British History, 27, 2 (2013), 179-180. 
13 John R. Meyer, ‘Regional Economies: A Survey’, The American Economic Review, 53:1 (1963), 
22. 
14 Parr, ‘Cities and regions’, 3014, 3017-8. 
15 Peter Aronsson, ‘The old cultural regionalism – and the new’, in Bill Lancaster, Diana Newton 
and Natasha Vall (eds.), An Agenda for Regional History (Newcastle, 2007), 254-255. 
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urban in pattern – ‘world-’ or ‘mega-cities’ whose economic successes are tied to their 
nation states – including London, Paris and New York.16 Areas within Europe, on account 
of both their advantageous geographical position and strong economic performance 
have been cast as representing ‘core’ regions, usually encompassing one or more 
‘global’ city-regions. A celebrated example being variants on Roger Brunet’s so-called 
‘blue banana’, encompassing South-East England and the Paris, Randstad and 
Rhineland regions.17 In contrast, those areas whose economies are not as developed as 
those of the ‘core’ regions have been characterised as ‘peripheral’ regions. in Europe, 
these have tended to be located on the geographical edges of Western Europe. Beyond 
these general binaries, however, finer distinctions have been identified. Ronald Martin 
notes how, in the UK context, some have preferred to see the national geography 
reflected in a fourfold conception of an ‘inner-’ and ‘outer core’, and an ‘inner-‘ and ‘outer 
periphery’.18 
Interregional core/periphery models are themselves supplemented by the perceived 
hierarchy of identified city-regions. Martin Rhodes, for example, emphasises that in 
economic terms ‘there are winners and losers and centres and peripheries even in the 
                                                            
16 See Patricia Garside and Michael Hebbert, ‘Introduction’, in Patricia L. Garside and Michael 
Hebbert (eds.), British Regionalism 1900-2000 (London, 1989), 13. 
17 See: Brenner, New State Spaces, pp. 184-189; Michael Wegener, ‘The changing urban 
hierarchy in Europe’, in John Brotchie, Mike Batty, Ed Blakely, Peter Hall and Peter Newton (eds.), 
Cities in Competition: Productive and Sustainable Cities for the 21st  Century (Melbourne, 1995), 
139-160. 
18 Ronald L. Martin, ‘The contemporary debate over the North-South divide: images and realities 
of regional inequality in late-twentieth-century Britain’, in Alan R.H. Baker and Mark Billinge 
(eds.), Geographies of England: The North-South Divide, Material and Imagined (Cambridge, 
2004), 21: ‘… an ‘inner core’ (roughly that area within a 60-mile radius of – or one hour’s train 
commuting time of London); an ‘outer core’ (within a radius of roughly 60 to 120 miles of 
London, and including the rest of the South East, the easternmost past of the South West and 
the southern parts of the East and West Midlands); an ‘inner periphery’ (within a radius of roughly 
120 to 300 miles of London, and including the rest of the South West and the two Midlands 
regions, Yorkshire-Humberside, and the North West and North East); and beyond that an ‘outer 
periphery’ (of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). 
  18 
core German regions.’19 Parr sees a ‘two-level hierarchy of city-regions’, citing 
distinctions within the English West Midlands and Scotland.20 Within global city-regions 
themselves, it has been argued that ever more complex spatial hierarchies have formed, 
relating to intra-metropolitan income distribution and demographics.21 Such frameworks 
emphasise the importance of the regional concept as part of a ‘mediating’ process of 
space, as part of what John Allen terms the ‘relational’ nature of power.22 Power is 
therefore exercised and distributed unevenly between regions, but also – importantly – 
within them. Such complexity is often simplified as part of the process of analysing 
regions; they are presented as homogenous entities, neglecting the ‘doily of regional 
development’.23 Relational approaches to space have more recently presented a 
challenge to these social constructions of regions, with Martin Jones and Michael Woods 
arguing that now ‘geographies are made through stretched-out and unbounded relations 
between hybrid mixtures of global flows and local nodal interactions that are 
interconnected’.24 
With the end of the Cold War, and an increasingly globalized and neoliberal economy, the 
region – particularly within the European context – has received political ascendance as 
a means of promoting industrial specialism and mitigating competition amongst local 
authorities. The ‘rise of regions’ has been argued by Keating as a necessary response to 
the need for ‘the management of change and to modernization in the new market 
                                                            
19 Martin Rhodes, ‘Introduction: the regions and the new Europe’, in Martin Rhodes (eds.), The 
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conditions’.25 Regions within states have been increasingly seen as the ideal unit of 
action within supranational or ‘world’ regions; such a project in general falls under the 
rather broad church of what has been termed the ‘New Regionalism’.26 In the context of 
the European Union, this has been seen in efforts towards a formal or informal ‘Europe 
of the Regions’ from the 1980s.27 As such, this has also increased theoretical 
scholarship on the nature and construction of sub-national regions. These efforts have 
focused primarily on ascertaining the key dimensions for capacity building in regional 
institutions. The ‘new regionalist’ literature has been primarily institutional in its focus. 
Regional ‘visions’, particularly those straddling national boundaries, have been seen as 
‘driven by the technocratic perspective of public officials, with little or no involvement 
either from communities or businesses’.28  
Inherent within this literature, however, and even nominally visible, is the sense that 
these institutional mechanisms and forms of regionalism are essentially ‘new’ in their 
conception. The re-emergence of the ‘region’ has supposed that such networks or 
associations do not have a strong history or lasting legacies. In a sense, ‘old’ regionalism 
has not been analysed as a means to critique or contribute to more contemporary 
discourses. The dynamics of recent regional forms have been generalised as different 
from the ‘corporatist predecessors’ of the past – ‘regionalism worked from the national 
down to the regional scale’ – inferring that the shift has been fundamental rather than 
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inherited.29 Such a notion is not, however, uncontested. It has been pointed out by many 
that the role of the nation state, not merely for practical reasons, is still an important one 
in discussions of regionalism.30  
The malleability of the region, but also its necessity as a unit of organisation and 
experience for understanding economic, social, political and cultural change, is 
demonstrated not just by the publications produced on the subject, but also by the 
reluctance of editors to impose their own definitions on authors. James W. Scott’s note 
that contributors ‘eschewed a unitary theoretical format: each author presents their own 
perspective on regionalization and institutional change’, is indicative of the approach 
taken in almost all cases.31 The bulk of the scholarship produced towards new 
understandings of regionalism has also remained in the realm of the theoretical. Its  
empirical data, when used, is primarily quantitative in form. Some academics have 
pointed to the unsteady foundations that such indicators provide for conceptions of 
regionalism.32 Imprecise definitions of regionalism have also meant that this literature 
has rather ambiguously overlapped with other theories of geopolitical organisation, such 
as narratives surrounding the ‘new localism’, that has argued that local authorities have 
themselves been increasingly empowered to pursue market-oriented approaches as 
‘spaces of neoliberalism’.33 In addition to this, within studies of regions and regionalism 
‘whether theoretical, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a specific focus’.34 
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The predominance of economic indicators both in analysis and theoretical work therefore 
only provides a partial ‘portrait of region’.35 
 
II 
Regional ‘identity’ remains intrinsically linked to regionalism, but is not always 
considered in terms of how it has been mobilised and politicised. The relationship is 
difficult to elucidate: the existence of a regional identity (or identities) does not inevitably 
predict its operationalization on a regional scale.36 Again, what is generally emergent 
from the literature that considers regional identity is that a workable definition for 
comparative purposes remains elusive.37 In the widest sense, a regional identity can be 
seen as the collective construction of a commonality associated with place on a regional 
scale; ‘a regional identity… is a sense of belonging, an awareness of similar traits among 
people living under similar conditions, or not coincidentally, of how their cultural patterns 
are distinctive in comparison to other regions or places’.38  
The cultural construct of identity has meant that narratives, or aspects, of regional 
identity have been drawn from ‘miscellaneous elements’; such as ideas on landscape, 
dialects, regional novels, and forms of historical production.39 Collective identities are 
understood as contingent and multidimensional in form; constructed from and/or 
competing with other forms of belonging such as class, gender and ethnicity. Institutions, 
boundaries and frameworks of governance also have a complex relationship with 
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regional identity, their existence in turn serving either to give form to existing cultural 
identities, or to strengthen a sense of community. Cultural forms of collective 
performance, either originating from these official sources or from other bodies, are 
important in generating a sense of belonging to a wider ‘imagined community’, as 
regional identity – as much as national identity – stems from the image of communion 
rather than lived experience. As part of these processes of identity formation, it is 
important to emphasise the role that academics also play in the ‘legitimation, 
representation and emasculation of territories’.40  
Keating has argued that three elements exist in the analysis of regional identity as 
political elements (or politicising forces): 
the first element is the cognitive one, that is people must be aware of such a thing 
as a region, and of its geographical limits. This in turn requires a knowledge of 
other regions, with which the home region can be compared and from which it can 
be differentiated. People must also be aware of a region’s characteristics, although 
they may differ on which ones are salient… A second element is the affective one, 
that is, how people feel about the region and the degree to which it provides a 
framework for common identity and solidarity, possibly in competition from other 
forms of solidarity, including class and nation. This provides a form of interpretation 
of the cognitive element, and links to the third element, the instrumental one, 
whether a region is used as a basis for mobilization and collective action in pursuit 
of social, economic and political goals. These goals may include the attainment of 
regional autonomy, or they may be focused on more immediate social and 
economic policies, to be achieved through the existing structures.41 
 
In examining the issue of regional identity, it is argued that the difference between 
regional identity as manifested in ‘regional consciousness’ and in the ‘identity of a 
region’ must be made in analytical terms.42 This distinction is perhaps more problematic 
in practice than might at first be presumed. The collective consciousness of the 
sociospatial is constructed not only ‘from below’, but also ‘from above’, in the form of 
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‘territorial control/governance’ – and this construction is discursive.43 This therefore 
means that the identity ascribed to a region from those outside can inform the regional 
consciousness of those within the region, and vice versa. As John Tomaney and Neil 
Ward argue regarding North East England’s perceived prosperity gap from ‘the South’: 
‘ironically, it is these conditions – and the sense of economic injustice they generate – 
that underpin the region’s recent assertion of its cultural and political identity.’44 To fully 
attempt to disentangle these two constructions is therefore complex and potentially 
misleading. 
 
1.3 The ‘English Question’:  English regionalism and regional 
identity in contemporary and historical perspective 
 
I 
The British context for regionalism serves to further complicate an ambiguous and 
fractured concept. Unlike European counterparts, Britain has had no strong 
constitutional federalism, such as the German Lander governments that represented the 
‘vanguard of Europe of the regions’, or the semi-federalism of France and Spain.45  
In Britain, public campaigns for greater political devolution have primarily come from the 
minority nations of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. These campaigns became 
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more vociferous in the 1960s, with Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties winning 
Westminster seats in Carmarthen and Hamilton by-elections respectively.46 Both the 
Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru began to make lasting gains in local elections in 
this period, and this combined upsurge was instrumental in the establishment of (what 
would become) the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution in 1969.47 Michael 
Hechter’s 1975 ‘internal colonialism’ critique – arguing that the Celtic Fringe had 
effectively been economically peripheralised and culturally marginalized by the dominant 
English core – reflected a dissatisfaction with the constitution of the Union that was also 
apparent in the politics of nationalism within the UK.48 With rising support for nationalist 
political parties came greater decentralization through a combination of administrative 
devolution and cultural nationalism. Joe England has documented how the creation of 
the Wales Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1974 came amongst a succession of 
institutional innovations, from the Welsh Office in 1964, the Welsh Arts Council and 
Language Act (1967), to the creation of tourism and sports bodies and an industrial 
development agency in the 1970s.49 In Scotland, institutional moves were even more 
pronounced and, as Jim Phillips has articulated, were actively promoted by industrial 
interests to try and smooth class tensions from the 1960s onwards.50 These economic, 
political and cultural forces eventually led to democratic devolution through the creation 
of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in the late 1990s. The pattern of the 
‘regions’ within England, however, has remained decidedly problematic. As Brian 
Hogwood remarked in the early 1980s, the English regions were characterised by ‘a 
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complete absence of a coherent definition of their boundaries, their size or even the 
concept of a region’.51 Such circumstances were exacerbated by the manner in which the 
functional administration of national governance were territorially divided in a chaotic, ad 
hoc and un-sociological manner.52  
Despite the issues inherent in defining both regionalism and regional identity, a broad 
consensus has formed surrounding the extent to which these concepts have provided a 
political force in British – or more appropriately, English – politics. Scottish historian 
Christopher Harvie’s 1991 article entitled ‘English regionalism: the dog that never 
barked’ argued: 
Whatever European salience the English regions have achieved in terms of fashion 
or entertainment (think Liverpool in the 1960s), this has never extended to politics. 
So, to activate decentralization in England entails overcoming a history and a 
culture which have – as much as politics and social policy – marginalised it.53 
 
The moniker of ‘the dog that never barked’ has, in many ways, come to characterise 
subsequent scholarship on the English regions; reference to the phrase has continued to 
surface in the work of academic and political commentators alike.54 When the 
possibilities of increased devolution within England have been proposed and debated, as 
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a potential solution to the multi-faceted issue dubbed ‘the English Question’, it has 
invariably become an adjunct to the more vociferous debates surrounding claims of self-
determination – or greater devolved powers – for the ‘Celtic Fringe’. Public and academic 
interest in the subject has clustered around the ‘Irish Question’ of the late-
nineteenth/early-twentieth century; the emergence as a political force of Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s; and the devolutionary settlements made by 
New Labour to the three minority nations of the Union in the late 1990s. The promise to 
the Scottish Parliament of increased powers – including the possibility of devolving 
greater control over taxation – following the referendum over Scottish independence in 
2014, also appeared to reopen public discourse on the politics and identity of English 
regions (with policy even moving pre-emptively towards greater regional control).55 These 
waves of interest in the regional question in an English context have therefore not been 
the result of a groundswell of indigenous expression for greater acknowledgement of 
sub-national distinctiveness. 
Various reasons have been advanced for this lack of strong regionalism from within 
England. An apparent lack of enthusiasm for devolution in England amongst senior 
bureaucrats, key institutions and the general public in the 1970s provided a crucial 
context for not adopting the devolution advocated in the Kilbrandon Report.56 Academics 
and commentators on this subject highlight the long enmeshing of the state with 
Englishness in a manner that favours unionism, and which thus marks regional 
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government as ‘un-English’.57 The synonymy of Englishness with Britishness – and its 
cultural institutions such as the monarchy and the BBC – has effectively served to 
remove the impetus of an ‘other’ which any effective political regional expression could 
be articulated against, despite the supposed peripheralization of areas outside of the 
South and South-east of England.58 Linda Colley’s influential work on the formation of 
British national identity in the wake of England’s union with Scotland in 1707 asserts 
that the prolonged wars against the French over the following century, alongside unifying 
cultural forces such as the Protestant religion and the conscious fashioning of the 
monarchy, rendered a contrast with Britain’s continental neighbour more decisive than 
any internal disputation.59  
 
II 
History as a discipline has thus generally aligned with other fields in defining their 
geographic space of study. Historians of England have generally been comfortable in 
designating and studying ‘economic regions’, particularly with regards to the Industrial 
Revolution. In the North of England in the nineteenth century, for instance, 
Tyneside was different from the West Riding [of Yorkshire] and as different again 
from the Lancashire cotton region… Diversity between regions was evident in the 
way new manufacturing and commercial interests were regionally based and 
attempts to organize national movements came to nothing.60 
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But even though economically definable regions were emergent in this period, most 
literature does not see this ‘regionalisation’ as manifesting in a coherent ‘regional’ 
political movement. A ‘regional agenda’ has been argued to be conspicuously absent 
from the politics of North East England throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, despite the region’s broad economic integration.61 
The significance of regions within Britain, has also been recognised following political 
devolution to Scotland and Wales. Even Colley has conceded, in a recent edition of 
Britons, that regional divides survived the creation of a single national identity.62 Despite 
supposed uniformity, the apparent – and real – geographical differences that exist have 
not been dispelled, and these have been drawn along fairly consistent lines. As Peter 
Scott points out: 
Britain has always been a regionally divided nation. Throughout the middle ages the 
English counties to the south of the Humber, Trent and Mersey contained at least 
80 per cent of England’s tax paying population and five sixths [sic] of its taxable 
wealth. They were much more urbanised; with the exception of York and Newcastle, 
the south contained all of England’s largest towns and the vast majority of its urban 
population.63 
 
Yet still, as a well-spring for collective consciousness, regional identity’s historical role 
has been downplayed by those who have explored it. Luis Castells and John Walton, in 
presenting North West England before World War II as a case study in contrast with the 
Basque Country, found that ‘an overarching sense of regional identity, as expressed (for 
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example) in literature, politics or popular culture, was never in evidence’ to complement 
the identities provided by neighbourhood and town, nation and empire.64  
The politics and culture of territoriality in the British state have been another factor in 
downplaying regionalism and regional identity in England in modern British history. 
Christopher Harvie argues that the reason for this was the power of the nation-state in 
the early twentieth century, and its increasing intervention in the economy.65 Jim Bulpitt 
conceives of the British state as a ‘dual polity’, in which the functions of local authorities 
and those of the Westminster administration work in autonomous and separate ways, 
and have served to concentrate power in both the local and the national. The ‘informal 
empire’ supposed by this relationship has served to both embed the local in a 
relationship to the centre, and to supposedly suppress any larger intermediary territorial 
tier of governance. This notion of the historical embeddedness of the local in the national 
has been argued by Arthur Aughey to be the reason why the regional proposals of the 
New Labour government in the late 1990s and early 2000s were unable to take hold, 
occupying as they did the intermediate and indeterminate position between traditions of 
local government and administrative centralism.66 This is seen in regional histories of 
identification with an immediate locality, or city, rather than with a broader regional 
space. The ‘Pals’ battalions formed in the First World War in Lancashire, for example, all 
but ignored a North West identity: they generated patriotic support for the war at 
neighbourhood, workplace and town level, for a national cause, through regiments 
that (incidentally) had county labels, sometimes laid claim to countywide virtues, 
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used the traditional county figurehead of the Earl of Derby as a recruiting talisman 
in Lancashire, but hardly appealed to any broader regional sentiment.67 
 
Regardless of the precise causes, modern British historians are confronted with the 
reality that – in a conventional political sense at least – there has been an absence of 
popular politicised regionalism in England. This normative idea of a highly centralised 
and unified political culture has also helped to marginalize regional studies within 
national narratives and historical investigations.  
This lack of a regional focus to British historical studies perhaps also stems from the 
lingering tint of parochialism and amateurism around regional history as a serious 
academic subject. In 1970, John Marshall, whilst trying to dispel the image of a sub-
discipline that was the preserve of the amateur enthusiast, still could only afford regional 
history the rather secondary role of ‘both assist[ing] insight and add[ing] to knowledge’.68  
Where the regional is considered in modern British history, the tendency has been to do 
so from a predominantly statist perspective; as effected by national strategies. This has 
been particularly the case in economic terms, with histories of regional economic policy 
taking up a significant proportion of the analysis of post-war provincial economies, 
without affording any agency to the region. In these studies, regions are passive, ‘top-
down’ creations; their treatment has not framed regional spaces – unlike more recent 
contemporary literature on regionalism – as discursive productions. 
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III 
Within English historical study, one particular historical and political binary shorthand has 
emerged. Though regional histories considering specifically regional action and regional 
identity have been sporadic, the increasingly discernible economic binary between the 
‘core’ region of the south east – or more often, ‘the South’ – has led an increasing 
number of academics and commentators to explore the ‘North/South divide’ within 
England. This binary has been increasingly used in academic writing since the 1980s, as 
a specific result of the measurable material differences between the South East and 
London with the rest of the country, a measure which had in part been facilitated by the 
increase in regional statistics since the 1960s;69 as Danny Dorling writes: ‘by the 1980s, 
reports on the North-South divide were dominated, not by travelogues, but by 
numbers’.70 This work has focused particularly on the extent to which ‘the North’s’ 
peripherality has led to an assertive or latent distinctiveness. Such studies have 
considered a wealth of varied sources in constructing and analysing Northern identity – 
including dialect, music, literature, 'political, economic and social material’.71 They have 
tended to emphasise that, rather than being the product of more recent change, the 
differences across the divide have been historically enduring. Helen Jewell’s study on the 
origins of Northern consciousness, though noting twentieth century regional economic 
decline as precipitating an awareness of relative hardship in comparison to the south, 
asserted that conscious Northern identity is ‘as old as the hills’.72 Neville Kirk’s collection 
on the North and Northernness is presented as complementary to Jewell’s work, but 
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takes the nineteenth century as its formative period.73 Alan Baker and Mark Billinge’s 
volume on the material and imagined North/South divide asserts a historical continuity 
in the Humber-Severn line drawn in Bruce Campbell’s chapter on the 1080s, and by 
commentators in the 1980s.74  
Cultural and political studies seeking to chart English national identity, or ‘Englishness’, 
in the wake of devolution within the United Kingdom have also argued that 
‘Northernness’ represents a separate identity to ‘true England’.75 Though the concept of 
distinct ‘southern’ and ‘northern’ metaphors for Englishness was coined by Donald Horne 
in the 1970s, the endurance and longstanding nature of this dichotomy in the 
imaginative geography of England (and of the UK) has been articulated in many forms.76 
Stephan Kohl explored how literary tours of the ‘North’ – from H.V. Morton and J.B 
Priestley to Bill Bryson and Robert Chesshyre – have not only judged it against the 
‘South’ (which forms the basis for understanding England and Englishness), but have 
also ascribed a moral dimension to its supposed inferiority.77 Howell sees Southern 
‘populism’ aligning with race and empire in the late nineteenth century to ‘denigrate’ the 
provincial industrial North; ‘with the South-East clearly identifiable as a cultural-political 
synecdoche of Englishness.78 The attendant counter to the dominant imagery of 
southern England – and most specifically the Home Counties – has been the notion that 
the North provides cultural authenticity that is lacking elsewhere, and is often the subject 
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of self-fashioning, as Saler has argued with regards to the ‘myth of the North’ as the 
home of distinctly ‘English’ visual modernism against the ‘cosmopolitan’ South in the 
interwar period.79  
Ultimately, this ‘Northern’ focus almost inevitably marginalises broader context and 
significance. Economic and administrative change is alluded to only in passing, during 
moments when it holds relevance. ‘Time’ is often passive to ‘space’ in these 
conceptions.80 Dave Russell’s work, for instance, locates the articulation of the ‘the 
North’ – or a traceable Northern identity – rather broadly in the inter-war years. The 
thematic manner in which aspects of ‘Northernness’ are explored by Russell means that 
an emergent and contextualised chronology of post-war developments remains elusive, 
with the ultimate message being ‘the constancy of these representations, with the 
external image of the North over much of the 150 years covered by this book remaining 
remarkably similar to the pattern that was in place in 1840’.81  In literary terms, 
Katharine Cockin brings to the fore the continuities of the ‘Literary North’ as a visceral, 
social-realist construction, opening her chapter on the subject by stating: ‘some of the 
problems in the cultural engagement with the North, which were live in the 1930s, are 
still prevalent eight decades later’.82  
Regardless of the observed continuities in the peripherality of the North in relation to the 
South (particularly in the twentieth century), approaches that downplay the complex 
changes in spatial definition, spatial relationships that have been driven significant 
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economic and social changes, serve to isolate historical and humanities scholarship on 
regional identities from broader academic thought on regions. This is not to suggest that 
more contemporary regional studies have not also employed similar reductive 
conceptions. This manner of conceptualising England as divided (as Allen et al. argue in 
another context) serves also to mutually reinforce – through material and discursive 
modes – the South East (or ‘South’s’) pre-eminent ‘Englishness’ at the expense of the 
North.83 These imaginative geographies also present problems with the construction of 
Northern identities as synonymous with working class identities. This is not limited to 
class, but extends to politics. The situation appears to have been particularly problematic 
in characterising the political tropes of Thatcherism and New Labour as distinctly 
Southern, ‘counterposed to what was regarded as the old and outmoded post-war culture 
of collectivism, welfare dependency and state subsidy identified as persisting… in the 
North’.84  
As such, the growing literature on ‘Northernness’ has struggled with both partiality and 
generality due to the exigencies that such a broad categorisation requires. Though 
distinctions such as the ‘near North’ or ‘deep North’ have been employed in edited 
collections and other work written on this subject, the supposed culturally imagined 
nature of the North still belies implicit geographical bias. For example, though Robert 
Colls considers Jack Common, Catherine Cookson and Sid Chaplin as ‘northern writers’, 
their ‘region’ – as Colls himself states – is the ‘North East’; embedded in the heavy-
industrial nature of the area.85 John Walton has suggested that Northumberland and 
Durham are ‘sometimes treated as if they alone constitute the ‘North’, or represent an 
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imagined core of genuine Northern values.86 Dave Russell, conversely, has claimed that 
– particularly regarding the realms of Northern identity emanating from music and sport 
– Lancashire and Yorkshire ‘tend to dominate writing about the North’.87 As has been 
pointed out in debates surrounding ‘new regionalism’, ‘regions are as much about 
conflict and division as about cooperation and association, and indeed emphasis on the 
one aspect presupposes the presence or possibility of the other’.88  
These drawbacks, the unwieldiness of the ‘North-South’ divide, and the internal 
complexities of the ‘North’, as highlighted by all, suggest that rather than taking an 
approach that draws the broadest conceptualisation of regional space as its starting 
point, a more nuanced approach may be more profitable. A focus instead on the 
interactions of regional or sub-regional areas within what is accepted as the North, 
considering how regions associate themselves with conceptualisations of ‘the North’ – 
and how these have changed over time – would possibly allow for the literature on 
identity to be integrated into the literature on the recent rescaling of state space. It is 
worth noting, however, that this approach is not entirely new to recent regional history. 
Natasha Vall’s work on cultural policy in the North East of England has examined the 
complexities of projections of the regional image in a manner that has sought to link 
identity to administrative, functional and political actions and campaigns. Her work has 
also tried to site the North East as a whole within the wider North, arguing that the status 
of the area was ‘as a periphery both within ‘the North’ and in the nation.’89 John K. 
Walton’s analysis of the extent to which the cultural development of a ‘North West’ 
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identity can be compared to the Basque region, also provides a promising starting point 
for future research on the changing nature of regionalism.90  
But there is a fracture within the literatures that exist on regionalism: in the more recent 
theoretical work on regions – particularly on the ‘new regionalism’ – there is a lack of any 
empirical assessment of the theoretical constructs advanced. There is also something of 
a disregard for the history of regions, which tends to be assumed or even subsumed in 
efforts to emphasise the novelty of current events. ‘Old’ and ‘new regionalism’ has at 
times been differentiated not only temporally but ideologically, as an implicit means to 
disown regional history. For example, Keating argues that 
there are… some grounds for distinguishing between old regionalists, who tend to 
be localist, defensive and rooted in traditional political networks, including those of 
dependence and clientism, and new regionalists, who tend to be upwardly mobile, 
modernising in their outlook and pro-European.91  
 
It must be stressed that, with rare exception, the fractures between old and new 
regionalism literature have been mutual. Historical studies have, on the whole, failed to 
relate constructs of regional identity to more functional theoretical discussions. As 
suggested above in relation to the scholarship on Englishness and northern England, 
regions have been abstracted from their physical and relational forms in the attempt to 
explore identities. This could be argued to be a function of broader ontological disputes 
surrounding regions in contemporary geography.92 But though the shortfall of temporal 
and spatial contextualisation and contingency has led to criticism of new regional 
geography as a ‘bad abstraction’ or a ‘chaotic conception’, contemporary British history 
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has produced little to fill this gap.93 Such a state of affairs has de facto emphasised the 
deep-seated historical permanence of identity, and served to confirm broader narratives 
of the English context that have characterised the more functional and political forms of 
English regionalism as being ‘the dog that never barked’. 
 
1.4  Yorkshire  
 
I 
The two English regions that have drawn most research attention are the South West 
(specifically Cornwall), and the North East. The South West has vied for both public and 
academic attention as ‘the most distinctive region in England’.94 A long established – 
though contested – Celtic tradition, alongside its geographical remoteness and cultural 
differences (manifested, amongst other things, in language, literature, and landscape, all 
explored by the University of Exeter’s Institute of Cornish Studies) has meant that 
historians – whilst highlighting commonalities with other regions – have suggested 
Cornwall should perhaps not in fact be considered part of England at all.95 And of the 
non-Celtic regions of the United Kingdom, the North East of England has drawn some 
recent concerted scholarly interest, particularly since the launch of Northern History in 
196696 but  undoubtedly quickened by the unsuccessful English devolutionary agenda of 
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the early 2000s, promoted by the New Labour government.97 These studies have 
explored the emergence from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of an ‘industrial, 
commercial, social and cultural configuration focused on the Tyne at Newcastle’, that in 
the nineteenth century would spill over the River Tees into North Yorkshire with the rapid 
industrial growth of Middlesbrough and the Cleveland Hills.98 Termed by C.B. Fawcett as 
the ‘North-Country’,99 its strong regional identity has been argued to be a product of both 
its historic pattern of heavy industry (shipbuilding, mining, engineering, iron and steel), 
but also its persistent economic underperformance in light of the ‘decline’ of these 
industries from the mid-twentieth century onwards.100 In economic terms, it has been the 
region most synonymous with provincialism, occasionally grouped with Scotland and 
Wales as forming part of ‘Outer Britain’.101 
Russell and others have rightly asserted that the ‘North’ has not merely been passive in 
the process of its construction within the ‘national imagination’; this process has 
included forms of self-assertion and self-expression.102 To a greater extent than Cornwall, 
the North East has been assertive in both political and cultural terms, and has led to the 
region playing ‘a disproportionate role in the debate’ when examining the ‘archaeology’ 
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of the intellectual history of regionalism in England.103 As Natasha Vall explores, in the 
late twentieth century there was a conscious attempt to align political and economic 
bodies with more cultural institutions, to promote an (inherently contingent) identity for 
the region based on selective cultural attributes.104 In T. Dan Smith, as Leader of 
Newcastle City Council, the region also had ‘arguably Britain’s most prominent twentieth-
century regional political leader’, and in academic actors such Henry Daysh and John 
House, some of the most prominent theorists on English regionalism.105 In pushing the 
region’s claim, the Northern Region Economic Planning Council (NEPC) were adamant in 
their evidence to the Kilbrandon Commission that this area possessed a uniquely 
regional consciousness; an assertion that legitimised its stronger advocacy of regional 
devolution for the North-East, than for any other part of England. Even academic work 
considering the North East’s self-conscious regional identity has been deliberately 
polemic in its origins, such as Robert Colls and Bill Lancaster’s volume Geordies: Roots 
of Regionalism, emerging from ‘the era of high Thatcherism’, with memory of the 1984-5 
miners’ strike still fresh in the contributors’ minds.106 Colls and Byrne’s chapters in 
particular sought to appeal to a distinctly north-eastern identity in light of the successive 
‘deaths’ and ‘rebirths’ they saw the region as subjected to since the early twentieth 
century, and the perception that the constitutional settlement as it existed at the time 
offered no foreseeable resolution to current issues.107 
Despite the failure of the 2004 referendum on regional devolution for the North East, 
analyses of this outcome have since cautioned against dismissal of the institutional and 
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political energy in this part of England. David Moon and Øivind Bratberg recently argued 
that the Labour Party’s lack of formalised regional institutions that could be mobilised as 
a source of latent identity, in contrast to Welsh Labour in 1997, was an overlooked 
contributor to the resounding ‘No’ vote in 2004.108 John Tomaney has highlighted the 
successive, primarily economically-focused institutions that sought to promote a sense of 
regional identity.109 As Vall has contended, echoing Anssi Paasi, these setbacks for 
regionalism in the North East still highlight the complexity inherent in asserting an 
alignment between the imaginative geography and cultural institutions of the region (the 
identity of the region), and an inherent regional consciousness (regional identity).110 
 
II 
This thesis focuses specifically on Yorkshire. Yorkshire has itself been recognised as 
perhaps the only formal county that could be considered a region of England in its own 
right.111 However, historic Yorkshire – vast in size – has not formed the basis for a 
cohesive administrative unit. The historic county is over 6,000 square mile in area, a size 
comparable to Wales, and bounded by the River Tees in the north, the rivers Humber and 
Don to the south and the ‘Pennines barrier’ to the west.112 The vast extent of the county 
meant, as Fawcett highlighted in 1919, that even when the county was divided between 
three administrative councils in 1888, the West Riding and North Riding ranked 
respectively as the first and third largest council areas nationally.113 
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The paucity of scholarship considering Yorkshire represents something of anomaly when 
considering the centrality of this historic county in the literature on the identity of the 
‘North’, and the longstanding local ‘patriotism’ that regionalists extending back to 
Fawcett (largely credited as the first geographer to attempt to establish the geographical 
determinants of administrative regions)114 have claimed for Yorkshire.115 Dave Russell’s 
work on Northern identity has documented many professions of attachment, extending 
into the nineteenth century, noting that ‘in 1875 one local writer argued, with the 
knowing hyperbole that typified much Yorkshire writing, that the county was ‘the most 
birthproud member of the human race'’. Russell,116 in indicating the more ‘problematic’ 
exclusionary forms that ‘Yorkshireness’ could entail as equivalent to nationalism, also 
highlights similar sentiments about the county espoused in 1939 by William Harbutt 
Dawson, who claimed local patriotism proved ‘an effective antidote to sentimental and 
irrational cosmopolitanism’.117  
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Figure 1.1 The Association of British Counties Map of Yorkshire 
http://www.yorkshireridings.org/files/ABC_Yorkshire_Map_v1-2.png (accessed 2 August 2017) 
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Figure 1.2 Map of Yorkshire, in Harry J. Scott, Yorkshire Heritage (London, 1973), 10-11. 
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A key feature of the vast area of Yorkshire is the significant diversity of both its physical 
and economic landscape, which stands in contrast to the more integrated economies of 
the North East and, to a lesser extent, the South West. Though the northern and eastern 
parts of Yorkshire both support predominantly agricultural economies, these in 
themselves show marked differences: with the upland landscapes of the Dales and 
North York Moors contrasting with the high quality arable land in and around Holderness 
near the coast. The distinctive pattern of industrialisation in West Yorkshire (Halifax, 
Huddersfield, Dewsbury, Bradford and Leeds) was a product of its rise to prominence as 
a world leading cluster for the wool textile industries by the mid-nineteenth century, partly 
as a result of the retention of distinctive social structures.118 During a similar period, 
coalmining and steel production had begun to transform the southern parts of the West 
Riding around Doncaster and Sheffield, respectively. This pronounced economic diversity 
produced within it a pronounced social diversity. Union militancy and highly gendered 
employment on the coalfield and around the docks contrasted with the textile district’s 
low trade union density, much greater employment of women and British Black, Asian 
and minority ethnic labour, along with the existence of a multitude of smaller locally 
owned firms, rather than nationalised heavy industries, up until the late twentieth 
century.119  
Industrial and geographical heterogeneity also contributed to political heterogeneity, 
particularly in the period considered by this thesis. Yorkshire contends, or at least 
problematises, the geopolitical aphorism that the Labour Party is ‘the predominant 
political force in the North’.120 It was not only the ‘country’, but also the 'town' in parts of  
Yorkshire that returned Conservatives to Westminster, particularly around the Leeds-
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Bradford conurbation. West Yorkshire also saw the endurance of an independent Liberal 
tradition, typified by Richard Wainwright’s victory in Colne Valley in 1966.121 Following 
elections for the reorganised local authorities in 1973, an article in The Guardian 
summarised the situation as such: 
Old Yorkshire retains its Texan standards, even under local government 
reorganisation. It has everything: two metropolitan counties, two “shire” counties, a 
crushingly Labour county, a bewitchingly Tory country (or, at any rate, anti-Socialist, 
as the Tories put it), a strong Liberal challenge, a stubbornly Independent 
challenge, a posse of anti-immigrationists and Communists and even – such is the 
tradition – eleven “Get stuffed” candidates. You can carve up old Yorkshire’s four 
million acres on a map but they will still be Yorkshire. 
For administrative purposes, however, there will be four separate counties… 
Together they cover the spectrum of English, political, social and industrial history, 
and the effect of the carve-up has been to lay bare the very secret of Yorkshire’s 
character: its defiant diversity. ⁠122 
 
Yorkshire’s broad neglect in the academic study of regionalism and regional identity is in 
part a likely product of its heterogeneity. It does not fit as neatly into the discursive 
binaries of ‘North/South’ and ‘core-periphery’ that underpin the economic, social and 
cultural analyses of other regions. Unlike the North East’s clear, enduring functional and 
cultural regional capital in Newcastle upon Tyne;123 Manchester’s pre-eminence in 
‘cotton Lancashire’ and (Liverpudlian exceptionalism aside) the North West,124 and 
Birmingham’s unrivalled size and significance in the West Midlands – Yorkshire’s 
polycentrism does not present an obvious regional capital. The historical significance of 
York is challenged by the economic primacy of Leeds. This in turn is challenged by 
Sheffield’s influence over South Yorkshire and the Yorkshire Coalfield, which has 
contributed to its own distinct traditions and frequent territorial ambivalence from the 
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City’s leaders towards its place in a larger Yorkshire region, as highlighted in the following 
chapter. Alongside this polycentrism, Yorkshire has less in the way of recognisable 
monumental regional iconography than that offered by Durham Cathedral, the Tyne 
Bridge, or the Angel of the North to the North East, though the symbolic Tyke and White 
Rose both offer historical traditions that have been tapped into locally.  
However, the oversight in not providing a more central role to Yorkshire in academic 
discussions on regionalism is not only a result of overlooking the fragments of a 
conscious sense of identity (as highlighted by a number of studies). It also ignores the 
vigour for regional capacity building that business and other leaders have recently 
displayed amid the regionalism agenda in the 1990s and 2000s. This has been 
particularly highlighted by Simon Lee, who noted that a ‘voluntaristic non-statutory 
Regional Assembly for Yorkshire and Humberside’ was formed in July 1996, pre-empting 
of the New Labour’s regional proposals. This body provided in its publications much of 
the grounding for the strategy documents and frameworks produced by the Regional 
Chamber and Yorkshire Forward Regional Development Agency (RDA). In addition to this, 
prior to the abandonment of regional assemblies, the Campaign for Yorkshire (which had 
as its president the Archbishop of York) had spearheaded discussions on this subject; 
holding conventions and producing its own White Paper.125  
Unlike John Tomaney’s account of the North East, such initiatives have not been linked 
to any previous functional regionalism in Yorkshire. Indeed, Tomaney and Lee have both 
been lukewarm about how much these bodies were representative of more active 
regional identification and attachment.126 In 2005, Yorkshire Futures, ‘the Regional 
Intelligence Network’, recorded a level of civic engagement in the region that was below 
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the average for England, with ‘apparent apathy and perceived lack of influence’ recorded 
amongst its citizens’.127 However, Thomas Leuerer’s contextual and definitional criteria 
for the existence of a region ‘relies on the actions of regional players, who constitute a 
region not as a natural unit but rather as a result of permanent political, administrative, 
socio-economic and cultural processes’.128 Though the permanence is debatable, it is 
apparent – as will be considered in the subsequent chapters – that such regional actors 
have served to produce a ‘region’ within Yorkshire in this period, even if the boundaries, 
and the economic and social identities, are more complex. Not only have these actors 
and institutions evinced an articulation of a regional interest, but the means through 
which they have done so have demonstrated values that are particular to Yorkshire; such 
as the high regard for professionalism, and a decentralised, almost federalist approach 
to sub-regional administration.   
 
III 
The rather ambiguous nature of Yorkshire as a region makes it the ideal candidate to 
interrogate in light of drawbacks within the existing literature. The region is 
simultaneously included in, and excluded from, discussions on the North/South divide in 
England – providing it with something of an intermediary position; it also seems to 
transition from an area largely not subject to any form of regional financial assistance 
prior to the mid-1960s, to one of the regions widely acknowledged to be both deprived 
and peripheral by the 1980s. The purported strength of the region’s cultural identity 
needs to be assessed against its apparent marked differences in other forms.  Another 
aspect of the region that lends itself to the scope of this study is both the numerous and  
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changing boundaries assigned to the region throughout this period, more how these 
boundaries were interpreted and contested by local and regional actors in Yorkshire and 
Humberside. The standard planning regions created in the 1960s were used by fewer 
than half of UK government departments, and the boundaries for the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region were subject to some significant changes in the mid-1970s.129 As 
discussed in the following chapters (in particular Chapter 3), the importance of these 
geographical areas and those used by NGOs and the private sector was shown by the 
way in which these were mobilised by citizens. 
As noted above, this thesis does not seek to provide a definitive boundary for ‘Yorkshire’, 
and therefore in some respects does not answer the broad criticism of much ‘new 
regionalist’ writing’s rather indeterminate spatial configurations. Through the case 
studies used here, this thesis will argue that a variety of definitions have been employed 
by different actors and institutions for ‘Yorkshire and Humberside’ in a variety of 
contexts. Such definitions, however, are not wholly constructivist creations, and are 
embedded and informed by history and the natural and built environment. Though this 
might appear somewhat unsatisfactory, this approach emphasises the importance of the 
regional paradigm in England whilst noting its contested and contingent nature. This 
approach fully acknowledges regions’ ‘slippery’ qualities, whilst validating both territorial 
and relational uses of regions in the social sciences.130  
These slippery or fuzzy qualities related to regionalism and regional identity, with the 
overlaying concerns of functional logic, cultural heritage are immediately apparent in 
relation to 'Yorkshire' in the period covered, and continue to be so in contemporary action 
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and debate.131 For example, though the fact that the majority of the North Riding was 
excluded from the economic planning region between 1965 and 1974 was a point of 
some consternation, the exclusion of Teesside was more – though not wholly – accepted. 
Similar ambiguities existed with the southern and eastern boundaries of the region. As 
the Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council (YHEPC) stated in a written 
response to the Redcliffe-Maud Report on Local Government, the majority view was in 
favour of a proposed regional tier with ‘executive functions’ that included the Northern 
Parts of Lindsey to the south of the Humber and excluded Middlesbrough.132 However, 
the professed view of Sir Bernard Kenyon, who served as Clerk of the West Riding County 
Council and as a member of the YHEPC until being embroiled in a corruption scandal, 
was for a local government unit to cover the whole of historic Yorkshire.133       
Another compelling reason for the use of this particular region in this study is the extent 
to which its size, broad range of experiences, and extent of social diversity makes the 
area an ideal prism through which to explore perceived nationwide changes and trends 
in Britain since the end of the Second World War, and the place of a distinctly regional 
perspective in these discussions. A similar point has been recently emphasised by 
Katharine Cockin, in quoting a review from the Guardian of the TV series based on David 
Peace's Red Riding, that 
…over the last 35 years, Yorkshire has been the place where many of Britain’s 
wider public problems have been played out in extremis: labour disputes, the 
ravaging effects of unemployment and industrial collapse, police corruption, 
football stadium disasters, rioting, racial and religious conflicts and the growth of 
the BNP in local politics.134 
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1.5 Hull  and Humberside 
 
I 
As noted above, a weakness within the literature on regional identity has been a false 
sense of territorial homogeneity in identity and political action. In order to remedy this, 
this thesis aims to consider how the ‘regional’ has been experienced by a more 
peripheral area. Though the whole Yorkshire and Humber region is considered within this 
thesis, much of the analysis within the chapters themselves focuses on the sub-region of 
‘Humberside’, which was the subject of experiments in regional policy and planning in 
the twentieth century that traversed the historical administrative boundary of the River 
Humber. Humberside primarily encompasses the area currently covered by parts of North 
Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire, including the steel town of Scunthorpe, the port 
of Grimsby, Immingham and Cleethorpes on the south bank of the Humber estuary, and 
the East Riding of Yorkshire and port-city of Hull on the north bank. Hull in particular 
provides an ideal lens through which to consider various aspects of regionalism and 
regional identity in England. The city problematises all the issues highlighted here – 
perhaps more than any other place in the country.   
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Figure 1.3 Administrative County of Humberside, from Ivan E. Broadhead, Portrait of 
Humberside (London, 1983), 10. 
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Though Hull is a sizeable city of roughly 300,000 inhabitants (a population that has, 
somewhat crucially, remained fairly stable across the 1960s to 1990s) and the major 
freight port in Yorkshire,135 the area has rather apparently been treated as little more 
than an afterthought in studies focused on regional political, economic and cultural 
identity, and in investigations into ‘Northernness’. For example, Stephen Caunce’s 
examination of urbanisation across Lancashire and Yorkshire, what he terms the ‘near 
north’, makes brief mention of both Hull and the East Riding of Yorkshire, noting the 
county’s largely rural and largely independent social organisation, and noting Liverpool’s 
outperforming of Hull as a port from the eighteenth century onwards.136 In Christoph 
Ehland’s volume on northern identity, there are no contributions that consider Hull, and 
only cursory mention is made to the area.137 Though there are a couple of exceptions, 
this sub-region is broadly overlooked.138  
Just as there is a British (or English) ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ relationship, so too there is 
Northern ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. As discussed above, the dominant industrial cities in 
northern England, such as Newcastle, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds-Bradford and 
Sheffield, have effectively developed as a network of city-states, or highly specialised 
clusters;139 from this economic pre-eminence has emerged greater cultural pre-
eminence.  Hull both exemplifies and problematizes this regional marginalisation. 
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Though it cannot claim to have had the economic, social, political or cultural significance 
of other cities in northern England, it has consistently remained one of the larger urban 
areas of the UK since the medieval period, when it was a naval base of strategic 
importance.140 It had developed industrially as a port of international importance, 
particularly in terms of timber importing.141 Though never as dependent on the industry 
as its ‘fish and ships’ image suggested, fishing also played a big part in the city’s 
economy and employment, until the industry’s sharp contraction in the decade following 
entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 1976 ‘Cod Wars’.142 Greater 
economic diversity than popularly presumed did not necessarily equate to greater social 
diversity. As Danny Dorling has documented, in 1931 the county borough had the 
greatest percentage in England of its employed population in the lowest social class 
(27.5%). By 1971, it still remained the seventh highest (14.3%).143 Politically, this 
translated into Labour-dominated parliamentary constituencies, and from the mid-
1930s, a Labour-dominated Corporation committed to public housing construction. In 
1966 the City Council levied the highest rates of any equivalent-sized city, had the lowest 
yield from the penny rate, and the highest expenditure on welfare and housing.144 
 
 
 
                                                            
140 M.T. Wild, ‘The geographical shaping of Hull from pre-industrial to modern times’, in S. Ellis 
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A Dynamic Estuary: Man, Nature and the Humber (Hull, 1988), p. 135; Peter Lewis and Philip N. 
Jones, Industrial Britain: Humberside Region (Newton Abbott, 1970), 60. 
142 K.J. Allison, A History of the County of York East Riding, Volume 1: The City of Kingston Upon 
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II 
The economic, social and political composition of Hull put it in marked contrast to the 
East Riding, in which it was the only county borough. Such distinctions became 
increasingly marked, as between 1931 and 1971 the percentage of those employed in 
the lowest social class in the urban areas of the East Riding fell from 21.7 per cent to 
just 5.9 per cent.145 Even in 1919, Fawcett remarked of Hull that ‘[a]round no other large 
town is the transition from urban to rural grouping of people so sharply marked’.146 The 
administrative centre of the county in the historic town of Beverley lies only ten miles to 
the north of Hull, and the County Council’s composition – prior to the reorganisation of 
local government and the creation of Humberside in 1974 – was staunchly Conservative, 
operating a distinctly low-tax, low-spend model.147 Such a pronounced divide between 
town and country meant that there was a significant degree of truth behind the rather 
hyperbolic pronouncement in a Tribune article in 1967 that Hull represented ‘a citadel  
of socialism in a sea of feudalism’.148 
Situated forty miles to the south of York and sixty miles to the east of Leeds, the nearest 
two large urban centres, Hull’s position has contributed to a sense of isolation and 
marginalisation. The city and the sub-region are therefore exemplars for examining the 
importance of both territorialist and relativist constructions of the regional concept and 
regional space, and emphasise the mutual importance of both paradigms. Across the 
twentieth century, when Hull has been written about – even by those residing there – a 
continuing theme is its unique sensibility, an isolation that runs deeper than its 
geographical location. Writing in 1934, following his travels throughout England, J.B. 
Priestley (a Yorkshireman by birth) remarked of the city in English Journey: 
                                                            
145 Dorling, ‘Distressed times and areas’, 53. 
146 Fawcett, Provinces of England, 145. 
147 Allison (ed.), A History of the County of York East Riding, 146. 
148 ‘Hull: City in search of a region’, Tribune, 1 December 1967. 
  55 
It [Hull] is not really in Yorkshire, but by itself, somewhere in the remote east where 
England is turning into Holland or Denmark.149 
 
Philip Larkin, in a collected published in the early 1980s, commented on Hull: 
 … As for Hull, I like it because it’s so far from everywhere else.150 
 
Sean O’Brien, in investigating the appeal that Hull has held to poets, has attributed this 
literary sensibility to its ‘remote secrecy and idiosyncrasy… Perhaps Hull’s very peculiarity 
may give it a symbolic status’.151 This may be linked to the geography of the place – and 
is not necessarily without parallels to other parts of the east of England (such as W. G. 
Sebald writing about East Anglia). Despite Suffolk’s relative proximity to London for 
example; a commentator in the 1960s remarked, ‘is there any other region so near to 
the capital that has its own daily morning newspaper? I think not: and that surely is a 
symptom of cultural independence’.152  
Hull’s distinct image of ‘Otherness’, its supposed disconnectedness from England, or 
even from the wider region – ‘true’ Yorkshire – has been emphasised throughout the 
mid-to-late twentieth century (and since) by the almost anthropological nature of its 
treatment in the British press. The unknown and unfashionable quality of the area has 
remained consistently resolute. As Tom Chesshyre wrote of the city in 2010: 
To say that Hull gets a terrible press is an understatement. Hull gets a stinking, 
lousy, almost hapless press; just about everyone seems to want to have a go at the 
south Yorkshire city.153 
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More infamous recent examples of this sentiment are Hull’s treatment in the book Crap 
Towns, much of which stands in marked contrast to the resurgence of Yorkshire's main 
urban centres - such as Leeds and Sheffield, but also the national assessments of East 
Yorkshire itself with Beverley itself coming top of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s ‘affordable 
affluence index’ in 2007.154 As discussed in the following chapter, Hull and much of East 
Yorkshire have, in their industrial base, physical topography and cultural representations 
been excluded or marginalised within the popular imagination. The longstanding nature 
of this is apparent in the contrasting literary archetypes of Yorkshire from the 1930s; the 
‘Phyllis Bentley Country’ of the industrial towns of Hudley and Annotsfield displaying little 
commonality with Winifred Holtby’s invocation of crumbling Maythorpe Hall and the ‘fine 
white dust of flour-mills and cement works’ of Kingsport in South Riding.155 
Hull has certainly not been alone in its ‘otherness’,156 but the lack – and even resistance 
– to self-assertive ownership of such liminal status stands in stark contrast to that of 
other comparable cities. Liverpool, for example, has seen its history of supposed 
exceptionalism celebrated in a process where the negative stereotypes of the city – such 
as the ‘scally scouser’ – have been reclaimed and reconstructed alongside the 
production of a new modern and global image.157 But although Hull was designated the 
2017 UK City of Culture, similar processes are yet to occur in the city. Hull has been 
dogged and stereotyped by a ‘fish and ships’ image, that wasn’t necessarily 
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representative of the economic reality even during the height of those industries.158 The 
supposed stigma of association with Hull can still often lead to pedantic distinctions 
being made by those from the city’s suburbs that they come from Hessle, Cottingham or 
even the tiny village of Swanland.159 Even those ostensibly seeking to sing the city’s 
praises are at pains to emphasise their at-arms’ length association, through qualifiers 
such as ‘growing up within the Hull postcode’.160 Dominic Sandbrook’s choice to use the 
common saying that ‘everything reached Hull five years after... everywhere else’ was 
intended to make the general point that the 1960s, as popularly portrayed, were not 
experienced equally across the United Kingdom.161 As such, beyond the discussion of the 
interactions with regional, ‘northern’ and national institutions, this focus on Hull 
penetrates deeper into variations on national experiences.  
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1.6 Post-War Context 
 
I 
An examination of ‘regionalism’ cannot be disaggregated from the broader issues across 
Britain and British politics in the late twentieth century. The Britain that had emerged in 
the aftermath of the Second World War needed a high level of centralisation to 
implement the social welfare reforms and nationalisation of key industries; but as ‘the 
political and institutional certainties of the post-war welfare state began to break down in 
the 1960s and 1970s’, regionalism began to resurface on the political agenda.162 Thus 
the concerns and cultural phenomena that reinvigorated interest in the ‘regions’ in 
England – and in the wider United Kingdom – were the same as those that motivated 
more general policy concerns. These in turn both shaped, and to a degree were shaped 
by, approaches to constructing and conceptualising Yorkshire and Humberside. This 
section briefly highlights these key trends and debates discussed in greater detail in 
each of the following chapters. 
This rise of a regional focus in the late 1950s was a symptom of the burgeoning debate 
surrounding British ‘decline’. ‘Declinism’ is an aspect of British political culture that has 
been widely historicised. It has been argued to represent an ideology, and to have been a 
persistent feature of British politics in the twentieth century, arising from distinct 
circumstances.163 Declinism is not confined to the period in question, but intensified 
during it: its arguments were born out by the apparent relative poor performance of the 
UK compared to other developing nations in this period, and by the cultural climate of 
the time. As Guy Ortolano has argued, regardless of the empirical reality, Britons felt 
                                                            
162 Mawson, ‘The English regional debate’, 182. 
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themselves living through a period of decline, as a paradigm in their own experience.164 
More importantly, despite doubts about the depth of public angst, declinism ‘became the 
norm’ amongst intellectuals and journalists.165 
 
II 
This broad intellectual consensus that there was something ‘wrong’ with Britain naturally 
led to an examination of what was right in other parts of the world. In such a climate, the 
supposed archaic form of Britain’s physical planning and land use structure came under 
scrutiny. As Glen O’Hara notes, ‘Britain’s perceived sclerosis caused a search for foreign 
models to emulate’.166 Central was a concern to adopt the French form of economic and 
physical planning, with the Economic Planning Regions set up by Labour in 1965 and the 
machinery that accompanied them being strongly influenced by the corporatist Regional 
Economic Development Commissions that had been established across the Channel in 
March 1964.167 Again, such regional planning and policy frameworks were an imposition 
from the centre, rather than a groundswell of organic regional initiative. ‘Regional 
planning’  ideas imported from France and the United States involved a combination of 
economic and physical infrastructure planning.168 The writers of Penguin Specials and 
‘state of the nation’ books, despite providing rather disparate analyses and perceptions 
                                                            
164 Guy Ortolano, ‘Decline as a Weapon in Cultural Politics’, in Wm. Roger Lewis (ed.), 
Penultimate Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London, 
2008), 203. Black and Pemberton have questioned ‘declinism’ as the dominant paradigm in 
British politics and society, but have affirmed that historians should interested in how ‘declinism’ 
has underpinned various political projects: Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, ‘Introduction – 
The uses (and abuses) of affluence’, in Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton (eds.), An Affluent 
Society? Britain’s Post-War Golden-Age Revisited (Aldershot, 2004), 3. 
165 Matthew Grant, ‘Historians, the Penguin Specials and the ‘State-of-the-Nation’ Literature, 
1958-64’, Contemporary British History, 17:3 (2003), 44. 
166 Glen O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and Social Planning in 1960s Britain 
(Basingstoke, 2007), 16. 
167 Ibid., 108. 
168 Hopkins, ‘Translating the transnational’; also see Mark Clapson, Anglo-American Crossroads: 
Urban Research and Planning in Britain, 1940-2010 (London, 2013), 29-53. 
  60 
of the supposed ‘malaise’ in Britain, uniformly evoked as a common thread the 
importance of ‘planning’ and ‘dynamism’ in the economic sphere’.169  
Though policy makers were spurred to broaden their conceptual and geographical 
horizons to embrace larger areas, pressing demographic imperatives also had a role to 
play in this process. The ‘baby boom’ of the 1950s and early 1960s reversed – if only 
briefly, in retrospect – what had been a downward trend in fertility and birth rates in the 
United Kingdom.170 Such a deviation from a well-established trend produced alarming 
predictions from planners, emboldened by their new methods of statistical modelling and 
projection, that ‘on the best judgements that could be made, the population of Great 
Britain was likely to grow by twenty million by the end of the century – from 53.1 million 
in 1965 to 72.5 million in 2000’.171 Such a possibility fed a variety of concerns, including 
the strain it would put on resources such as housing,172 and the on-going ‘problem’ of 
productivity within the economy.173 The required expansion of existing urban centres 
(alongside the relief of those already considered to be overly congested, such as London 
and the South East), and the potential pressing need for entirely new ones also 
contributed in part to the need to provide regional solutions. 
State-sponsored regional planning was never a consistent initiative, and there were 
moves towards the retreat of the state and a greater concentration on existing cities as 
the hubs for economic development in the 1970s. This went alongside the increasing 
peripheralisation and marginalisation of Yorkshire and the North, as deindustrialization 
saw rapid reductions in employment in its traditional industries. Already in the early 
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1970s with the continuing struggles of the economy and strained industrial relations, the 
more grandiose aspects of public planning appeared to be falling off the agenda. The 
Conservative Government of Edward Heath – elected in 1970 on a platform of large-
scale infrastructural investment – was by 1972 already switching emphasis to more 
modest ‘local’ concerns instead of larger regional or national projects, in a series of 
political crises.174 Not only was there an emergent public dissatisfaction with the effects 
and shortcomings of regional and urban planning, but academics such as Peter Hall, who 
had been vocal proponents of such policies, began to question their benefit.175 
Beginning in the early 1980s and extending into the 1990s, the inability of the modern 
technocratic Keynesian state to deliver its promised change added a new dimension to 
the debates surrounding decline. In the late 1980s, Robert Hewison noted that 
‘recession has encouraged the feeling that not only has the post-war period been one of 
decline, but that even its innovations have been a failure’.176 
 
III 
In addition to these trends, there has been increasing debate as to the role of heritage – 
both industrial and pastoral – within England. The latter has been cast by some as 
synonymous with conceptions of ‘Englishness’: according to Mandler, this avatar has 
‘become a thesis not only about economic decline, but also about anti-modernism in 
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culture and conservatism in society and politics’ for the cultural studies field.177 Mandler 
has argued that the 1970s onwards saw a ‘heritage panic’, ‘because of a loss of 
confidence in the future, and a turning backwards in that decade to take consolation in 
the glories of the national past – particularly in its rural and aristocratic (and less 
significantly, its imperial or industrial) past’.178 This look back to the past not only turned 
nostalgia into an ‘economic enterprise’,179 but – due to this perception of failure – 
developed a political desire to reclaim aspects of the past. As Hewison notes, 
and so we polish up a history that has been reselected and rewritten. The past is 
made more vivid than the present. It never rains in a heritage magazine… The past 
is domesticated and, by regulation, made safe; it is reduced, removed, rebuilt, 
restored and rearranged.180 
 
1.7 Structure and Approach 
 
I 
This thesis does not seek to be a comprehensive or authoritative ‘history’ of the places 
under consideration. Any attempt to do so would inevitably run the risk of reproducing 
Christopher Harvie’s well-worn conclusions about the lack of politicised regionalism in 
England. As argued above, an empiricist definition of the regional space has been 
effectively dispelled by the broad academic consensus regarding the highly discursive 
and contested nature of regional constructions. That regional identity exists as a product 
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of dialectics from above as well as below,181 means that the national context – and 
governmental action – is an important consideration throughout.  
Instead, in keeping with broader trends of modern British political history, in particular 
those historians who are broadly considered to comprise the ‘new political history’, this 
thesis adopts a structure of situated case studies to consider aspects of regionalism and 
regional identity in Yorkshire and Humberside. Lawrence Black terms these ‘core 
samples’: 'not simply case studies, but the sites and hosts of bigger debates… [They] 
have been selected because they traverse political and social terrains and formal and 
informal politics. Their claim to be representative or typical is partial. Nor however, are 
they arbitrarily selected’.182 This approach also has a symmetry with the more 
constructivist strains of regional geography. As Allen et al. have argued, ‘place-specific 
studies’ that focus on particular aspects of regional action or organisation are valid ‘as 
exemplars of wider phenomena, symptomatic of broader changes; as laboratories for the 
exploration of particular issues, both theoretical and empirical’.183  
 
II 
In this spirit, the second chapter in this thesis has been broadly titled ‘Economic 
regionalism’. The economy is probably the most explored and debated dimension of the 
more peripheral provincial regions. The fluctuations, functioning and relative successes 
of regional economic policy – broadly, the geographically targeted forms of financial 
subsidies and incentives that reached their apogee in the 1960s and 1970s – have 
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been the main focus of most studies. Such approaches have predominantly (and rather 
inevitably) adopted a solely ‘top-down’ approach to analysis, with the regions themselves 
and actors within them remaining largely passive. When the response of regions has 
been considered in such studies, it has mainly been to generalise that ‘the assisted 
areas of the country want it; the rest of the country resists it’,184 or to observe the effect 
of assistance on general election fortunes.185 
This chapter instead focuses on an institution created as part of these centralised 
regional policy measures, but embedded within the region itself: the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Economic Planning Council. The Council was admittedly a creation of central 
government, with its members appointed rather than chosen through any form of direct 
democratic process, but through its function to advise and recommend exercised a fair 
degree of autonomy in constructing an economic image for the Yorkshire and Humber 
area. The regional plans and strategy produced by the Council have not received much 
attention, mainly because several of its reports were openly dismissed out of hand by 
government.186 But the Councils were empowered with the scope to imagine their 
region’s economy, and assess their strengths, weaknesses, and their potential future 
direction. The chapter explores how the Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning 
Council’s imagined its ‘economic region’ both locally and nationally. It also considers the 
interactions not only between the Council and national actors and institutions, but also 
within the broader ‘north of England’, to trace and explore the extent to which a 
‘Northern’ economic consciousness was articulated, and to which interregional 
competitiveness and tensions were displayed.  
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Chapter 3 focuses on ‘Political Regionalism’, on the period roughly from the beginning of 
the 1960s until the 1980s. Humberside provides the ideal prism for two reasons: firstly, 
efforts to engender a collective identity for ‘Humberside’ as an administrative unit 
represented perhaps the most extreme change upon historical and geographical 
boundaries and loyalties. Secondly, such endeavours were intrinsically linked to one of 
the bolder projects of economic and social regional planning – namely the feasibility 
study undertaken by the Wilson Government to consider the possibility of 
accommodating ‘a new population’ of 300,000-750,000 in Humberside by the end of 
the century. Chapter 3 considers how the ‘designation’ or branding of the region as 
Humberside was understood and fashioned in the late 1960s, the means through which 
this novel political region was promoted, and the extent to which it was adopted. This 
study helps to problematise the issues of political, economic and cultural identities on 
the Humber, and also to contextualise and situate these concerns within the 
‘modernising’ agenda within which so much was framed in this period. Such a ‘core 
sample’ – as a host of bigger debates – seeks to develop analysis of the growing debates 
over the use and preservation of heritage and history in Britain since the 1970s, as the 
supposed destruction of a real or imagined urban and rural past spurred various 
movements towards action. This chapter seeks to add a regional dimension to these 
national debates. 
Chapter 4 is broadly termed ‘Regionalism and transport’. The transformative effects of 
transport developments upon the economic and cultural geography of the United 
Kingdom have been explored by several academics, most notably John Langton, who has 
argued, for example, that the canal network constructed in the Industrial Revolution was 
integral to the processes through which contained economic regions with distinct 
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provincial capitals and political lobbies were produced.187 Transport development was 
physically and socially transformative, considering the relative practical distance that 
existed prior to the advent of mass transport, such as the railway in the nineteenth 
century, which served to make large parts of the country ‘foreign’ to outsiders.188 And 
with the dawning of the ‘jet age’ in the 1950s, aerospace was a core element of ‘the 
triumvirate of modernity’ (alongside nuclear industries and computer technology).189 
State control and regulation of the aviation industry provided the context of this period, 
and the complexities of airport provision and the strict controls on scheduled 
international routes – made more problematic by charter business – hampered a 
coherent policy.190 The various forms of management of airports, with some nationalised 
and run by the British Airports Authority, and others in the hands of local authorities, 
added an extra layer of complexity to their governance and logistics. Within a cultural 
mood that prized modern innovation and forms of transport, the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region’s ‘most serious imbalance’ in the provision of air services in the UK 
created concerted regional action to remedy this.191 From the early 1960s a campaign 
began, originating from a group of interested and committed individuals who formed the 
Yorkshire and Humberside Airport Development Association, to designate and construct 
a new ‘Yorkshire Airport’ to replace inadequate airfields – such as Yeadon (later 
Leeds/Bradford Airport) – to serve the population east of the Pennines, and provide 
them with international (and potentially intercontinental) air services. This campaign 
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gained traction and support amongst commercial and local government interests alike at 
various times, but was not without controversies and debate, both at the regional and 
national level. 
Despite remaining under-studied,192 airports policy is thus a particularly useful route 
through which to consider both regionalism, and also the changing role of ‘experts’ within 
British governance. Chapter 4 thus considers air transport in regionalism, siting this long 
running debate over (and campaign for) a Yorkshire airport within the broader context of 
national airports policy, from the end of the Second World War until the beginnings of 
liberalization of air transport in Britain in the mid to late 1980s. It considers the extent to 
which institutions either served to promote or constraint regional action towards a 
potential international airport. It assesses the relative importance placed on air travel by 
regional actors in Yorkshire and Humberside within their imaginations and constructions 
of an economic and cultural region. Throughout this period, the economic benefit of 
airports to the surrounding area remained assumed rather than quantified:193 promoters’ 
arguments for the importance of airports were largely subjective. How airports’ utility was 
conceptualised by local interests is thus a key consideration, particularly for how the 
region constructed itself economically; though air services provided a valuable service to 
traditional business interests, their function and success lay more in a combination of 
increasing affluence, and availability from the 1960s onwards of relatively cheap ‘all 
inclusive’ tours and holidays offered by independent carriers.194  
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The final ‘core sample’ considered here in Chapter 5 is termed ‘Cultural Regionalism’. 
Culture, as has been noted above, is an integral component of almost all forms of 
regional concern and identity, and is considered throughout the thesis. Chapter 5 finally 
focuses on a particular cultural institution, the arts associations, established to stimulate 
the arts in the regions on behalf of the Arts Council of Great Britain. Natasha Vall, in her 
study of North East England as a ‘cultural region’, covers similar ground in the context of 
Northern Arts, the first such arts association to be founded.195 A key feature emphasised 
by Vall is that the aligning of the boundaries of the association with those of the Northern 
Economic Planning Council allowed for ‘the overlapping rhetoric of economic 
modernisation and cultural improvement’.196  
Arts policy and arts associations in Yorkshire and Humberside provide an apparent 
contrast to the regional context of Vall’s North East. Unlike the alignment of 
administrative boundaries that provided the platform for cultural action and expression, 
the region was served until the early 1990s by two separate associations: the Yorkshire 
Arts Association (YAA), and the Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts Association (LHA). The 
latter was the second such association to be formed after Northern Arts, but it was not 
until the end of the 1960s that the YAA was established. The Yorkshire and Humberside 
Planning Council, in contrast to their northern neighbour and their close attention to 
transport inadequacies, paid little attention to cultural resources and activity in their 
work.197 The impact of ill-defined boundaries and jurisdictions, differences in areas of 
population, and rather ambiguous role of Humberside are evident throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s. Notable literary figures from Hull such as Philip Larkin were involved in 
various capacities with both associations. The integration of Humberside – where there 
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were was a ‘weakness of… expertise and knowledge’ – into the broader Yorkshire region 
proved ultimately problematic after the creation of the new Yorkshire and Humberside 
Arts Board in 1991.198 During its existence, the association in Humberside had several 
clashes over funding and resources with the county council. 
Chapter 5 therefore, in considering the two arts associations, not only provides a 
narrative of the development of arts policy in Yorkshire and Humberside as a 
comparative UK study, but also seeks to build on themes noted elsewhere, such as the 
extent to which institutions formed or constrained a coherent regional identity; and how 
various strands of public policy were used to articulate and construct a distinct region. 
The chapter situates these arguments in the wider national scholarship on art in Britain 
in the twentieth century, particularly the uses and development of community arts, which 
the Arts Council increasingly sought to cultivate and promote from the mid-1970s 
onwards, and which prioritised participation over more ‘professional’ artistic output.199 
 
III 
The conceptualisation and definition of the region of Yorkshire and Humberside within 
this thesis is largely passive. It derives from the manner in which those organisations or 
institutions covered by the core samples defined the region. As Walton states, regions  
cover broader territories (physical and imaginary) than a single administrative 
county, province, department or equivalent, and constitute the largest and most 
extensive intermediate collectivity between the individual and the nation state. 
Within them nest the lesser categories of provinces or counties, lesser territorial 
entities of government, cities, towns and smaller, more local communities, to each 
of which individuals and families owe allegiances which may be mutually 
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reinforcing, contradictory or conflictual according to the circumstances in which the 
various layers of loyalty and instrumentality come into contact.200  
 
That this relatively succinct definition as employed here should remain so conditional 
and problematic demonstrates the complexity involved in analysing the regional unit. It 
remains however a necessary task. 
While the methods of historical investigation have expanded beyond a traditional focus 
on government records, instead using ‘a more catholic range of sources’ to delineate 
investigations in British political history from a reductive framework of ‘high’ or ‘from 
below’ politics,201 recent studies such as that by Glen O’Hara have made use of the 
‘wealth of [archival] materials available’ in combination with more innovative forms of 
analysis.202  
This thesis adopts a similar approach, with much of the evidence used for each of the 
chapters coming from archival sources. This includes both records of central government 
from the National Archives in Kew (particular those related to the Department for 
Economic Affairs, Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for the Environment), but 
also primary evidence from the archive services across East and West Yorkshire: the 
West Yorkshire Archive Service, East Riding of Yorkshire Archive Service, and the Hull 
History Centre. These are used in conjunction with other published and unpublished 
sources. Much of this data has only recently become available, though much of the 
government record from the 1980s and 1990s still remains classified. The use of 
archival documents and records as a means for historical regional studies for modern 
England has also become more profitable and rewarding in part due to the significant 
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improvements and investment that has been made in provincial archives by the Heritage 
Lottery Fund and other bodies.203 
The use of archival records does, however, have certain drawbacks and limitations, both 
ontologically and practically. Modern sources are not immune to the process of 
destruction and degradation more associated with historical investigation from earlier 
periods; a flood in the basement of the Department of the Environment in 1984, for 
example, destroyed a number of files relating to the Yorkshire and Humberside Economic 
Planning Council.204 Many records are incomplete or have not yet been catalogued. The 
relative completeness of accessions such as those of the Yorkshire and Humberside 
Airport Development Association and East Yorkshire Action Group has partly influenced 
their inclusion here as ‘core samples’, but they also stand as testament to the 
commitment and conviction of certain actors towards regional actions or constructs of 
regionalism. 
As previously indicated, the core samples chosen for this thesis are not exhaustive for 
this study, but representative.205 They have been selected because they best allow for 
the developing of an understanding of the relationship between functional, political and 
economic considerations of regionalism in Yorkshire and Humberside alongside 
questions related to local, regional and national identity; a current separation within the 
literature that has developed studying English regions. For Yorkshire, several other case 
studies may have been appropriate as part of this process, such as the effects of 
immigration, the importance of sport or the development of regional television content in 
this period. These examples have indeed already been the subject of focused case 
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studies – either in Yorkshire and Humberside – or in other areas, and might indeed prove 
fertile ground for future study. The examples chosen are admittedly ‘intermediate’ in 
nature, predominantly focusing on institutions or bodies non-popular in constituency, 
often ‘quangos’ (for instance the Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council, 
and the arts associations). In many respects this is a necessity of the liminal place of 
‘regional’ concerns within people’s everyday lives. But it does not preclude such 
organisations from articulating a collective purpose despite being – at times – ‘virtually 
invisible to the broader population’.206  
The process of defining and constructing regional spaces for academic study is not an 
objective process, and the researcher takes an active role in fashioning these concerns. 
The attempt here to provide some focus on Hull and East Yorkshire/Humberside is a 
conscious one, intended to mitigate some of the marginalisation of sub-regions or 
secondary urban centres that inevitably arises in  regional studies. For example, in 
Lancaster’s study of the North East, Middlesbrough and Teesside are included but 
scarcely directly mentioned, in contrast to Tyneside and Wearside – in a chapter 
intended to summarise the major facets of the modern North East’s regional self-
consciousness.207 Omissions such as these mean that the reasons for the promotion of a 
separate Teesside airport, or the particular effects of decline of the steel and chemical 
industries have had on the sub-region, have not been properly considered,208 nor 
consequently have the potential issues these cause for coherent regionalism in the North 
East. 
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But to seek to remove the city or sub-region from the regional framework, or indeed the 
narrative framework of modern British history – as has been the case with John 
Belchem’s work on Liverpool’s supposed ‘exceptionalism’ – would serve to reinforce the 
peripheral or ‘isolated’ nature of Hull in relation to the broader Yorkshire region, the 
wider North, and also nationally.209 This also ignores the ways that the regional paradigm 
has been understood, interpreted, appropriated and contested. The construction of 
Humberside, though also (like Merseyside County Council) ‘ridden with cross river and 
cross county tensions’,210 was still attempted by Hull’s political and economic 
establishment as a means of promoting both its national and international significance 
as ‘Capital of Humberside; Gateway to Europe’. 
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Chapter 2: Economic Regionalism: Economic 
development and industrial  promotion in Yorkshire and 
Humberside, c .1965-c .1990 
 
What kind of people do the Opposition think Yorkshire folk are? We are not here 
with our begging bowls. We are not here to beg for mercy or to ask for love and 
kisses from the Government. We want our fair share of what is going, but once we 
get it we shall show grim determination in beating the lot of them. 
 
Sir Donald Kaberry MP (Cons., Leeds North West), House of Commons Debates, 19 June 
1972, vol. 839,  col. 115.  
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
I 
This chapter explores the changing context of what is loosely termed as ‘economic 
regionalism’ in Yorkshire and Humberside. It examines the work of the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Economic Planning Council (YHEPC), part of the regional machinery 
established by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in the mid-1960s. It was eventually 
wound up alongside the other Economic Planning Councils (EPCs) in August 1979. 
Alongside the work of the YHEPC, it focuses on other organisations and campaigns 
established to promote regional economic development, such as the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Development Association (YHDA) in the mid-1970s. 
Through exploring these bodies, and contrasting their experience with that of other 
regions – most notably the Northern planning region – I argue they articulated a complex 
and regionally distinct identity that was emergent from the region’s particular character. 
This was demonstrated in both the strong concern for locational or ‘environmental’ 
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factors in not only social but also economic planning, and also the strong commitment to 
practical expertise as a means to promote regional economic development, rather than 
direct political lobbying. Both these dimensions were partly a reflection of the region’s 
historical associational structure and highly varied political pattern. 
Yorkshire and Humberside thus provides an important perspective within broader 
debates surrounding national economic decline, deindustrialization and the supposed 
entrenchment of a ‘North-South’ divide in this period. Economic problems ‘echoing the 
trauma’ of the 1920s and 1930s were seen as re-emergent from the early 1970s.211 
Unemployment in Britain rose sharply to 6.1 per cent in 1977, in marked contrast to the 
average rate of 2.1 seen during the supposed Keynesian ‘golden age’ of 1947-73.212  A 
combination of greater exposure to global markets, significant economic shocks and the 
planned run down of the staple, nationalised industries that had been on-going since the 
1950s led to rapid de-industrialisation in this decade.213 But the effects of this de-
industrialisation were profoundly regional in character. The concentration of the staple 
and heavy manufacturing industries was in provincial localities such as north-east 
England, South Wales and the central belt of Scotland. But these areas had from the 
interwar period been seen as increasingly peripheral in the UK economy – part of ‘outer-
Britain’ – and subject to central government financial assistance in the form of regional 
economic policy.214 The Yorkshire and Humberside planning region began the postwar 
period without any designated ‘Development Areas’. By 1979, the entire area was 
designated for some level of economic relief.215 The region was therefore subject to 
increasing peripheralisation in the 1970s and 1980s; on the wrong side of an emerging 
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debate on the existence of a North/South UK divide that would intensify under Margaret 
Thatcher. But despite the close alignment of Yorkshire and Humberside with the wider 
North, this chapter demonstrates their uneasy relationship to a Northern identity, 
especially their relationship with what might be termed the ‘deep North’ of the North 
East. 
 
II  
This chapter will consider the extent to which the YHEPC and similar bodies articulated a 
particular regional identity. It argues that the YHEPC and YHDA articulated a distinct 
regional identity that – despite increasing debates over economic and social ideologies – 
demonstrated a consistent sense of the importance of location and environment; and 
which sought to pair the concerns of the Yorkshire and Humberside region with a strong 
sense of national priorities, favouring forms of professional expertise to more political 
means of regional economic agitation. There was, however, a shift in the forms of 
professional expertise that were employed, as the authorities and industrialists moved 
their support away from planners and placed more trust in management consultants and 
advertising professions. 
This chapter first provides a brief overview of the changing national policy framework 
towards regional policy: the raft of measures pursued with varying vehemence by 
successive governments since the 1930s to address issues of regional unemployment 
and regional industrial development. It also sets out the economic and intellectual 
context of Yorkshire and Humberside in the mid-1960s, prior to the formation of the 
YHEPC.  
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The chapter then focuses on the late 1960s to 1970, as the lack of economic growth 
and the spectre of rising unemployment put increasing strain on the YHEPC’s ability to 
maintain support across the region, and posed challenges to the Council’s conviction 
that Yorkshire and Humberside could avoid financial assistance from central 
government.  Not only did the YHEPC show a particular approach to its work, but this 
approach reflected wider existing regional traditions of organisation and association in 
Yorkshire. But analysis of the YHEPC's work demonstrates that its requests and plans 
remained broadly consistent with previous forms of regional action and regeneration: 
and the increasingly open enmity towards development areas, in particular the Northern 
Economic Planning Region, was indicative of a particular regional identity of Yorkshire. I 
suggest this demonstrates a more complex regional identity than merely intra-regional 
‘North-North’, or ‘near-North / deep North’ tensions, but one where the cultural and 
political weight of a more entrenched notion of a binary North/South divide must be 
acknowledged. 
Such concerns would be maintained and would become amplified into the 1970s and 
1980s, even as Yorkshire and Humberside’s relative economic position became more 
perilous with the rapid onset of de-industrialisation, and its lasting effects on the labour 
market. Between 1971 and 1987 the region lost over 40 per cent of its manufacturing 
employment, and the regional GDP per capita fell relative to the UK average by just under 
5 per cent from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. Though in this period the methods 
through which economic development was promoted changed, the overarching vision of 
the locational advantages of Yorkshire and Humberside remained similar. With the quick 
erosion of public confidence in state-led economic planning policy following the 
perceived failures of the 1960s, the YHEPC itself was usurped by its own creation, the 
YHDA, from 1973. This was a product of the challenge in the region of Keynesian logic by 
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more Victorian notions of mutuality and self-sufficiency, of ‘self-help’ in regional industrial 
promotion. 
In examining organisations such as the YHEPC and YHDA, this chapter argues that 
although the economic challenges faced by Yorkshire were not unique, the approaches 
taken towards efforts to address them demonstrated a particular regional identity, one 
shaped by the its geographical, cultural and industrial inheritance.  It also argues that  
the efforts of YHDA to promote the region in the 1980s demonstrate Yorkshire and 
Humberside’s ambiguous relationship to the wider north in economic terms, with this 
being shown in the changing approaches to marketing the region globally. John Belchem 
has argued that economic distinctiveness was a significant factor in Liverpudlian 
‘exceptionalism’ in comparison to the ‘“woolyback” industrial districts’ of the surrounding 
north west.216 This distinctiveness was a complex issue in Yorkshire and the Humber, 
with the primarily agrarian economic areas of North Yorkshire, North Lincolnshire and 
East Riding of Yorkshire sitting alongside the urban system of the West Riding.217 These 
considerations in wider terms serve to demonstrate the inherent diversity of the 
industrial regions and sub-regions of ‘the North’ that has engendered ambivalences in 
the northern experience. This creates significant problems for generalising over 
responses and experiences, particularly in matters related to local and regional 
economies. 
This chapter contains three key themes which I argue are of particular importance to 
examining both regionalism and regional identity in Yorkshire and Humberside, and 
which formed a central part of initiatives which were lobbied for and/or enacted. The first 
theme discussed is how a sense of the region’s geography was central to the articulation 
of an economic region. Regional economic bodies placed consistent emphasis on the 
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importance of locational, rather than structural factors, in promoting economic growth in 
the region. The second theme is the relationship of the region with experts and expertise 
in fostering economic growth; and the final theme considers these debates in the context 
of ‘northernness’ and the wider North. 
 
2.2 Context:  UK regional policy, de-industrial isation, and 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
 
I 
British regional economic policy's successes and failures in maintaining or reviving its 
industrially depressed regions since the late 1920s have drawn much analysis from the 
1980s onwards, when the national level of regionally targeted financial assistance was 
significantly reduced.218 The number of jobs created and redistributed from the more 
prosperous regions of the country to those in receipt of government aid are deeply 
disputed. Various other critiques have been made of regional policy, including the rather 
tenuous relationship it held with national planning policy more generally; its 
concentration on manufacturing industry to the exclusion of supporting service sector 
employment; the lack of geographical focus in its eligibility and application; the 
ambiguous role of public sector employment and regional dispersal; and the 
governmental preference for focusing on general structural problems rather than 
concentrating on addressing locational disadvantage.  In the context of this chapter an 
evaluation of the efficacy of regional policy is less important than a discussion of what 
policy measures were pursued and how these related to the region considered by this 
thesis. 
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The initial driver of regional economic policy in Britain was the persistence of the 
structural slump in the old ‘staple’ exporting industries. Emerging in the early 1920s, and 
continuing into Great Depression years of the 1930s, collapse of global demand for 
coalmining, heavy engineering and shipbuilding, iron and steel manufacture created an 
unemployment problem that was sharply spatially concentrated. In the mid-1930s these 
areas, such as South Wales, Clydesdale and the North East, termed by Miller as ‘outer-
Britain’, experienced an unemployment rate amongst the insured labour force of more 
than ten per cent that of southern England and the Midlands.219 This regional 
unemployment differential belied the sectoral growth precipitated by the consumer 
goods boom of the 1930s; the growth in employment brought about by these light 
manufacturing industries was located away from these areas, and which only accounted 
for 8.32 per cent of all new manufacturing plants employing 25 or more people.220 The 
interwar years have been characterised as being a period of affluence in which living 
standards rose, primarily as a result of a significant fall in the cost of living, particularly 
for the skilled and semi-skilled trades, exacerbating the feeling of a widening divide.221 
The increasing perception of a material divide as reproduced in broader spatial terms in 
turn encouraged greater articulation of a matching cultural division, evident in the work 
of travel writers and other commentators in the 1930s, most notably George Orwell, J.B. 
Priestley and H.V. Morton.222  
The persistence of these problems made it politically unavoidable for central government 
to maintain its non-interventionist approach, though Treasury resistance to wider 
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assistance tempered the extent of any regional policy during this period.223 Initially policy 
focused on enabling the mobility of labour from those regions worst affected. The 
Industrial Transference Scheme and Juvenile Transfer Scheme were established in 1928 
to provide small grants and loans for the unemployed to relocate. During the depths of 
the depression in 1932-33, as many as 14,000 people a year were helped to move.224 
By 1934, after a series of government-commissioned studies into the ‘depressed areas’ 
– and intense public interest – there was an acceptance of the need for ‘positive 
external assistance’ to break the cycle of depression.225 The Special Areas (Improvement 
and Development) Act in that year designated four special areas in South Wales, North 
East England, West Cumberland, and West Central Scotland. Major cities in these areas 
such as Newcastle and Glasgow were excluded from these initial measures due to their 
slightly less alarming unemployment rates. Modest but increasing loans and financial 
inducements to attract new industry were offered in these areas, as well as introducing 
trading estate developments in places such as Team Valley and Hillington.226 In many 
respects, this owed less to enthusiasm for direct intervention from the centre, and more 
to the persistence of Sir Malcolm Stewart as the Commissioner appointed for the English 
special areas, and to Scottish industrial activism.227 
The economic difficulties experienced in the 1920s and 1930s also increased calls for 
the creation of larger ‘regional’ areas of public administration, in part to alleviate the 
financial and functional burdens local authorities faced, and in part for more effective 
                                                            
223 Scott, Triumph of the South, 88, 286. 
224 Peter Hall, ‘The Regional Dimension’, 77. 
225 McCallum, ‘British Regional Policy’, 4; D.W. Parsons, The Political Economy of British Regional 
Policy (London, 1986), 11-13. 
226 Peter Scott, ‘The Audit of Regional Policy: 1934-1939’, Regional Studies, 34:1 (2000), 57-61; 
Law, British Regional Development, 45; McCallum, ‘British Regional Policy’, 5. 
227 Parsons, British Regional Policy, 15-21; Gavin McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (London, 
1969), 95-102; Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution, 15-19. 
  82 
planning – both economically and also of the physical environment.228 The persistence of 
severe structural problems outside the south and midlands of England would lead the 
appointment of a Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population in 
1937, under the chairmanship of Sir Montague Barlow. The Barlow Commission’s report, 
published in 1940, advocated ‘the adoption of a regional system’ with wide ranging 
controls for development.229 Abercrombie’s minority report had gone further in calling for 
‘a Ministry that would tackle the problems of housing transport and land at the same 
time as having powers over the distribution of industry'.230  
Despite considerable interest in the possibilities of more coordinated national and 
regional planning machinery, the focus of the more concerted regional policy pursued by 
the Attlee Government from 1945-51 was primarily social and political.231 Peter Scott 
has convincingly argued that an immediate emphasis on employment generation in 
areas in receipt of government assistance took priority over Barlow’s recommendations 
for more wide-ranging economic regional planning policy.232 The ‘Development Areas’ 
designated by the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act largely reflected the prewar assisted 
areas, with parts of the Scottish Highlands, Merseyside, Wrexham, and South Lancashire 
also being added to these areas by 1950.233 The Board of Trade was empowered to 
provide loans and grants to firms in the Development Areas, and to facilitate the 
financing, building and leasing of trading estates. Industrial development outside of the 
Development Areas was curtailed initially through the retention of wartime building 
licensing, and then was formalised into Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs) by the 
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1947 Town and Country Planning Act. The supply of ‘advance factories’ by the Board of 
Trade in the assisted regions were argued by Peter Hall to have produced ‘spectacular’ 
results, with more than half new industrial building from 1945-7 situated in the 
development areas, compared to just 5 per cent prior to the Second World War.234 
However, despite reasonably impressive employment figures for these factories in the 
mid-1950s, the application of these controls and incentives has been argued to have 
been less effective in practice than the scales of the powers of the Board of Trade 
suggest. Scott and Phillips have highlighted the structural vulnerability – the increasingly 
branch plant nature – of the factories established in the North East and Scotland at this 
time. The balance of payments crisis confronting the Attlee Government in 1947 also 
meant that the immediate postwar expenditure on regional policy and rigid application of 
IDC policy were short-lived.235 Firms outside of the Development Areas – particularly in 
export industries – were more readily able to appeal to 'national interest / national 
efficiency' arguments to obtain IDCs.236 Further to this, New Town and overspill policies 
around London – the most active form of regional planning enacted after 1946 – placed 
the development corporations into direct competition with the Development Areas for 
more mobile industry.237 
Though the force with which regional policy was pursued eased towards the end of the 
1940s, this ‘de-emphasis’ was accelerated under Conservative governments from 1951 
onwards. Regional policy has been generally characterised as in ‘abeyance’ in the period 
from 1951-8, as post-Korean War rearmament and economic growth maintained levels 
of employment in heavier industries such as coalmining, iron and steel and shipbuilding. 
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Public spending priorities shifted towards other policy concerns, such as housing.238 In 
the first eight years of Conservative rule, total expenditure per annum on regional 
assistance under the 1945 Act was barely half what it had been in the final three years 
under Labour.239 Regional planning in the south east continued to take priority over 
active regional policy in the Development Areas. In 1953 for example, Scott highlights 
IDCs granted to London New Town factories created 31 per cent more jobs than new 
factories across the whole of the assisted regions.240 Where regional policy was still 
employed in the mid-1950s, Scott argues, it was done so explicitly for social reasons: 
‘..the ‘black spot’ option… resources being concentrated on the precise localities in which 
unemployment occurred, even if there were much more economically viable centres 
within a relatively short distance’.241 
In 1958, however, regional policy once again came to be applied more actively by the 
Conservatives. Scott has argued that in part this was a result of the shift within the 
Cabinet away from the neo-liberalism of erstwhile Chancellor Peter Thorneycroft towards 
the corporatism favoured by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan.242 Impetus was given 
however by the sharp and ‘totally unforeseen’ downturn in the British economy.243 
Deflationary cuts to public spending and decreased global demand, alongside increasing 
international competition, caused the re-emergence of significant levels of regional 
unemployment. Coal and shipbuilding were particularly hard hit by this shock, and falls in 
output in these sectors were matched by increased unemployment that was more acute 
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in the Development Areas than elsewhere in Britain,244 highlighting the continued 
structural weaknesses of their local economies.245 The government’s response was to 
introduce the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act 1958 which added some 
smaller areas outside of the existing Development Areas to the places eligible for grant 
and loan aid. Direct public expenditure on regional policy more than doubled to £8.6 
million in 1959-60, and then increased to £11.8 million in 1960-61.246 These years also 
saw the partial revival of government intervention to provide industrial infrastructure. IDC 
controls were once again tightened, and advance factory policy was revived in some 
form. The most notable example of this policy was MacMillan’s ‘judgement of Solomon’; 
with two strip mills at Ravenscraig in Motherwell, and Llanwern in Newport construction 
in preference to one on unemployment grounds.247 Dissatisfaction with this ad hoc 
system, political and otherwise, would rapidly lead to the consolidation of the various 
acts since 1945 into the Local Employment Act in 1960. Abolishing the Development 
Areas – which were viewed as too inflexible – this legislation gave the Board of Trade the 
power to schedule Development Districts on the basis of high unemployment rates, 
which in practice was set at 4.5 per cent of the insured population.248 Alongside 
maintaining the carrot and stick measures of previous to direct industrial development to 
the Districts, the Act also empowered the Board of Trade to provide financial subsidy to 
industrialists constructing their own factories in assisted areas.  
Assessments of this policy have been generally critical. Scott has argued the government 
managed ‘to achieve the worst of both worlds, neither allowing industry to choose its own 
location according to efficiency criteria, nor being prepared to plan the location of 
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industry according to long-term, growth orientated considerations’.249 Parson perceived 
this period as ‘perhaps a “dithering” before the “dreaming”, a phase that fell between 
two stools’.250 The disadvantages of this were clear: the flexible scheduling and de-
scheduling of Development Districts proved frustrating to industrialists and public 
authorities alike. Development Districts covered 12.5 per cent of the country’s 
population in 1961, only 7.2 per cent in 1962 and then reached a maximum of 16.8 per 
cent in 1966. On top of this uncertainty that mitigated against effective planning, the 
strategy of concentrating on unemployment figures as the criteria for regional policy 
served to direct investment into areas with the least robust prospects of growth.251 
Moore and Rhode’s attempted analysis of the effects on employment on regional policy 
presented this period – particularly up to 1963 – as a mixed one. High growth of 
manufacturing employment continued in the South East and Midlands in the late 1950s, 
and this was not matched across the Development Areas. A more uneven picture was 
evident in the early 1960s.252 
There are several important points that emerge from this history. The first is that regional 
policy represented a reflection of national economic debates, rather than being a product 
of any strong regional activism or focus. Even though the 1960 Local Employment Act 
decentralised administration of regional policy to regional offices in the UK, powers for 
approval remained with the centre in all cases.253 The structures through which regional 
policy was administered were overwhelmingly vertical, and aligned with a national 
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concern for full employment and the efficient use of national resources.254 Such a 
strategy broadly fitted with the spatial Keynesian policy agenda that accompanied the 
national social welfare policies enacted following the Second World War. A general 
consensus exists that it was social, rather than economic impulses that were the drivers 
of policy.255  
 
II 
The early 1960s saw the emergence of more intensive regional plans. The adoption of 
greater economic planning, and the desire in British policy circles to see this applied in a 
regional context in combination with more active physical planning on a regional scale, 
emerged from a diverse and complex set of national and international circumstances 
and cultural trends. One commonality was the increasing impact of transnationalism on 
policy networks and exchanges. This was not in itself novel to the late-twentieth century, 
but gained importance in the climate of ‘high-modernism’ of the 1950s and 1960s.256 
The need for the adoption of foreign models was in part fuelled by general cultural 
anxieties around Britain’s perceived decline. The result of this national crisis of 
confidence was to look abroad for models of seeming success. As O’Hara has 
highlighted, it was France – and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union – who proved the 
ideal archetypes to follow; France’s extraordinary growth rate and resilience in the 1950s 
and 1960s appeared ‘like an attractive mirror image of Britain’s “stop-go” crises’.257 
In contrast to Britain’s seemingly sluggish economic performance, the ‘French miracle’ 
appeared a product of a ‘semi-planned’ economy. Channelled through the small 
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Commissariat du Plan, acting independently of government and by the late 1950s 
supervising modernisation commissions across various industrial sectors and on issues 
common to all, France’s planning strategy gained significant traction in Britain, with 
French influence seen across the UK government.258 A move towards the adoption of 
economic planning began in the early 1960s, through intense debates between 
industrial bodies such as the Federation of British Industries and the TUC, and the 
Conservative Government. It would eventually lead to the creation in 1962 of the 
National Economic Development Council and National Economic Development Office, 
whose initial attempts at indicative planning for industrial growth served as a forerunner 
for the later ill-fated National Plan.259  
This transnationalism was also a product of the wider ‘declinist’ critique of the lack of 
expertise in policy making. The 1950s and 1960s in particular marked an influx of 
experts – particularly academic expertise – into governments across the world, as was 
particularly the case with the Kennedy administration in the USA.260 In this period, ‘the 
“modern” seemed to promise liberation from the past and a preferable future’, and part 
of this vision was that ‘scientists and other experts would deploy their training to benefit 
the nation’.261 The ‘region’ served as the ideal geographical unit through which to 
channel such planning fervour; and the latter half of the 1960s was ‘an exceptionally 
busy period, ‘witnessing a veritable flood of planning studies, planning reports, planning 
research, and especially, perhaps, talk about planning’.262 
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Figure 2.1 Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Region, taken from Diana Pearce, 
‘The Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council 1965-1979’, in Patricia L. Garside 
and Michael Hebbert (eds.), British Regionalism 1900-2000 (London, 1989). 
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2.3 From planning to publicity:  the changing role of expertise 
 
I 
The Yorkshire and Humberside Planning Region was the last of the northern planning 
regions to be designated, and in some ways the most contentious. Its geographical 
constitution was disputed: various interests around Sheffield showed some displeasure 
at being put into Yorkshire and Humberside, rather than the East Midlands, and the 
novel inclusion of parts of Lindsey in Lincolnshire, to the south of the Humber river, 
reflected the intense interest from both central government and academics in the growth 
potential of ‘Humberside’ (a context discussed in detail in the next chapter).263 Some in 
the North Riding were frustrated at being included instead in the Northern region: the 
Yorkshire Council for Social Service (YCSS) stated that ‘it is convinced that, in social and 
economic terms, Yorkshire and Humberside provides a focus for the life of the North 
Riding in a manner which is not possible for a Northern region’.264 The clerk of the East 
Riding County Council would also write to the YHEPC Chairman in 1967 requesting the 
redrawing of the boundary to include the North Riding. The arguments for this were 
defended as 
not merely sentimental…nor are the grounds for suggestion limited to the 
psychological advantages, in that your Council would be able to call upon a strong 
existing sense of coherence instead of having to endeavour to create one for an 
area possessing no historic links. The most forceful argument for redrawing the 
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boundaries of the “Yorkshire” region must purely be at present that they cut across 
what is quite clearly a physical and planning entity.265 
 
It was not only the boundaries of the planning region that caused debate. The 
composition of the YHEPC also drew criticism, particularly from some labour groups who 
felt their interests would not be adequately represented. These included initial concerns 
expressed by the president of the Yorkshire miners and by the Yorkshire Federation of 
Trades Councils.266 The eventual list of appointments to the YHEPC reflected a similar 
corporatist balance to that of other Planning Councils, and demonstrated the economic 
diversity of the region. Only three union representatives (the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU), Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and the National Union 
of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers) made the thirty-strong list. They were joined by 
industrialists from the region’s transport textile, steel, coal and fishing industries 
(amongst others); representatives of local authorities from the county councils and 
county boroughs, such as Leeds and Grimsby; and a handful of public and voluntary 
bodies.267 
Most important in setting the tone of the YHEPC and its work was the appointment of its 
Chairman. Sir Roger Stevens was a former diplomat and Vice-Chancellor of Leeds 
University. Whilst holding this role he also served on the Economic Development Council 
(‘Little Neddie’) for the wool textile industry, which had been been retained by Labour as 
part of the wider machinery of indicative planning and also placed under the 
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responsibility of the Department for Economic Affairs (DEA).268 Academic representation 
on the Council was also provided by Anthony Goss, the head of the Leeds School of Town 
Planning, and by John Page, Professor of Building Science at Sheffield University. Several 
of the local authority representatives were also chairmen of their town planning 
committees. The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor to chairman was not in itself unique 
or an unusual step for the DEA –  as demonstrated by economist Charles Frederick 
Carter’s chairmanship of the North West Economic Planning Council until 1968 – but it 
stood in contrast to the more political appointment of T. Dan Smith for the Northern 
Economic Planning Council. Stevens’ assertions immediately after assuming his role 
were highly instructive. He was keen to stress the active role he felt his university could 
play through ‘using talent’ to aid the YHEPC’s work. The Guardian reported that ‘a 
university in its position ought to contribute in every sort of way to regional life and 
therefore he welcomed the opportunity of combining his function as vice-chancellor’. 
Alongside this advocacy of utilising academic expertise, Stevens also stressed his own 
objectivity: ‘he thinks the fact he is not deeply wedded to any part of the region could be 
an advantage when it comes to economic planning’. His aim was declared to be 
‘completely fair and neutral’.269 
Stevens’ past as a senior civil servant, and the connection he now had to an academic 
institution, positioned him almost as the archetype of the modernist technocratic 
professional ideal culturally in ascendant in policy circles globally, as brought to the fore 
by the ‘planning fervour’ of the mid-1960s. His disavowing an attachment to place and 
his statement of his own objectivity echoes the general attitude that Mike Savage argues 
was pervasive in the social scientific community in this decade. Sociologists in the 1960s 
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sought to ‘demoralise’ and standardise their methods. In the process, their claims to 
objectivity and general applicability led to the minimisation of the place-specific concerns 
of their subjects and in turn gave their work a ‘locationless logic’,270 distancing such 
practitioners from their participants.  
Also important in this context was the apparent depth of social capital amongst middle-
class interests the YHEPC could draw on across the region. The composition of these 
groups was important in legitimising the Council’s purpose. Not only was provincial 
'associational life' vigorous and influential in the region,271 associations were also ‘largely 
professional, and managerial middle class’.272 In the early 1970s, almost three-quarters 
of associations in Yorkshire could draw on the skills of members representing at least six 
different professional classes: crucially including architects, planners, surveyors and 
other academics (although only 18 per cent had some representation on their respective 
local authorities).273 
Strong regional and local (mainly urban) professional and voluntary links therefore 
existed in Yorkshire, and the Chairman himself had involved himself in various societies 
in the 18 months he had resided in Leeds prior to 1965. A strong and conscious concern 
to tap into these existing middle-class reserves was evident almost immediately. In July 
1965, Stevens’ addressed the YCSS to make clear the on-going work would not be purely 
economic in its focus, as it was reported ‘…he thought the Board would be losing sight of 
its purpose if, in picking up the instruments of economic analysis, it were to forget that it 
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was concerned with the opportunities for men and women to lead happy lives’.274 
Stronger links to voluntary and elite organisations were also later enshrined in the 
Council through changes to its membership, with the appointment of representatives of 
the County Landowners Association and Women’s Royal Voluntary Service alongside a 
member of the YCSS.275 
 
II 
The initial actions of the YHEPC confirm its commitment to the technocratic ideals 
advocated by the ‘white heat of scientific revolution’ of Harold Wilson’s first government. 
Steps were taken by the Council and the Board to move quickly to establish a sound and 
rational means through which to assess the region’s strengths and weaknesses. One of 
the first actions was to designate sub-regional divisions through which various studies 
and statistical information should be arranged. Rather than focus on the existing 
administrative divisions within Yorkshire and Humberside, it was instead made clear that 
these divisions should reflect functional divisions across the region: 
Within this extensive and varied territory there is a great diversity of economic and 
social conditions. For the purposes of economic and land use planning it is 
necessary to study many problems which arise within, and in the main must be 
related to, smaller areas which exhibit either some homogeneity of character or 
interdependence based on practical limits of accessibility. The delineation of sub-
divisions must therefore take account not only of physical features but also of 
economic groupings and social environments which have developed over a long 
period.276 
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But though wishing to reflect a rational division of the region based on economic and 
social function, the inherent difficulties of precise alignment were also acknowledged: 
The lines of demarcation between the defined sub-divisions are not clear cut. A 
number of fringe areas have affinities and connexions in more than one direction; 
… The areas as defined are however thought to afford a satisfactory working bases, 
provided it is recognised that hey are not entirely self-contained or mutually 
exclusive.277 
 
The seven study areas created for this purpose held some distinct differences from the 
local authority boundaries at the time, but also foreshadowed the reorganisation of the 
early 1970s. The West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire sub-divisions were centred on the 
Leeds-Bradford conurbation and Sheffield respectively. The North Humberside and South 
Humberside sub-divisions focused on the major urban centres around the Humber 
(which would also form the rationale for Humberside’s creation); and the South Lindsey 
sub-division consisted of almost all the area in the region at this time that would revert to 
Lincolnshire County Council in 1974. The more novel territorial sub-divisions were ‘Mid-
Yorkshire’: covering ‘the Ripon/Selby/Bridlington triangle’ and including York; and 
‘Yorkshire Coalfield’ located in the south of the region, that acknowledged the 
overwhelming importance of (predominantly male) mining employment to area around 
Barnsley and Doncaster.278 This ordering stands in contrast to the sub-divisions used by 
the other two northern EPCs; the Northern Economic Planning Council, for instance, did 
not prominently use its sub-divisions in their reporting and findings in a manner that 
acknowledged sub-regional sectoral specialisations and concentrations.  
The YHEPC's novel conception of regional space demonstrated the complex 
interrelationships that existed in Yorkshire and Humberside between the varied local 
economic concerns and interactions. This translated into complex interactions between 
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local and regional identity, particularly on an official level through the numerous and 
varied local authorities. From within the region, it was again the East Riding that baulked 
at the redrawing of its boundaries on the grounds it was a ‘physical, administrative, 
social and historical entity’.279 The Chairman himself moved to reach out to the county 
councils and county boroughs to ‘co-operate in assembling information’.280 Though this 
drew a mixed response it did elicit unanimous cooperation. Stronger liaison with planning 
officials for local government in Yorkshire and Humberside was also given a boost 
through the establishment of the Standing Conference of local planning authorities 
shortly after the planning region’s creation. Sharing members with the YHEPC, the 
Standing Conference involved itself with various aspects of the physical planning of the 
region, for example taking an active role in the issue of regional airports in Yorkshire (as 
discussed in chapter 3). It was the Conference itself that reached out to the Council to 
agree on the form of the relationship between the three bodies. Evident in the terms was 
a fundamental emphasis on technical considerations and expertise. Efficiency and 
objectivity were also key:  
1. The Conference and the Board should establish regular contact to avoid 
duplication in the assembly of facts, to exchange data and to reach agreement on 
facts. 
2. There should be exchange of information on forward programmes of studies and 
surveys. 
3. Data should be interpreted independently and exchange of the results on 
interpretation is desirable.281 
 
The focus on both ‘facts’ and ‘data’ as crucial to the on-going work of both authorities 
ultimately endorses O’Hara’s general highlighting of the dearth of statistical information 
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available on a regional level in the 1960s.282 This was something the DEA sought to 
rectify through its own ‘programme of regional economic research’ intended to inform the 
work of the EPCs and Economic Planning Boards (EPBs).283  
For the YHEPC however this research was a more fundamental concern than was evident 
in the work of other regions. This was particularly the case in the first few years of its 
work, in the lead up to the publication of the first regional review in October 1966, the 
catchily-titled A Review of Yorkshire and Humberside (in depressing contrast to the North 
West of the 1970s, or Challenge of the Changing North, used by the adjacent EPCs).284 
Not only was a significant amount of research put in train to acquire the factual basis on 
which planning decisions about the region could be made, but this was bolstered by the 
formalising of an academic advisory group, under the chairmanship of Professor Page, to 
act as a ‘clearing house for the results of research into the region’s development’.285  
The appeal to such experts, particularly economists, planners and social scientists, 
reflected what James C. Scott termed ‘high modernism’, associated with ‘how the 
benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied – usually through the state 
– in every field of human activity’.286 Though not necessarily as sweeping as Scott’s 
focus, the planning culture of mid-1960s (promising increasing progress through the use 
of technical expertise) was not only illustrated through the ambitious visions of the urban 
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future such as Fred Pooley’s ‘North Bucks New City’,287 or the more speculative forms of 
‘futurology’ that ran alongside planning in the 1960s.288 In Yorkshire and Humberside in 
the mid-1960s, the intense interest of central government in the Humber Estuary and 
the work of the DEA’s Central Unit for Environmental Planning (CUEP), discussed more in 
the next chapter, meant that a radically different industrial and urban future for the 
region – brought about through sober technocratic analysis – stood as a tangible 
possibility.289 The focus of the Council’s work aligned closely with the modernist 
intellectual and economic climate that had been generated by the ‘planning fervour’ of 
the late 1950s and 1960s, and broader transnational scientific expert-led modernism 
reflected in various national international institutions.290 That it was the EPC’s role to 
harness and realise the long-term benefits of such expertise for the modernisation of the 
region’s infrastructure and economy was made very clear in the public pronouncements 
of the Stevens. In a press conference to promote the upcoming regional review, the 
Chairman described it as ‘a first stepping stone towards longer-term economic planning 
for the Region’. It was to be ‘based on factual information and assessments provided by 
the region’s Economic Planning Board, and sifted by specialist groups of the Board and 
Council… it will show where in the Council’s view there is scope for improving the 
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economic imbalance’.291 Such discourse – with its appeal to objectivity and blunt 
positivism – demonstrates a claim to authority that arises, as Porter states, ‘from the 
application of uniform, “objective” standards that seem independent of political 
pressures’.292 Such a stance corresponded with national policy interests, and the on-
going ‘transformation in the disciplinary base of the academic infrastructure’ in the UK in 
1960s.293 Several times in this period, the YHEPC held fast to its long-term economic 
planning ambit, against challenge from its own members.294  
The Council’s stance towards long-term economic planning was consistent with the major 
intellectual ideas regarding regional growth during this period. Most notable amongst 
these was pole de croissance, or growth point/pole theory, synonymous with Francois 
Perroux and developed by other European economists.295 The concept was originally 
employed by Perroux in the mid-1950s to describe a sector of economic growth that 
exerted ‘propulsive’ effects on other sectors; and expanded to refer in spatial terms to 
urban agglomeration.296 Although Perroux's work was subject to significant critique,297 
growth pole theory gained significant traction in academic and policy circles in Britain, 
particularly in relation to regional planning and economics. The focus on using expertise 
towards identifying growth points is clear in examining work and pronouncements of the 
Council. When establishing the academic advisory committee in 1965, The Guardian 
reported that Stevens ‘said one of the development group’s main tasks would be to 
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examine the region’s growth points’.298 Though largely absent from A Review of Yorkshire 
and Humberside, vague allusion was made to growth points in the overall summary:  
In short, some parts of the region, in particular the Coalfield and Humberside, offer 
scope for the attraction of additional new industries to achieve a better balance in 
employment opportunities. Other areas have advantages for natural industrial 
growth; South Humberside obviously so; also the Doncaster / Pontefract / 
Knottingley area at the centre of good road and rail communications.299 
 
The YHEPC agreed on four selected ‘growth zones’ in the region that it believed should 
become the ‘focal points’ for additional jobs and investment: the ‘Five towns’ (comprising 
Normanton, Featherstone, Knottingley, Castleford and Pontefract); ‘Greater Barnsley’; 
‘Greater Doncaster’; and ‘Greater Hull’ (i.e. North Humberside).300 The first three of these 
areas were staunchly defended as representative of dispassionate selection on 
economic grounds when their inclusion in evidence to the Hunt Committee was 
challenged on the grounds of focusing on depressed areas rather than ‘centres of 
growth’. Both Stevens and another member of the Council argued: 
[Sir Roger Stevens]:- Why should any location along the M.1., for example, in the 
centre of the United Kingdom within very easy access, or it will be very easy access 
to both Liverpool and Humberside be regarded as uneconomic? 
[Mr Sara]: We have set our hearts against putting down, as Mr. Sales has said, little 
factories in little villages. We have been ruthless about saying we do not believe the 
Pennine Valleys should be developed with industry, but we do think that in this area 
there are places where industries can flourish on a viable economic basis in 
comparison internationally and nationally…301 
 
The YHEPC also sought to express an industrial strategy that was intended to provide a 
long-term basis for an industrial region that would be both modern and efficient. Not only 
                                                            
298 ‘Clearing house for research’, The Guardian, 29 October 1965. 
299 YHEPC, Review of Yorkshire and Humberside, 74. 
300 HCC TCRD/8 ‘YHEPC: Summary of the Council’s work: October 1968 to November 1969’, 17 
November 1969. 
301 TNA EW7/876 ‘Hunt Committee on the Problems of the Grey Areas, note of meeting with 
YHEPC representatives’, 16 February 1968. 
  101 
was there need for ‘faster application of technological advances in industry and fuller 
use of modern plant and equipment and up-to-date production methods’;302 but also a 
need to prioritise research for the ‘selective encouragement of science-based and other 
industries in particular parts of the region’.303 YHEPC agreed that academic professionals 
should remain central to these studies deemed essential to regional planning:304 it was 
deemed essential that the Council’s Academic Advisory Committee be retained.305 
The commitment to further empirical and other research was likely the reason for the 
rather preliminary tentative tone of Review. It was clear in the preface that this was not 
intended to be seen as a comprehensive regional plan in any sense.306 However, it 
presented a much more thorough and statistically driven picture of the region that was 
given by either the Northern Economic Planning Council or the North West Economic 
Planning Council in their work. Alongside the main report, consisting twelve main 
chapters (five of which dealt with issues related to industry and employment), there were 
some fifty pages of statistical and other appendices,307 as well a dozen additional tables 
in the text and almost thirty illustrations.308  
The stronger and more immediate tone of North West of the 1970s was similar to 
Changing North. Both strongly put forward a series of specific policy recommendations 
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for action in their immediate summaries.309 In contrast to these rather active stances, 
Review presented its general findings in a much more suggestive way. The summary was 
placed in the final chapter of the main report, under the rather vague title of ‘Signposts 
to Action’.310 Though some points were ‘urged’ – such as attention to the region’s roads 
(see below) – and some generally speculative targets were given, such an estimated 
730,000 new houses in the region by 1981 to meet rather alarmist population 
projections,311 Review’s general conclusions positioned it as a means to provide a 
‘useful basis’ for further consultation.312 
The rather non-committal recommendations of the YHEPC hinted at some of the tensions 
and debates around the interpretation of data for the region’s geographical size and 
economic diversity. For example, a survey of almost 800 firms conducted on behalf of 
the Council’s Industry group by the CBI found that almost two-thirds expected to employ 
more workers. These findings – along with others – sparked considerable debate among 
two of the group’s industrialists about the implication that industry in the region was 
depending on a considerable increase in manpower supplies.313 Stevens himself noted 
to the Hunt Committee that, though there was ‘very little statistical evidence to support’ 
his view, he saw pressing structural problems in the wool textile industry of ‘a good deal 
of under-employment’; over-reliance of firms on a small number of large buyers; and 
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issues of profitability.314 Such issues, and other complaints on lack of statistical 
evidence, demonstrated the inherent tensions on attempting regional economic planning 
through such rationalist data and expert-modernism. Region-wide statistics were still in 
their infancy, and though the Abstract of Regional Statistics had first been published in 
1965, it still lacked figures on indicators such as productivity, output, overall investment 
and labour use which represented facts ‘absolutely vital to resolving some of the 
inherent dilemmas of regional planning’.315 In some senses O’Hara assertion that it 
represented ‘an immature research programme’ was correct.316 
Regardless of this vagueness, the enthusiasm for regional planning was not sectional,  at 
least at the point of the publication of the first review in 1966. There is some evidence of 
broad popular engagement: 30,000 to 40,000 copies of the broadsheet were estimated 
to have been sold by the YHEPC upon its release, and it was claimed that 5,000 or so 
copies of the actual report had been purchased. This was in line with times; as Tomlinson 
has noted, ‘the 1960s saw a scale of official economic propaganda unparalleled since 
the 1940s’, with the importance of data stressed as ‘not just about designing [The 
National Plan] and judging its success, but about educating the population about the 
possibilities of prosperity that planning brought with it’.317 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
314 TNA EW7/876 ‘Hunt Committee on the Problems of the Grey Areas, note of meeting with 
YHEPC representatives’, 16 February 1968. 
315 O’Hara, Dreams to Disillusionment, 107. 
316 Ibid., 107. 
317 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy, managing the people: Britain c.1931-70’, Economic 
History Review, 58:3 (2005), 570. 
  104 
III 
In general, Yorkshire and Humberside had exhibited a degree of enthusiasm for the form 
of rational, modernist and objective regional economic planning that was at the heart of 
the national policy in the mid-1960s, and at the time the YHEPC fulfilled the archetype. 
But by the late 1960s, increasing dissatisfaction with the Planning Council would lead 
instead to calls for a different form of professional expertise to articulate a regional 
economic identity, and of economic regionalism. 
Changing national economic fortunes and their particularly acute consequences for the 
region were a key factor in this increasing dissatisfaction. The National Plan and the 
various instruments for indicative planning towards economic growth objectives were 
‘effectively jettisoned’ in the deflationary ‘July measures’ of 1966; a situation confirmed 
by the failure to maintain an effective voluntary incomes policy, and by the continued 
Sterling crises that would lead to devaluation in November 1967.318 Harold Wilson’s 
government left office with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth at 1.8 per cent, after 
inheriting growth of GDP of 5.4 per cent in 1964, and promising annual growth of 4 per 
cent by 1970.319 The unemployment rate began to steadily rise from the late 1960s 
onwards. 
Economic slowdown and the acceleration of deindustrialization had a series of 
interrelated effects across the Yorkshire and Humberside region. The planned run-down 
of mining on the Yorkshire coalfield, as production was moved further east towards Selby 
with as many as 20,000 jobs shed, generated significant and lasting unemployment 
                                                            
318 Hugh Pemberton, ‘Relative decline and British Economic Policy’, The Historical Journal, 47:4 
(2004), 997; O’Hara, Governing Post-War Britain, 75-83. 
319 Dominic Sandbrook, State of Emergency – The Way We Were: Britain, 1970-1974 (London, 
2011), 59; Cmnd.2764. The National Plan (1964), 2-3. 
  105 
amongst these communities.320 Despite the designation in November 1967 of Special 
Development Area status which offered significant grant incentives and other 
inducements to industry to these small coal-mining districts, chronic unemployment rates 
in places such as Mexborough and Hemsworth were already quoted as upwards of 10 
per cent by the early 1970s.321 Rationalisation in the wool textile industry was a long 
running process, with 42 per cent of mills closing in Yorkshire between 1925 and 
1967.322 However, this only had a significant impact on employment in the West 
Yorkshire ‘textile zone’ during the 1960s, as employees in this sector contracted from 
153,000 to 94,000 across the decade.323 Of increasing concern from late 1967 onwards 
was the situation in North Humberside, particularly around Hull. Modernisation of the 
dock facilities to handle containerised cargo – a process that cut port employment in half 
– was largely completed by 1968.324 Cancellation of Royal Navy orders also saw the 
labour force cut at the Hawker Siddeley factory in Brough,325 and competition from other 
Development Areas caused major issues for shipbuilding and repairing firms on the 
Humber. These sudden shocks to the local economy led to numbers of registered 
unemployed that, according to the Corporation, were greater than any time since the 
interwar years.326 
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The issues faced by industry and the local authorities in Yorkshire and Humberside saw 
increasing calls from the YHEPC to push not only the region’s long-term case, but also for 
immediate measures to be taken for certain localities. Frustration grew, then, when the 
Council refused to assist the local authorities and MPs in North Humberside in seeking 
government assistance. Roger Stevens defended this position in The Financial Times by 
noting though ‘at the moment, for instance, there is more unemployment in Hull than in 
Huddersfield’, the future transport infrastructure and development proposals for the 
Humber make this region more ‘dynamic’ in the long-term: 
For the moment, therefore, we think that more thought and money must be 
devoted (selectively and with discrimination)… [to the] old industrial areas where 
people do and will live than to the wide open spaces of the Humber estuary where 
the great and glossy New Towns of the future may later be conjured into 
existence.327 
 
Though the Council would repeatedly make the claim, with some justification, of its 
influential role in the establishing of the Hunt Committee on the ‘intermediate’ or ‘grey 
areas’ – that would eventually lead to Intermediate status for the Yorkshire Coalfield and 
North Humberside in 1969 – in the face of these immediate issues the YHEPC was 
increasingly forced on the defensive. In a press conference in November 1969, Stevens 
acknowledged that 
for years the Council has been widely criticised for being only an advisory body, 
incapable of actually doing anything. In answer to such criticisms it has previously 
been explained that while the Council is not an action body, this didn’t mean it 
could not command considerable influence in getting other people who could do 
things to do them; and to do them in the directions in which the Council was 
advocating.328   
 
Listing several examples of when such influence had been brought to bear, Stevens 
concluded: 
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I offer these examples not in any sense for self-glorification or as evidence of self 
satisfaction or complacency. But it would be a great pity if, in spite of what has 
been achieved the hard work that has been done by the Economic Planning Board 
and council between them over the last four years continue to be regarded as 
academic or backroom stuff of little practical significance. It isn’t. The Council does 
its job by giving sound and well argued advice which as recent experience confirms, 
gets acted upon…329 
 
The statement demonstrated how the Council was confronted with an increasingly 
changed attitude to the economic regionalism of the area. The emphasis on ‘doing’ and 
practical action highlighted a greater premium placed on immediate decisions, rather 
than indicative planning. The reference to ‘academic’ or ‘backroom stuff’ also noted the 
erosion of popular endorsement of this form of expertise in decision-making. That trust 
and enthusiasm for the work of the YHEPC had dissipated, particularly amongst the local 
authorities and industrialists of the region, was displayed in the reception of the eventual 
publication of the Regional Strategy in 1970, again given an enlivening title: Yorkshire 
and Humberside: Regional Strategy. The broad strategy predicted no fundamental shift 
in the urban pattern or industrial structure of the region; it reiterated the concentration of 
growth on the ‘focal points’ of the Five Towns, Doncaster and Barnsley; and stressed 
efforts should be concentrated on the need to attract both ‘science-based’ and service 
industries.330 Though the strategy gained broad endorsement from the government, the 
local response from key regional actors was less kind. Local authorities and other bodies 
demonstrated general dismay at lack of any new insight, and its ‘weak generality’.331 The 
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Times reported in January 1971 that the document had drawn ‘a great deal of criticism’, 
citing in particular the CBI and Yorkshire group of Labour MPs.332 
How then did such a rapid shift against state-led planning expertise arise so quickly? The 
recent historiography of British cultural history is instructive here. Historians including 
Lawrence Black and Matthew Hilton have argued against the general characterisation of 
this period as representing a broad Keynesian corporatist collective consensus; instead, 
they highlight the growing consumerist movement that manifested itself through an 
expanding sphere of pressure groups and private actors. Ortolano and others have 
pointed to the more individualist critiques of British culture, such as the ‘radical 
liberalism’ of F.R. Leavis, that were encompassed by the ‘declinist’ literature of the 
period.333 And in party politics, Black and Green have noted the on-going debates in the 
Conservative Party between free market liberals and Butler-style paternalists – played 
out in institutions such as Swinton College in North Yorkshire. Similarly, Labour Party 
revisionists such as Michael Young pushed for greater appreciation for consumer 
matters and of consumer culture.334 Even before the 1970s, such pressures had brought 
about greater citizen protection and involvement in planning, through such means as the 
the creation of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Town and Country Planning Act 1968, 
and later the Skeffington Report.335 
In this on-going discourse on greater market freedom and the role of the state, the 
advertising and marketing executive emerged as the alternative model of 
professionalism and expertise through which economic growth could be fostered. Sean 
Nixon and others have discussed how the advertising industry had emerged as a 
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commercial authority  that rivalled established forms of social power and recognition, 
having successfully countered the moral and ideological concerns of both the left and the 
right surrounding its methods and techniques that had been debated since the early 
1950s.336 This was undoubtedly linked to this burgeoning consumer culture in the 
1960s, which also informed the ‘institutionalisation of a modern, organised 
consumerism’ that manifested in the many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
seeking to exert socio-political influence from this period onwards.337 As Nixon argues, 
advertising men became emblematic of the particular affluence of London in these 
years, and their agencies were emblematic of the increasingly global nature of trade in 
the post-war period.338 In contrast to the disinterested, objective approach claimed by 
planning, public relations, marketing and advertising were imbued by their proponents 
with dynamism, engagement, and assertiveness.  
That the authorities in Yorkshire and Humberside would look more towards these 
alternative forms of expertise lay in the lack of tangible results regional planning had 
wrought. Crucially, however, the perceived failings of planning neither led to the 
abandonment of a desire for region-wide economic cooperation, nor an abandonment of 
the need for professional expertise to coordinate such action. It instead heralded 
increasing desire for the Yorkshire and Humberside to be actively promoted, rather than 
taking the YHEPC’s presentation of its more passive role within a broader national 
framework. Such a point was illustrated in May 1971 in a Yorkshire Post article by John 
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Spence, Conservative MP for Sheffield Heeley. Titled ‘Why the regions need to call in the 
experts’, Spence criticised the lack of dynamism in planning that had seen economic 
potential in the region wasted:  
For years we have had regional economic plan on top of plan. Each for a time has 
held some attraction. Largely each succeeding plan has been a re-hash of some 
earlier plan – updated of course – but essentially the same as what went before. 
And just as earlier plans and advice had not solved the problem, so later ones did 
not do so either… Why have we been so long on policy – long on plans and advice, 
but so short on performance?339 
 
In Spence’s opinion, both national and local government served as ‘protective agencies’ 
– ‘they are not initiators – they are not “doers”’. What was needed for economic 
development was ‘attracting scarce money and economic resources – this will not be 
done by the public relations officer, but only by an effective “go-getter” organisation going 
all out for results’.340 
The appointment of Bernard Cotton to the Chair of the YHEPC in October 1970 (a role he 
would hold until its abolition in 1979) was perhaps the most crucial aspect of enshrining 
this change in attitude. Sheffield-born, and the chief executive of the Osborn steel group, 
his appointment was described as ‘a surprise for many who expected a name from the 
circuit of public affairs participators’.341 Grammar-school educated, and having starting 
his career – rather crucially – as a salesman after wartime service, he made much of 
credentials as a ‘self-made’ man.342 Cotton’s continued refrain was for the local 
authorities and sub-regional institutions to exercise greater ‘self-help’ to alleviate the 
gloomy economic outlook.343 It was a position he made clear almost immediately upon 
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taking charge of the YHEPC; the Hull Daily Mail reporting his statement that ’self help, 
and not just Government cash hand-outs, is the answer to the problems of Yorkshire and 
Humberside’.344 
That Cotton was appointed by the incumbent Conservative government of Ted Heath 
makes it easy to identify the more market liberal approach represented by the election 
manifesto and the Selsdon Park conference of early 1970. Though, as Green has argued, 
the policy approach adopted not as laissez-faire as suggested, its attitude towards 
regional policy placed much greater emphasis on competitive self sufficiency and 
individual decision-making.345 This matched official and semi-official moves across the 
region in various local and urban centres. Several area development associations, 
formed from partnerships between ‘professionals and businessmen’,346 local authorities 
and trade unions, had been established by the early 1970s including in Labour-
controlled areas such as Rotherham and Doncaster. Such associations had taken on the 
role of more actively promoting their local areas to industries, several taking advantage 
of the opportunities provided by their Intermediate and Special Development Area 
Status. 
The steps taken in North Humberside, and in particular Hull, are particularly illustrative. 
In mid-1970, the Hull Junior Chamber of Commerce and Shipping formed a steering 
committee from various interests on the North Bank,347 and several companies (in 
manufacturing, service and retail trades) in the Hull and East Riding area were 
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canvassed to discover what these firms saw as limitations to growth, and what a 
development association could do about these. As the summary of the findings reported: 
The majority of the companies want, and are prepared to back financially a 
professionally-run P.R. Campaign to improve the image (and their recruiting 
prospects) of the City. One specifically refers to the need for a professional Director 
“with missionary zeal”.348 
 
Intense interest in this issue was evident around the city of Hull at this time, as was the 
need to commit resources to active promotion, not just the creation of the conditions for 
industrial development. Advertising’s potential power in this endeavour was put forward 
for instance in a report in the Hull Daily Mail: 
We should be prepared to spend more on publicity. When one remembers that it 
cost £500,000 to inflict a new motor car on us, pittance is too polite a word to 
describe the £10,000 given to our Development Committee to publicise Britain’s 
Third Port.349 
 
When the Chamber’s steering committee report was published in November 1970, it 
acknowledged that the economic problems of the area were pressing, but action needed 
to be taken:  
Whatever the future may bring, it is clear that North Humberside’s major problem is 
the short-term. Experience elsewhere has shown over three decades how difficult it 
is to reverse a well established decline, so that events of the next five years will be 
crucial… “Self-help” may very well be tried and eventually found wanting; but this is 
no justification for finding it difficult and leaving it untried.350 
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An appendix to the report envisaged an advertising strategy that would be ‘a slower build 
project than simply one strong burst of publicity’, and for this purpose needed the 
appointment of ‘a London based Independent Public Relations Consultancy’.351  
As it was, Hull’s Corporation had at the same time employed McKinsey as consultants to 
assess the council’s capacity to stimulate economic development. Their report reached 
similar findings in relation to the city, pronouncing the main deficiencies lay in the lack of 
‘a positive and dynamic approach… towards commerce and industry’. In order to 
overcome this it was declared that ‘the Corporation needs a positive, outward-looking 
“management style”: a marketing orientation towards commerce and industry, and more 
efficient property management’.352 Rather that work through a proposed development 
agency, the Corporation looked to appoint ‘a man to develop a city’, who required ‘an 
analytical mind and the tenacity and ability to make decisions’.353 Ian Holden, the man 
appointed in April 1971 to the role of Director of Industrial Development, pronounced in 
the local press that he planned ‘…to get Hull more widely known using public relations 
and other marketing techniques, and hopes to get investment in Hull from outside 
companies’.354 
 
IV 
Despite these initiatives, the continued worsening economic conditions in the winter of 
1971-72 would lead to the government’s reversal of the decision to move from capital 
grants to tax allowances in the development areas, which had a particularly alarming 
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effect in the Yorkshire and Humberside region.355 This led not only to the 1972 Industry 
Act that would extend Intermediate status to the whole region, but also to an Opposition 
motion tabled by Roy Mason – former President of the Board of Trade – and Sheffield 
Attercliffe MP Patrick Duffy. The motion, highlighting ‘increased unemployment and loss 
of job prospects in the last two years’ and calling for ‘an urgent reappraisal of its 
measures to give its people faith in a more prosperous future’, led to a debate lasting 
more than five and a half hours. Though Conservative MP for Bradford West John 
Wilkinson contended that ‘there [was] very little in common between the West Riding 
textile district and the South Yorkshire coalfield, between Huddersfield and the deep 
south around Sheffield’,356 an area of broad commonality between both Labour and 
Conservative MPs was that self-reliance rather than greater central financial subsidy was 
the preferred strategy for economic development. That this should be channelled through 
a region-wide development association – using marketing expertise now increasingly 
favoured – was again advanced by Spence who put forward that ‘…a vigorously led local 
campaign with the object of selling the area, the town, the city, the region is probably the 
most constructive form of self-help that we can do for ourselves in the regions’.357 
By September, the YHEPC through Cotton had pressed forward with such proposals. A 
region-wide industrial development association ‘strongly recommended’ to promote all 
that the region had to offer to industrialists. Envisaged as ‘a small number of of high 
calibre specialist staff’, the main roles of a regional body included promotion (through 
‘more effective and widespread advertising and general publicity’); and co-ordination 
(acting as ‘a clearing house of information’ for available industrial sites etc. throughout 
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the region’).358 By the end of January 1973 the constitution of the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Development Association (YHDA) had been approved and adopted.359 The 
new YHDA was able to secure membership from all the new local authorities within the 
region, who would also provide financial support – a position that it would retain through 
both the 1970s and 1980s.360 
The man hired to be YHDA’s first Director came directly from industrial development and 
promotion work. Dr. Iain Skewis had been responsible for industrial development and 
marketing for the Highlands and Islands Development Board. The Association’s second 
director in 1977, Peter Watson, came from ‘a marketing career previously’ and declared 
himself as ‘a relative newcomer to industrial development’.361 Though the YHEPC 
continued to operate under Cotton until 1979, the chairman saw its most notable and 
vigorous achievement to be the Association’s creation.362 The action taken by the YHDA 
almost immediately sought to emphasise its assertiveness and dynamism: initial policy 
objectives for the ‘small professional team’ included ‘to establish the YHDA in the eyes of 
the Government and regional local authorities, industrialists and commentators as a 
professional, imaginative, and above all a ‘doing’ body’.363 This mantra of being a ‘doing 
body’ cut across all of the Association’s early communications. Promotion was seen as 
central to such efforts: 
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It is in the promotional field that the Yorkshire and Humberside Development 
Association will be most in the public eye. It is planned that the effort will be 
“regional” in character and it is expected that the response will arise from the 
whole development spectrum of manufacturing and service industry (including 
office activities and distributive centres). 
In every case the technique will be to secure the developer’s interest, analyse his 
needs, review the possibilities of the region with him (normally by a visit to the 
Association’s Central Planning Centre), and then arrange for him to meet the 
appropriate people who can take his interest further ‘on the ground’ in the parts of 
the region he wishes to consider.364 
 
Rather than use expertise as a means to provide factually-grounded advice, the YHDA 
was intended to position the Yorkshire and Humberside region aggressively and 
competitively, as an Financial Times editorial on the region in March 1974 remarked: ‘Its 
avowed intention during the next year is to use hard-nosed publicity techniques to put 
the region more noticeably on the map’.365 This strategy developed over the mid-1970s 
and into the 1980s. Articles highlighting industrial development, or the advantages of the 
region to commercial and industrial interests, continued to appear in the national press. 
In 1978, the YHDA began to publish its own almost-monthly newsletter/trade magazine 
titled Development Digest, which by the early 1980s had a circulation of over 6,000, 
many of which went to overseas industrialists, embassies and chambers of commerce. 
The YHDA also organised trade visits with Northern Europe and Scandinavia, the United 
States, and – by the mid-1980s – South East Asia (particularly Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Japan) all being targeted as areas of particular focus.366 From 1981 onwards, YHDA 
would also establish their own presence in the US by hiring agents. A directory of 
companies and various brochures were also produced. 
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The focus on marketing also indicated a shift in both the scale and timeframe of 
prospective regional economic development. Industrial policy as pursued to the 1960s 
had favoured macroeconomic economic measures as a way of increasing productivity, 
particularly via growth in export-based manufacturing industries. Nicholas Kaldor and 
Thomas Balogh, two of the foremost economic advisors to Harold Wilson, argued that 
this needed to be done through larger units and a process of ‘orderly rationalisation’.367 
Rapid deindustrialization and increasing unemployment eroded the logic of such 
assumptions, and by the early 1970s these assumptions of more large-scale and long-
term ‘prestige’ projects were being increasingly questioned. This was in part embodied in 
1973 by E.F. Schumacher’s book Small is Beautiful.368 Such sentiments were evident in 
Yorkshire and Humberside in the 1970s. Spence opined that ‘…it is better to have a 
cosmetics factory and employ people, even though it might not be as dramatic or have 
the same prestige as an aluminium smelter plant or oil refinery…’.369  
Despite the change towards a more competitive, private and entrepreneurial form of 
expertise, there still remained a number of continuities to the approach that had been 
adopted in the 1960s. YHDA, in the 1970s at least, maintained an acute awareness of 
the local and sub-regional diversity of the region. This was in part a result of the YHDA’s 
origins in local development association initiatives. Though facilitating commercial and 
industrial promotion through use of marketing expertise, the role of the Association was 
then to ‘pass on’ interested parties to the Development officers of the new local 
authorities. Similarly, the importance of data and new technologies as a means of 
facilitating efficient decision-making remained an initially much-vaunted part of YHDA’s 
                                                            
367 Martin Chick, ‘The state and industrial policy in Britain, 1950-1974’, in Christian Grabas and 
Alexander Nutzenadel (eds.), Industrial Policy in Europe after 1945: Wealth, Power and Economic 
Development in the Cold War (Basingstoke, 2014). 
368 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and global history since 1900 (London, 
2006), 191; Sandbrook, State of Emergency, 183-184; Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional 
Society: England since 1880 (London, 2002), 481; O’Hara, Dreams to Disillusionment, 211-212. 
369 ‘Why the regions need to call in the experts’, Yorkshire Post, 5 May 1971. 
  118 
work. YHDA’s focal point on launch in 1974 was its ‘regional planning centre’, intended 
to give ‘a complete picture of the region’ both visually (through maps) and statistically 
(through its ‘computerised data bank’ and reference library).370 Though this planning 
centre fitted the more consumerist context – its purpose being ‘..to offer “customers” an 
impressive and efficient service’ – YHDA continued to place emphasis on its being a 
‘clearing house of information’. Though policy relied less on the influence of academics 
or on fundamental restructuring of the economy, and more on incremental commercial 
and industrial developments, this did not mean an entire rejection of their role and 
importance to development. However, as Cotton told a conference at Hull University, ‘the 
universities could provide research, new thinking, and innovation that could result in new 
products, new employment and new wealth for the community’.371 A YHDA promotional 
piece in the Financial Times in 1987 emphasised the credentials of the then director Dr 
John Bridge and his ‘“targeted marketing” approach’ by clarifying that ‘the PhD is in 
economics’.372 In the 1970s and 1980s, expertise was more singularly refocused onto 
market-driven, wealth-generating forms. 
 
2.4 Environment and Image 
 
I 
The YHEPC and YHDA both asserted the central importance of employing expertise in 
regional economic problems. They were representative of the changing attitude towards 
how and what professional expertise were necessary to secure regional economic 
growth. A crucial part of how this expertise was constructed centred on the physical 
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‘environment’ of the region. This focus showed similar development over this period: 
from a reliance on high-modernist representations of the 1950s and 1960s, to the 
increasing commodification of Yorkshire and Humberside’s natural and more 
‘postmaterialist’ assets in the 1970s and 1980s. This section highlights the relationship 
between the physical environment of Yorkshire and how the region’s ‘image’ was 
perceived, emphasising how this interacted in the work and actions of the major regional 
economic institutions. This examination highlights how material and imagined 
geographies of regional differences are interwoven in – rather than separate dimensions 
of – English regionalism and regional identity.373 However, it also highlights the extent to 
which diverse material and economic geographies, and occasionally contradictory 
regional imaginations, can be employed simultaneously.  
 
II 
In the few instances where the EPCs have been historicised, most attention has focused 
on their direct role within economic development, and their apparent lack of both 
influence and success in this regard.374 This primary concern is understandable and 
valid, but it has also meant that less attention has been given to the EPCs’ more indirect 
influence on issues around physical planning. In Yorkshire and Humberside, the EPC’s 
attempts to exert direct and indirect influence were most apparent in relation to the 
environment. This concern was not just the preserve of public sector officials acting in 
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accordance with public health, amenities and transport, but was also the deep concern 
of a variety of NGOs and voluntary initiatives.  
The development of ‘the politics of the environment’ represented a key theme of the 
1960s and 1970s.  While environmental action and conservation groups in England 
dated back to mid-nineteenth century, modern environmentalism began emerge in 
earnest in the mid-1960s.375 Hilton et al have argued this period also saw ‘a major 
philosophical shift’ in environmental campaigning, with ecological considerations 
increasingly supplanting aesthetic considerations.376  J.R. McNeil has suggested a more 
interrelated development, highlighting how popular and vociferous movements had 
emerged by the 1970s – in part motivated by the visual nature of the damage wrought 
by pollution-intensive economies – represented by interlinked global and locally focused 
environmental groups.377 But the literature generally agrees that increasing 
environmentalism was in part a product of increasing affluence across Western societies, 
and the move towards more values-based public politics. Such a context was keenly 
apparent to the actors within the YHEPC, who in their report on environmental progress 
in the region in 1973 noted that 
Public concern about the environment has grown enormously during the period 
covered by this report. The environment is nowadays an “in” word, embodied, for 
example, in the title of a major Government Department… Nowadays, the need to 
clean and renovate buildings is taken as a matter of course. When the Council 
started their work this was not so.378 
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The Council created an Environmental Group upon beginning its work in 1965. The terms 
of reference adopted by the Group demonstrated a primary concern for the aesthetic 
environment of Yorkshire and Humberside, and in particular the built environment: 
To consider in what respect environment in the Yorkshire and Humberside Region, 
including the appearance and physical condition of urban and rural areas, and 
facilities of living, for education, for health and welfare, and for recreational and 
cultural activities.379 
 
The Group sought the involvement of the local authorities from an early stage, with Roger 
Stevens writing to establish the relative importance they placed on various 
environmental factors, what steps they had taken, and the barriers they perceived to 
addressing these issues.380 The condition and appearance of various public utilities 
(such as car parks, public transport interchanges and council housing estates) and 
industrial sites were the most prominent feature of the list supplied. However, 
atmospheric pollution and the condition of waterways and recreational facilities (physical 
and cultural) were also included, demonstrating at least some sense of a more rounded 
environmental ambit.381 Unlike the unanimous response received to their enquiries on 
planning initiatives, responses for these environmental factors were less forthcoming, 
with only 57 per cent of the region’s 143 councils having submitted returns by March 
1966.382 
However, the replies received and subsequent actions showed both local and regional 
environmental concerns centred on the quality of the built environment, primarily due to  
the ageing and increasingly obsolescent industrial infrastructure of the region. Derelict 
buildings and sites were summarised as the main problem faced by local authorities but, 
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as with other elements of economic and physical planning in Yorkshire and Humberside, 
there was great diversity within this. The environmental problems reported ranged from 
derelict pit-heads and unsightly slag-heaps of the coalfield; derelict railway stations and 
factories, particularly in the West Riding; and even planning restrictions in rural areas of 
the East Riding preventing expansion or derelict land clearance.383 Review of Yorkshire 
and Humberside, in addition to having a chapter dedicated to the ‘physical environment’, 
included an appendix detailing the scale of dereliction across the region. In relative 
terms, the acreage of designated derelict land across the region was less than all but 
three of the planning regions across England and Wales. The YHEPC however made a 
point of emphasising the high concentration of this land in the industrial areas of the 
West Riding (see Table 1), and the high cost of treating this land for the local authorities 
given that the region was not eligible for government grants of 85 per cent offered to the 
Development Areas. In some senses this was a prescient case as, due to the continued 
rundown of the region’s mines and other staple industrial concerns, the total acreage 
justifying treatment had all but doubled to 10,544 acres by 1971.384 
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Table 1 - Derelict Land in England and Wales, 31 December 1964 
Area 
Total Acreage 
of Derelict 
Land 
Derelict Land 
per 10,000 
Acres of the 
Total Regional 
Acreage 
Total Acreage 
Justifying 
Treatment 
Percentage of 
Column 4 
treated in 
1964 
Percentage of 
Column 4 to 
be trated in 
1965 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
England and 
Wales 99,091 27 59,495 4.38 6.8 
Northern 19,882 42 13,291 1.94 11.19 
Yorkshire 
and 
Humberside 
9,733 28 5,660 2.24 3.9 
West Riding 6,248 35 3,811 2.97 5.79 
East Riding 622 8 379 3.69 Nil  
L indsey 2,863 30 1,470 Nil  Ni l  
North West 12,784 65 9,453 4.72 5.81 
Wales and 
Monmouthshire 14,191 28 8,304 4.88 6.1 
East Midland 6,142 20 3,899 2.98 7.18 
West Midland 12,290 38 10,991 7.76 5.49 
East Anglia 2,970 10 1,873 2.24 4.48 
South West 16,042 27 2,763 3.11 6.04 
South East 5,117 8 3,261 4.54 4.47 
YHEPC, A Review of Yorkshire and Humberside (HMSO, 1966), Table F1, Appendix F, 126. 
 
The built, primarily urban environment and its renewal was a core focus of the YHEPC in 
its early days. Again, this was in line with the urban nature of modernist thinking, which 
as John Urry has summarised defines space as 'absolute, generalised and independent 
of context'.385 Implicit within this was a modernist distaste for the past, noting there was 
a need for relief from ‘the general drabness and monotony of much of the urban area of 
the West Riding’.386 By 1970 there were 29 urban redevelopment plans in place across 
the region which in Yorkshire showed little regard for the value of the existing 
environment, as Simon Gunn has highlighted particularly in relation to Bradford, where 
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the past was seen as ‘the locus of environmental problems, not charming relics’, and 
which also placed ‘speedy transport links’ to other urban centres as a priority.387 Leeds 
similarly sought a grandiose redesign of its built environment, attempting to reshape 
itself as ’The Motorway City of the Seventies’ through the creation of its Inner Ring Road 
from the mid-1960s that – though in part inspired by the Buchanan Report (1963) – saw 
its more conservationist sentiments ‘overridden by the seemingly unrelenting imperative 
for road space’.388 These development plans followed the ahistorical logic of modernism 
to a greater degree than some of the more infamous experiments in urban planning such 
as Newcastle.   
In the 1966 Review, urban and regional road communications were given particularly 
close attention, and it was this subject that produced perhaps the most strident call to 
both central and government action from the YHEPC, with the statement that 
only a bold and imaginative programme of road improvements can reduce this 
problem to manageable size. This will take time, perhaps a long time. Meanwhile 
traffic will increase progressively and traffic increases will continually overtake road 
improvements.389 
 
In contrast, the other two Northern regions displayed less concern with road transport. 
The circumstances in the North West were pronounced by the North West EPC (NWEPC) 
to be ‘improving markedly’, with the construction of the M6 and additional motorways in 
planning.390 In the North East, the communications situation was also perceived to be 
less pressing, as some £125 million was programmed to the spent on improving the 
region’s roads between 1965-70, including £50 million made available as a result of 
Lord Hailsham’s political missions in 1963 which stressed infrastructural improvement 
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as vital to the region’s economic future.391 The YHEPC’s emphasis on the importance of 
modernising communications, particularly for road and air travel (see chapter 4) 
demonstrated the emphasis placed by regional officials on modern infrastructure and 
urban environments designed for automotive mobility as an essential prerequisite for 
economic growth in the 1960s. The Council were unapologetic that '…because most 
people spend the greater part of their time at work or at home, improvement of the urban 
environment should have the highest priority'.392 This emphasis would continue even as 
regional economic promotion eclipsed regional planning. The improving situation for road 
transport by the 1970s, with the completed extension of the M1 to Leeds, and the 
ongoing construction of the M62 and M18 as the major schemes in some £350 million 
of road investment in the region, meant that emphasis shifted elsewhere.393 Skewis 
would use one of his first YHDA articles in the national press to make plain the 
Association’s belief that transport was still ‘key to regional growth’ and ‘substantial and 
imaginative investment in Yorkshire and Humberside’s railways, docks, waterways and 
airports is what is now needed’.394 When under fire for its lack of ‘doing’, the YHEPC 
would claim that it took the initiative in 1968 to launch a regional ‘clean-up’ campaign. 
Roger Stevens made clear that the Council saw small improvements (‘painting, cleaning 
and tidying up’) as essential means of attracting the dynamic industries the YHEPC was 
seeking to capture: 
This is the kind of thing the campaign is directed towards, and the council believes 
that in this a great deal can be done which would have the effect of making this 
region more attractive, above all to new science-based industry.395 
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The success of the campaign would lead to a dedicated ‘Yorkshire Council for the 
Environment’, which in 1973 the YHEPC described as ‘a thriving and busy 
organisation’.396 The YHEPC was not alone in launching such a ‘self-help’ campaign; 
‘Operation Springclean’ was launched the following year by the NWEPC, with its slogan of 
“Fight grime in the North West”.397 As a 1971 special report in The Times on the North 
West noted, much still needed to be done as part of ‘clearing up the mess left behind in 
a less enlightened age’. However, much praise was heaped on the new urban 
landscapes of ‘sparkling new blocks of flats, new factories, smooth-moving traffic on dual 
carriageways and grass and trees interspersing the brick and concrete’ were ‘far cry from 
the Love on the Dole and Coronation Street images’.398 
It was an appeal to meeting the needs of both clearing the supposed debris of the 
Victorian era, and an inducement to more modern infrastructure, which informed the 
evidence the YHEPC provided to the Hunt Committee during its work in 1967 and 1968. 
This reflected a general aversion of the Council towards increased financial subsidies 
such as the Regional Employment Premium used in the Development Areas. Central was 
the case for greater investment grants to be offered to new and existing industries in the 
'older industrial parts of the region' to improve and modernise their premises and assets. 
It was deemed 'essential' that preferential grants for the derelict land clearance were 
needed – ideally the 85 per cent grants offered in the Development Areas – 'to clean the 
environment, in order to make these areas attractive to industry'. Roads were the final 
infrastructural necessity the YHEPC pressed for: ’in particular, the highest priority should 
be given to road improvements and developments which would help to encourage 
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industry and increase the mobility of the region's manpower'.399 In contrast, the NWEPC 
was less bashful about appealing for fiscal assistance, as their Hunt evidence called for 
the ‘Pennines Zone’, ostensibly centred around Burnley and Blackburn, to receive 
financial assistance commensurate with the Development Areas.400 But the YHEPC 
would remain consistent in their basic focus that infrastructural and environmental 
improvement was a means for economic growth. This motivated the Council to produce 
perhaps its most provocative call to action for local and national government under the 
Chairmanship of Roger Stevens. As part of the 1970 Strategy Review, the Environmental 
Group created a map of ‘Environmental Conditions’ by local authorities. In doing so, the 
Council was clear that had ‘…not shirked from setting out frankly the worst aspects of the 
region’s environment’. Eleven factors – including provision of basic amenities and 
rateable values, dereliction, pollution, and access to the countryside – were condensed 
into ‘a single index of environmental deficiency’, with the greatest weight placed on 
housing quality.401 The coloured map of the region (Figure 2.2), whilst attempting to 
show the area as ‘full of contrasts’, nevertheless highlighted that much of the urban 
environment of the West Riding (in particular the textile districts and coalfield) was ‘poor’ 
to ‘bad’. The categorisation of Hull as ‘bad’ – claimed mainly on the basis of its poor 
housing – sparked particular consternation from the Corporation, which saw this as a 
point of controversy in the report, a view supported by the region’s Standing Conference 
of Local Planning Authorities.402 
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Figure 2.2 ‘Environmental conditions’, in Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning 
Council, Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Strategy (HMSO, 1970). 
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III 
The YHEPC’s early work noted the negative perceptions of the environment across 
Yorkshire and Humberside. Under the Chairmanship of Roger Stevens, YHEPC set out a 
strongly proud regional identity, but one that was deeply concerned about the ‘image’ of 
the region. In the article in the Guardian announcing the launch of the region-wide clean-
up, it was stated that ‘visitors were adversely impressed’ by the overall appearance of 
the area.403 This consciousness of the visibility of dereliction and industrial decay was 
clear in the Chairman’s suggestion to Hull’s clerk in late 1969 that even the clearance of 
small ‘abandoned and ruinous factories’ was important: 
Many of these kinds of dereliction are conspicuous and should by no means be 
overlooked in forming programmes. Indeed, schemes to clear and plant small sites 
adjacent to main roads (which need not be expensive) yield an impressive reward 
in terms of improving the appearance of a town at a reasonable cost.404 
 
Such a consciousness of the image of the region was borne out of the technocratic and 
planning fervour of the 1960s. Constant defensive allusions were made in the late 
1960s and early 1970s to the negative perception of Yorkshire and Humberside by 
those outside the region, particularly by the South East and London. This consciousness 
of a negative image is most visible in the Commons debate in 1972; J.P.W. Mallieu, the 
Labour MP for Huddersfield East, saw the economic difficulties besetting the region as 
due to the 'difficulty' presented by 'the image of Yorkshire as being black and bleak and 
scarred'.405 Stanley Cohen, the MP for Leeds South-East was more blunt, but more 
evocative in his pronouncement: 
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We must create a new image of our region. It is unfortunately true that in many 
areas in this country, particularly the South of England, there is a tendency to 
regard us still as morons wearing cloth caps and mufflers, keeping a donkey in the 
bath and spending our leisure time climbing slag heaps.406 
 
Similarly, in a volume on Yorkshire Heritage first published in 1970, Harry J. Scott, the 
long-time editor of the monthly Yorkshire magazine The Dalesman, summarised the 
partiality (but also the grain of validity) of the image presented of the region to the 
outsider: 
A standing grievance with Yorkshire folk is that their county of broad acres is so 
widely misrepresented as a black land of pit-heads, belching mill chimneys, 
clanging steel works and grime smothered houses. Unfortunately many of the 
modern ‘ways in’ have lent substance to this view. Because our railways were 
designed to serve industrial areas they entered where the murk was greatest. 
Because the roads to the south traversed the area of coal and steel, the first 
impression of travellers was of blackness and of noise. The traditional English way 
of entering a city through its backdoor of slums applies as much to the North as on 
the way into London. But you don’t judge London by its backdoor! The blackness of 
a limited area of Yorkshire is, indeed, a comparatively recent development.407 
 
The YHEPC even saw it necessary to state in their Review that, ‘contrary to popular belief, 
the climate of the region is not markedly worse than many other parts of the country'.408 
The decreasing capital of and trust in planners, academic professionals and civil 
servants in favour of more assertive promotional activity led by public relations and 
advertising professionals provided an impetus for a change in emphasis within the 
YHEPC. The worm of public opinion had been steady turning against the 'second planning 
revolution' and its ills in the late 1960s.409 The backlash to much of the planned 
redevelopment of this period saw palpable distaste to the supposed vandalism wrought 
on the urban landscape, a rejection of many of the industrial precepts of economic 
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planning, and increased both appreciation of both rural and industrial heritage. Such 
shifts provided the economic development bodies with both a need to more assertively 
market and self-fashion the image of their region; but also an opportunity to exploit 
different regional assets in doing so. In the 'self-help' spirit engendered by Cotton, the 
new Chairman's introduction to YHEPC's Environmental Progress Report in 1973 
signalled the need to more assertively promote the positives the region had to offer 
rather than focus on its negatives: 
Yorkshire and Humberside is a great region. Its people are characterful and 
hardworking. Its towns and cities are bustling and lively centres. It has industries of 
world-wide reputation and a prospering agriculture…. And yet the region is 
considered in some parts of the country to be a drab relic of the nineteenth century, 
full of dark satanic mills. What are we going to do about it?410 
 
This shift in emphasis and positivity saw increasing and more vocal criticism brought to 
bear on areas that pled economic distress, for instance Hull. Hull’s officials had been 
lobbying for greater regional policy assistance in light of the economic issues the city had 
been facing. There had been conscious attempts to highlight that ‘the economic situation 
within the city and its immediate environs is considerably worse than the region’,411 and 
to press their case for full Development Area status.412 Despite an unemployment rate of 
over four per cent, sympathy from industrialists and the regional economic bodies was 
minimal. It was stated in response that the city itself was to blame for its ‘rundown 
image’, with one piece positing that 
when we have councillors and aldermen demanding that we be treated as a 
development area at once, who can blame the rest of the country for thinking that 
Hull is a depressed area?413 
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The secretary of the YHEPC was similarly damning, suggesting that the Humberside’s 
‘chip’ on the shoulder over its supposed isolation ‘…was often put forward as an alibi 
when the question of the lack of industrial and economic growth throughout the region 
was raised’.414 
 
IV 
This new image-conscious form of economic regionalism relied on the cultural and 
imaginative vocabulary that regional industrial bodies in Yorkshire and Humberside could 
draw on to construct an identity for the region to outsiders. In this regard, the images 
drawn on by the YHDA in its work in the 1970s and 1980s represented something of a 
shift in emphasis, not just in relation to the spatial environment but also – perhaps more 
importantly – in relation to the temporal conception of the region.  
Though large urban centres had been the focus of efforts in the 1960s, attention now 
turned to the smaller market towns and equally rich rural environment that Yorkshire and 
Humberside offered. The region’s countryside had come under consideration by the 
YHEPC in publications and interactions with public and voluntary bodies, but these had 
been somewhat cursory in scope. In the 1966 Review, the chapter dedicated to the 
‘physical environment’ had acknowledged that the ‘richness and variety’ of the region’s 
countryside was one of its ‘greatest assets’, and that most city centres were only three 
miles from open country.415 However, such statements amounted to barely ten 
paragraphs in a chapter that focused primarily on derelict land within the cities and 
towns, and which had been preceded by a full chapter on the deficiencies of the region’s 
urban housing.  
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The 1970 Strategy was, for the most part, as equally passive about the virtues of the 
countryside as it sought to highlight the environmental issues of urban areas. However, 
in the half paragraph in which the YHEPC highlighted the countryside, the traces of a shift 
in approach could be seen: 
…there is another and much brighter side which represents one of the region’s 
most valuable assets and which is so often not recognised by many others who 
have not lived here. The region is endowed with spectacular scenery and 
countryside of unsurpassed beauty extending throughout the region’s boundaries 
and close to many of its industrialised areas. Throughout, the region is able to offer 
great attractions to the tourist. These assets are becoming more widely 
recognised.416 
 
For a Council whose position had previously been ambivalent, if not openly hostile, to the 
region’s past, it was noteworthy that illustrations of some of both Yorkshire and 
Lincolnshire’s historic landmarks, and the market town of Knaresborough, were included 
alongside modern industrial images of smelting works and power stations (Figures 2.3.1, 
2.3.2). 
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Figures 2.3.1, 2.3.2 From Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council, Yorkshire 
and Humberside Regional Strategy (HMSO, 1970). 
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The diverse landscape and heritage of the region became something that could be used 
as an asset in forging a imagined regional identity in the 1970s. Not only could the 
region project its modern industrial infrastructure, but it could also promote its historical 
significance. Scott would not only highlight this, but assert that greater ownership of this 
meeting of past, present and future needed to be taken by interests in (and away from) 
Yorkshire: 
Many a Yorkshire exile has boasted in far lands of the manifold richness of his 
home territory: sheep on the hills and an abundance of minerals beneath the 
ground, rich farms on the plains and the wolds and a multitude of manufactories in 
the industrial valleys, the age-old industry of bringing fish from the sea and the 
modern production of chemicals along the river estuaries. All this against a 
backdrop of ancient abbeys and castles, lonely fells and remote moors and dales, 
historic architecture side by side with new universities and modern housing estates. 
It is a country of which to be proud. Yet it must be admitted that there are moments 
where one wonders if Yorkshire folk at home, for all their aggressive loyalty, are not 
insensitive of the riches which are their heritage. So much is ignored and forgotten 
in these days where we speed through our land more concerned with miles per 
gallon than the panorama of the landscape.417 
 
As the following chapters emphasise, the assertion of both tradition (invented or 
otherwise) and a deep heritage and history of place had been a key response to the 
encroachment of urban modernism in the more rural parts of the country, such as 
Lincolnshire and the East Riding, since the 1960s. The adoption of these images by the 
YHDA, in particular, looked to blend both images, to appeal both to the dynamic 
businessman and industrialist, but also the national and international tourist. The 
neglect of tourism in Yorkshire and Humberside to this point somewhat reflected the 
changing patterns of mass tourism. Increasing affluence in Britain, combined with a 
flourishing charter and Inclusive Tours (IT) market operated by independent airlines, had 
produced a huge expansion and ‘democratisation’ (as Peter Lyth has termed it) in 
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international air travel.418 By 1970, some 5.7 million Britons were venturing abroad on 
holiday, and spending around £460 million.419 Such a development had seen the 
increasing eclipse of the British seaside resort as the holiday destination of choice in the 
1960s, but increasing mobility through both rail and road communications had meant 
that the traditional resorts in Yorkshire and Humberside of Bridlington and Cleethorpes 
had been eclipsed by Blackpool, Morcambe and Skegness from a much earlier period.420  
However, the increasing importance of the historical assets of Yorkshire and their tourist 
value came to the fore in the 1970s. In 1974, there were a reported 47.6 million visits to 
‘historic properties’, with a supposed 9.5 million of these accounted for by foreign 
tourists.421 Ballooning membership of the National Trust and of civic associations in the 
mid 1970s also affirmed a wider popular appreciation for the country’s architectural and 
cultural past.422 In this context, tourism became seen as the ‘new growth industry’ in 
Yorkshire at a time of difficulty for traditional industrial concerns. The English Tourist 
Board estimated that in 1972, the value of tourism to the region was approximately 
£120 million in turnover. Such was its value to the region that the Conservatives were 
keen to emphasise, in a second debate held on region’s economy in November 1973, 
that it stood to overtake coal mining in importance to the Yorkshire and Humberside 
economy.423 A 1974 report commissioned by the English Tourist Board indicated how 
well placed Yorkshire with regards to these cultural developments that were underpinned 
by increased affluence, leisure time and greater car ownership across a larger section of 
the population. It noted that ‘…the growth of international tourism has fundamentally 
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altered the structure of the domestic tourist industry with a shift from seaside to inland 
locations. In Yorkshire, the favourable balance of inland and seaside tourism augers well 
for the future’.424 Across the county, the report identified 29 major historic houses or 
gardens, 11 castles or ruins, and 13 abbeys and priories of architectural and historical 
interest. Additionally there were at least four large areas of natural beauty, and also ‘a 
strong pro-tourist attitude among residents’.425 
In addition to a greater emphasis on historic buildings and the natural beauty of the 
landscape, a revolt against the excesses of urban redevelopment, exemplified by Colin 
Amery and Dan Cruickshank’s polemic against the ‘licensed vandalism’ carried out since 
the 1950s by ‘professionally-aided merchants of greed’,426 also led to a move towards 
conservation of the historic parts of Yorkshire and Humberside’s towns and cities. In 
marked contrast to the disavowing of the merits of the area’s inherited architecture, the 
YHEPC’s Environmental Progress Report in 1973 noted that 
An immense amount of building took place in the region in the high noon of the 
Industrial Revolution between 1840 and 1914. At the time of the Regional Review, 
few post-1840 buildings had been listed. But much greater value is now placed on 
Victorian buildings… This means that the region almost certainly will have many 
more listed buildings of architectural or historic importance.427 
 
The establishment of the YHDA therefore was not merely a change towards promotion, 
but also a move towards the construction and projection of an increasingly varied 
cultural and economic image of the region: one that combined the region’s modern 
economic and progressive urban outlook with an appreciation for its historical features 
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and natural landscape. This was explicit in the initial discussion paper produced by the 
YHEPC prior to the YHDA’s formation: 
A body promoting industrial development in the region could also usually co-
ordinate its efforts with other regional bodies, including; e.g. those of the Yorkshire 
Tourist Board: the work of these too bodies should be complimentary since 
industrial development promotion invariably stresses the scenic and other 
environmental attractions of the region, while tourism cannot hope to flourish 
without a sound basis to the regional economy; dilapidated industrial towns would 
be no help in attracting tourists to the region. Both bodies would be interested too, 
in encouraging greater use being made of the region’s facilities for conferences of 
all kinds.428 
 
2.5 “Heartland”: North/South divide, interregional and 
intraregional perspectives 
 
I 
YHEPC, YHDA and – by extension – groups and officials supporting these associations 
grappled with these complexities in relation to the inherent cultural indivisibility of the 
north-south divide in the UK, and more specifically in England. This section contrasts the 
approach of economic institutions in Yorkshire and Humberside with those nations and 
regions that were considered increasingly ‘peripheral’ in the UK economy, particularly 
Scotland and Wales; and the Northern and North Western Planning Regions. Central in 
this is an understanding of how actors within Yorkshire and Humberside saw the 
imaginative geographies of the ‘North’ and ‘South’ and the rather ambiguous positioning 
of the region within such conceptions. This is most evident in the YHDA’s campaign to 
cultivate a ‘Heartland’ image for the region in its promotional activity; in which its location 
in ‘the Centre of Britain’ was pushed as an appeal to the best aspects of both northern 
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and southern ‘metaphors’.429 But such appeals presented continuous ambiguities that 
led to the increasing alignment of certain places with this regional economic image to the 
exclusion of others. 
Increasingly from the 1970s a sense of a binary division within the UK and within 
England itself began to emerge, based on the geographical concentration of 
deindustrialization and consequently unemployment in the regions and nations outside 
of the South East, and to a lesser extent the other regions of the South and Midlands. 
The 1980s saw a continued stream of articles, particularly from the left-wing press, that 
documented the economic and demographic statistics that underpinned a North-South 
divide. In addition to this characterisation in the popular press, ‘during the course of the 
1980s, and into the 1990s, numerous academic accounts pointed to the emergence of 
a substantial gap between south and northern England in terms of employment 
opportunities, unemployment rates, average incomes, dependence on welfare support, 
and various other measures of economic well-being’.430 The basic economic figures 
provided evidence for an acceleration in such trends in the 1980s, with total 
employment in the ‘Southern’ regions increasing by 1.1 million between 1979 and 1986, 
compared to a decrease in jobs of almost 900,000 across the rest of Great Britain over 
the same period.431 Yorkshire and Humberside bore much of the brunt of this, with an 
unemployment rate across the region consistently above the UK, peaking at 13.5 per 
cent in 1986. The number of manufacturing jobs fell by 250,000 between 1979-87, 
some 36.6 per cent of the workforce in that sector within the region.432 Following the 
designation of Intermediate and Special Development Areas following the Hunt Report 
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and planned pit closures in the late 1960s, the region had been subject to creeping 
regional policy assistance. By 1977 the whole of the region was eligible for either 
intermediate or full regional relief, and areas of the region would continue to receive 
support even as the Conservative Government in 1979 began de-scheduling large areas 
of the country, reducing and consolidating the commitments to regional policy.433 
However, as important to the perception of a North-South economic divide based on real 
disparities and inequalities was the distinct images and constructions of the imagined 
cultural divide between North and South. One of the more provocative examples of this 
merging of the real and imagined divide was written in 1989 by journalist David Smith. 
Alongside describing the long economic decline of the North in relation to the South, as 
well as other distinctions such as health outcomes, union density and divisions in voting 
tendencies, Smith’s chapter on the ‘perceptions of North and South’ saw him quote 
George Orwell’s observation in The Road to Wigan Pier of the perceived social realist 
nature of the North by its inhabitants, observing: 
Everyone has encountered the modern descendant of George Orwell’s 
Yorkshireman… If, as it seems incontrovertible, lifestyles are related to prosperity, 
then the economic differences between North and South will tend to reinforce 
social differences.434  
 
Other ideas included that ‘…northerners are somehow more moral and fairer than their 
faster and looser counterparts in the South’; that northern males were more chauvinistic 
than their southern counterparts; and that northern workers were ‘less adaptable and 
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have been more determined to cling on to trade unionism than their southern 
counterparts’.435 
Such generalisations about the nature and image of the North in relation to the South 
were deep-rooted well before the 1980s. Northern space-myths, as Rob Shields has 
traced, held a long literary history dating back into the nineteenth century, and that the 
wild, rugged, untamed nature of the ‘North’s’ natural landscape was meshed with the 
‘unredeemed ugliness’ of its urban environment.436 Such imagery, Shields argues, saw 
‘the spatialisation of England… constructed around London with peripheral regions 
taking different mytho-poetic positions irrespective of their detailed realities – the hellish 
industrial North, for example, or the pastoral south’.437 As Katharine Cockin’s summary 
of  the ‘Literary North’ highlights, ‘the strategic identification of the North with the strange 
and primitive’ was partly a means to buttress the cultural prestige of the South, 
compared to the ‘centres of innovation’ found in the Southern metropolis.438 Such 
stereotypes and images, Lez Cooke also argues, were given new voice by the ‘new wave’ 
of Northern writers who emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, whose North ‘signified a grey, 
constricting drabness, that was the embodiment of limited ambitions and philistine 
cultural outlook’.439 Such images came to be commodified with the establishment of 
commercial television, which capitalised on the ‘kitchen sink drama’ working class 
realism populised in novels and theatre since the 1950s. It brought homogenized images 
of a Northern ‘Granadaland’ to an increasing national television viewing audience.440 The 
distinctly urban image of the North of England also served to provide it with an 
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‘otherness’ to the true, deep Englishness embodied in the supposed pastoral  
landscapes of the South.441  
As many of these scholars on the North and the North-South divide argue, these 
imagined geographies have also led to an ascribing of a character, moral, and ideological 
dimension to these stereotypes. For example, in literary constructions the North was 
characterised as masculine, representing emotional restraint, physical strength, and a 
‘brooding melancholy’ formed from the general gloominess’.442 In economic and political 
terms, Martin suggests that this dichotomy was drawn and exploited by the Thatcher 
government in the 1980s: 
…The South was seen as the dynamic locus of a new culture of enterprise, 
innovation, individual initiative and self-help, a new market-based economic 
democracy, that was counterposed to what was regarded as the old and outmoded 
post-war culture of collectivism, welfare dependency and state subsidy dentified as 
persisting amongst the electorate in the North.443 
 
This also assumes the primacy of the South in the production of such an imagined 
geography of England, a circumstance which as Hechter argued in relation to the Celtic 
Fringe served to reinforce the economic inequalities between core and peripheral 
provinces and nations.444 However, Dave Russell has offered an important corrective to 
these more negative and exclusionary forms of Northern identity and images, and 
Englishness respectively. He argues that the North has had much more agency in the 
conscious construction of its own identity, and that ‘being Northern imbues individuals 
with valuable cultural associations implying a capacity for hard work, a lack of 
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pretension, a certain generosity and warmth and much else’.445 Such can be contrasted 
with Southern metaphors projecting ‘sinful excess’, illogicality and frivolity.446 Russell has 
also highlighted the value that a variety of public figures from more privileged socio-
economic backgrounds have drawn from their Northern associations when claiming 
cultural authenticity.447 However, perhaps most importantly in this regard, the examples 
Russell mobilises are almost entirely drawn from Yorkshire. 
 
II 
The associations’ conscious acknowledgement and articulation of these negative 
associations and particular images of Northernness, and of Yorkshire and the North, 
highlights the validity of the contention that the space-myths surrounding regions and 
their identities form a basis for thought and  action.448 The power of these spatial images 
in the establishing of the YHDA were clear. The initial long-term objectives for the 
Association included 
To project the region in the rest of the UK as part of modern Britain/Europe and to 
steadily erode the “North Country” image.449 
 
In seeking to construct a new image for Yorkshire and Humberside, rather than simply 
eschew a Northern image and emulate the Southern model of economic respectability, a 
different approach was sought that demonstrated a less passive approach to place 
marketing. The same document listed an immediate policy objective as 
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To consolidate and promote the concept of a Yorkshire and Humberside region and 
to establish as its “brand image” its “Heartland” location in the UK and its very 
special position relative to the EEC.450 
 
This ‘Heartland’ found form in Yorkshire’s ‘central’ location, both on the real and 
imagined fault-line between a physical and socially constructed North-South divide. The 
promotional material and statements made within the national press makes the 
exploitation of the region’s geographical position within the UK clear. As the examples 
below in Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show, the YHDA made clear the positioning of the 
Yorkshire and Humberside region, with its now revised boundaries that included North 
Yorkshire County Council. Local development authorities and private firms also followed 
suit in their promotional material. Transport infrastructure was often incorporated into 
these visualisations of the  Yorkshire and Humberside’s location, whilst also emphasising 
its equidistance from both London and Edinburgh. Not only was this geographical 
centrality with the nation aggressively highlighted, but so too was the region’s central 
location in relation to Northern Europe and its ports, as a means of attracting inward 
investment both nationally and internationally. As was emphasised in a YHDA pamphlet 
from the mid-1970s, 
The unique geographical location of Yorkshire and Humberside gives huge 
advantages to its businesses. At the “Centre of Britain” it offers those with national 
distributions the most economical answer to their problems. The whole region is 
the hinterland of the Humber ports looking towards the North Sea and the most 
prosperous parts of Europe. It lies at the eastern end of the rapidly growing 
Humber/Mersey trade axis.451 
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Figure 2.4 From YHDA, ‘Finance for Industrial Expansion’ (1979). 
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Figure 2.5 From ERA Y388 YHDA, ‘Yorkshire and Humberside – Britain means business (u.d. 
c.1982-1984). 
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Figure 2.6  From YHDA, ‘4000 Companies in Yorkshire and Humberside – West Yorkshire 
Volume’ (1976 edition). 
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Figure 2.7 From YHDA, ‘4000 Companies in Yorkshire and Humberside – West Yorkshire 
Volume’ (1976 edition) 
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These industrial promotion activities also used imagined geographies in constructing an 
economic region. A brochure issued in North America in the mid 1980s was keen to point 
out that ‘topographically’ as well as economically, the region was one ‘of great contrasts’; 
highlighting on the same page its vast acres of agriculture; the ‘rugged backbone’ of the 
Pennines and the ‘rolling chalk uplands’ of the Wolds; its centres of commerce; and an 
industrial base that had ‘kept pace with evolving technology and diversified into 
electronics, plastics, petrochemicals, healthcare and biotechnology, and food 
processing’. Not only did this embody the natural imagery and enterprise culture 
associated with the South, it included imagery that capitalised on the supposed untamed 
natural environment of the North, and the legacy of industriousness. Rather than 
negative assertions of the industrial heritage, the YHDA sought to capitalise and 
characterise a past where ’the region [had] been at the forefront of heavy industry’; 
noting as well that ‘much of this countryside remains unchanged, but the heritage of the 
industrial revolution and the region’s present day character derives equally from the 
numerous weaving mills in its valleys’.452 These documents juxtaposed idyllic scenes of 
countryside, pleasant villages and market towns such as Richmond in North Yorkshire, 
Beverley racecourse and Yorkshire Cricket Club, with jet aircraft at Leeds-Bradford, 
petrochemical facilities, office developments and other images of a modern, globalised 
region. Perhaps the most striking of these contrasting spatial and temporal images was 
that of an Intercity train shadowed by York Minster included in 1980s promotional 
material (Figure 2.8). Such positioning for the region economically sought to present it as 
both of the North, and of the South, but independent of both. Rather than emulate the 
South East – or the South – the YHDA instead sought to be a counterpoise. 
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Figure 2.8 From ERA Y388 YHDA, ‘Yorkshire and Humberside – Britain means business (u.d. 
c.1982-1984) 
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III  
Such assertive positioning, challenging, and reinforcing of stereotypes and images were 
representative of the ambiguous and complex inter-regional relationships of the other 
Northern English regions, and of the minority nations of the UK: although the YHDA 
survived the abolition of the regional planning machinery, and with it the YHEPC, in 1979, 
and its unwavering support from all the major local authorities through the 1980s was in 
stark contrast to the experience of the other Northern regions.  
Both the North East and the North West had established industrial development 
agencies well before the belated creation of the YHDA. The North East Development 
Council (NEDC) had existed in various forms since the 1950s as a body to promote the 
North East; and the North West Industrial Development Association was created in the 
1960s ‘to coordinate and promote regional economic development’.453 In terms of the 
promotional activities involved, there were many similarities in the ways they looked to 
promote their regions economically, to attempt to show cultural diversity, and that the 
benefits of increasing affluence were available to executives and industrialists there as 
much as elsewhere in the country. For example, the NEDC would highlight not only the 
region’s communications network in its advertisements,454 but also ‘outstanding facilities 
for sports… unspoiled countryside… uncrowded coastline’ and living space much more 
affordable than the South.455 Similarly, the North-West Industrial Development 
Association (NWIDA) would present an image of ‘one of the finest systems of roads and 
motorways… the complementary attractions of towns and countryside and the whole 
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quality of life in general’.456 They both also adopted similar means of promotion to YHDA, 
organising trade missions and setting up offices overseas as part of an effort to be 
competitive globally from the mid 1970s, the UK’s entry into the EEC. 
Their efforts within their regions proved, however, to be much more fractious and 
turbulent than the Yorkshire experience. Both the NEDC and the NWIDA struggled to 
maintain the involvement of their constituent local authorities. The former’s experience 
was tumultuous for over two decades, with the NEDC’s public relations officer resigning 
in 1969 and declaring the council had ‘failed totally in the past two years to attract new 
industry, and the industrial development were restive and unhappy’.457 Amidst 
unhappiness over the scope of its actions, including sponsoring a forum on devolution, 
Tyne and Wear County Council threatened to withdraw from the NEDC in 1978, Cumbria 
having already done so and joined the North West agency the previous April.458 NWIDA 
would cease in 1985, under accusations that it failed ‘to do its job properly’, and was 
reconstituted as ‘Inward’ the following year with some difficulty in what the Financial 
Times termed ‘one of the most parochially divided regions in Britain’.459 In the midst of 
substantial government reductions to the regional development agencies in the mid 
1980s, the NEDC became subsumed into a new Northern Development Company in 
1987, and suffered similar difficulties with the chief executive leaving after only five 
months in the role.460 The main impetus for development in the North East would from 
this point come from Urban Development Corporations, based on a similar model to that 
used in London’s Docklands, that as Vall notes sought to culturally capture maritime 
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histories and the heritage of Northumbria, rather than the more immediate industrial 
past.461 
In comparison, YHDA could claim much greater success as a regional industrial 
promotional and coordinating body. Despite the distinctly liberal, more free market 
approach the Association represented, it could use its goodwill to coordinate action 
between staunch Labour councils, including Sheffield City Council, and capital-oriented 
‘antagonists’ such as the chambers of commerce within the region.462 When funding was 
cut to the industrial development agencies in 1985-86, four private sector firms  based 
in Yorkshire stepped in to make up the shortfall.463 In 1982, in addition to hundreds of 
companies signed up as associate members, YHDA had established a strong ‘London 
Committee’ deemed essential to promoting Yorkshire and Humberside both nationally 
and globally, that included amongst its members politicians and representatives of global 
companies such as Price Waterhouse, BP, and Chase and Nordic Bank. 
The stable footing of the YHDA, and its presence in London, were indicative of the strong 
construction of a Yorkshire region that would work economically within the national 
interest. As discussed above, an appeal to such an approach was consistent from the 
more technocratic objectivism of the YHEPC in the mid 1960s, and was markedly 
different from that adopted by the other two regions. This analysis of both the YHEPC and 
YHDA’s efforts to articulate and construct Yorkshire and Humberside as an economic 
region demonstrate that this appeal to the national economic interest also involved a 
conscious distancing from the behaviour of the other ‘Northern’ regions and nations. 
Roger Stevens had made clear in his opening address to the YHEPC as Chairman that it 
was essential that it not act as a ‘regional pressure group’, but instead work wholly in the 
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national interest.464 Such an assertion seemed to have a pointed air given the more 
aggressively lobbyist tone the NEPC struck from its beginning. Indeed, Stevens was 
contrasted on an article about the EPCs with T. Dan Smith over the issue of whether  they 
were ‘sticks to belabour the Government into using its vast purchasing power and 
employment role’ for increased regional aid.465 Yorkshire and Humberside’s emphasis on 
regional policies geared towards derelict land clearance, investment grants and 
communications infrastructure were sought as a fair corrective to the region’s 
environmental inheritance. Direct financial assistance, and the stigma of full 
Development Area status, was seen as something to be avoided at all costs, and 
antithetical to the region’s belief in it’s own ‘self-help’ and self-sufficiency. In advocating 
for financial assistance to the Hunt Committee, the representatives of the YHEPC made 
clear that it was only ‘after a great deal of thought…’ that ‘…however unpalatable,’ the 
areas identified were seen as ’in need of a shot in the arm and… a fair do’.466   
That other regional industrial bodies appeared to want to distance themselves from the 
‘North’ and was almost accusatory of its failings. As Smith himself stated to the Hunt 
Committee: 
I think the West Midlands would say, “The reason we want to do this is because we 
do not want to be like the north”. They can see there is nothing as bad as that. This 
is a significant argument. When I go to other areas they say “We want to avoid 
making the mistakes that have led to the position you are in”. They do not deny that 
we are in that condition, and I think that is significant.467 
 
There some significant clashes between the two northern regions, not least the outrage 
when the NEDC was accused of ‘poaching’ in 1968 due to a targeted marketing 
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campaign of firms in the West Riding to entice them to relocate. Stevens wrote to the 
DEA Secretary of State Peter Shore bemoaning a move that was deemed ‘mistimed, 
mistaken and misdirected’: ‘it achieves nothing except to engender inter-regional rivalry 
to the benefit of none’.468  
Such a conscious attempt to not promote more ’Northern’ traits of special pleading on 
the basis of economic exceptionalism led to arms length dealings of the YHEPC and 
YHDA with the Northern regions, and with Wales and Scotland. In the wake of Kilbrandon 
Commission on the Constitution, and the devolution proposals it entailed, a ‘Campaign 
for the North’ emerged which lobbied for similar proposals for the region though – as 
Keating has highlighted – with little unity as to its overall aims.469 Such a view found 
endorsement in part from members of the NEPC, particularly towards the establishing of 
development agency similar to Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA), and it was recorded there were at least ‘mixed views’ on 
more radical constitutional change.470 But not only were the views of the YHEPC 
antipathetic to both suggestions, a national consciousness and the national interest was 
again invoked, as the Council alluded to the threat to the Union the Scotland and Wales 
Bills presented. At the same time ‘fairness’ was again a central feature of the YHEPC’s 
economic concern, as their response to Scottish and Welsh devolution was to highlight 
the ‘danger’ this posed,471 that despite the intention of the Government to ‘secure 
fairness for all different parts [of the UK] devolution would see pressure ‘…to give still 
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further larger shares of national resources to these 2 [sic] countries that the shares to 
which they would, in all equity, be entitled’.472  
The greatest complaint against such unfairness was directed at the government’s grant 
to the YHDA as the regional means of maintaining economic self-sufficiency in Yorkshire 
and Humberside. Firstly, in 1976 the YHDA issued a press release proclaiming ‘WE WANT 
A FAIRER DEAL’, comparing their £15,000 sum from central government to the 
£150,000 received by the SCDI and £540,000 provided to the SDA for publicity and 
research.473 The following year, the Association – despite its grant being doubled – would 
highlight to the Government the much greater sums going to the NWIDA and NEDC, 
noting that though the Association would ‘find it hard to put a reasoned case for parity’ 
with them, the situation deserved examination if it was accepted the other two regions 
‘are getting a fair deal’.474 
Such was indicative of a regional identity portrayed by the region that saw itself 
somewhat separate from the North, not only in terms of its industrial structure and 
physical geography, but in the way the YHDA in particular tried to incorporate and pursue 
a more ‘central’ image by mixing these metaphors; alongside traits that Featherstone 
has identified as aligned with Englishness such as ‘inarticulate patriotism’, fairness and 
a sense of fair play.475 Such sentiments were mixed with more regionally-specific 
stereotypes  such as invocations of ‘typical Yorkshire grit’ and stoicism in the face of 
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adverse economic conditions,476 or the straightforward ‘non-bureaucratic manner’ with 
which the YHDA was reported to assist foreign investors.477 
 
IV 
Finally, discussion of Yorkshire and Humberside’s regional economic bodies’ contingent 
and ambiguous relationships with the imaginative geographies of ‘North’ and ‘South’ 
requires some consideration of intra-regional relations. Within the increasing literature 
from the 1980s on increasing economic disparities between North and South, or the 
‘core’ and ‘periphery’ of the UK, several scholars and commentators highlighted the need 
to recognise the importance of locally concentrated inequalities and increasingly uneven 
regional economic development.478 Brenner argued that the restructuring processes of 
globalisation and deindustrialization produced contradictions in the spatial-Keynesian 
policies adopted across Europe that led to the proliferation of more focused state spatial 
projects.479 In the UK context, these supposed spaces in neoliberalism took the form of 
Enterprise Zones and urban development corporations that in some respects were the 
ultimate rejection of the ‘planning moment’ of the 1960s in representing experiments in 
‘non-planning’. Assistance to industry also became much less spatially focused under the 
Thatcher Government, exacerbating intra-regional economic disparities. When observing 
the work of the YHDA and other evidence during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in 
relation to the regional ‘image’ it constructed and marketed as noted above, such issues 
are apparent with regional industrial promotion. However the novelty of such dynamics in 
the period identified by new regional geographers is seemingly more questionable. 
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In economic terms, the West Yorkshire sub-region and, at its heart, the city of Leeds has 
been considered by a number of studies for its supposed success in engendering growth 
and regeneration. Dutton has noted that ‘the concentration of contemporary economic 
growth in Leeds shatters many doom-laden predictions, so prevalent in the early 1980s, 
of the peripheral role cities play - particularly industrial cities in the north of England - in 
an increasingly post-industrial economy.480 The forefront of such a boom was a 
significant increase in service employment, most notably financial services. Employment 
in financial services from 1979-87 in Yorkshire and Humberside grew by some 50,000, 
alongside large increases in other service sector industries, growth that outstripped other 
prosperous ‘Southern’ regions such as the neighbouring East Midlands.481 This reflected 
the sub-region’s engendering of the ‘central’ image created by the YHDA. The successes 
in West Yorkshire were not confined to Leeds. Urry has highlighted how Bradford, with no 
previous tourist industry, was able to generate one from the early 1980s through its use 
of its 
proximity to international attractions such as Haworth and the Dales and the 
Moors; a substantially intact industrial heritage of buildings, railways and canals 
derived from Bradford’s status as “Worstedopolis”; its location within the high-
profile county of Yorkshire; and the existence of a large and vigorous Asian culture 
that had generated a plethora of small enterprises.482 
 
Also nearby in North Yorkshire was the ‘retirement town’ of Harrogate, which also held 
economic importance as a centre for office, conference and tourist facilities from the 
1970s.483 Alongside York, Harrogate and other suburban hotels within West Yorkshire 
                                                            
480 Paul Dutton, ‘Leeds Calling: The Influence of London on the Gentrification of Regional Cities’, 
Urban Studies, 40:12 (2003), 2570. 
481 Balchin, Regional Policy in Britain, 18-19. 
482 Urry, The Tourist Gaze, 107-109; Lindsay Smales, ‘Desperate pragmatism or shrewd 
optimism? The image and selling of West Yorkshire’, in Graham Houghton and David Whitney 
(eds.), Reinventing a Region: Restructuring in West Yorkshire (Aldershot, 1994), 41-46. 
483 YHEPC, Yorkshire and Humberside - Regional Strategy Review 1975, 21. 
  159 
were seen to be large beneficiaries from the large expansion of tourism noted in the 
previous section.484 
Such economic successes were harder to replicate across the rest of the region, in part 
because they were less able to emulate the image created for the region by promotional 
campaigns. The YHDA had stated themselves that they would be much more selective in 
their promotional campaigns and the areas they would promote as early as 1982. Even 
so, South Yorkshire, through its Enterprise Zones, its rail and north/south road links with 
the M1 and A1, and its location on the edge of the Peak District, was more able to share 
in the economic recovery of the late 1980s. However, Humberside – and in particular 
Hull – did not share these fortunes. The picture in Hull was significantly bleak; for 
example in 1987 the council claimed that in its 22 wards, nine had unemployment rates 
greater than 20 per cent, and two of those were in excess of 25 per cent. The city at least 
externally exhibited much of the special pleading and dependency associated with the 
more negative aspects of the North rather than the reconstructed aspirant wider 
economic region, traits that had brought criticism from elsewhere in Yorkshire in the 
1970s. 
As well as the basic geographical difficulties inherent in adopting this new image of a 
‘centre’ region, Hull and Humberside in general faced criticisms for their failure to adopt 
the new spatial and temporal paradigm of place marketing. Of particular note was its 
continuation of a high-modernist approach towards urban planning well into the 1970s, 
the removal of its history being somewhat aligned with the industrial decline it was 
seemingly facing. As one article written in 1976 put it: 
Once the second port of the kingdom, with a sixteenth-century charter and the 
status of a county, to some eyes Hull now presents a sad spectacle. Many historic 
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streets and buildings, escaping second World War bombs, succumbed to corporate 
bulldozers.485 
 
Similar scathing remarks were even forthcoming from businessmen within Hull, as 
articulated in one article in the YHDA’s own magazine Development Digest in 1983, 
where it was claimed that public relations and marketing techniques ‘had been sadly 
lacking until comparatively recently’. It went on, in relation to Hull’s image as a fish port 
that 
The City Fathers have less to complain about now. That is not because the fishing 
industry, now in its death throes, had had its voice stilled. It is more because they 
have discovered that more favourable identities arise from doing more positive 
things, like putting a stop to knocking their historic city down and trying instead to 
retain and restore it.486 
 
As is considered in the next chapter, despite more support for Humberside as a county 
evident in the 1960s and 1970s than has been popularly suggested, much of the 
articulations against its existence stemmed from its dislocation from a real and imagined 
geography of Yorkshire; one formed from a conception of place based both on space and 
time. The heightened campaign against the county in the late 1980s leaned on the area 
having an modernist ahistoricism that was economic as well as social and cultural. As 
the  East Yorkshire Action Group (EYAG) claimed in 1988: ‘its structure plan is still based 
on that idea of expansion, Nissan factories and the low technology culture of the 
1960s’.487 It was also claimed in their material that ‘Yorkshire is a far better brand name 
that needs no promoting’.488 In this vein, the image of Humberside, as separate and 
anachronistic to Yorkshire, was claimed to be repelling Yorkshire’s booming tourism, as 
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one letter to a local paper stated: ‘we are desperate to attract tourists but who wants to 
visit Humberside?’489 
An important aspect of this, however, is the distinct reflexivity in the construction of such 
images, both for the imagined economy and environment of Hull, and by wider 
association Humberside. Though the Hull’s Industrial Development Director and the 
YHDA would put much of its initial resources into highlighting the ports and potential of 
the Humber, such promotional messages found a much more skeptical and 
unsympathetic hearing that was the case for other parts of the region. The former’s 
attempt to demonstrate the enterprising spirit of the City in a Guardian report saw such 
self-help characterised rather harshly as Hull aiming to stand ‘on its own webbed feet’.490 
The Financial Times was similarly dismissive in its own assessment: 
The slogan “The Humber Estuary - In the Centre of Britain” on some of the publicity 
literature distributed by [the YHDA] is probably more a reflection of over-
enthusiastic salesman than strict geographical accuracy. Humberside is, in fact, off 
the beaten track and difficulty in communications has been one of the besetting 
faults of this area since industrial development first began.491 
 
Such statements illustrate then not only the intraregional complexities and contingencies 
within the construction and articulation of a coherent economic region and regional 
identity, particularly with the increasingly liberalised and globalised context of the late 
1970s and 1980s, or the important interrelationships not only of the imagined 
geography of a region from within and without, but also the basis such imaginations have 
within the region. Both these real and imagined geographies shape and inform each 
other in their implications for the social environments of these regions and localities. 
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Importantly these constructions are rooted not only in space but also real and imagined 
temporalities.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The aspects of economic regionalism discussed within this chapter have been primarily 
the interests of capital over labour, highlighting how regionalism formed primarily a 
middle class pursuit. This aligns with Jim Phillips’ argument about the origins of Scottish 
industrial devolution being found in the Scottish Council for Development and Industry 
(SCDI), a business leaders’ organisation similar to the YHDA, but in the case of Yorkshire 
and Humberside we can see less trade union and other forms of support for economic 
regionalism.492 Contrary to the more pessimistic pronouncements on the power of 
regionalism, we can see the creation of a regional economic lobby with similar political 
efficacy to that of other private lobbies that Hilton, McKay Crowson and Mouhot have 
argued have become increasingly important in British politics.493 Regional associations 
showed a regional identity, distinct from the broad sweeps of ‘peripheral’ north and ‘core’ 
south(east). The Yorkshire and Humberside regional identity was articulated as a 
separate function of these forms, demonstrating a particular appeal to expertise 
(increasingly from the advertising sphere) over overt ‘political action’; a distinct concern 
for the environment and transport infrastructure; and cultivating an image that tapped 
into popular imaginative geographies of the ‘north’ and ‘south’ to attempt to articulate a 
best of both worlds ‘centre’ approach. This led to an ambiguous, fluid and conditional 
attitude to both northern authorities and southern and central authorities. As part of this 
distinct economic regionalism, we can see various other themes: an appeal to the 
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national interest and to unionism, and an aversion to financial assistance through 
regional policy over other forms of ‘self-help’. Examining these institutions indicates that 
the geographical, political, economic and social diversity of the region – and the 
acknowledgement of this – was fundamental to the unique shape of these institutions.  
On wider debates than regionalism, this chapter also serves to partly affirm Brenner’s 
assessment that  
the 1970s is thus best viewed as a transitional period in which state institutions at 
various spatial scales attempted to adjust to the destabilising national, regional, 
and local effects of geo-economic restructuring. It was characterised by interscalar 
struggles between political alliances concerned to preserve the nationalised 
institutional infrastructures of spatial Keynesianism and other, newly formed 
political coalitions concerned (a) to scale back the redistributive insterscalar relays 
associated with postwar welfarism and (b) to introduce more place-sensitive 
frameworks of economic governance. Although the new regulatory spaces sought 
by such modernising coalitions remained relatively inchoate at both national and 
local scales, they were generally grounded upon a rejection of nationally 
encompassing models of territorial development and oriented towards the goal of 
promoting endogenous local and regional growth within particular places.494  
 
However, in examining this in Yorkshire and Humberside, it is possible to see such ideas 
of competitive regionalism developing in less teleological ways;495 and to see a greater 
degree of ‘policy assemblage’, continuity and contingency in the actions that emerged,496 
very much shaped by context. The YHDA survived to become the template for the 
Yorkshire Forward Regional Development Agency (RDA) in 1999 under New Labour, and 
in some ways represented the template for such ‘third way’ policies. 
                                                            
494 Brenner, New State Spaces, 198. 
495 As is sometimes evident in discourses on Thatcherism that concentrate on spatial scales, e.g. 
Allen, Massey and Cochrane, Rethinking the Region. 
496 Sue Brownhill, ‘From planning to opportunism? Re-examining the creation of the London 
Docklands Development Corporation’, Planning Perspectives, 30:4 (2015), 537-570; Wetherell, 
‘Freedom planned’. 
  164 
Chapter 3: Polit ical Regionalism: “Yorkshire Forever – 
Humberside Never”:497 the creation and abolit ion of 
Humberside County Council ,  c.1962-c.1996 
 
Utopia is the perfect society – therefore it cannot exist. A Utopian is an impractical 
dreamer. Utopians have always stood at the crossroads of history. If the paths they 
chose led to nowhere, if they failed to take mankind with them, if a world of peace 
and harmony remains a pipedream, they remain, nonetheless honourable losers… 
So it is with Humberside.498 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
I 
The previous chapter explored the ways in which semi-representative quasi-NGOs 
mobilised various images and ideas of Yorkshire towards a functional economic 
regionalism. These images were selective and partial, and were both national and 
international facing. The result was that the eastern side of the region – the area that 
would become Humberside in the reorganisation of local government the early 1970s – 
fitted awkwardly into this model of regionalism. The dissonance of the natural landscape 
with the ‘heartlands’ of Yorkshire, the industrial and social profile of the area, and its 
physical remoteness from south and west Yorkshire all served to marginalise the 
Humberside sub-region within the popular imagination of either Yorkshire or the 
industrial ‘North’. 
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This chapter explores the political and discursive creation of Humberside in the 1960s 
and 1970s within this ‘regional moment’. As with the economic regionalism that 
emerged from the modernising, professionalising impulse of the time, it focuses 
particularly on how such changes brought the administrative area of ‘Humberside’ into 
national parlance and policy. In doing so this chapter briefly touches on the 
contemporary debates on the feasibility and desirability of a ‘regional’ tier of governance. 
It argues that though these intended reforms and their rationale were characterised as a 
top-down, high-modernist and technocratic imposition – as particularly displayed in the 
work of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission on local government – in the creation of 
Humberside, this process involved a degree of support, negotiation and appropriation 
from official and semi-official actors within the area. Of particular importance within this 
were various large-scale infrastructural proposals and developments, such as a mooted 
‘New City’ on the banks of the Humber; a major new deep-water port complex to rival 
Rotterdam; and road transport crossing for the Humber Estuary. 
 
II 
The first two sections of this chapter consider the political circumstances in which a non-
metropolitan county of Humberside was established by the Local Government Act of 
1972. The following section then focuses on the concerted campaign to have the new 
local authority of Humberside abolished – which would emerge ‘almost the day after the 
decision was announced’, as Beverley MP James Cran claimed in 1994.499    
The persistent and varied campaigns against reforms to the traditional boundaries of 
local government is an aspect of modern British politics that has received surprisingly 
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little attention from historians.500 Where local government in England in the 1970s and 
1980s has been the focus of studies, this has tended to be in relation to either the role 
of the Greater London Council (GLC), Metropolitan County Councils (MCCs) and 
Metropolitan Boroughs (such as Liverpool or the ‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’) 
in mobilising alliances of new social movements and ‘local socialisms’ as pockets of 
resistance against Thatcherism; or the attendant diminishing role, autonomy and 
influence experienced by local authorities as a result of the changes in economic and 
planning policies highlighted in the previous chapter.501 
Despite this comparative neglect, this section argues that the grassroots – and arguably 
genuinely popular – campaigns against new patterns of local government demonstrates 
not only the construction and articulation of concerted alternative regionalisms against 
official and statist regional definitions, but also provides a new perspective on 
contemporary British politics and political ideologies from the late 1970s. Though the 
various societies and associations formed to oppose Humberside – in particular the 
Yorkshire Ridings Society (YRS), the East Yorkshire Action Group (EYAG), and the North 
Lincolnshire Association (NLA) – reflected and embodied aspects of mainstream 
Conservatism in the 1980s, certain other aspects of their lobbying, correspondence and 
activities contradicted key tenets of Thatcherism. Exploring these groups and the 
debates their actions provoked also provides perspectives on many of the core 
dimensions of British politics debated by political historians: the uses and role of heritage 
and ‘heritage panics’; the construction of ‘imagined communities’; the backlash against 
a professional society; and the ‘privatisation of politics’. Though arguably ideologically 
anathema to the regionalism practiced by the regional economic bodies discussed in the 
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previous chapter, this section also highlights some similarities in method and 
organisation that speak to the discernible associational culture of Yorkshire.     
Finally, this core sample will discuss the intrinsic and important role the Humber Bridge 
played within the competing forms of regionalism and regional identity articulated on 
Humberside. Despite its contingent origins, the Humber Bridge became a central, almost 
obsessive focus of abolitionist activities, as well as a central raison d’etre for those who 
defended Humberside’s existence. Its symbolic power is a significant dimension to 
understanding contested political identities within the sub-region of Humberside.  
In addition to official reports, publications and local government archival sources from 
both national and local record offices, this chapter examines primary evidence deposited 
at the Hull History Centre by members of the citizens’ action groups against the 
Humberside authority. It also considers records of national coordinating organisations  
such as the Association of British Counties (ABC). This broadens understanding of the 
debates on local government from the limited focus on the top-down reforms of local 
government in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly their financial motivations,502 and help 
in exploring the complex relationship between localism, regionalism and nationalism. 
These documents also begin to explain the longer historical foundations of arch 
conservative interests that have recently mobilised identity politics as a means to build 
popular support across traditional party boundaries and allegiances, to particular effect 
since the 2010s. Examining the complex lobbying groups formed out of an stated 
interest to uphold an imagined ‘Yorkshire’ culture against perceived ‘internal 
colonialism’, and to abolish ‘unnatural’ political institutions, further serves to highlight 
the complex interaction between relational and physical attributes of regionalism as 
emphasised in this thesis. 
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3.2 The birth of ‘Humberside’ in context,  1962-1966 
 
I 
By the end of the 1960s, Humberside had become widely established as an area with a 
broadly recognisable geography, one that was central to debates on the economic, social 
and (perhaps most crucially) political future of the assumed sub-region around the 
Humber Estuary. Such widespread usage of the term is remarkable in itself. Unlike other 
northern estuarine conurbations that had (since Victorian industrialisation) at least been 
known colloquially and semi-officially as Tyneside and Merseyside, Humberside was a 
term of little usage, definition or cachet before the 1960s.503 This itself did not preclude 
well-established functional and associational ‘cross-Humber’ links; David Neave for 
example has highlighted an appreciable number of societies and organisation that by the 
end of the nineteenth century were operating on a Hull, East Riding and North 
Lincolnshire basis, as were local newspapers such as the Hull Daily Mail and other 
publications.504 It was the context of the early 1960s that served as the formative period 
for the emergence of Humberside as a recognised sub-regional entity. 
 
II 
Though given impetus by the modernising and professionalizing political culture that 
pervaded public life in the early 1960s, the reform of English local government was 
debated and advocated frequently since the creation of administrative counties by the 
Local Government Act in 1888. Though C.B. Fawcett’s highly influential Provinces of 
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England (first published in 1919) was primarily framed around providing a federal 
solution to the Irish Question, much of the rationale for the changes put forward was the 
increasingly ‘extreme complexity’ of the local government divisions that had proliferated 
since the 1888 Act, that were overlaid with additional divisions for public utilities and 
central government functions. The provinces Fawcett devised in 1919 were justified not 
only as more rational units for public administration, but also that significant revisions to 
the boundaries denoted neither anything ‘sacrosanct’ in them, nor popular attachment to 
the administrative counties.505 The following two decades until the outbreak of the 
Second World War did little to demonstrate the efficacy of this pattern of local 
authorities. Local government finance was plunged into crisis by the sectoral slumps and 
global economic shocks of the 1920s and 1930s respectively. This led to a reduction in 
the autonomy of local authorities through increased central control, through both the 
imposition of financial restrictions, and through the transfer of functions to central 
government and to ad hoc bodies with varying degrees of centralised control.506 But such 
measures, including the 1929 Local Government Act that provided for a review of county 
districts, did little to fundamentally alter the local government map. 
Despite this, local government arrangements and boundaries remained subject to 
continued academic discussion – mainly amongst human geographers and planners – 
through the 1920s to the 1940s. Arguments were consistently in favour of larger 
‘regional’ units of government, particularly from members of the Garden Cities and Town 
Planning Association (later the Town and Country Planning Association, TCPA), and the 
Fabian Society.507 From the latter, G.D.H. Cole’s The Future of Local Government (1921) 
argued that increased central government finance would inevitably necessitate 
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increased central control. Rather than a federal solution, Cole argued that large regional 
authorities should be established whose responsibilities would be ‘local’ rather than 
parliamentary in scope, with their role envisaged as centred on regional planning. Though 
believing the rural districts to be too small to effectively carry out their intended 
functions, county boroughs (in addition to many urban districts) – ‘town’ – should remain 
distinct from the more rural county council areas, the ‘country’.508 
Though there were broad similarities between the provinces of Fawcett and the regions 
of Cole, their differences underlined the plurality of schemes produced, with no easy 
consensus emerging. Despite this, regionalisation of various public and private bodies 
continued at pace in the 1930s, highlighting the distinct lack of any standardisation in 
boundaries. Provincial regional ‘capitals’ such as Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, 
Nottingham and Newcastle were frequently the chosen administrative centres, but in 
1939 E.W. Gilbert was able to produce no fewer than twenty-five different geographical 
divisions of England and Wales either proposed or in use by public and private bodies, 
some with significant differences in their boundaries.509 This heterogeneity was matched 
by the multiple schemes advanced by various reformers; with some, such as Cole, 
prefiguring indirect election to a ‘Federal Council’;510 others favouring more direct 
electoral accountability along the lines of Fawcett’s provincial ‘parliaments’;511 or ad hoc 
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arrangements between local authorities on larger scales than had previously been 
attempted, as advocated by W.A. Robson and other writers on local government.512  
Despite contention over the desirable scale of administrative units – one that was 
undoubtedly bolstered by the party political distinctions between urban and rural – broad 
academic consensus existed on the need for planning of service provision on a larger 
scale than possible through the pattern of councils. A 1929 essay, in rather Whiggish 
terms, claimed this to be self-evident: ‘the deliberate adoption of larger [local 
government] units’ represented the logical line of development as ‘the tendency of to-day 
throughout the whole sphere of human activity is towards the larger unit’.513 Even prior to 
the Second World War, increases in personal mobility meant that a town/country 
distinction appeared to most observers an unacceptable ‘geographical anomaly’.514 The 
necessity to plan the physical and social environment over a greater area than allowed 
through traditional urban/rural distinctions was at the heart of Ebenezer Howard’s 
Garden Cities of Tomorrow, first published in 1898. Though largely concerned with the 
practicalities of financing and self-sustaining his ‘Garden Cities’ proposals, the principles 
of Howard’s work (the need to plan settlements on a regional basis, and the channelling 
of urban growth rather than unlimited sprawl) were strongly promoted in the interwar 
years through the association established to develop its ideas, what would become the 
TCPA. 
Howard and Fawcett’s centrality to the discussions on the reform of public administration 
at a local and regional level emphasises the rather cautious and contingent approach 
that formed towards American and European ideas and reforms in this period. In urban 
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planning terms, this period saw distinct differences between Anglo-American problems 
and the high density, socially mixed centres of continental European cities.515 
Transatlantic ideas of town planning remained somewhat distinct from their continental 
European counterparts,516 and it was to the ‘Metropolitan Regionalism’ of the United 
States of America that many of essays on English regional administration referred in the 
interwar period.517 An aversion to the type of regional standardisation and ‘planning’ 
instituted in the interwar years by totalitarian regimes in Germany and the Soviet Union 
spurred officials and commentators to embrace ad hoc (social, economic and political) 
regionalism, as demonstrated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.518 An important factor 
in scepticism towards political regionalism in larger units was the supposed strength of 
‘local jealousies and vested interests’.519 The issue of supposed regional ‘capitals’ 
elicited considerable debate over designating any urban hierarchy. As one responder to 
Fawcett’s initial provincial proposals posited in 1917, ‘I feel the most troublesome thing, 
if the scheme were to be carried out, would be, not the want of local patriotism, but the 
excess of it. Could one ever get Liverpool and Manchester to agree as to either being a 
capital?’.520 Manchester’s adoption over Liverpool in all regional administrative schemes 
of the state was mirrored by Leeds’ adoption over Sheffield – a problem Fawcett had 
sought to solve with the inclusion of the ‘Peakdon’ province.521 Vocal local opposition, 
particularly from the local authorities themselves, was cited as one of the reasons for the 
government’s rejection of the 1937 Royal Commission on Tyneside’s recommendation 
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that a regional council be established with responsibility for some services.522 Another 
key context of this debate was a strong current of pastoralism, and continuous reference 
to ‘natural’ boundaries and/or regions. Much like the regional geography of Vidal in 
France sought to balance the competing pulls of the local rural community and of 
rationalising urban industrial modernity,523 Howard’s Garden City movement sought to 
blend the competing magnets of the town and country. Within many of the proposals was 
a desire to check ‘the drift to the towns’ and the attendant ‘alienation from the soil of the 
country’ this had facilitated.524  
These three factors would each remain core aspects of the debate on local or regional 
government reform in the post-war period. With the outbreak of the Second World War, 
the ad hoc regional administration that had emerged in the preceding years was 
replaced by a full regional system. The urgency of civil defence and the necessity for an 
intermediate commander should the threat of invasion materialise, meant the 
appointment of twelve Regional Commissioners (ten for England and one each for 
Scotland and Wales).525 In additional to their organisational imperative regarding civil 
defence, the Commissioners were effectively assigned ‘to act as the eyes, ears and 
mouth of the central government in the region’.526 Given the exceptional circumstances 
that led to this constitutional imposition, and the autocratic nature of the 
Commissioners, their abolition at the end of the war stood as one of the few points of 
agreement amongst the local authorities.527  
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Though a weight of evidence demonstrated the obsolescence of the existing system of 
local government, central government resisted radical reform whilst no consensus on its 
likely scope existed. The absence of consensus was effectively assured by mutual 
antagonism between the respective associations of the municipal corporations and 
county councils.528 There was some official movement towards the discussion of radical 
change outside the ‘county/county borough system’ through the Local Government 
Boundary Commission (LGBC) founded in 1945. But despite making general proposals 
around optimal sizes for single and two-tier authorities that would have seen the 
abolition of the some of the ‘unfit’ units of government,529 the LGBC was abolished in 
1949 with none of its proposals adopted. Timidity towards reform in this period was also 
argued by Robson as an aversion of the LGBC towards advocacy of anything resembling 
provincial regionalism.530 This highlighted the issue Cole had raised: that due to what he 
saw as ‘terminological misfortune’, ‘region’ in the federal sense had become confused 
with the notion of remodelled local authorities or functional city-regions, as were being 
widely advocated after the war.531 An important related factor, as Bulpitt famously 
argued, was the conscious attempt to uphold fragmented and largely depoliticised 
‘peripheral government’ in this period as a means to maintain a separation between 
national and local political interest. Though there may not have been the constitutional 
calculation credited to the Centre by Bulpitt, the nationalisation of various industries by 
the Attlee Government precipitated further geographically uneven regional arrangements 
and further centralisation.532 In this context, maintaining largely unreformed local 
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government may have appeared the most desirable option, particularly with little local 
official or public enthusiasm for sweeping change. 
 
III 
This lack of consensus saw attention shift instead to what was seen as the more 
immediate concern of reconstruction. As highlighted in the previous chapter, more 
centralised and regionalised economic and physical planning absorbed regional energy 
during the 1940s; nationalisation of key industries and public services went alongside 
more sustained regional economic policy with the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act. The 
Town and Country Planning Act (1947) extended the planning powers of local authorities 
to allow for comprehensive redevelopment under ‘top-down’ supervision from the newly-
established Ministry of Town and Country Planning.533 The 1946 New Towns Act also 
facilitated central planning towards varied regional objectives, such as controlled urban 
overspill around London, and promoting economic development in North East England 
and Scotland.534 The centralised focus of policy saw interest in political regionalism wane 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.535 The extension of the post-war welfare state further 
sapped the autonomy of local authorities post-1945, as more power was concentrated in 
Westminster.536 In housing, the scale of reconstruction served to render them ‘more the 
agents of a national housing policy than autonomous providers for their local 
communities’.537 
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Developments towards the end of the 1950s reinforced frustrations with the existing 
system of local government, while continuing to offer no wholesale radical solution. 
Despite a developing academic consensus, the changes made in this decade maintained 
the principle of separation between town and country. As with regional policy, the post-
war controls of the Attlee government relaxed over this decade, frustrating planning 
circles such as the TCPA.538 The Conservative government drew criticism from Robson 
and other campaigners due to the attitude of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government that no fundamental change in administration could be countenanced 
without the agreement of all local government associations.539 The 1958 Local 
Government Act created another Local Government Commission for England with limited 
powers to propose extensions to the county boroughs, but only for continuous suburbs of 
urbanised areas. Some marginal headway was made, with mergers and rationalisations 
to county boroughs and councils in Cambridgeshire and around Birmingham in particular. 
But bitter local political opposition between neighbouring shire and city authorities saw 
many more defeats for the commission.540  
So though there was a long established critique of the administrative, geographical and 
planning framework of local authorities prior to the 1960s, the main drivers of change 
remained the economic shocks of the late 1950s. As discussed, ‘declinist’ debates 
spurred a widespread discussion about both the nature, structure and culture of British 
society.541 The national mood that evoked ‘dynamism’ and ‘planning’ had at its heart 
however a drive towards not only increased efficiency, but within that a rejection of the 
supposed amateurism of both British industry and the state. The most vehement critique 
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against ‘country’ interests came from Perry Anderson’s ‘Origins of the Present Crisis’ in 
1964. At the heart of Anderson’s diagnosis of the fundamental weaknesses in British 
society were the incomplete nature of the bourgeois revolution that had defined the 
landed aristocracy as the ‘dominant capitalist class’. Through this economic dominance, 
he argued, they had culturally buttressed their social position through various cultural 
insignia to maintain the social relations of the ‘countryside’, ideologically underpinned by 
Burkean conservatism. Though Anderson’s structural Marxism was not in itself indicative 
of popular thought, his article built on and endorsed more popular works such as 
Shonfield’s British Economic Policy since the War and Shanks’ The Stagnant Society.542 
His emphasis on ‘the pronounced personality type of the governing class: aristocratic, 
amateur and, “normatively” agrarian’ highlighted an appetite to challenge the overriding 
parochialism of local government in the shires, and for the urban as the source of 
modern dynamism. This technocratic, scientific and professional modernism was set in 
contrast to the supposed amateurism of the country gentleman; as shown in the image 
somewhat successfully cultivated of Harold MacMillan and Alec Douglas-Home by the 
Labour Party led by Harold Wilson in 1964. 
As with economic issues, this urban shift in politics was led by an initial focus on the 
metropolis. New town development around London, and the decentralisation of the 
capital’s population, strained existing local government patterns as larger districts 
clashed with county councils. The Herbert Commission was therefore established in 
1957 to look specifically at the problems of the main ‘built-up’ area of Greater London. 
The recommendations from the Commission’s report led to the creation of the GLC, 
which was provided with responsibility for major local services (such as strategic 
planning, overspill housing and later public transport) with thirty-two boroughs that had 
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immediate welfare, children, housing and maintenance services. Campaigners for reform 
of local government and those advocating wider regionalism similarly saw this as a 
positive, if incomplete, measure. Though the creation of a top-tier authority with 
democratic accountability was commended by Robson and others, this primarily 
represented an extension of the existing system rather than functional reform. True 
political regionalism, it was argued, would require – as the Herbert Commission had 
admitted – an authority to govern over a much larger area, and for this authority to be 
given some centralised functions, such as the development of highways.543 
The ascent of ‘the city’ – defined in highly rational, abstract and high-modernist terms – 
became much more central in academic and planning policy discourse at this time. This 
reflected anxieties about the increasing suburbanisation of (particularly) the English 
population, with the increasing affluence and concerted low-density home building 
programmes of the 1950s. This was posed as a cultural threat to civic and political 
engagement, with Lewis Mumford most famously arguing in The City in History that the 
‘ultimate outcome of the suburbs’ was passivity and alienation from the city.544 A radical 
solution was required to address the estimated population increase of three million in 
the next fifteen years. If the overspill problems of the major cities were to be solved, the 
report Let Our Cities Live argued, ‘it is necessary to establish one or two New Cities with 
the same purpose as New Towns’.545 As Ortolano has documented, prior to the 
construction of Milton Keynes, ambitious plans for a ‘North Bucks New City’ – imagined 
as a carefully planned conurbation for 250,000 – were promoted by Buckinghamshire 
county’s architect and planner Fred Pooley.546 More ambitious plans were articulated by 
other planners, such as Derek Rigby Childs’ ‘Counterdrift Cities’ proposals, which also 
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took industrial decline as their reference point, proposing a series of ‘new growth’ points 
within ‘development zones’: concentrated corridors imagined to contain dynamic 
employment opportunities. These zones included proposals for new ‘regional centres’, 
urban complexes that would be efficiently planned to provide local, national and even 
international transport links. Peter Self, the new chairman of the TCPA, also advanced 
similar planning proposals ‘to match the pace and intensity of urban growth’ in the South 
East; through channelling resources into growth elsewhere in the country.547 
Such ideas borrowed heavily from the European high-modernist tradition, such as the 
work of Le Corbusier.548 They assertively claimed the obsolescence of the traditional city, 
eschewing the existing British traditions of planning, and arguing, hand in hand with 
economic planning, for urban planning on a much greater scale with more even and 
efficient distribution of people and services. Though Thrift has attributed the more 
rationalising and totalising neglect of place in the regional geography in the 1960s and 
1970s to a Marxist tradition, the highly statist, modernist embrace of such ideas 
appeared to cut across the political spectrum in Britain at this time.549 In the ‘planning 
fervour’ from the early 1960s both the left and right saw a necessity to arrest the 
supposed ‘drift to the south’ through economic, social and urban planning.550 
As regions supported by the EPCs and designated by Whitehall emerged as a means to 
transform the UK’s economic future, so intense top-down interest was sparked in 
‘regions’ as the basis for a redrawing of the form and function of local government. The 
creation of the LGBC in 1963 had shown the potential for fundamental reform around 
larger geographical areas. Again the debate focused on what the ideal units for 
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functional service provision should be: tensions still existed between whether the 
preferred ‘intermediate tier’ of governance should provincial in size (like the EPCs) or 
more ‘city-region’ authorities.551 The latter conception found its most cogent and public 
articulation through Derek Senior. His exploration of ‘the city-region as an administrative 
unit’ in a 1965 Political Quarterly article which distilled arguments for a radical reform of 
local government. The transformative effects of motor transport on the functional 
geographies of the conurbations was established from the outset. Senior repeated that 
that local authorities were neither of sufficient size or quality to fulfil their former 
functions, and it was as much the reluctance of local government officials to 
countenance reform that had led to many of their former functions being vested within 
ad hoc central government bodies.552 As an alternative Senior saw a ‘city region’ defined 
as ‘an area whose inhabitants look to a common centre for those specialised facilities 
and services… whose economic provision demands a user population of large but less 
than national proportions’. He identified thirty or so ‘units’ that fitted four typologies: 
‘mature, emergent, embryonic or potential’.553 Local government, should instead of the 
former ‘counties’ reflect these units. 
The most striking aspect of the article was Senior’s attitude towards local cultural 
identities and historical antecedents in local government: 
Culturally speaking, townsfolk and countryfolk in the same region are ceasing to 
differ: both are demanding all the satisfactions, urban and rural, that modern 
technology and personal mobility are making available to all. Few of us can be said 
in any meaningful sense, to live in town or country, no matter where we may sleep: 
the range of our normal activities is region-wide.554 
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Senior argued that administration on the basis of the historical ‘counties’ allowed 
councillors to inspire ‘blind’ loyalty through a ‘confidence trick’ that elided their 
administrative areas with geographical units.555 In a broadly modernist manner, Senior 
stated that functional identity was of greater importance than cultural identities: 
It cannot, of course, be pretended that even the mature city regions are yet 
communities in the corporate sense that towns and sometimes counties used to be 
in the pre-motor age. There is, indeed, a school of thought which… holds that no 
unit can inspire a sense of belonging until it has been defined, named and 
institutionalised. What can be claimed is that the city region, even in its embryonic 
form, is a social entity much more relevant to the concerns of local government 
than any other now that the motor-vehicle has come into general use.556  
 
Of the thirty city regions Senior defined, he argued that all save Newbury and Ashford had 
ready-made cultural resources; particularly public transport services, universities and 
local print newspapers with sales that were ‘virtually self-contained’.557 
It was this somewhat highly centralised, paternalistic if not authoritarian attitude towards 
reform of the national map, coupled with the supposed necessity for radical 
modernisation of England’s institutions to stem the rapid national ‘decline’, that provided 
the catalyst for action. In 1966, Richard Crossman as the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government in Harold Wilson’s Labour Government wound up the Local Government 
Commission that had operated since 1958, and established a Royal Commission on 
Local Government in England and Wales under the chairmanship of Sir John Maud (who 
would be Lord Redcliffe-Maud by the time of the Commission’s report). The 
commissioners appointed included Senior, T. Dan Smith and Evelyn Sharpe, who for the 
previous decade had served as Permanent Secretary in the MHLG and had ‘remarked at 
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length on the decline in quality of the councillors’.558 The work of the Commission 
consequently reflected the scientific, modernising and urban impulses that had assumed 
intellectual and political dominance by the mid-1960s. Whereas the Herbert Commission 
had been criticised for the lack of an social scientific representation amongst its 
members, Redcliffe-Maud enlisted the expertise of L.J. Sharpe to conduct a number of 
national sample surveys to establish the optimal unit of ‘functional effectiveness’. 
Sharpe’s three surveys reinforced the preconceptions that had led to the Commissions 
appointment: they indicated over-representation on local authorities by ‘elderly and 
higher status men’; ‘a worrying degree of [public] apathy towards local government’; and 
that in urban areas local citizens did not demonstrate ‘parochial attachments to specific 
districts or neighbourhoods’.559 
 
IV 
In this context, the area that would become Humberside is exemplary of these dynamics. 
The debates around town and country; the tensions between county boroughs and 
county councils; the extent to which suburbanisation highlighted the inappropriateness of 
traditional local authority boundaries; the increasing concern around the calibre and 
competency of local government representatives and officials; and the national 
imperative for economic modernisation and urbanisation to counter anxieties around 
industrial ‘decline’ were all at play in the Humberside area. 
                                                            
558 L.J. Sharpe, ‘Elected Representatives in Local Government’, The British Journal of Sociology, 
13:3 (1962), 201-202. 
559 Savage, Identities and Social Change, 188-189. 
  183 
Compared to the 'moth-eaten blanket' of county boroughs within the county councils 
elsewhere across the industrial areas of Yorkshire and Lancashire,560 the area contained 
only two county boroughs across the East Riding and the northern Parts of Lindsey 
councils that became known as Humberside; the town of Grimsby on south bank, and 
the city of Hull on the north. In the mid-1960s, the two county boroughs accounted for 
around fifty per cent of the population what would substantively become the area of the 
county council, with Hull – at just under 300,000 inhabitants – around three times the 
size of Grimsby. The only other urban area of significance was the steel town of 
Scunthorpe. The vast majority of the rest of the East Riding and Northern Parts of Lindsey 
remained remarkably rural and sparsely populated, save for the coastal resort towns 
such as Hornsea and Bridlington in the former, and Cleethorpes in the latter county.   
As noted in the previous chapter, the physical geography around the Humber, stretching 
up the coast through the East Riding, was in general markedly different from the space 
myth or geosophy that has framed the 'North'.561 Instead, as an industrial survey of 
Humberside from 1970 asserted, 'its relief, climate and prevailing systems of agriculture 
belong firmly to lowland eastern and southern England'.562 Through intensive warping of 
the soil around the estuary from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both banks of 
the Humber consisted primarily of high quality ‘carefully drained’ agricultural land.563 The 
average size of farms in Humberside through this period continued to be both 
significantly larger than the national average, and relatively profitable.564 In terms of 
social organisation the area remained distinctive even into the twentieth century, with 
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‘the continuance of hiring and living-in’ of servants who would move from farm to farm, 
rarely staying in one place for more than a year. Beverley, the historic county town of the 
East Riding, was in the post-war period increasingly middle-class,565 but possessed a 
handful of significant industrial concerns.566 However, despite being little more than 10 
miles from Hull, it was significantly different demographically. The concentration of the 
City’s economy around the port and the fishing industry meant it had consequently a 
much higher proportion of unskilled and/or casual manual low-wage labour than the 
national average.567 Though less economically diverse, such a social structure was 
shared by Grimsby on the South Bank, due to the town’s reliance on the fishing and food 
processing industries.568 The more middle class population of Beverley meshed more 
readily with the smaller working class contingent of the town through myriad voluntary 
and other associations.569  
This created a deep political divide between town and country, with the overtly ’socialist’ 
council in Hull in contrast to Beverley’s staunchly ‘Independent’ local government.570 This 
distinction between town and country was more starkly marked by the composition of 
East Riding County Council (ERCC). Graham Turner in his exploration of the North Country 
in 1967 noted that, much like the North Riding, it was: 
…the world of big country houses and spacious estates that has been touched 
surprisingly little by the industrial society to the west. The majority of the big landed 
magnates have no business interests whatsoever: in case after case, the entries in 
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Who’s Who? list not a single company directorship among the catalogues of public 
service and the support of charity.571 
 
Turner also emphasised the feudal intertwining of these landed interests with local 
government, as well as the associational life of the county, as almost the archetype of 
both the amateurism and social malaise the reformers of the 1960s saw as complicit in  
supposed national decline: 
[Lord Halifax] himself has been a county councillor since 1947, and his wife, a 
member since 1951, is chairman of the education committee amongst other 
things… 
Both Lord Hotham and Sir Tatton Sykes, who both own estates that are significantly 
bigger that Halifax’s, are county aldermen, and the chairman of the county is Sir 
John Dunnington-Jefferson, a squire who has been a member since 1922. Halifax is 
also a local magistrate and he acts as a figurehead in any number of social 
functions.572 
 
This deep embedded nature of local officials and civic leaders was not however 
restricted to the county council’s operations. There was significant disquiet regarding the 
receptiveness of Hull City Council’s (HCC) to industrial interests in the area, with one 
critic in 1966 claiming that ’these old socialists can’t get out of the 1920s and 30s… 
they just don’t understand’.573 Indeed, local Labour grandee Sir Leo Shultz served as 
leader of the City Council for all but two years until its dissolution, having first been 
elected in 1926.574 Other prominent council councillors such as Fred Holmes had served 
since the 1930s. One paper noted that ‘…the geographical isolation, coupled with the 
                                                            
571 Graham Turner, The North Country (London, 1967), 164-167. 
572 Ibid., 171. 
573 John Barr, ‘Hull and Humberside’, New Society, 29 September 1966, 486. 
574 Howard Elcock, ‘English Local Government Reformed: The Politics of Humberside’, Public 
Administration, 53:2 (1975), 161-162. 
  186 
social immobility which is the result of its industrial base, produces an aggressive 
insularity, not least among councillors’.575 
The political and geographical separation between town and country belied more 
artificial separations in local government areas. Though Hull itself had been rather static 
in its population and social structure, the mid-1950s had seen a significant increase in 
suburbanisation to the villages and market towns covered by Haltemprice Urban District 
Council (UDC). That these affluent areas of Hessle, Cotttingham, Anlaby and elsewhere 
fell within the functional area of the City was recognised by the Local Government 
Commission in its later days in 1964, who recommended an extension of the Borough 
boundaries to include the greater part of this area as it was ‘dependent commercially 
and industrially on the City’. However an appeal from ERCC that loss of these areas 
would threaten their limited resources led to a reversal of this decision.576 
The continuities provided by the agricultural base of much of the East Yorkshire and 
North Lincolnshire were an important context for the debates surrounding Humberside 
and its creation. This, combined with the geographical distinctiveness of the area, 
indicated the enduring social structures which Phythian-Adams has argued must serve as 
the most immediate filter between people on the ground and the wider social 
organisation of the nation. The latter furnishes, as it were, a vocabulary of possible 
options, the particular mix and interpretation of which will vary in turn across the 
country according to the structure that becomes traditional to each localised 
society in the environing cultural context of its own specific topographic, historic, 
demographic and economic circumstances.577 
 
 
                                                            
575 A.P. Brier, ‘The Decision Process in Local Government: A case Study in Fluoridation in Hull’, 
Public Administration, 48:2 (1970), 154. 
576 HHC U DMC/34A HCC, ‘Annual Report of the Town Planning Officer 1966/1967’ (1967). 
577 Charles Phythian-Adams, ‘Introduction: An Agenda for English Local History’, in Charles 
Phythian-Adams (ed.), Societies, Cultures and Kinship, 1580-1850: Cultural Provinces and 
English Local History (Leicester, 1994), 5. 
  187 
V 
Humberside found very little usage in local or national popular parlance prior to the late 
1950s. Where reference was made to Humberside, it was generally to the immediate 
areas around both banks. As an estuary that was four miles at its widest, the Humber 
presented a formidable barrier, broadly recognised as a natural division rather than a 
functionally unifying waterway. But this did not preclude a degree of cultural and 
associational exchange, and some economic links due to the shared common 
agricultural base between the East Riding and North Lindsey, and the Humber ports.578 
What groups did exist tended to retain in their names distinctions between Hull, East 
Yorkshire and North Lincolnshire.579 
‘Humberside’ as a spatial designation thus emerged initially from the top down. The 
potentialities of the Humber excited planners, commentators and officials for a number 
of reasons. The first were the national and regional planning potentialities the area 
offered, both in economic and physical terms, based on their desire to harness the 
dynamism of ‘growth pole’ industries to modernise industry and arrest economic 
decline.580 The seeming success of such initiatives was demonstrated by Europoort in 
Rotterdam, which had by the early 1960s become the busiest cargo port in the world. 
Rigby Child’s ‘counterdrift’ strategy emphasised that ‘new growth points’ should be 
centred on estuarine areas (including the Humber). It was clear to planners that the 
Humber appeared particularly well placed. As one commentator noted in the mid-1960s:  
Almost every month one reads of some new major industrial or port development 
on Humberside: the new East Midlands Gas Board £6.5m plant at Kinningholme 
[sic]; a new 600 acre oil refinery to be served by 100,000 ton tankers; new docks 
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at Hull; new coal export facilities to Italy and the Continent… and gas gushing from 
the North Sea from drillings opposite the Humber.581 
 
The surprise find of natural oil and gas in 1959 in the North Sea, whilst generating 
particular political interest and public euphoria,582 also served to increase interest in 
Humberside. The expected need to accommodate a vastly increased population of up to 
20 million more people by 2000 also underpinned interest in the Humber: its sparse 
population and easy physical landscape offered possibilities. A number of in academic 
journals proclaimed, in particularly modernist terms that: 
A new metropolitan city, based on international trade and commerce, at the head 
of the Humber Estuary (as part of a National Plan and as a rival to London) could be 
Britain’s greatest enterprise in the second half of the twentieth century.583 
 
Ambitious proposals were envisaged by planners, who saw the possibility for the creation 
of a ‘Humberopolis’ city for one million people, joined not only by a road bridge but also a 
barrage. Press interest also intensified, with The Times producing a special supplement 
on ‘Humberside’ in April 1965. This noted how, paradoxically, many of the features that 
had been seen as disadvantageous for growth, were now seen as points of strength: 
… England in the latter half of the twentieth century abhors a vacuum, and the 
situation behind the Humber is no longer described as lack of hinterland, but as 
ample space for development. The Humber offers plenty of undeveloped land 
around reasonably deep water within reasonable distance (by today’s new 
standards) of large centres of population, and there are few such places left in 
England.584 
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The ascent of regional planning in within government policy circles was most crucial to 
ensuring that Humberside would emerge as a descriptor for an imagined region around 
the Humber, a commitment that was only signalled rather than embodied by the creation 
of the Yorkshire and Humberside standard planning region under the DEA. As early as 
1964, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government had indicated to Hull City Council 
that there would be a preliminary ‘regional study’ of the East Riding and Lindsey over a 
new development.585 At the 1965 Labour Party conference, Housing Minister Richard 
Crossman revealed that ‘I have my eye on the Humber… with a Humber Bridge you might 
really get a new town of 750,000 inhabitants south of the Humber, if we have the 
courage to make the right decisions’.586 Labour would also use the crucial North Hull by-
election in early 1966 to reiterate enthusiasm for this: Harold Wilson himself noted that 
‘linked by a bridge, Humberside…could become… the most promising area for a really 
large new town’.587 Following emphatic victory in both the by-election, and then the 1966 
General Election, it was agreed that Humberside would become the site for perhaps the 
Wilson Government’s purest attempt at combining regional economic and physical 
planning. In July 1966 it was announced by George Brown that a Central Unit for 
Environmental Planning had been established under the DEA to explore the possibility. 
A consistent theme across almost all of the literature of this period, especially volumes 
written with distance from the public and intellectual modernist climate of the 1960s, is 
the implicit assertion that the forms of political city-regionalism that was advanced in 
academic circles found no official indigenous support and/or public resistance or, more 
likely, public apathy. But an examination of ‘Humberside’ instead indicates a local 
endorsement and appropriation of the term. However, there were key differences in the 
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manner through which a notion of a region of Humberside was articulated and 
understood from a bottom-up perspective, in comparison to how city-regionalism was 
conceived as advanced by the likes of Senior and the TCPA.  
 
3.3 ‘Humber mania’ and the creation of Humberside County 
Council ,  1966-1972  
 
I 
The origins of Humberside as a spatial classification in the early to mid-1960s were 
broadly top-down and primarily defined outside of the area. This provided physical 
boundaries for the region, but crucially would also give both the emerging sub-regional 
area and political administrative unit a distinctly temporal regional form; siting it 
conceptually in the modernism and urbanism that characterised public policy in the 
1960s. Despite these outsider origins for Humberside, and the formidable barriers in 
both physical and cultural terms that existed for its local adoption, how the new 
designation was understood and articulated locally in the late 1960s into the 1970s 
demonstrates a much more complex discursive relationship than the popular narratives 
surrounding Humberside’s abolition in the 1990s indicate. The understanding and use of 
Humberside was indicative of more complex spatial relationships than simply the 
centre/periphery distinctions that would be stressed by academics in the 1980s. 
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II 
The national political and economic attention that was placed on Humberside in the 
1960s stood somewhat in stark contrast to how the areas on the North and South Bank 
of the Humber had been viewed prior to this period. As discussed in the introduction, 
North Humberside, and Hull in particular, had been subject to remarks about ‘otherness’ 
and remoteness dating back to interwar period. This was still the case in the 1960s, as a 
member of the Yorkshire Coast Resorts Chambers of Trade informed Patrick Wall in 
1966: ‘a short time ago the Port of Hull was described on the BBC as being the City thirty 
miles from England’.588 Other similar characterisations such as ‘a town at the end of a 
railway siding’ appeared in the press and elsewhere.589 This isolation was apparent to 
John Barr when writing about Hull and Humberside in New Society in September 1966: 
One is most conscious of the loneliness of Hull, 22 miles from sea, nearly 40 road 
or rail miles from another city, 30 miles east of the country’s transport spine, a vast 
rural hinterland around it, the unbridged Humber before it. The Lindsey coast 
opposite is another land, only two miles away over one of the country’s most 
disgraceful trunk roads, half an hour away by the paddle steamers of one of the 
country’s most expensive ferries.590 
 
This illustrated the significance of both distance and the transport infrastructure of the 
area: before the final section of the M62 was built in the mid 1970s, the region was 
served by a road single carriageway road from Hull to Selby and the A1. The situation was 
worse in South Humberside, and it had led on both banks to ‘traffic saturation, 
congestion, slow frustrating journeys and interminable delays’.591 Such isolation found 
form in cultural flows and tastes. Graham Turner in his book on the North in 1967 
compared Hull unfavourably to Merseyside, both in terms of nightlife and intellectual 
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fodder, characterising it as ‘an immensely parochial, ingrown sort of town’.592 Shiva 
Naipaul, writing of a tour of Humberside in 1978, wrote of Hull that ‘cultural life has 
ground to a standstill’, and that: 
until recently, the girls of Hull wore mini-skirts – fashions come late and change 
slowly in this part of the world. The town, stuck out on a limb, is on the way to 
nowhere. It lends itself to being passed by.593 
 
The attention of the 1960s was thus an opportunity to break such national and regional 
isolation, and to achieve greater prominence. Hull in particular claimed a wider national 
standing (against Manchester) as Britain’s Third Port.594 Barr's 1966 New Society article 
quoted one resident who emphasised this desire for greater recognition: 
It’s not an aggressive insularity, but negative, almost begrudging. We take pride in 
our city, but not in our insularity… we really want to plug into the mainstream.595 
 
There was a sense from citizens and civic leaders alike that ‘with a little bit more 
prodding this area will go like a bomb’.596 
As the expert-led regional planning paradigm was embraced by economic interests 
across Yorkshire and Humberside in the 1960s, perhaps the most enthusiastic adoption 
came from the North Bank of the Humber. A Tribune article on the subject noted that 
‘Hullinsians see the answer to their problems – and much else besides – in stronger 
regional planning. indeed Hull must be the most regional planning conscious city in the 
country, judging by the frequency with which the subject crops up in conversation’.597 The 
most enthusiastic adopters of ‘Humberside’ were the city's Corporation, who formed a 
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Regional Development (Special) Committee of the Council in November 1965, with Leo 
Shultz as its chairman. The committee's founding terms of reference revealed something 
of the contingent nature with which the local authority embraced economic and political 
regionalism, namely ‘to give continuing consideration to the problems associated with 
regional developments and the safeguarding of the interests of the City in such 
development’.598 The leaders of the Council implored the area to ‘think in terms of 
Humberside’, with Shultz stating in a response to Adamson’s ‘Humberopolis’ plan that: 
Unfortunately he is saying nothing strikingly new or original! The Hull Corporation 
has long been thinking on Regional lines and has set up [a committee]… to 
consider and propagate Regionalisation in all its aspects, in particular to cooperate 
with all other authorities in the Region to secure as far as practical Rationally 
planned development.599 
 
Apparent though in this adoption of the language of regionalism was a sense that, 
though wider interest in the potentialities of Humberside offered opportunities for Hull to 
break into the ‘mainstream’ of national life, this also carried apparent threats. The 
CUEP’s Physical Planning Unit had established its base in Barton-Upon-Humber in North 
Lincolnshire, and it was more than apparent prior to the long-delayed publication of the 
Feasibility Study that the South Bank was the favoured for large-scale urban 
development, accompanied by continued major industrial development in the rapidly 
expanding growth areas around Immingham.600 If similar development was to happen on 
the North Bank it was envisaged to be to the West and East of Hull respectively (figure 
3.1).  
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Figure 3.1 - From ‘New areas physically suitable for development’, in CUEP, Humberside – A 
Feasibility Study (HMSO, 1969). 
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Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the increasing economic difficulties 
and rising unemployment of Hull, rather the export-led growth demanded by the National 
Plan in the late 1960s, made clear the precariousness of the City’s existing industrial 
base and led to the North Bank’s designation an ‘Intermediate Area’.601 Worries over the 
consequences of not aligning Humberside fortunes wholeheartedly with Hull and the 
North Bank were noted by New Society in 1966, that ‘in recent years they have become 
conscious… that North Lincolnshire, not Hull, is setting the pace’.602 The fear then that 
fervour towards ‘Humberside’ would continue to exacerbate Hull’s peripherality 
underpinned the approach towards the regionalist agenda of the 1960s. While the CUEP 
continued their own economic and physical planning assessment of the area, the 
Regional Development Committee asserted their independence, commissioning their 
own consultants to conduct an initial appraisal of the industrial future and potential of 
the area.  
Industry on Humberside: Growth and Potential, published in 1967, recognised that the 
‘internal situation and potential on Humberside is favourable to bid-scale industrial 
development’, and linked this to the need for much better communications infrastructure 
to allow it to function on a much higher economic level as ‘a gateway into Europe’.603 
Industrial strength was indicated by employment growth in the region being greatest in 
four of the six fastest growing industrial groups nationally. Contrary to the conception of 
the South Bank’s propulsive nature, the report argued that ‘Professional and Scientific 
Services’ employment was growing ‘much faster’ (a 31.5 per cent increase compared to 
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a national increase of 23.3 per cent nationally).604 The publication of the report gave 
Shultz the opportunity to firmly align Hull with Humberside: 
Speaking at a press conference to introduce the report he said that Hull was the 
natural capital of the region and the centre of educational, recreational, industrial 
and commercial activity.605 
 
The assertion that the city served as its ‘capital’ was a common motif, also advanced in 
the City’s promotional material on a national level (Figure 3.2). Alongside this was the 
idea that the area was a ‘Gateway to Europe’: representing both enthusiasm of officials 
and industrialists for potential entry into the Common Market (as was the case across 
the Yorkshire and Humberside during the 1960s and into the 1970s)606, and a regional 
identity stronger than the ‘embryonic’ city-regionalism Senior had detected. This 
regionalism was constructed as industrial, progressive and modern; outwardly 
enthusiastic about the ‘potential’ offered by Humberside. 
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Figure 3.2 - Advert from The Times, 26 June 1968. 
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III 
Importantly, the regional aspirations of Hull’s civic leaders in the late 1960s found a 
significant audience with the area's organisations, who also sought to construct and 
represent a functional unity across the Humber. The Hull Daily Mail, with established 
circulation on both the North Bank and North Lincolnshire since the late nineteenth 
century,607 was a consistent proponent of the possibilities offered by Humberside in 
these years, extolling the ‘enormous future and unlimited scope’ planners and 
academics predicted for the Humber,608 and also investing in the campaign for the 
construction of the Humber Bridge (see below).  
Increased public collaboration between industrialists and labour groups with a regional 
agenda visibly emerged in this period. After a report on regional development around the 
Humber Estuary by Hull’s Chamber of Commerce sparked interest, a  Humber Area 
Development Committee was established. Its activities included the publication of a 
pamphlet advocating the construction of barrage across the Estuary from Grimsby Docks; 
the intention being to simultaneously provide deep water port facilities to rival those in 
Europe, and also to provide closer physical ties across the Humber. In 1964, prior to the 
full agreement of the Wilson Government’s regional planning apparatus, the trade 
journal Voice of Yorkshire and Humberside Industry and a socialist newspaper, 
Humberside Voice, were founded. Though both publications emphasised the existence of 
a divide between North Humberside and South Humberside, they demonstrated a local 
acceptance and appropriation of the regional designation, and included many 
invocations to overcome barriers to unity. MP Tony Crosland in Humberside Voice 
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implored readers ‘let’s stop assuming Hull and Grimsby are continents apart’;609 one 
report in the Voice of Industry was more emphatic: 
It is essential to think in terms of a united Humberside with a view of the 21st 
century before any sane forecast of the shape of things to come can be made. 
Therefore, administratively, Humberside will be one unit capable of developing in 
the next century as a whole to meet the challenges of trade with a united 
Europe.610 
 
Much of these hopes, however, rested on an imagined regional economic future, and the 
calls for unity concealed weaknesses in these ties. 
But there were also other productions of a Humberside identity that seeped into popular 
culture, that were much more closely rooted in place. The folk duo Christopher Rowe and 
Ian Clark recorded first Songs for Humberside in 1968, which was followed by a second 
record – More Songs for Humberside – in 1970. Despite the title, the subject matter of 
the songs was primarily focused around Hull and its uneasy social and political 
relationship the more affluent suburbs of Hedon and Haltemprice, despite the city’s vital 
economic function (‘Hull’s Best Friends’; ‘Keep your Hands Off Haltemprice’), though 
allusions were made to the landmarks and history of the area, along with (on the first 
record) strong references to a potential Humber Bridge (‘Humber Bridge’).611 Though 
grounded in a distinct locality, and tinged with distinct humour and the isolation and 
dislocation O’Brien has identified in the work of poets in Hull,612 Clark’s sleeve on the 
first EP notes a unifying intention to their work, that ‘…music and humour can link almost 
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anything and armed with both we set out to take a long look at Humberside’.613 By the 
time of the second release he noted that the Songs had been sung live and on television 
to a wide variety of audiences providing something of a ‘“fragrance” of Humberside’ to 
many outside the area.614 
Despite the strong local associations placed on Humberside with Hull, the subtleties of 
which were generally lost on a national press and government that knew little of the 
area, this did not preclude both official and more popular enthusiasm for stronger ties 
from the South Bank. Turner (with surprise) noted this alignment of Yorkshire and 
Humberside with the identities of North Lincolnshire residents, quoting a Cleethorpes 
woman saying there was ‘…only the Humber between us and Yorkshire’.615 The 
authorities in Scunthorpe in particular consistently desired closer links with the North 
Bank, as in their 1966 ‘Scunthorpe Study’.616 Grimsby’s Corporation also indicated to the 
Redcliffe-Maud Commission that they favoured the creation of a higher tier provincial 
authority to include ‘the entire Humber Estuary’ rather than one based on the 
geographical county of Lincolnshire.617 
 
IV 
But while there were enthusiastic calls for unity among economic interests, the press, 
sections of the population and urban authorities, and attempts to construct a locally 
understood Humberside that aligned with national priorities, divisions between town and 
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country continued to be a point of controversy and resistance. Both North Lindsey County 
and East Riding County Councils would continue to assert their own identities against the 
emerging functional, economic and political unity of the two banks. The East Riding in 
particular set out both its geographical suitability as a unit of government, but also its 
cultural alignment with continuing rural patterns of life. The Council was emphatic in its  
written evidence to the Redcliffe-Maud Commission: 
The East Riding has a natural entity, imposed by boundaries which are almost 
completely natural and obvious. The sea is on the east and the Humber Estuary on 
the south. To the west and north are the rivers Ouse and Derwent.618 
 
It claimed to be a local authority representing a ‘natural’ area and to refute ‘expert 
opinion calling for as much as possible a dissolution of the distinction between town and 
country in the ‘motor age’. The Council stated that ’the antithesis between town and 
country is something quite fundamental and, even in this overcrowded island, it remains 
true that each represents a way of life substantially different from each other’.619 As 
Patrick Wall noted, the possibility of ‘drastic local government re-organisation had led to 
‘a genuine fear that rural areas will be dominated by City of [Hull]’.620 
The most obvious example of this tension came from the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government’s recommendation in 1967 that there should be a coordinating ‘Joint 
Planning Body’.621 The initial attempt to form such a body proved a non-starter, as the 
Unit were informed by the Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Board (YHEPB) 
that after enquiries, both Lindsey and the East Riding ‘feel strongly that machinery of the 
kind envisaged is not necessary. These authorities are very jealous of their individual 
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responsibilities’.622 When the idea was resurrected it was again rejected by the county 
councils despite some enthusiasm from the more urban authorities.623  
Many of the issues surrounding the political future of Humberside would begin to come 
to a head in 1969. The Feasibility Study was finally published in April, following 
significant and heated internal discussions between various departments, most notably 
the Treasury and the DEA. Rather than signal the immediate unleashing of the growth 
potential of the region, it instead deferred the decision on whether any new settlement 
for 250,000 people should go ahead on the Humber to 1972.624 As it was, any action on 
the wider recommendations, beyond the early construction of a Humber Bridge for 
opening in 1976, were quietly dropped by the DEA’s successor, the Department for the 
Environment (DOE), in 1971.625 
In June 1969, Lord Redcliffe-Maud’s report on local government in England was also 
finally published. The recommendations endorsed many of the criticisms that had led to 
the Commission: that local government no longer reflected the pattern of modern life, 
and that county boroughs ‘as islands in the counties’ led to fragmented service 
provision.626 The report argued that town and country needed to be recognised as 
interdependent.627 The recommendation of the report was that, to ensure more efficient 
provision of services and reduce the number of councils, unitary authorities should be 
created with population sizes ranging from 1 million to 250,000 inhabitants. From these 
local authorities there would be an indirectly elected provincial council. This majority 
report recommended the creation of unitary authorities on both banks: North 
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Humberside encompassing Hull, with its ‘strong influence’ of the surrounding areas, and 
the vast majority of the East Riding; and South Humberside, which contained both 
Scunthorpe and Grimsby, primarily as the Commissioners argued neither was sufficiently 
large to be an effective unit on their own, but that their character was sufficiently 
distinctive from the rest of Lindsey.628 In his memorandum of dissent, Derek Senior, 
questioning the logic used for the viable size of unitary authorities, argued that instead 
there should be primary tiers at regional and district level; with a regional tier of 
government centred on Hull and spanning the Humber, and three district councils 
supporting the urban areas. Though these proposals including much larger areas of 
Lindsey in the districts for Scunthorpe and Grimsby, the third district on the North Bank 
again reflected broad boundaries of the East Riding.629 
The proposals were subject to significant national debate in the early 1970s, influenced 
also by the change in government of the 1970 General Election.630 Peter Walker as 
Environment Secretary made more ready concessions to ‘local sentiment and historic 
ties’ than the Redcliffe-Maud proposals had done.631 However, a decision on how the 
Humber area should be governed prior to the Local Government Act proved perhaps the 
most difficult for the DOE in 1971. The Heath Government’s first white paper in February 
1971, noting their commitment to a two-tier authority structure that would put decision-
making in the hands of local interests, set out two counties almost wholly consisting of 
the historic East Riding (with the town of Goole) and Lincolnshire respectively.632 
However, when boundaries were revised in November following consultations with the 
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local authorities and publicity in the local press, the amendments set out a united 
Humberside, more along the lines proposed by Senior.633 
Such a change was primarily driven not by a top-down insistence from Whitehall but by 
civic leaders in the urban areas of Humberside. The embrace of the region again 
demonstrated the traditional local distinctions between town and country. The mayors of 
Hull, Scunthorpe and Grimsby felt moved in December to send a letter to Walker 
expressing ‘unreservedly our wholehearted support and that of our respective authorities 
for the formation of a new Humberside county’, whilst pledging that the important role of 
agriculture and the balance of town and country would be maintained.634 Both Hull’s 
political leaders and Chamber of Commerce, and also civic leaders from the small 
authorities areas such as Isle of Axholme and Beverley Rural District Council (RDC), 
declared themselves ‘unitedly delighted’. For the East Riding, the potential loss of name 
was seen to ‘add injury to insult’.635 But rather than assert the counties' historic 
boundaries, the council proposed instead that a new ‘East Yorkshire’ county council be 
formed from the inclusion of Scarborough ‘and possibly the York area’ due to their 
‘affinities with East Yorkshire’.636 In the hastily arranged consultation meeting, local 
representative Alderman Bisby put it bluntly when he claimed 'the East Riding did not like 
Hull’ suggesting an ‘estuarine county’ could be formed.637  
Lindsey County Council put up even more vehement opposition, especially over the 
prospect of being divided between the Humberside and Lincolnshire counties, and as a 
result took its own initiative in arranging three postal county ‘plebiscites’ in March 1972, 
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to demonstrate the strength of feeling for an ‘All-Lincolnshire County’.638 However, the 
results from the plebiscite were not as overwhelming as expected for a wholly new county 
that existing councils argued did not reflect the ‘natural’ region. Officials in the DOE 
noted that, compared with similar moves in other counties such as Poynton and North 
Somerset, and ‘considering the amount of propaganda and the natural preference for 
the existing county name’, the majority of 73 per cent (or roughly 47 per cent based on 
turnout) was quite small.639 Alongside the vehement protests of the county councils were 
statements from prominent figures such as the Bishop of Lincoln, who articulated the 
common heritage - discussed in chapter 5 – of the ‘great agricultural county, with great 
agricultural industry’, and ‘sad’ that the great record of associational ties between 
statutory and voluntary associations would be broken.  
These debates demonstrate the existence of a contested regional identity, but one 
representative of the cultural moment of the 1960s. Its existence and creation was more 
negotiated than accepted, interacting uneasily with existing social and political relations. 
It was a product of the cultural productions of authority and expertise that favoured 
modern, urban and industrial imagined geographies. Glanford Brigg RDC, in protesting to 
the DOE, stated that through the proposal for a Humberside county ‘could be diagnosed 
as a touch of Humber mania’, it highlighted a national but also local phenomenon. The  
RDC also noted that the move for Humberside focused on potential unity rather than an 
immediate reality, adding: ‘it is always a mistake to equate thinking for the future with 
telling somebody else to go and live in it’.640 
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3.4 Regional identity and the campaign to abolish Humberside 
 
I 
Following the creation of the new metropolitan and non-metropolitan county councils in 
1974, it was claimed in the late 1980s and 1990s that the campaign to abolish the new 
local authorities, and to 'Save our Shires’, was both fervent and instantaneous. This was 
supposedly strongest in ‘Britain’s Newest County’ – the slogan used by the Humberside 
County Council. Resistance to Humberside, and the campaign to abolish Humberside 
County Council, is perhaps the most fitting prism through which to consider this 
phenomenon, which has been little considered in twentieth century British history. This 
section will set out how local and national relationships with Humberside were much 
more complex, spatially expedient and temporally contingent than popular narratives 
asserted. These constructions of place, of alternative regions or historic counties, were 
grounded in broader political, social, economic and cultural changes in late twentieth 
century Britain, most notably declinism and its relationship to the rise of concern over 
and commodification of heritage, the ‘privatisation of politics’, the rejection of 
technocratic expertise, and decreasing satisfaction with government. 
 
II 
When finally established in 1974, the promoters of this new system of local government 
were keen to emphasise that the new counties themselves, particularly the non-
metropolitan counties made up of wholly new areas (namely Cleveland, Avon and 
Humberside), were intended purely for administrative purposes, and did not supplant the 
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historical counties.641 It was argued that the historic counties themselves had long 
ceased to fulfil a direct administrative purpose due to the ‘hotch-potch’ of county 
boroughs that had emerged since 1888.642 In many respects it appears that in first few 
years of the County Council’s existence, its existence was broadly accepted, if somewhat 
begrudgingly and conditionally. An article in the Illustrated London News in 1976, though 
bearing the rather ominous title of ‘Who Belongs to Humberside’, found a significant 
degree of adherence to the county unit whilst indicating it was ‘hard work’. The article 
focused primarily on the more rural areas, including a quote from the chief executive of 
the North Wolds district that joined Bridlington to Pocklington that ‘we are completely 
loyal to Humberside as an administrative unit’; and quoted Jeremy Elwes (see chapter 5) 
that having protested, he now ‘accepted the decision and was keen for Humberside to 
succeed'.643 But much remained conditional on the potential of the Humber Bridge to 
functionally unite the two sides of the Humber. 
In political terms the largest divide across the county was again between urban and rural. 
In the first elections for the county council, Labour gained a narrow majority almost 
entirely gained in the urban areas of Hull, Grimsby and Scunthorpe (save two rural 
seats).644  The Council would continue to be contested along urban and rural lines, and 
control would change hands several times over the life of the Council. As Elcock 
highlighted, the Labour Group sought to portray the professional, modern identity that 
tinged the imagined geography and potential of Humberside, choosing to name a chief 
executive rather than a clerk (though the role was taken by the former clerk of Hull City 
Council, and both the role and committee structures remained fairly traditional in 
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scope).645 The tight nature of Council meant that there was an uneasy balance between 
urban and rural interests, as the Labour Council gave assurances that the approaches 
around the Humber Bridge was not be subject to large-scale development, and 
committed to careful limits on its public spending.646 Conservative control from 1977 
also brought about significant promises of financial stringency as they sought to keep the 
rate burden down.647 
However, the effect of deindustrialization on the urban areas of the Humber would 
undermine the initial aspirations for what Humberside could become as a region. The 
effects of the ‘Cod War’ in the mid 1970s were particularly damaging for an area where 
up to 75,000 people were dependent on the industry.648 Rather than gaining from its 
locational advantages as the ‘Gateway to Europe’, the Humber’s ports struggled against 
increased EEC competition.  As North noted, ‘this industrial and commercial facade’ in 
Humberside was ‘dominated by a backcloth of prosperous agriculture’, as the farming of 
the area remained efficient and innovative.649 From Intermediate status, both Hull and 
Grimsby would become full Development Areas in 1977.650 It was also hampered by the 
County Council’s failure in the early 1980s to entice Japanese car manufacturers to 
establish factories in the region. These structural issues began to place strain on the 
concept of Humberside, as by the late 1970s Grimsby’s District Council were seeking a 
reform of the boundaries, so that the town was part of a North Lincolnshire authority. 
One councillor claimed:  
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There is a widespread feeling we have lost our identity. We have little in common 
with the people living in North Humberside. The Humber is a great divide and will 
continue to be a great divide even when the Humber Bridge is built.651 
 
In April 1977 the North Lincolnshire Association (NLA) was founded in Grimsby, and 
claimed 7,000 signatures on a petition to abolish the county in only three weeks. The 
East Yorkshire Action Group (EYAG) at the same time claimed 57,500 signatures on their 
own petition.652 This demonstrates the growing unrest of the former county boroughs 
over their former powers, and the issues with administering ‘ideological politics’ in local 
government.653 
 
III 
Such rumblings in the late 1970s were the beginnings of a more concerted campaign for 
the abolition of Humberside that would build to a crescendo in the late 1980s, due to the 
opportunity for reform provided by the scheduled review by the Local Government 
Boundary Commission (LGBC). The politics of such movements, and how they 
constructed notions of identity in relation to local government politics, are highly 
complex. Neave highlights that when the LGBC proposed no radical changes to the 
county in 1990, it received 81,500 signatures on 26 petitions, with only two in support 
(totalling little more than 100 names).654 This however suggests a homogeneity that is 
less clear in an examination of the major agitating associations. 
The political context outlined above was a reflection of broader trends in British society, 
particularly in the declinist critique. Guy Ortolano has argued that declinism represented 
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a ‘rhetorical weapon’, and that the critique itself differed between the left and right.655 
The failures of the 1960s to bring about the planned modern future, as Tomlinson 
argues, led in part to the ‘panic’ of the 1970s that saw a clear ‘right-wing shift in political 
discussion’.656 Part of this political shift also included both an increasing distrust of 
experts, and an increasingly centralised and bureaucratic state that was losing 
confidence, as it appeared in constant crisis and overburdened.657 The panics of the 
1970s and 1980s led to an explosion of interest in national heritage through 
organisations like the National Trust and Council for the Preservation of Rural 
England.658 As discussed in chapter 5, the supposed threats to ‘country’ heritage 
articulated prior to these flashpoints, and resistance to the modernising rhetoric of the 
period, claimed a more libertarian, anti-statist ideology. 
In the construction of identity in opposition to Humberside it was such images and 
political ideas that were mobilised. The most apparent example of such resistance were 
the Yorkshire Ridings Society (YRS) that was founded in Beverley in 1974. The YRS 
articulated a distinct sense of region and identity that located Yorkshire not only in space 
but in time. Their stated objective on foundation was to campaign for ‘recognition of the 
continued unchanged existence of the whole Yorkshire within its three Ridings’, including 
an eight point ‘Yorkshire code’ that ‘refuses the new local government areas “a 
geographical status not intended them by the 1972”’.659 The most overt of the Society’s 
assertion of a Yorkshire identity was the creation of ‘Yorkshire Day’ in 1975, celebrated 
on the 1 August to commemorate the battle of Minden in 1759 where they claimed 
soldiers from the Yorkshire regiments ‘picked white roses from nearby fields as a tribute 
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to their colleagues’.660 A number of events were arranged on this day each year and it 
continued to receive active press coverage for this, such travelling the coastline handing 
out 1,101 sand castle flags emblazoned with white roses in 1977; one for every year of 
Yorkshire’s supposed existence.661 Additionally the Society would campaign actively, 
amongst other things, to Yorkshire addresses accepted by the Post Office and ‘roadside 
boundary signs to mark the Ridings’, which they were eventually to get Humberside 
County Council to agree to in 1990.662 
The actions taken by the YRS clearly aligned Hobsbawm’s arguments on the ‘invention’ 
of tradition, where the ‘rapid transformation’ of societies can be seen as destroying the 
social patterns of old traditions as part of modernisation.663 However, given that the 
historic Ridings had not existed as used in their traditional boundaries during the 
twentieth century, these practices of regional construction appear to align more with 
conceptions of ‘nostalgia’ of place identified and articulated by Savage, which ‘takes its 
reference to the past, not literally but to stake a contemporary claim’; such that can use 
discursive space distinctions as a means of distinguishing between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’.664 By the late 1980s, the effect had been so compelling that it was noted 
that it was remarked ‘it is evidently now seen by some as an ancient festival of 
mysterious origin’.665 
However, these imagined geographies in the actions of the YRS were supported by more 
real social structures and landscapes associated with Yorkshire. The Society with the 
associational culture observed previously within Yorkshire, in not only continuing to 
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describe itself as ‘non-political and voluntary’ but also establishing a ‘Yorkshire Day’ 
charity.666 Similarly, the YRS sought to align themselves strongly with nationalism and 
the national interest, not just in evoking the battle of Minden, but also in the rising of the 
‘Yorkshire flag’ alongside the Union Flag on Yorkshire Day. In its founding aims it wished 
to keep the Ridings intact as ‘an integral part of the UK’ indicating the strong unionist 
ideology.667 In Michael Bradford’s 1988 book The Fight for Yorkshire, which was heavily 
supported by the YRS, the author invoked not only the importance of associations and 
societies in the sense of ‘belonging’ people in Yorkshire, he also named a chapter on 
local government reorganisation ‘betrayal’, in seeing the move as sabotage of the 
historic county’s national loyalty and service.668 
Though the YRS was both important and visible from a cultural standpoint they were 
secondary to the active campaigning for abolition that came from the EYAG and NLA, who 
even in 1981 were able to present petitions with over 120,000 and 50,000 names 
respectively to the Conservative Government.669 The foundations of the former were very 
much on similar grounds to the YRS, as were its expressions of identity. However, in the 
late 1970s and through to the late 1980s, Trevor Pearson, a Conservative councillor in 
the North Wolds District Council restricted the efforts of his newly formed Group not to 
abolishing the County Council, but to securing a change of its name to ‘East Yorkshire 
and North Lincolnshire’ and resisting and change to the Postal address. The anti-
bureaucratic nature of these protests became framed around resistance to perceived 
imperial imposition from the centre, a centre which these groups deemed had little 
regard for patterns of community life and local identities. As a report in the New York 
Times with Pearson, and the YRS Chairman Colin Holt quoted as saying: ‘The bureaucrats 
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in London sit in their offices, and they don’t care about such things but really Yorkshire is 
something that’s in the mind’. As Pearson also noted it’s got to end, for sanity’s sake as 
well as common sense’.670 However, the EYAG (which had by the late 1980s turned its 
attention to the full abolition of the county), though demonstrating a strong sense of 
place in its campaigning was less doctrinaire that in that while acknowledging the 
‘sensible natural boundary’ of the former East Riding, the EYAG and made clear in their 
submissions that ‘Our wish is to firmly think of the future… we are by no means thinking 
nostalgically’.671 
A large part of the EYAG’s campaigning, in preparing submissions for the LGBC inquiries 
in the 1980s and Local Government Commission for England in 1992 appeared clearly 
to invoke an ‘imagined community’, attempting to forge an ‘image of communion’ or 
‘kinship’ as Anderson has explored in relations to the formation of nationalisms, and 
using print media in a similar way Anderson argues made national consciousness 
imaginable in industrialising capitalist societies.672 The members of the EYAG collected 
as many examples from the national and local press, including the Hull Daily Mail, 
Beverley Guardian and Lincolnshire Echo which had by the 1980s all editorially aligned 
against the county, of local and national businesses, organisations and groups that 
continued to use the Humber as a ‘natural boundary’, or maintained East Yorkshire in 
their name, including new clubs to show that allegiances persist. Such added to their 
conviction that  a division based on the river was both ‘common sense’ and universally 
desired. As a note included within these  press cuttings indicated: 
Here is a further selection of evidence of the way in which local clubs, societies and 
organisations choose to observe the natural river boundary in name their 
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institutions according to the traditional north bank East Yorkshire/East Riding 
names.673 
 
That the campaigns for abolition were due in part of the continued modernist aspirations 
and image of the County Council was highlighted in the previous chapter. The failure of 
these aspirations and the continued peripherality of the area leading to a perceived lack 
of material benefit was clear - as the EYAG’s submission in response to the LGBC’s initial 
submission for no boundary change indicated: ‘If fourteen years of Humberside is 
supposed to have brought benefits then what are they? Why are people not recognising 
or asking for them?’.674 In such a climate, there was an increasing narrative of unilateral 
central imposition and invasive urbanism onto a region conceived as primarily 
agricultural. Within many citizens as well as the abolition groups began to articulate a 
regionalism based on the discourse and rhetoric of nationalism and resistance on both 
Banks of the Humber. Trevor Pearson continually referred to the ‘Bureaucratic Baboons’ 
of Whitehall claimed to other campaigners his interest was in inciting ‘resistance’ to 
them.675 
For the NLA, not only was Humberside County Council ‘thrust upon us’, there were 
continued claims of supposed favouritism towards the North Bank and in particular 
Hull.676 The Council’s Hull based Chief Executive Terry Geraghty was increasingly cast as 
a ‘dictator’ overseeing  ‘his empire’.677 The supposed tyranny and imposition was also 
shown in the invoking of assertions of nationalism elsewhere, as one Peer in the Lords 
remarked ‘The Government have made clear that the wishes of the majority of those who 
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live in the Falkland, Gibraltar and in Northern Ireland will be upheld. Surely that should 
also apply to those that live in Humberside’.678 
The nationalist discourse employed by the ‘Shire’ organisations, despite their differences 
in aims, was also intended to lend legitimacy to their claims of a heritage under threat, 
and of the colonial imposition of dominion rather than of self-determination. One letter to 
the Yorkshire Post claimed that the ‘imposition’ of Humberside by ‘the powers that be in 
Whitehall’ was to ‘break up two of the largest counties in the country hoping to prevent 
us developing into provincial power blocks such as those of the Celtic fringe’.679 A letter 
signed by fourteen member of a Methodist young group stressing a desire ‘to keep our 
Yorkshire heritage and identity within the geographical area of the Three Ridings of 
Yorkshire’ stated that: 
we are all under the age of 20 and have suffered the full-force of the “Empire-
building” of the bogus County officials and vested interest of the Local media Radio 
and Television stations intended to obliterate our Yorkshire birthright.680 
 
IV 
The stridency of the EYAG, NLA and other organisations intensified in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s precisely because of increasing popular identification with Humberside, 
particularly generationally. This was evident of the broader cultural conflict caused by 
increasing affluence and class ‘dealignment’ that was making conceptions of place more 
malleable. Both industrialists and younger generations found a sense of belonging and 
identification with Humberside, in part with its monumental imagery in the Humber 
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Bridge. The County Council in 1989 were clear that not only was there ‘no case for 
disturbing the County as an administrative unit’ but also that ‘…over time people’s 
allegiances present undisputed resistance to the County’s name will diminish’.681 
The County Council in the late 1980s was not without successes, despite its apparent 
negative internal and external regional and administrative image. In 1988 the LGBC’s 
initial decision that no change should be made was based on the assessment it provided 
‘effective and convenient local government’ and that economic development had been 
similar on both Banks of the Humber. During the 1980s the County had also overseen 
GDP per head rise from 87 per cent of the national average to 99.1 per cent.682 Schools 
in Lincolnshire and other areas also sent letters to parents and appeals in the local press 
urging support for retention of the county due to the services it provided.683 
Though the EYAG had collected copious examples of national and local businesses that 
saw the Humber as a ‘natural divide’, they remained unable to get business leaders to 
support their cause. In 1989, the Chairman wrote to several business leaders, asking if 
‘a group of industrialists would be prepared to make a submission’ to LGBC to 
demonstrate the ‘economic and commercial arguments’, so ’that the Commissioners do 
not get the impression that the only groups that want to see change are the EYAG and 
Ridings Society’.684 Unable to secure this, and with the County Council claiming the 
support of businesses and education associations throughout Humberside was crucial in 
the initial decision for not change in 1989,685 eventually the EYAG would argue on the 
basis of the absence of ‘Humberside’ from North Sea Ferries or British Aerospace 
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literature, and a local press quote from the Chairman of Northern Foods that Humberside 
was ‘a disaster.’686 All affinity was considered to be somewhat conspiratorial on behalf of 
the County Council. when a public debate was held in January 1991, a motion supporting 
the retention of Humberside was defeated somewhat narrowly by a margin of 81 to 60. 
The EYAG made clear that the small venue and arrangements made the meeting ‘heavily 
biased in Humberside’s favour'.687 Even in North Lincolnshire, a independent poll run in 
1989 noted that some 32 per cent of residents wished to be in Humberside, with 62 per 
cent for Lincolnshire showing that support was not overwhelming.688 
Generational change was also evident. When submitting their case to a further review of 
the area in 1992, Humberside were able to claim that ‘opinion polls have shown that a 
majority of 16-17 year olds in the county identify strongly with Humberside’.689 The 
supposed ‘loss’ of a traditional county identity among youth had been a significant 
anxiety for campaigners from the beginning of their actions, as Michael Bradford in his 
Fight for Yorkshire had stated, ‘once you are a Yorkshireman you stay one: but what 
about the unborn?’690 Such fears were now seemingly realised, as one abolitionist 
bemoaned to This England: 
The whole thing has got into one enormous muddle and where as some adults are 
able to comprehend the situation the vast majority of our young people are totally 
unaware of the situation and are suffering from insipid education in this filed or are 
being “brain-washed” by the new empire-building L.A. Counties. 
In 1986 and onwards, when we began collecting signatures for the Boundary 
Changes (East Riding)… the young people were keen to retain their Yorkshire 
heritage and readily signed the petition as most were born around the time L.A. 
changes occurred. Now in 1992, the new generations of young people are not so 
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informed and it is proving a longer job to obtain signatures for the “Yorkshire real 
Counties” petition.691  
 
When finally in 1993 the Local Government Commission for England ruled that 
Humberside should be divided into four unitary authorities for Hull, the East Riding, North 
Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire, it noted that these authorities would accord 
closer with both community and identity. However, even in the evidence provided it 
demonstrated that these identities were more complex and contingent than was 
assumed. Despite its short existence, the lack of realisation of much of its founding 
principles, and the overlaying of strong traditional identities, 34 per cent of those 
surveyed by MORI indicated ‘very or fairly strongly’ identifying with Humberside, against 
49 and 80 per cent for Lincolnshire and Yorkshire respectively.692 
 
3.5 ’Nowhere to Nowhere':  The Humber Bridge, Hull  and 
Humberside 
 
I 
In Cities in Modernity, Dennis emphasises the active role of space in ‘stimulating new 
forms of representation and shaping new identities’. He argues that ‘space is not simply 
a container in which modern life is played out. Rather the ways we conceptualise and 
operationalise space are products of political, economic, social and cultural 
processes’.693 Tellingly, his book begins with an examination and discussion of perhaps 
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the most dramatic transformation of space: bridges – namely the Brooklyn Bridge, Tower 
Bridge and Bloor Street Viaduct. Dennis argues such bridges are also highly contested 
spaces: for all the opportunities that arise from a bridge, there are also anxieties over 
power dynamics, and the possibility that they might bring different peoples and activities 
‘too close’ together.694 This is true of the Tyne Bridge between Newcastle and 
Gateshead, being a closely managed extension of the authority and identity of the larger 
corporation over the smaller.695 
Dennis’ chapter on bridges illustrates an important issues raised by their construction, 
namely the uneven distribution of spatial power and authority they represent. Such 
tensions were evident in the building of the Humber Bridge, opened to the public in 1981 
after almost a century of proposals and deliberations, and – as above – which informed 
the debates surrounding the viability of Humberside as a region. Though seemingly 
‘regional’ in function and origin, the bridge served not only as a literal and figurative 
representation of the competing historical political and cultural identities discussed in 
the previous section, but also of competing political ideologies in late twentieth century 
England; of the perceived imposition of an centralising, technocratic urban modernism 
onto deeper rooted, popular identities. It highlights aspects of wider debates and 
controversies on-going in Britain during this period about its ‘past, present and future’ 
and the role of the civil servant as an ‘expert’.  
 
II 
On the opening of the bridge in the summer of 1981, there was cautiously optimistic  
hope that the bridge would finally serve to stimulate a unified cultural, economic and 
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functional identity between the two banks of the Humber – and finally give shape to the 
non-metropolitan county of Humberside. It was implied that the bridge was deemed 
central to the logic of the region, and was imbued with a regional aspiration. However, 
similarly obvious in this commentary was a significant degree of animosity, pessimism 
and anxiety, with the same articles deeming the bridge ‘a white elephant’ or ‘the bridge 
from nowhere to nowhere’:696 from Hessle, five miles west of Hull, to the tiny Barton-
upon-Humber. The Humber Bridge is one of Britain’s most controversial transport 
projects: its cost increased from original estimates of £19 million to over £90 million at 
the point of its completion (a debt that spiralled to greater than £320 million within a 
decade), and it finally opened five years behind schedule. By the mid-1980s the bridge 
was also carrying barely more than a third of the initial projected vehicles per day.697 
But despite the Hull Corporation's general belief that a bridge over the Humber would 
open up access to the south of England and provide the basis for a route of national 
importance, the Conservative government of the 1950s was emphatic that a bridge 
would be of ‘primarily regional value’.698 A significant factor in this was the government’s 
aversion to taking on the not insignificant cost of the bridge (estimated at £15,750,000 
in 1959),699 as it would if it was included in the trunk road network. The disparity in 
thinking about the importance of the Bridge was clear. When the construction of the first 
Severn Bridge was authorised in the early 1960s, the clerk of the Humber Bridge Board 
wrote to the Ministry of Transport requesting clarification on what the ‘dividing line’ was 
between a ‘national’ and ‘regional’ bridge project.700 The consulting engineers for the 
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Bridge Board, Freeman Fox and Partners, assured them in 1963 that their estimates for 
traffic flows demonstrated a Humber Bridge would have flows of ‘national’ traffic similar 
to the Severn Bridge. It was a source of frustration therefore that the Ministry took six 
months to reply and provided no empirical reason for their decision. 
The case made to the Labour Minister of Transport Tom Fraser in March 1965 from the 
Humber Bridge Board made clear the ‘barrier effect of the estuary’ was perceived for an 
area much greater than the south bank of the river, opening with: 
The River Humber is the only main river in England without a bridge or tunnel 
crossing. The estuary is a formidable barrier to traffic moving between the North 
and the south [sic] and South-west, extending 40 miles from Spurn Head, or 
roughly one third of the distance from the East coast to the West coast… 
Any journey to the South or Midlands from Hull, other than by the ferry service… 
must be preceded by a 28-30 mile trip to the west before turning South.701 
 
The supposed utility of a Humber Bridge in connecting Hull to the rest of England took 
precedence in the Board’s thinking, even in light of the regional paradigm opened up by 
the interest in Humberside. The statement of case did not mention ‘Humberside’ until 
page six of its nine pages, and its importance to Hull rather than the broader region was 
what was emphasised: 
If the [sic] Humberside is to mean anything in the Government’s scheme of regional 
economic planning and growth, the Humber Bridge must be commenced 
immediately. By so doing, not only would the industrial and economic potential of 
the region be developed, but the regional centre facilities of Kingston upon Hull for 
shopping, culture and education, such as its University and College of Technology, 
would become available for the whole of the Humberside.702 
 
As such, Humberside is fundamental to understanding the Humber Bridge. The Humber 
Bridge was intrinsic to the supposed aspirations for national importance of Hull city. 
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Rather than access to the south bank of the Humber and the opening up of the regional 
potentialities that informed the central debate over Humberside in the 1960s, it was 
towards the south of England and London in particular that civic officials in Hull looked. 
Following the end of the Second World War, with the passing of the Trunk Roads Act 
(1946) and an increasingly powerful roads lobby pushing plans for a new network of 
highways,703 the Corporation had successfully canvassed twenty-seven other authorities 
to seek the approval of the Ministry of Transport for the construction of an ‘Eastern 
Highway’ to run parallel to the Great North Road (later A1). A bridge over the Humber was 
an integral part of this highway and argued to be of ‘national importance’.704  
Though the dramatic cuts to public expenditure introduced by the Attlee Government 
removed any prospect of an early realisation of this idea, a major road through the 
Eastern Counties remained a part of proposals into the 1950s. Haltemprice UDC 
submitted a preliminary suggestion to a meeting with MPs and representatives of local 
authorities to push for a new road, the route of which would run from London’s 
Docklands and then to the east of Cambridge, Peterborough and Lincoln. After crossing 
the Humber it would join the A1 around Boroughbridge. As such this would serve to make 
the Bridge a national asset and provide a ‘further justification’ for a bridge.705 
When the Feasibility Study was finally published in April 1969, it indicated that – despite 
the economic case remaining inconclusive – the early completion of a Humber Bridge by 
1976 would be fundamental to integrating the banks of the Humber, bringing positive 
'psychological' effects to the region.706 This, rather than the supposed election pledge in 
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1966, was the basis of the Government’s final decision in May 1971 to support the 
construction of the Bridge through loans. It was followed in November by the designation 
of Humberside as a single administrative unit. The Humber Bridge, from a national 
perspective at least, was therefore seen as the embodiment of an aspiring regionalism 
on the Humber. 
In the view of those who would later campaign for the Humberside County Council's 
abolition, Humberside and the Humber Bridge were thus inextricably linked in this high-
modernist regional paradigm: both imposed; both a product of their time. This narrative, 
however, glaringly discounts the fact that the bridge campaign had a much longer local 
history, and preceded the external designation of the area as Humberside. As argued by 
the clerk of Glanford Brigg RDC in opposition to their inclusion in Humberside, ‘the 
Humber Bridge has been used by the Government as an argument for the creation of 
Humber County. The Bridge itself however is not the Government’s creation. It’s rather 
rubbing salt in the wound if a Humber County were created.’707  
The campaign for the Bridge had been initiated in the late 1920s, and over time myriad 
cultural significances had been attached to it locally. Central to all initiatives were the 
interests of the City of Hull. It was the Corporation’s parliamentary committee that 
maintained pressure on the government into the post-war period and ultimately obtained 
powers for the Bridge in 1959, leading to the creation of the Humber Bridge Board. The 
composition of the Bridge Board makes apparent just how much of a civic, rather than 
regional, initiative this embodied. The only authorities committed to financial contribution 
to the Bridge were Hull and the small UDCs of Haltemprice, and Barton-Upon-Humber.708 
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III 
The Bridge was thus linked to Hull’s particular civic cultural identity discussed earlier in 
this thesis; one constructed from a sense of physical and social isolation, but which 
fostered aspirations to overcome such difficulties. The Humber Bridge was therefore 
envisaged as providing a physical end to the isolation of the city, with a much wider local 
significance than the immediate regional importance the government attributed to it in 
the 1970s. For Hull, the significance of the bridge was as much a product of the indirect 
psychological aspirations attached to it. Its monumental and psychological power to the 
City were made evident in Kevin McNamara’s (Hull North MP) comment piece on Roland 
Adamson’s ‘Humberopolis’ plan, noting the importance a Humber Bridge would have: 
The Northern Bank of the Humber missed out after 1945 and it is now trying 
desperately to catch up. This is why the Humber Bridge is so important. A barrage 
might well be better if its cost did not make it prohibitive: but the Humber Bridge, 
ending the isolation of the North Bank while linking both banks of the estuary is 
psychologically more important. It means a realisation of Hull’s potential. It 
promises in the foreseeable future better jobs, more money, less drift from the 
Region.709 
 
Playwright Alan Plater, who as honorary editor of the journal had sounded local 
dignitaries for responses, noted his agreement with McNamara’s when thanking him for 
his contribution: 
One point I particularly agree with is the psychological importance of the Bridge. I 
suspect this is one of those things that prevents Hull from realising itself as a big 
city and not a large town. I think mentally we’ve got a slow burning fuse; we want to 
believe we’re important but there’s a psychological block that the bridge might well 
demolish.710 
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Rowe and Clark's song ‘Humber Bridge’ carried a rhetorical refrain asking whether the 
Humber would always be an 'exception to the rule' of bridging waterways.711 
Plater re-examined this psychological block in his 1973 Play for Today Land of Green 
Ginger. Though Cooke suggests the theme of the play was ‘separation from northern 
roots’,712 the highly place specific nature of the play – set in Hull – emphasises more the 
particularism and isolation of what Plater termed a ‘misty and magical city’ than a more 
general northernness.713 In a central scene, the protagonist Sally - visiting the city of her 
birth from London – is taken by Mike, an old boyfriend, to see the site of the Humber 
Bridge. Both characters then discuss its possibilities: 
Sally: What’ll happen when it’s built? 
Mike: I think they’re hoping that people’ll drive across it… No, what it is I’ll tell ‘yer. I 
think they’re hoping it’ll bring trade and prosperity to Hull. Said so in the paper, 
must be true! Be like the Klondike round here; we’re all gonna make our fortunes. 
Ten grand a year; big houses near Kirk Ella Golf Course; three weeks at Butlins; 
Hull’s gonna beat Kingston Rovers in the final at Wembley, fifty points to nil; City’s 
going to win the European Cup three years running; I’ll be Lord Mayor… and I’ll pack 
in the fishing. 
Sally: Will you pack it in? 
Mike: I’ll pop down here at weekends, just for relaxation. That’ll be the salmon. You 
See you’ll be able to sit here and see the salmon leaping. 
Sally: When the Bridge is built. 
Mike: Aye, round about then. Might take a week or two longer for the salmon… 
Sally: When does the Bridge open? 
Mike: Well you can see, they’re well on with it now! [camera pans to empty estuary]. 
1976…714 
 
In the play, the Bridge is not framed in the context of Humberside, more in its importance 
to Hull. Though Mike’s scepticism about the potentialities of the Bridge was merited in 
Plater’s eyes, his cynicism, insularity and localism seemingly reflected a broader 
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frustration of Plater’s. This was demonstrated in Sally’s admission at the end of the play 
that Mike and herself ‘didn’t look hard enough’ for the eponymous Land of Green Ginger, 
representing the failure of the two lead characters to find ‘magic’ of the city.715 
For its promoters, the psychological importance of a bridge, or more importantly the 
Bridge, was apparent. Leo Shultz, the leader of the Labour group on the council in Hull, 
and his Conservative counterpart Rupert Alec-Smith, had both been actively involved in 
the Bridge proposals since efforts were revived post-1945. Fred Holmes – the Bridge 
Board’s Chairman in 1960s – had been actively involved in the promotion of the Bill in 
the 1930-1 that had progressed through Parliament before the government grant was 
withdrawn. Not only did Holmes in particular remain convinced of the role the Bridge 
would play in linking Hull to the Midlands and south of England, he argued vehemently 
that it must be a bridge, and it must be in the location agreed. Having promoted the 
Humber Bridge Bill in 1959, Holmes had held the long history of the campaign as almost 
self-evident of its virtue. A meeting of the Board and MPs in July 1960 resolving to seek a 
deputation with the Minister had been told that: ‘It was also true that the Ministry knew 
all about the scheme which had been before them for years and it was important to 
remember that the then Minister of Transport promised a grant of 75 per cent in 
1930’.716 In the end, Ernest Maples had met with three MPs (Harry Pursey, Patrick Wall 
and Michael) and been emphatic in his dismissal of any kind of Ministry support, to the 
extent that Pursey’s note of the meeting to Holmes that: 
the Minister had a full brief of the whole history – everything that happened in the 
past is dead – we can only deal with current information. To sum up it will not be a 
national project in 5 to 10 years – may not be in 20 years or ever. We have to 
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forget about it being a national project – if Hull ever decides to go ahead they are 
on their own.717 
 
Despite his objection to a bridge, the Minister had informally suggested that 
consideration should be given to the construction of a tunnel. Other proposals were also 
forthcoming later in the decade as the national interest in Humberside increased. The 
option of sinking a prefabricated tunnel into the Humber was put before the Bridge Board 
on several occasions as a possible alternative. Another notable proposal was calls for 
investigation into the feasibility of a Humber barrage from the Chambers of Commerce as 
discussed above. When Cyril Osborne, MP for Louth, raised the possibility of exploring the 
tunnel option in Commons he sparked a forceful rebuke from Holmes who – it was 
reported in the Hull Daily Mail – pronounced ‘that he was fed up of hearing proposals for 
crossing the Humber put forward by bodies without any authority or responsibility’: 
Unofficial bodies which were putting out ideas for such things as barrages across 
the Humber and tunnels under it were, he said, only trying to sidetrack the board 
from what is was going on with. “We know what we are going for, said Ald. Holmes, 
“and we should not let anything stop us”.718   
 
Holmes’ own limited records deposited in the archives in the Hull History Centre 
demonstrate that the imagery of a bridge; its representation to the city officials was 
highly influential in his actions – and, if anything, was as much a consideration as the 
practical benefits it would bring to Hull. Several artist’s impressions of the single span 
suspension bridge design are included amongst his papers. 
So deeply ingrained was a belief in the essential nature of the Bridge that the Bridge 
Board even found themselves in the position of opposing the Ministry of Transport’s 
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proposals for linking Hull to the east-west M62 motorway. It was a move for which they 
found little to no support politically, or amongst the city’s industrial interests. The Ministry 
had sounded opinion from the Board in February 1965 when they had agreed to adopt 
the recommendations of their engineers that the future trunk road of the north bank of 
the Humber would require an interchange with the Great North Road immediately south 
of Ferrybridge, crossing the River Ouse by a high level bridge at Hook near Goole.719 The 
prospect of a major high level bridge at Hook – with an estimated cost in excess of £8 
million – roughly 20 miles from the site of the proposed bridge over the Humber, became 
a central cause for concern for the Board, despite its purpose to remediate the 
inadequate road links to Lancashire and West Yorkshire. Despite opposition from the 
local authorities in the East Riding and Lindsey, and flat refusal from the YHEPC to 
countenance supporting reopening of the issue at a meeting where the Council were at 
pains to ‘emphasise… was taking place at the request of the Humber Bridge Board and… 
the members of the Economic Planning Council will do as they think fit’,720 the Board met 
with both Castle and Crossman in mid-1966 to lobby for the proposed motorway route to 
join the Great North Road further north at Ledsham. The meeting led to a further review 
of the arrangements to the consternation of local interests. Holmes, as Chairman of the 
Bridge Board, informed the press that the Bridge at Hook was ‘inconceivable’ following a 
small Government grant to carry out soil and aerodynamic tests on the sites on the 
Humber.721 
Although Barbara Castle confirmed the M62 would go ahead as planned in the 1970s 
along the route previously confirmed with a bridge at Hook,722 such incidents and actions 
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of a Hull-dominated Bridge Board served to further strain goodwill towards a Humber 
crossing and patience with various interests on Humberside, and contribute to the 
hostility shown towards the Corporation. With a road network described as ‘medieval’, 
the lobbying for a Humber Bridge to the detriment of other projects did not sit well with 
other authorities who claimed they were not opposed to a scheme in principle. In the 
region’s trade journals, and in the press, industrialists were clear in their position that 
east-west road connections were far more vital to the viability of Humberside. This did 
not preclude a strong desire to improve the transport services across the Humber in the 
short-term. The prospect of commencing a hovercraft service as a means of ‘socially 
linking’ the communities of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire gained traction in the 1960s.723 
Another example of this exclusionary and extraversionary representation of Humber 
Bridge, illustrating the intended civic rather than regional symbolism, is a 1980s 
pamphlet ‘Hull and the Humber Bridge: A Modern Gateway to an ancient city’. Tellingly, it 
contains no explicit mention of Humberside, and contains German, French and Dutch 
translations; echoing a remark made in a special issue of The Times that ‘it had 
sometimes seemed the Bridge was really being thrust across the North Sea’.724 Indeed 
Larkin’s poem ‘Bridge for the Living’ to commemorate the opening (which is on the 
handout), had noted Hull the ‘isolate city’ with its face half-turned to Europe.725 All seem 
to suggest an intention to generate an international iconic status for the Bridge, and 
specifically Hull. 
 
 
                                                            
723 ‘Humber hovercraft on way from factory’, Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 19 July 1968. 
724 ‘Hull and the Humber Bridge: A Modern Gateway to an ancient city’, pamphlet u.d. (c. 1980s); 
‘The Humber Bridge’, Times, 17 July 1981. 
725 Motion, Philip Larkin, 487-488. 
  230 
IV 
That the bridge served instead to exacerbate existing intra-regional tensions, rather than 
being a source of regional unity, was probably to be expected. Despite increasing support 
over time for both the county and the bridge from Scunthorpe, Grimsby, the only other 
major urban centre in South Humberside, had always steadfastly refused to contribute 
financially to the Bridge, and had bluntly told the Humber Bridge Board that the bridge 
was ‘of little value to them on economic or historical grounds’.726 In the early 1970s, the 
area determinately referred to itself as South Humberside, maintaining the apparent 
distinction. By June 1978, with unemployment over six percent and with further erosion 
of the fishing industry affecting the town, the leader of the Borough Council lamented 
what he saw as ‘this stupid Humber Bridge’ – indeed even in 1989 a resident of North 
Lincolnshire bemoaned the influence of Hull in the county, which was believed to have 
been propped up by their money.727  
It is therefore unsurprising that the most vociferous anti-Humberside lobby sprung from 
the more remote areas of the county. The East Yorkshire Action Group was coordinated – 
by the colourful pint-sized pool hall owner Trevor Pearson – from the northerly seaside 
resort of Bridlington almost immediately after Humberside’s creation, and was matched 
by the North Lincolnshire Association on the opposite bank. The records of the Action 
Group emphasise persistent frustrations, particularly with Humberside’s economic 
modernising agenda, lamenting in a letter to the Local Government Boundary 
Commission in 1988 that people were ‘heartily sick of that word potential’.728 As Pearson 
and other opposition groups campaigned tirelessly to the Local Government Boundary 
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Commission, the Bridge and its perceived failings became a central target of the Group’s 
protests; the Bridge was seen as an unnatural imposition on the area. 
By the late 1980s, the failure of the bridge to bring the supposed vibrant future, visible 
signs of economic growth, or an end to either physical or psychological isolation appears 
to have led even some of the citizens of Hull to turn against both the Bridge and the idea 
of Humberside, and from here perhaps can be seen the growth of this narrative of 
imposition. In March 1990, before the local elections, there were palpable attempts to 
disown the Bridge as well as the County – such as a report in The Times entitled ‘Hull 
laments its loss of identity in a super-region’, in which blame for both the county and the 
Bridge were attributed to Dick Crossman.729 A report on the East Yorkshire Action 
Group’s campaign in the Daily Telegraph in 1988 had also declared the Bridge had been 
conceived in 1966, neglecting its long history that had previously been extolled.730 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has observed how private interests constructed their own oppositional 
regional identities against what were perceived as the imposition of official forms of 
regional colonisation in the case of Humberside. Though arguably forms of localism 
rather than political regionalism, groups such as the Yorkshire Ridings Society, East 
Yorkshire Action Group and North Lincolnshire Association formed associational links 
beyond their localities, and constructed county identities through appeals to imagined 
communities and the invention of tradition. Examining these more conservative forms of 
regionalism also sheds light on contemporary English political culture; emphasising the 
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ideologies and organisational roots of movements that have challenged perceived 
political domination from the Centre, and have been able to forge wider and more 
populist political support. 
This chapter has also highlighted the complex and contingent history of the 
reorganisation of local government and the complicit – and often enthusiastic – role of 
regional actors in these developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It also 
emphasises the broader point (also made in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5) of Humberside’s 
liminal and ambiguous relationship with the wider Yorkshire region. 
‘Humberside’ was conditionally embraced as a political regional project and emergent 
identity in the 1960s; the resistance observed in the 1970s and 1980s only became 
more vocal after the failure to realise the high modern industrial future that had been put 
forward. In this construction of Humberside, strong local identities interacted with 
political and cultural identities that extended beyond immediate localities and imagined 
Yorkshire as a region. 
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Chapter 4: Transport and Regionalism: The campaign 
for a ‘Yorkshire Airport’ ,  c.1945-c.1980 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
I 
Transport is central to issues of regional development, not least in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century with the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The economic 
distinctiveness that industrialisation brought to many parts of England – integral to the 
social formation of regional particularisms – was intrinsically linked to the role played by 
various transport infrastructures. John Langton, for example, has argued that the canal 
network became crucial to the processes that led to the emergence of regional capitals 
with their own political lobbies.731 The advent of mass transport by the mid-nineteenth 
century surmounted the relatively large social and cultural differences that made large 
parts of England ‘foreign’ to outsiders.732 Not only did the railways lead to a practical 
expansion of regions, but the commercial considerations of the railway produced an 
expansion of the ‘iconography’ and ‘cartographic imagination’ or language of regions; 
culturally producing a space discipline in which constructions could be either inclusive or 
exclusive.733 These processes also emphasise that transport’s role in economic, social 
and cultural specialisation in Britain (or more specifically England) was a facilitating 
rather than determining one. The natural landscape itself remained an important part of 
the regional economic specialisms that emerged from the resource-based industrial 
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development in the English regions;734 for example in the concentration of the woollen 
and worsted textile industries in the West Riding, coalmining in the North East and the 
steel industries in Sheffield and South Yorkshire.735 Even with the possibilities offered by 
transport, the delimiting effect of natural frontiers such as watersheds and valleys in the 
designation of regions was stated to be of ‘great importance’ for Fawcett in establishing 
his principles for regional division, as highlighted in the previously.736 
Transport issues and development are therefore crucial to considering both the 
functional and cultural constructions of region in any examination of regionalism and 
regional identity in England. This chapter intends to provide this perspective through an 
examination of an almost wholly overlooked dimension of regional transport, regional 
airport development. The issue of airport provision, I argue here, is a particularly 
appropriate case study not only for the period considered by this thesis, but also for the 
region of Yorkshire and Humberside. The region was nationally acknowledged as the 
most poorly served by airfield and airports in the UK. As this chapter will argue, this 
brought about a distinctly regional response. Three separate reports on the region’s 
future airport needs were produced in the space of a decade from 1962; each was 
produced by a different regional sponsor body, each conceived the ‘region’ in different 
ways, and each came up alternative solutions to a lack of airport capacity. This chapter 
sets this debate over regional strategy in the context of the social and cultural 
conceptions of air travel, through the changing view of air travel by various interests in 
Yorkshire and Humberside – particularly over a period of significant change in British life 
and the tumult of the 1970s.  
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II 
Transport links and the communication they provide are essential to any conception of a 
region. In this context, airports may seem like a minor concern compared to the two 
major modes of inter-urban travel, road and rail. British railways in particular have been a 
subject of particular interest for their economic development, urbanisation and other 
demographic changes, in addition to their social and cultural significance in tourism and 
advertising. Rail has featured heavily in the development of the regional economy of the 
‘north’ and in regional identity. 
Railways are not discussed in this core sample for a number of reasons, not least that in 
post-war England, the railway was primarily a national rather than regional concern.737 
More importantly however, the railways were in eclipse in this period both physically and 
culturally. Regardless of the contested politics of Beeching’s The Reshaping of British 
Railways, the contraction of the passenger network by almost half between 1948 and 
1973 demonstrated rail’s diminished role. Alongside this change was a more 
fundamental shifting of the meaning of the railway in late twentieth century England. Loft 
has effectively argued for the social and cultural transformation of rail in relation to other 
forms of transport in the post-war period, from having once been the ‘epitome of 
modernity’ to being the preserve of the rural idyll, and as ‘eulogised’ by Betjeman as 
evoking the ‘“[u]nmitigated England” of farms, woods and village churches’ in opposition 
to the ‘…regimented cars of parked executives’.738 Where rail was discussed in the 
1960s by planners and observers, it was primarily urban monorails that ‘promised to 
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take Britain into the future’ as public transport’s compliment to the motor-car.739 The 
seemingly outmoded nature of traditional rail transport was in stark contrast to the 
‘reign’ of modernity signalled by the jet age, and the (fleeting) unbounded optimism 
encompassed within it.740  
Though a case study of road travel and motorways might also have been appropriate in 
discussing regional dynamics in this period, I argue that the cultural pervasiveness of the 
‘motor age’ by the 1960s makes this subject more intrinsic and pervasive – and 
therefore less easy to disentangle and define. The effects and importance of 
‘automobility’ are inherent to the other studies in this thesis: such as the prevalence of 
multi-storey car parks in the planning proposals of local authorities, YHEPC’s ‘stress’ on 
the ‘seriousness and urgency of the requirement’ for new roads in Chapter 2,741 and the 
significances attached locally to the Humber Bridge as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
increasing responses to these concerns, and the broader objections to perceived 
encroachment upon traditional identities as also highlighted in the discussion of 
Humberside in Chapter 3, formed part of cultural trends that saw NGOs, ‘non-experts’ 
and private citizens challenging the ‘…belief that you don’t restrain the car’;742 and saw 
increasing public objection to further (especially urban) motorway construction in the 
1970s.743 The ‘motor car’ even forms part of the context to the final chapter of this 
thesis, as illustrated in John Betjeman’s involvement in the establishment of the 
Lincolnshire Arts Association (see below).  
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There are also other reasons why this chapter examines airports policy over roads. The 
dynamism of the development of the civil aviation in this period, and the ambiguities and 
difficulties this presented for their administration – as discussed below – stands 
somewhat in contrast to road transport provision in England. Much of the legislation 
used in the construction of motorways was effectively in place by the end of the 
1940s,744 and the cost-benefit methods through which schemes were justified – though 
contentious – were also well-established.745 In the 1960s there were no such 
administrative settlement for airports, and the attempts to provide greater social and 
economic sureties in provision would spark considerable political controversy. 
Furthermore, though the politics of road transport, particularly in an urban context, has 
been a subject of attention for planners, geographers and historians alike, air transport 
remains largely undocumented and discussed for this period in modern Britain. Though 
the Roskill Commission, Maplin Sands and the recent Davies Commission have garnered 
some interest, this has rarely, if ever, extended to a regional case study. Most 
importantly, however, in the context of this thesis, the question of airports – more than 
any other area of transport policy – highlights the institutional constraint put upon 
regional action in England, which forms an important contention to Harvie’s claim that 
regionalism has ‘never barked’.  
Despite having a somewhat separate focus to the modernisation programmes 
surrounding road and rail concerns from the mid-1950s onwards, airport policy had 
considerable thematic parallels.746 Simon Gunn argues that this supposed national 
cultural shift towards increasing ‘automobility’ in this period was equivocal rather than 
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totalising, closely associated with and reflective of the uneven spatial distribution of 
increased affluence.747 As this chapter will demonstrate, these social issues were also 
amplified in debates surrounding civil aviation; an important part of these debates was 
whether increased airport capacity should be provided for to facilitate increased leisure 
travel (or – as conceived by some – ‘inessential travel’).748 An increasing consideration 
for environmental concerns in all forms were central to debates surrounding airports. 
These related in some ways to the concerns considered elsewhere, but also had different 
nuances in some ways.  
 
III  
This chapter will briefly outline the context for these debates surrounding regional and 
national air transport and policy from the 1960s onwards. It will consider how the 
geographic pattern of civil airports and aerodromes came about, and highlight how long-
running ambiguous policy decisions towards airline ownership and operations 
contributed to this geography. In turn, it will highlight the implications this had for civil 
aviation in Yorkshire and the Humber, in particular the decisions made by local 
authorities in relation to the aerodrome facility at Yeadon (later Leeds-Bradford Airport). 
As is discussed, the long-term suitability of Yeadon as not only an airport suitable to 
serve Yorkshire, but also its physical suitability as a whole was being questioned as early 
as the 1940s. 
This chapter will then discuss the developments of the 1960s, in which the concerted 
dawn of the ‘jet age’ was seen to revolutionise air travel, not only for the businessman 
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but for increasing numbers of leisure travellers.749 Much greater general interest in and 
provision for air travel was coupled with the related fervour for (long-term) planning and 
greater professionalisation in decision making, igniting calls for a more rational and 
efficient provision of airport facilities. In Yorkshire, the seeming inadequacy of available 
airports became a matter of pressing concern, leading to the creation of an organisation 
of interested individuals, the Yorkshire and Humberside Airport Development Association 
(YAHADA), who were instrumental in the production of two reports on the region’s civil 
aviation needs. In this period, it is possible to see the formation – for a time at least – of 
a concerted regional purpose in relation to airports and air travel, one in which both 
industrials and local authorities sought a distinctly regional solution. 
This chapter will then consider air transport in relation to Yorkshire and Humberside in 
the 1970s, at a time when competing political pressures placed further constraint on the 
possibility of any coherent regional action. The fallout from the Roskill Commission’s 
report on the need for, and location of, a third London airport, and the creation of the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) following the Edwards Committee report on civil aviation in 
1969, focused the national government on finally providing a more coherent and 
deliberately rationalised plan for airport provision, via the white paper Airports Policy, 
published in 1978. At the same time the political, social and cultural context had 
transformed to such an extent that concerted public opposition made any new 
development in air transport increasingly difficult to provide.750 In this climate, and 
despite the most comprehensive consultants’ report on the airport needs of the region in 
1972, whatever consensus had existed in Yorkshire began to dissipate. 
In this context, the term ‘regional airport’ is in itself difficult to disaggregate. A ‘regional 
airport’ is most readily a spoke within a hub feeder system, which can serve a city-region 
                                                            
749 Stephen Wheatcroft, Air Transport Policy (London, 1964), 91-108. 
750 Rigas Doganis, The Airport Business (London, 1992), 33. 
  240 
rather than a larger region – such as the broad standard planning region considered 
here. This highlights the complexity of adequately defining the purpose and function of 
an airport in itself. As Amoroso and Caruso state, the airport ‘is seen as a service to a 
territory, similar to that of a hospital, a school or a cultural center’.751 The economic 
value of airports, however, does not necessarily align with this supposed public utility. 
Airports are an intermediate good within the aviation industry, rather than a product in 
themselves.752 The airlines that use this good represent the final product, and as such 
airports are reliant on elasticity of demand for the services that they provide. But air links 
have been argued to be essential for the global competitiveness of businesses and 
industries, not only for the import and export of goods but also as a means to remain 
connected with supply chains.753 
 
4.2 Context:  Post-war civi l  aviation development, 1945-61 
 
I 
The turbulent beginnings for civil aviation in the inter-war years were somewhat an 
indicator of the issues that would arise in the policy framework for airlines and airports 
following the end of the Second World War. Decisions made during this period would 
have significant and long lasting consequences that continued during the development 
of a more formalised structure of regulation and administration of air transport. Following 
the lifting of restrictions on civil flying in 1919, there were three British companies 
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providing international passenger services to Paris and Amsterdam from London by early 
1920.754 But the market was short-lived, with the steep early running costs and low 
initial loads meaning no commercial airline existed by 1921.755 As Peter Lyth notes, the 
somewhat reluctant response of the government was an attempt to simultaneously begin 
subsidies and discourage competition, with Imperial Airways established in 1924. 
Despite desires for regulation, the burgeoning and unregulated domestic market led to ‘a 
whole rash of small domestic airlines’ in the 1930s. The ‘bad press’ of Imperial Airways 
and political concerns regarding international prestige saw subsidies additionally granted 
to British Airways Ltd., a ‘newcomer’ in international travel, in 1935.756 Despite these 
developments, civil aviation in the interwar years was undoubtedly secondary to the 
military concerns. Edgerton notes that value of civil aircraft sales in 1934 was £0.5m, 
compared with £6m in sales to the Air Ministry.757 
Though policy towards aerodromes has received less attention in the inter-war years than 
the aircraft industry and airline policy, John Myerscough’s adept history of aerodromes in 
this period highlights important issues. Similarly to air travel, and despite the efforts of 
Frederick Sykes as the first Controller General of Civil Aviation in the Air Ministry to 
outline the desirability of a ‘national scheme’ of strategically important aerodromes, 
airports were afforded a low priority by national government in the early 1920s. An 
aversion to providing any form of public subsidy was again one of the key reasons for 
this.758 Enthusiasm for aerodrome development was more forthcoming from local 
government however – eventually in part endorsing Sykes’ assertion that ‘ultimately an 
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aerodrome will be as necessary to a modern town as a railway station’ – with many 
municipal authorities capitalising on the financial aid from the Unemployment Grants 
Committee to construct airfields from the late 1920s onwards.759 Despite heavy 
investment in facilities, and some 45 local authority aerodromes opening between the 
wars, demand – though expanding – remained low, with only Liverpool and Brighton 
providing international services, and costs remained very high.760  
Three key airports established in this period were Birmingham (Elmdon), Manchester 
(Ringway) and Liverpool (Speke).761 The long-term importance of the siting of air facilities 
was generally given little consideration versus the desire for the early commencement of 
operations. The prescience therefore of Manchester in relocating their municipal 
aerodrome from Wythenshawe to Ringway in Cheshire, on the basis of planned ground 
transport links, excellent visibility and space for expansion, was little replicated 
elsewhere, but would have significant consequences for future developments.762 
 
II 
The national picture for civil aviation prior to 1940 was thus a complex one, 
encompassing a mixture of concerns, and public and private interests. Though there had 
been some attempts to consolidate and plan what was increasingly acknowledged as an 
important – but also very expensive – transport sector, this had proved an exceedingly 
difficult task. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and the election of Clement 
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Attlee’s Labour government, it initially appeared that civil aviation would move towards a 
more rational and planned approach. In place of the more mixed form of ownership 
proposed by the Conservatives, Labour nationalised the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (BOAC), British European Airways (BEA) and British South American Airways 
(BSSA) in late 1945.763 Through them, Labour hoped to experiment with a ‘multiplicity of 
instruments’ to ensure what Stafford Cripps termed ‘orderly, economic and efficient 
development of air transport’, and that one managerial group would not compromise 
‘matters of great national importance’.764 Alongside this development was the earlier 
‘unanimous’ decision by the cabinet sub-committee on civil aviation to nationalise 
Britain’s aerodromes. Beyond the decision itself, there was great uncertainty over what 
this would entail, but as one member of the civil aviation ministry explained to Hugh 
Dalton in 1945: 
On what is before me at present, [I] estimate that we shall need eventually, for 
transport purposes (in addition to international airports) between 70 and 80 
airfields of which some are at present owned by local authorities, some by private 
owners, some have been constructed by the RAF mainly on requisitioned land, and 
several will have to be constructed.765 
 
Despite the overall intentions that this should be a planned, programmed and 
centralised area of nationally significant transport policy, the picture became no less 
opaque than in these initial estimates. Hastily assembled figures identified forty four 
aerodromes that would be acquired as a matter of priority. They expected, based on 
consultation with BEA, that the majority of traffic (around 250 daily civil aircraft 
movements) would be through London. Against 108 non-domestic daily flights through 
London, the Civil Aviation Ministry estimated that provincial airports would handle at 
most eight international daily movements, and that such traffic would be restricted to 
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only a handful of airports.766 By late 1946, with efforts on-going to acquire those 
nationally important aerodromes, the intentions of the Ministry had changed somewhat 
from the BEA’s envisaged concentration on the capital. Regional economic policy was a 
strong impulse for this, as was made clear in the proposals put before Cabinet: 
[I] attach importance to the introduction of services from provincial centres direct to 
the continent. This will not only give some relief to congestion of air traffic in the 
London area, but should provide a stimulus to provincial business to help 
counteract the drift towards London.767 
 
Fifty-nine aerodromes were now deemed as required for domestic and continental 
services and it was intended that these should be nationalised. It was estimated that the 
demand on the Exchequer would be around £20 million during the initial phase of 
development, and that a similar sum would be needed in the subsequent phase.768 
These proposals therefore met with some consternation from the Treasury, which opined 
that ‘the programme seems unnecessarily lavish in the provision of aerodromes 
sufficiently large enough to take continental traffic’.769 
The strain on public that the envisaged programme would entail almost immediately met 
with misgivings, as the Attlee Government sought to curtail spending in 1947. Only three 
days after publishing proposals for the acquisition of aerodromes, the civil aviation 
ministry issued a supplementary note ‘in light of the recent White Paper on the Economic 
Situation’, that noted ‘[a]lthough it may well be damaging to our prestige to put a 
deliberate brake on the expansion of internal air services’, it might be necessary to halt 
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these developments until the economic situation became ‘easier’.770 What resulted was 
an ad hoc selection of airports to be nationalised. The criteria was more expedient than 
rational; the ‘necessity for providing the main provincial cities with an airport’ being set 
alongside ‘the need on social grounds’, and the ‘pressure on political grounds for 
providing aerodromes at places which, before the late war, had municipal or licensed 
airports’.771 On such regional policy grounds for example, Barrow and Carlisle were 
deemed essential airports to maintain.772 The Cabinet would eventually agree to 
nationalising seven provincial airports for continental services, in part because the 
Ministry of Civil Aviation had argued that these would ‘not only give relief from congestion 
of air traffic in the London area, but… also provide a stimulus to provincial business and 
help to counteract the drift towards London’.773  
As attentions turned to adequate provision for Heathrow as the first London airport, and 
designation of Gatwick as the site of the second in the mid-1950s,774 the landscape for 
the regional airports of the UK continued to drift away from any form of planned system. 
A number of different factors would determine instead which airports outside of London 
would continue to develop both in terms of facilities, routes and the airlines they 
accommodated. For example, Manchester’s Corporation, in maintaining municipal 
control of the Ringway in 1950, benefited not only from the locational advantages of 
their airpot being a reasonable distance from the city and on over 600 acres of 
‘remarkably even land’, but also from prescience in acting at an early opportunity in the 
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1950s to extend their runway over 10,000 feet to accommodate large long-haul jets at 
the earliest opportunity.775  
The opportunity for airport expansion in the 1950s again emerged from a divergence 
from initial proposals regarding aviation provision. Charter and private services had been 
run by a number of small operators after the war and, due to the financial pressures and 
more limited capacity than envisaged of nationalized carriers, it was agreed by the Air 
Transport Advisory Council (primarily established as a consumer advisory body) that 
these airlines and providers should be allowed run these routes as ‘associates’. Shortly 
afterwards, these airlines were permitted to run in direct competition to the national 
airlines, establishing themselves from humble beginnings through lucrative trooping 
contracts during the Berlin Airlift and Korean War.776 The system which until 1960 
operated on a basis of dubious legality increased the supply of air services which in turn 
operated of available number airports and airfields situated across the country and 
increasingly run by municipal authorities. Licenses for operating aerodromes were readily 
granted where no physical obstruction existed for flying.777 The enthusiasm of these local 
authorities to operate services, which if scheduled were mainly domestic feeder and 
short-haul in nature, led to a distinctly uneven pattern of airports emerging by the mid-
1960s, with Speke and Ringway developing little more than 35 miles apart, and the trio 
of Birmingham, Coventry and Castle Donington (East Midlands) in the Midlands a mere 
10-30 miles apart.778  
The development of larger and more powerful aircraft necessitated significant capital 
investment for both central government and the municipal concerns, not only only in 
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longer runways, aprons and taxi space, but also in the need for more sophisticated 
technical services. Higher load (capacity) factors on this newer generation of aircraft also 
necessitated larger terminal facilities, while at the same time reducing the number of air 
movements per passenger and therefore squeezing revenues. The consequences of this 
multiplicity of uncoordinated facilities and ad hoc arrangements was severe losses and 
deficits. Capital losses on the Exchequer in 1955 alone were reported to be £6 
million.779 In 1961, as the Ministry of Aviation concerned turned its attention to the 
potential need for a third London airport to handle both domestic and international 
traffic,780 both they and the Treasury believed a formal separation was required, through 
relieving: 
 …Rigid parliamentary control over the day-to-day management and accounting of 
 airport operations, [to] make use of the enthusiasm of local authorities in running 
 their own airports and reduce the cost to the Exchequer.781 
 
The resulting white paper introduced in a matter of months divested the Ministry of  22 
of  its airports and also an financial responsibility other than the technical requirements 
for air traffic management.782 At the same time it semi-formalised the two-tier national-
local airport provision, in leading to the creation of a new state Corporation, the British 
Airports Authority (BAA) to manage the principle national airports of Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Prestwick.783 
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III 
In Yorkshire, the immediate post-war period made clear the unsuitability of the 
aerodrome facilities for future use. The rather contingent and ad hoc nature of the 
national programme of development in the 1940s – after the initial attempts to plan 
proposals - not only meant that these deficiencies were not satisfactorily addressed prior 
to the 1960s, but also contributed to exacerbating these problems. The Second World 
War had seen the proliferation of military airfields of varying quality being situated in the 
east of the country including several in the Vale of York (including nine in the vicinity of 
the City). There therefore were a number of sites for potential use, but they were not 
necessarily near centres of population. 
It was felt in the initial planning phases of aerodrome policy in the late 1940s that 
aerodromes at York, Doncaster and Yeadon (Leeds-Bradford) would be needed for 
domestic services, but with some potential for European services to ‘Holland, Belgium 
and the Rhine’. Before a decision was made it was felt by the Ministry of Civil Aviation the 
aerodrome 2 miles from York would be required to make use of the facilities it already 
provided in 3 ‘hard runways’, the largest being 4,800 feet. Despite this however, it was 
subject to ‘controversy which as embroiled the local authorities concerned’ due to 
demand to use its approaches for residential development from the RDC in which it was 
located, despite the wishes York Corporation.784  Quickly however, as it became clear 
there was less supply and demand for internal services, it was decided the airport would 
not be required and would see little further civil use. 
More complex than the situation in the North Riding was that in West Riding. The Ministry 
of Civil Aviation had clear misgivings about the long-term suitability of Yeadon as a civil 
airport. Despite the ‘earmarking’ of Leeds for continental services, the Minister had some 
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doubt as to the possibility it could be developed into a suitable aerodrome to meet heavy 
traffic demand. The airfield and buildings had been completed as a joint venture of 
Leeds and Bradford corporations in 1939 (having opened in 1931), and had seen the 
installation of two tarmac runways (both less than 4,000 feet in length) when 
requisitioned and used as an aircraft factory during the War.785 Its location made it not 
only the highest aerodrome in the UK and subject to highly changeable meteorological 
effects such as fog from low lying cloud, but also lack of convenient flat terrain due to its 
location on a rocky plateau meant it had already been determined it would be difficult to 
extend. It was already being described to the Ministry as ‘heartily disliked’ by pilots as 
deliberations over its use were ongoing.786 
Despite this clear indications of the unsuitability of the site for future development, local 
and national political considerations came into play at an early stage, particularly 
between industrial interests in Leeds, and those in Bradford and the larger textile areas. 
Leeds’ Chamber of Commerce was clear in its deputations to the Ministry in 1946: 
Over eighteen months ago the Leeds Chamber investigated the position and 
expressed the view that this great industrial area in the West Riding required a 
Regional airport permitting direct access to the Continent… 
…The Yeadon Aerodrome cannot in its present state fulfil the requirements of an 
airport to accommodate the aircraft of the size required for direct flights to the 
Continent and its geographical position is such that it cannot be extended or 
adapted for the purpose except at prohibitive expense.787 
 
Industrial interests in Bradford, Huddersfield and other areas to the west of Leeds were 
firm that it was they that had greatest need for an airport for convenient international 
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trade, and any site further to the East, such as those suggested at Sherburn-in-Elmet and 
Church Fenton, a resolution that was unanimously supported by the Corporation.788 
However, it was national priorities and the nationalised carriers that had an even greater 
bearing on air transport in the West Riding, and Yorkshire more generally. By late 1947, 
despite plans in place for modest extension of the north/south runway to accommodate 
larger civil aircraft, the BEA were briefing the Ministry that they were ‘unlikely to ever 
require a “Continental” aerodrome in the West riding of Yorkshire’.789 By mid-1948, the 
situation was even bleaker with regards to Yeadon. despite its acquisition by the Ministry 
it was noted that: 
The cold douches flowing from BEA’s accounts and the Capital Investment 
Programme have pushed Yeadon into the distant future so far as scheduled 
services are concerned. BEA have stated that they will not want it before 1956 and 
if the Helicopter becomes a commercial proposition by that time, it is highly likely 
that Yeadon will never be developed.790 
 
Yeadon therefore remained in limbo for a variety of complex reasons. Despite its inherent 
locational disadvantages the strong local agitation for there to be an airport with the 
potential for continental services, and that this should be conveniently located close to 
the main industrial areas in this period served keep the potential use of the site in the 
Ministry’s mind, which was a contributing factor in neither York nor Doncaster being 
developed.791 However, the exigencies of national resources and the attitudes of BEA in 
particular also had a bearing on this. Even at this stage it was clear enthusiasm existed 
for a ‘regional’ solution within the industrial heartland of the West Riding. 
Such dilemmas continued into the 1950s with regards to Yeadon.  Though the Ministry 
had informed the Leeds-Bradford joint committee responsible for aerodrome that it 
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would not be retained as part of the national programme, they then approached the local 
authorities in 1953 over sale of the site of the site for what appeared to be solely military 
purposes. The following protracted negotiations over the value of the site between the 
local authorities and the Ministry indicated it was a site of little value to either party; with 
the Joint Committee investigating the potential value of a residential development and 
the Ministry stating that from their point of view purchase ‘more a matter of expediency 
than necessity’.792 A failure to meet their valuation eventually in 1956 led the City 
Councils of Leeds and Bradford to rescind their offer of sale and instead to run Yeadon 
as a civilian airport, despite continuing rumblings that the corporations wished to close 
the site.793  
The continuing development of private airlines, the burgeoning expansion of air  
transport in the late 1950s due to technological innovation and increasing affluence now 
posed a challenge to the authorities. The company running the site on lease from the 
corporations, Yeadon Aviation Ltd., made clear the two airlines operating out of the 
airport were expanding, and that they had been reliably informed that Aer Lingus, KLM 
and a Belgian airline were interested in operating from the airport ‘in the relatively near 
future’, and that the two small existing airlines running services were looking to expand 
these. However, in order to do so it was made clear a runway of at least 5400 feet was 
‘essential’ to be able to handle newer Viscount V10 aircraft. They informed the Joint 
Committee that: 
It is apparent with anyone connected with the Aviation Industry and in particular to 
those who have been engaged in it at Yeadon recently, that Yeadon is the finest 
possible site for a Commercial Airport, situated as it is at the heart of a large 
industrial area.794 
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Even in spite of the inadequacy of the facilities, the expansion of both services and 
passengers at Yeadon saw dramatic increases, with the number of passengers handled 
almost trebling between 1959 and 1961.795 In 1960 despite its small baseline, Flight 
magazine were declaring it Britain’s fastest growing airport, and the Joint Committee - 
now in full control - claimed it required an expanded airport for its ‘expanding and 
prosperous business community with a developing need for air services’.796 The 
inadequacy of the facilities and the urgency to capture the hugely expanding market put 
pressure on the local authorities to act. The Yorkshire Post was particularly strong it 
stating that ‘If the airlines have faith in Yeadon they must be backed to the hilt. If they 
leave Yeadon disillusioned, they will never return’.797 Such circumstances therefore saw 
the Joint Committee invest first in the early 1960s in a new runway construction to 5,400 
feet at an cost of £600,000, and then in 1964 a new terminal building for around 
£180,000 that was designed, it was boasted, to handle between 350-500 passengers 
an hour.798 Crucially, the runway was not built to a much greater length of over 7,000 
feet primarily for cost and potential planning opposition; with no guarantee of a financial 
return, the Joint Committee were clear they ‘have laid their emphasis on providing the 
minimum extension to secure [sic] that the development of the Airport is unimpeded’.799 
For all the technological innovation, civil aviation maintained a degree of amateurism 
and an association with military flying. The role of civil aviation within broader transport 
policy continued to remain rather ambiguous and difficult in a definitional sense in these 
years, which added to the administrative complexity at a national level. Between the wars 
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it was suggested that ‘…aviation in these years was something of an occult fellowship, 
which set itself apart from mainstream transport life’.800  
 
4.3 A ‘Yorkshire Airport’ :  The Yorkshire and Humberside 
Airport Development Association and regional airport proposals 
in the 1960s 
 
I 
Air transport and airports policy in the UK as it developed in the UK up until the 1960s 
had been both sporadic and uncoordinated. Decisions and indecision after the war had 
led to the development of a highly uneven geographical pattern and pattern of ownership 
for airports and airfields across the UK, with the vast majority of provincial or regional 
airports in the hands of either one or a consortia of local authorities. The primary concern 
of central government and the majority of planners and academics in this period would 
be on the huge controversies that would surround the potential siting and development 
of the Third London Airport, and highly controversial and long debated Roskill 
Commission Inquiry, which Peter Hall has argued ‘represents a high-water mark for a 
certain kind of comprehensive planning based on the attempt to qualify’.801  
In the early 1960s therefore, the local authorities in Yorkshire and Humberside appear to 
have been particularly progressive, arguably even pre-empting this demand for 
concentration around a single regional airport. The spur for such action came initially 
from a body of private interested individuals in 1962, the Yorkshire and Humberside 
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Airport Development Association (YAHADA), who brought local authorities and 
industrialists together to commission two studies on the possibility of a regional airport 
for Yorkshire, which form the basis of discussion here: A Regional Airport For Yorkshire 
produced for Development Association in 1963, and An Airport Programme for Yorkshire 
and Humberside produced for the Consultative Committee in 1966; both of these were 
carried out by Air Transport Consultants  Alan Stratford and Associates. The Chairman of 
YAHADA emphasised in 1964 that 
To get to the heart of the trouble it was realised that Yorkshire’s air transport 
system must be organised on a regional basis and it consequently decided to 
campaign for a Yorkshire regional airport.802 
 
II 
Though air links were considered integral for a modern region, the manner in which this 
was defined in a Yorkshire context was geared towards a primarily industrial and 
commercial construction of air travel, even after the burgeoning of increased affluence 
and leisure time for a broader section of the population. As was argued by Caruana and 
Simmons, the success of Manchester Airport that allowed it to emerge as an 
‘international gateway’ in the late 1970s was the diversification of services achieved 
through capturing a mixture of scheduled and charter flights (mainly in the form of the 
Inclusive Tour Package Air Holiday (IT)) from the mid-1960s onwards. Such a strategy, 
they suggest, helped to insulate against volatility of demand for domestic and 
international services, and helped to give the airport its edge over competitors such as 
Birmingham and Liverpool.803  
                                                            
802 HHC U/DPW/3/155 Yorkshire Airport Development Association Annual Report, 26 September 
1964. 
803 Caruana and Simmons, ‘Emergence of an International Gateway,’ 18-23. 
  255 
The rapid increase of the IT market in the 1960s was reflective of a combination of 
technological, economic and social trends. The independent carriers that had emerged 
after the war as seat-of-the-pants concerns were in a position to capitalise on an 
increasingly affluent population with more leisure time to offer cheap package holiday 
deals to seaside resorts in the Costa Brava and other destinations.804 Though the local 
authority in Manchester catered for this increasing demand for flights as a means of 
pleasure, as well as business, such concerns remained far from the minds of the bodies 
involved in the promotion of airport development in Yorkshire. The original preliminary 
report by YAHADA into the need for increased airport provision placed ‘air cargo’ ahead of 
passengers in its justifications of the necessity of better facilities. The prioritising of 
manufacturing stimulus, as opposed to that of service industries was also shown in the 
listing of ‘recent new industries’ on the Tees and Humber that would serve to gain 
(including ‘paper sacks’, ‘wallpaper’ and ‘sporting cartridges’).805 The Leeds-Bradford 
Joint Airport Committee, even in the midst of a significant boom in leisure passengers – 
with the numbers of passengers carried on non-London flights increasing almost four-fold 
in the 1960s – indicated to the consultancy group they had hired to produce the 1972 
study that they were unwilling to invest in facilities for the purposes of ‘inessential 
travel’.806 In some respects, the demands that international tourism placed on the 
airports system nationally – let alone the economic value of such services – was not fully 
considered by the Department of the Environment until after the abandonment of 
Maplin, and the move towards a ‘National Airports Strategy’.807 In considering such 
statements, however, it is worth bearing in mind even with the increasing level of foreign 
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travel that was beginning to be in reach for people, those who used air travel still 
represented a small fraction of the population. This was likely due to the cost element, 
falling as it would on the local authorities, but it is arguable that there was also a moral 
dimension. 
The 1960s, in contrast to the early era of civil aviation, were a time where the wonders of 
jet aircraft and air travel were less the preserve of the waning heroes of Empire and 
much more attainable. Air travel and the jet era was in many ways the embodiment of 
the possible achievements of modernity. It harnessed the ‘technocratic liberalism’ that 
scientific rigour and a political focus on increasing professionalism in British society. 
Aircraft were a formed a significant part of this drive, forming one third of what Coopey 
and Lyth termed ‘the triumvirate of modernity’ alongside the nuclear and computer 
industries.808 Even aside from the supersonic marvel presented by the Concorde 
programme, airframe technology and the development of civil aircraft formed a 
significant part of the research and development drive within central government during 
this period; illustrated most explicitly by Benn’s Ministry of Technology (or ‘Mintech’ as it 
would be termed). 
The accompaniment to increasing national and public interest in aerospace were the 
airlines themselves and Britain’s national airport infrastructure. As was highlighted in the 
previous section, developments in this area had been rather ad hoc, producing with them 
a number of inconsistencies and inefficiencies. Such a state of affairs however created 
significant contradictions and paradoxes against the increasingly high technological 
nature and scientific triumph of aircraft design and production. The first of these was 
markedly rudimental statistical evidence available on the subject. Stephen Wheatcroft in 
his study on Air Transport Policy in 1964 stated, rather bluntly, that ’statistical facts 
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about airline operations are ephemeral’.809 The records maintained by the managers of 
Yeadon in 1960s showed that only basic monthly information on the number of air 
movements, the total numbers of passengers and weight of freight handles, and 
operational accounts were kept. Prior to the creation of the Civil Aviation Authority these 
gave no indications of size and type of aircraft, load factors or performance in relation to 
other airports. 
All of these issues and tensions become clear in the Yorkshire Airport proposals. 
Such a complex and diverse system of ownership cannot but create confusion and 
local rivalries. There is no machinery for co-ordination, no plan or framework within 
which separate airport authorities can plan their own development in the 
knowledge that their forecasts and expectations will not be upset by developments 
at neighbouring airports. On the contrary, airport owners enjoy almost complete 
freedom of action, especially if they do not need government aid. To attract the 
traffic upon which their revenue and prestige depend they try to outdo each other in 
the facilities they provide. This is both costly and wasteful.810 
 
Rather than differences emerging from the local authorities represented on the 
consultative council for airport development, it was Ministry of Aviation that appeared 
determined to deter a regional solution for civil aviation. A paper sent to the newly-
formed body by the Northern Division of the Ministry of Aviation in November 1965 
stated: 
This paper though agreeing that it may be prudent to safeguard the land for such 
an aerodrome nevertheless concludes that there is no foreseeable requirement for 
it whilst the major conurbations of Leeds, Sheffield and Humberside have 
aspirations for their own separate aerodromes. 
Regional aerodromes such as Ferrybridge have been a feature of area plans over 
the past thirty years… but none of these have materialised. This is not to say that 
Ferrybridge will follow a similar pattern, but the many good reasons why Regional 
Airports have not been developed are portrayed in subsequent paragraphs.811 
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The reasons listed on reflection appeared to be somewhat short-sighted, or even 
outdated within the context of 1965. They focused on the interests of local authorities in 
their own airports (all of which, it was argued ‘could be developed to operate the most 
demanding aircraft known to-day’)812 that it was relatively cheaper for an existing 
airfields to be developed for commercial air services, and that it was erroneous to believe 
that regional airports located near motorways would have greater ease of access for 
users than local ‘aerodromes’ currently being operated. The conclusions were that ‘a 
Regional aerodrome at Ferrybridge may be required later in the century but no action 
other than safeguarding the site should be considered at present.813 
The documents produced regarding airports in Yorkshire by the mid-1960s, starting with 
the ‘Regional Plan for Airport Development’ produced by the technical committee of the 
consultative council in November 1965, demonstrated a commitment to a regional 
solution to the problems of air service provision that incorporated the broader goals of 
integrated long-term economic and physical planning. Noting the on-going and planned 
construction of the M1 between Leeds and Sheffield, the M62 (that would join Liverpool 
to Hull), the M18 and the A1(M), the plan recognised that 
these four roads of motorway or near motorway standards are going to dictate the 
pattern of movement and development within this region in the years ahead and 
land adjacent to them… will assume more importance. If, therefore, an airfield is to 
be developed in this Region, designed to serve the whole of the Region and areas 
beyond, then it should be closely related to one or other of these four important 
highways.814  
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In the short term the plan called for modest services to be provided for South Yorkshire, 
Humberside, and an improvement to the terminal facilities at Yeadon, but in the longer-
term it was felt from both a national and regional point of view it was necessary to plan 
for ‘a major long-haul International Airport’.815  
Despite the well-documented disputes that arose from any site considered for airport 
development or expansion, particularly those in the south east of England, the 
identification of Thorne Waste, a site situated close to the intended motorways links near 
Goole and chosen by the consultants as the most viable location for a potential 
intercontinental airport once other airports had reached a saturation point in the 1970s, 
appears to have been relatively uncontroversial. Though proposals never reached 
anything more than potential, the residents in the vicinity of Thorne do not appear to 
have actively resisted with the same vehemence as the various groups protesting airport 
expansion elsewhere. Similarly to the Thorne site, in was hinted that proceeding with the 
site at Balne Moor would draw as muted a response. Prior to the publication of the later 
1972 Metra Consulting report,816 a spread in the Yorkshire Post included a quote form a 
resident of Balne stating ‘it’s that quiet they [the residents] probably wouldn’t notice 
even if you did build an airport here. Not until the planes actually started flying in and out 
that is.’817 
Despite assertions to the contrary of local fragmentation in airports policy – given 
institutional licence by the pattern of airport and aerodrome ownership – the movement 
to stimulate aviation provision in Yorkshire had a strong regional coherence and focus. 
Though the initiative stemmed from a group of private individuals, that they were able to 
generate over 200 responses from official and industrial concerns – almost 80 per cent 
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‘in favour of a Yorkshire Airport’ – showed the capacity for a collective solution.818 The 
Association later claimed that the first Stratford survey was, in fact, ‘supported by 138 
local authorities, public bodies and private companies’.819 Three years later, after the 
publication of the first Stratford report, the Association was able to bring together 
fourteen local authorities to form the Consultative Council for Airport Development in 
Yorkshire and Humberside – including both Leeds and Bradford, despite their on-going 
development of Yeadon, demonstrated that enthusiasm could be maintained.820 
This rapid expansion of air travel, and the increasing success of the independent carriers 
during the mid-1960s – bolstered as they were by the flourishing charter market – did 
mean that the Ministry’s short-term warnings about local conflicts of interests had some 
validity. Having previously enthusiastically endorsed the original Stratford Report, Hull’s 
Corporation’s support – at least in financial terms – began to wane somewhat. The 
regional development committee ‘having regard for the contribution already made by this 
authority towards the cost of the original survey’ declined contribution towards the 
updated survey.821 Officials in the city and the surrounding East Riding hinterland, 
however, were keen to develop flights from the area, and in April 1966 Autair were 
successful in obtaining a licence to run six weekly services to London via Luton Airport, 
the inaugural flight taking place on the 3 October.822 The costs involved in promoting a 
full airport at that time though appeared to be a stumbling block for the local authorities. 
Hull City Corporation, MPs James Johnson and Patrick Wall all sought agreement with the 
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Ministry of Defence for joint civil and military use of the airfield at Leconfield (north of 
Beverley), as the continued use of the Hawker-Sidderley facility at Brough was 
compromise by its short runway and the erection of an industrial chimney. When an 
agreement was reached with the Ministry in 1969, Alderman Leo Shultz was keen to 
emphasise that ‘this is a bargain indeed for the initial costs of a developing service’.823 
The service, however, did not last out the year as Autair ceased its scheduled operations 
to London from Hull, Carlisle, Blackpool, Dundee and Teesside in October, citing 
significant losses.824 
The strong planning problems that would be generated from environmental pressures by 
promoting a new site for an airport in Yorkshire appear to have effectively excluded the 
proposals from the national discourse by the mid-1970s. As the second Wilson Labour 
government sought to move quickly on a national airports plan for at least the next 
decade, a working party of officials and civil servants drawn from the relevant 
departments (including the CAA and BAA) and regional offices was formed to produce 
both national and regional issues. At the first meeting, the representative from the 
Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Office noted that ‘in the longer term it was likely that 
Yorks and Humberside would need a new international airport if Yeadon were not able to 
expand’. In response, however, ‘it was agreed that new sites would be excluded at this 
stage: it was doubtful if these were realistic starters and officials would be in the difficult 
position of having to develop, and appear to promote such proposals’. A desire to 
‘mitigate the environmental impacts at any one site’ – also emphasised within the 
minutes – undoubtedly played into this desire not consider alternatives. The fifteen 
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English ‘regional’ airports and four London area airports that were listed in original 
briefing note for the group were settled on for the purposes of the study.825  
 
4.4 Airports in the 1970s: Regional airports and national 
planning to 1978 
 
I 
The early 1970s represented perhaps the most concerted regional action with regards to 
airport development in Yorkshire, but also highlighted the increasing constraints on any 
proposals for a new airport as a result of a changing national, regional and local policy 
environment. It also made clear the significant issues that came from a brand of 
regionalism that sought high-modernist, expert-led guidance as a means of decision-
making within this increasingly complex context. This increasing complexity was driven 
not only by the administrative ambiguity with regards to decision-making at a regional 
level, but the increasing plurality of competing interest groups and policy considerations 
that had begun to emerge in relation to the still-ongoing Third London Airport debates.  
Though the prospect of a new airport centrally located in the region was openly 
discussed over this period, it was the extension of Yeadon – despite continued concerns 
over its suitability – that would be actively pursued by the local authorities in West 
Yorkshire. This decade would also see the commencement of nominal operations from 
RAF Kirmington, which would become Humberside Airport, in lieu of any services from 
the airfields north of the Humber following the failed experiment of the late 1960s. In 
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terms of the reason why proposals for larger and more suitable civil aviation facilities 
were not advanced, YAHADA – who continued their active promotion of the Thorne Waste 
site – were emphatic that it was squarely the local authorities themselves who were to 
blame. YAHADA’s Director made this plain in letters sent to councillors in the recently-
formed South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council in May 1975: 
That Yorkshire and Humberside remains without a Regional Airport and virtually 
non-existent air services is attributable, in our view, to two major causes. Firstly, the 
inability of the old Local Authorities to agree on a common airport policy related to 
the benefit of the whole region. Secondly, the parochial attitudes which continued 
to result in calls for the development of the Yeadon Airport long after it had been 
proved that Yeadon was not only incapable of providing a regional facility because 
of its location but that its development was environmentally unacceptable.826 
 
Though the debates surrounding air transport facilities in the early 1970s would suggest 
that there was a degree of validity to these charges, the evidence from this period would 
indicate that in fact there was significant degree of concerted and coherent ‘regional’ 
action, as in the 1960s, but that the increasing constraints highlighted above provided 
no clear means through which to channel and maintain this. This was also exacerbated 
by an increasingly opaque national picture. In some senses national airports policy would 
prove to be a true archetype of this characterisation of British politics in the 1970s; 
epitomise most starkly by the Roskill Commission’s report, and the decision to choose 
Maplin Sands as the location of the third London Airport.    
 
II 
The decision made in October 1970 by Secretary of State for the Environment, following 
the extensive public inquiry held during the previous winter, was to refuse permission for 
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the extension of the runway at Leeds/Bradford beyond 7,000ft. The reasons for doing so 
were stated as ‘environmental’; most specifically in relation to the noise nuisance the 
potential use of full jet aircraft would subject the residents around Yeadon to. Despite 
complaints from MPs and business interests that seventeen days of the hearing had 
been devoted to the noise issues, compared to only six on the economic operational 
aspects of the extension, the Government were firm that ‘while obviously meriting the 
most careful consideration, the case in economic and social terms for airport 
developments must be weighed against the equally pressing need to conserve the 
environment either to protect the peace of those living in heavily populated areas or to 
preserve the countryside’.  
It was a decision that was generally reflective of the broader public concern in this 
period, that had escalated since the Wilson Committee on Noise in 1963 and had 
intensified with protests against Stansted’s initial designation as the Third London 
Airport. Ted Heath had been involved in the decision to designate Heathrow in the 
1950s, and as Prime Minister was personally averse to exacerbating a problem 
increasingly in focus. The close proximity of airfields to urban areas was testing 
tolerances. As one commentator in Business Week remarked ‘What was once merely a 
major nuisance has… grown into roaring calamity for millions of people living near 
airports. Jet noise stops conversations dead; it keeps people awake at night; it terrifies 
children; it can damage buildings and lower property levels’.827 In the 1970s the typical 
sound of a jet aircraft taking-off at 150 metres measured around 130dB, and the Noise 
and Number Index (NNI) developed by the Wilson Committee was closely monitored.828 In 
the case of Leeds/Bradford, it was not the immediate noise that would be generated but 
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more the belief it would be ‘impractical’ to impose any planning controls related to noise 
that would limit later developments. 
Despite assurances that scheduled services would continue to run from Leeds/Bradford 
until at least 1975, the threat of withdrawal by Northeast Airlines Ltd. – who provided 
some 70 per cent of scheduled traffic – and Aer Lingus began to materialise much 
sooner than this. The Yorkshire and Humberside region’s only major airport had already 
begun to see a marked downturn in its traffic and use in 1970. At a time high passenger 
growth nationally, particularly in chartered tourist traffic (which saw annual passenger 
growth rates of 28 per cent prior to the oil crisis), Leeds/Bradford was experiencing 
decreases. Though the airport could still be used by the majority of the short-range turbo-
prop aircraft used by the airlines, the length of Runway 15/33 and the meteorological 
conditions around Yeadon imposed restrictions on speed and weight of these planes that 
made questionable the commercial viability for operators whose margins relied so 
heavily maintaining high load factors on flights. 
The authorities in West Yorkshire and the airport committee themselves were quick to 
act following this setback, as they were faced with the likely obsolescence of a facility on 
which considerable capital had been spent and which employed several hundred 
individuals in some capacity. It was decided in the short term that the airport was to be 
kept open and the decision was to be appealed, but separate meetings were held in 
December 1970 with the airline operators, MPs and ‘representatives of supporting 
organisations’ to assess the options. As the airport committee’s minutes recorded: 
Mention was repeatedly made at all three meetings of two basic points - the 
question of the re-submission of planning applications for the runway extension 
after an appropriate length of time, and the question of a study in depth of the 
airport needs of the Yorkshire Region as a whole. Confirmation of the vital 
importance of these two matters has come from other informed sources, and tied 
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in with these matters is the question of the need to examine closely the factors of 
congestion at and overspill from Manchester Ringway Airport.829 
 
The need to re-assess the regional requirements, and the possible overspill from 
Manchester, appear to have directly referenced the second Stratford report and may 
have been influenced by the input of YAHADA in these debates. But a possible imperative 
given by capacity issues at Ringway was not forthcoming. The Manchester Airport 
Authority informed the committee that their ‘multi-million pound’ proposals for expansion 
of passenger, freight and aircraft facilities – including the construction of a second 
runway – was expected to satisfy demand for the next fifteen years. As a result of this, 
the matter was referred the Yorkshire and Humberside Standing Conference of Local 
Planning Authorities to consider ‘…whether it would be advisable for Consultants to be 
appointed to up-date the [1967 Stratford airport study]’.830 
The consultants appointed this time were not Alan Stratford and Associates, but instead 
the Metra Consulting Group. Rather than simply reviewing the provision of airports for 
West Yorkshire, they were tasked in their terms of reference with taking into account An 
Airport Programme for Yorkshire in producing ‘effective estimates of demand for air 
transport services in Yorkshire and such wider area as may be appropriate…’. From this 
the consultants were to examine all suitable sites ‘…identifying those most suitable on 
operations, economic and financial and transportation grounds, and having particular 
regard to environmental grounds and, after a more detailed examination in a final report 
to recommend the most suitable on all grounds’.831 In this task they liaised more closely 
with the central government departments associated with air transport as they carried 
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out their work in late 1971 and early 1972; namely the DTI, DOE, MOD and National Air 
Traffic Services. Metra, in association with Frederick Snow and Partners, also made their 
presence felt in the region as they surveyed the various sites deemed as potential 
locations for a new ‘Yorkshire airport’, and in doing so their investigations were keenly 
investigated by the Yorkshire Post and other local press. 
In terms of the scope of the study, An Airport for Yorkshire was by far the most 
comprehensive of the reports on air transport in Yorkshire produced to that point. When 
published in Spring 1972, at a cost to the Leeds/Bradford Airport authorities of £40,000, 
the technical report volume totalled more that 300 pages. Though an evaluation of the 
Thorne Waste site was an explicit element of their research, it was made public several 
months prior to publication that the site had not made the preferred shortlist. Metra 
made clear their reasons, insisting that the site could not be justified for inclusion on 
cost, environmental or economic grounds; the claim it would ‘attract any more industry to 
its vicinity’ or draw in regional traffic was labelled ‘doubtful’.832 In the end it was a new 
site that was recommended as an airport to serve the Yorkshire and Humberside, a 
greenfield location at Balne Moor. It was ‘nine miles apart as the crow flies’ from the 
Thorne site,833 and described in the report as: 
[…] particularly suitable for airport development. It is situated 9 miles from either 
Doncaster or Selby and lies across the A19 linking these two towns. Access to the 
projected M62 motorway would be 4 miles to the north of the site. There are no 
obstructions in its proximity which could represent a hazard to flying…834 
The Yorkshire Post provided a more vivid description of the site that would also be some 
20 miles by road from Leeds and Hull following the M62’s completion; the moor itself 
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characterised for its readers as ‘a vast area of monotonously flat farmland’, and Balne 
itself as: 
… Not so much a village, more a pub, a parish room and a handful of scattered 
farms. Hardly a house has been built there since the Second World War. It is as if 
the march of progress had bypassed Balne and none of the residents made any 
attempt to divert it.835 
 
An Airport for Yorkshire however also contained a degree of pragmatism regarding the 
short-term imperatives for the maintenance of air travel in the region, and for inevitable 
difficulties in formulating a regional solution. The consultants’ advice was therefore that 
as an interim measure, there was a need to revisit a possible runway extension at 
Leeds/Bradford: 
However, owing to the multiplicity of local authorities that would have to be involved 
in the planning of a new airport and their impending reorganisation, it is possible 
that no initiative would be taken on the new airport, which may, therefore, not be 
ready until the eighties. The unemployment problem might ease off by then which 
would remove some of the reasoning behind the benefits stemming from 
construction. Moreover, other airports will have developed during the next ten years 
and Yorkshire could end up not ever having an airport at all.836 
 
Having received a new report recommending a new location in the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region, the local authorities continued to move the matter forward, the 
Leeds/Bradford authorities pushing for an early meeting officials from the DTI and DOE, 
from which the official present from the latter department reported that ‘it was clear that 
Leeds and the West Riding are strongly in favour of the Balne Moor recommendations 
and want to press for an early decision so that the new airport can be in operation before 
Yeadon goes out of business in 1976’.837 The following day, the YHEPC’ communication 
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836 Metra Consulting Group, An Airport for Yorkshire, 84. 
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group held preliminary discussions on the summary report in which they reportedly 
‘welcomed’ its ‘“vindication” of the need for a new airport to serve Yorkshire and 
Humberside’.838 
 
III 
Why then was there no action on moving forward with a regional airport? The immediate 
reasons appeared to have less to do with any explicit ‘parochialism’ as YAHADA would 
opine, and were due to more pressing factors. The most vital of these was the continuing 
lack of the necessary political infrastructure to bring a ‘regional’ project of this nature to 
fruition. Evident in the public statements of MPs, business organisations and the local 
authority bodies was not only a significant interest in providing this transport 
infrastructure that was deemed necessary, but the difference in means represented a 
combination of praxis and cynicism. In the June 1972 parliamentary debate, spurred by 
the alarming upsurge in unemployment across Yorkshire and Humberside, the subject of 
action on the airport question was raised by no fewer than seven MPs and formed a 
significant part of the discussion. Though this debate demonstrated some preference for 
an immediate extension of Leeds/Bradford’s runway, this did not preclude general 
adherence amongst Yorkshire politicians for a longer-term regional airport in a new 
location. Both Conservatives (including Donald Kaberry and Joseph Hiley) and Labour 
MPs (such as Alfred Broughton and Roy Mason), did not discount a ‘Yorkshire’ airport in 
highlighting immediate concerns over Leeds/Bradford. As Alfred Broughton emphasised: 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
timeframe for the new airport being able to start operating was unrealistic, and that there was a 
desire to consider the use of Church Fenton instead. 
838 TNA AVIA 86/41 J.A. Chadwell, ‘Survey of air transport facilities for Yorkshire - Notes of 
discussion at a meeting of Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council Communication 
group on 11 May 1972’, 15 May 1972. 
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Members have said already, the region seriously lacks an airport capable of being 
used by large modern aircraft. We have heard a great deal of talk of the wonderful 
new airport that we are to have somewhere at some time. However, what is needed 
very quickly, if only as a temporary measure is an extension of the runway at 
Yeadon airport.839  
 
Even the most strident rejecters of the proposals in the Leeds, Bradford and 
Huddersfield Chambers of Commerce – who branded the Metra report ‘a waste of time 
and money’ – felt there was a long term need for improved services in the area, as they 
called for ‘a massive inter-continental airport somewhere in the North by the year 2000 
to meet demand from the Midlands and Scotland’.840 In October 1972, the Standing 
Conference of Local Planning Authorities of the Yorkshire and Humberside Region were 
decisive in their resolution that 'this conference is firmly of the opinion that there is a an 
urgent need for a Regional Airport in Yorkshire and urges the Secretary of State for the 
Environment to make a formal government commitment now for a Regional Airport to be 
in operation by the early 1980s’.841 
What was lacking was any clear institutional means of bringing about these proposals, 
something that highlighted seemingly wilful contradictions in the ‘dual polity’ model of 
British governance articulated by Bullpitt, as the ‘centre’ attempted to maintain more 
control in the more tumultuous conditions of the 1970s.842 During the study period for 
the report, the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) and DOE demurred from 
providing a clear policy steer from central government, insisting – when queried – that as 
per the 1961 Act it was the responsibility of the local authorities concerned in the first 
instance to submit planning proposals for any new airports, or a renewed runway 
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extension. Despite purporting to remain objective and removed from this debate there 
was, however, significant and entrenched opposition from interests, strongly set against 
any new airport development in Yorkshire and Humberside. The most crucial objections 
came from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). From an early stage, the concentration of 
military airfields in Yorkshire and around the Vale of York – particularly Royal Air Force 
(RAF) Church Fenton, Lindholme, Elvington, Linton-on-Ouse, Scampton and Finningley – 
due to airspace restrictions elsewhere aroused discussions among government 
departments.843 When contacted by the consultants, the MOD were strident in their 
response: 
The Vale of York from Airway Blue One to the Tees, where most of your selections 
have been made, contains a number of RAF flying training aerodromes and is 
designated an Area of Intense Military Air Activity… …The siting of an airport for 
public transport in this area, together with the establishment of controlled airspace 
to surround it and link it with the National Airways System in some cases so 
severely restricting this flying activity that the Ministry of Defence would raise the 
strongest objections to the proposal.844  
 
The MOD had little interest in any of the ‘swap’ proposals for one of the military air bases 
for Yeadon, and were clear that the further west an airport was located the better, 
strongly indicating that if a new airport were to be constructed in Yorkshire and 
Humberside their preferred location of those shortlisted was a greenfield site at 
Wintersett, located to the south-east of Wakefield. Though ‘strategic defence 
considerations’ were indeed identified as a prime ‘cost’ for the airport, Metra in their 
selection of Balne Moor – though Wintersett was short-listed – stated that the site could 
be accommodated into the pattern of RAF airfields at a cost of £100,000 to realign the 
air approaches at RAF Finnningley and RAF Linton-on-Ouse.845 It was a figure the MOD 
                                                            
843 TNA AVIA 86/41 W.H. Pope, Loose Minute Ref. CO/121/090 ‘Yorkshire Airfields Study’, 18 
November 1971. 
844 TNA AVIA 86/41 E.J. Dickie to A.D. Townend, ‘Yorkshire Airport Study’, 23 February 1972. 
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strongly and indignantly contested when the final technical report was discussed by the 
relevant government departments, with their representative making clear their position 
would be to ‘…strongly resist the establishment of a civil airport at Balne Moor, RAF 
Lindholme, RAF Church Fenton or RAF Elvington. Development of a civil aviation airport 
at Thorne Waste would also be unacceptable’.846 The significance of this objection, the 
continued importance in Britain even in the 1970s of the ‘warfare state’, particularly in 
relation to military and civil aviation, has been outlined by David Edgerton 
comprehensively in several volumes.847 Such resistance was a pervasive if understated 
one. 
The second department which brought into question autonomy of the local authorities to 
act in this case had only been in existence for a month at the time of the publication of 
An Airport for Yorkshire. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was established by the 1971 
Civil Aviation Act following the recommendation made by the Edwards Committee that 
the economic and regulatory functions of DTI (Department for Trade and Industry) and 
the Air Transport Licencing Board should be consolidated into an independent body, one 
that would also play an advisory role in the development of a national airports policy.848 It 
was envisaged from the outset that broad policy and a plan for national airport 
requirements would take ‘several years’ for the CAA to produce. The DTI and DOE 
officials were therefore very clear that CAA consultation would be needed in any 
decisions within Yorkshire. 
The institutional ambiguities that another tier of centralisation created for the authorities 
in Yorkshire and Humberside, who were told planning applications were their own 
                                                            
846 TNA AVIA 86/41 ‘An Airport for Yorkshire - Notes on Meeting on 31 May 1972’. 
847 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane. 
848 Cmnd. 4018 British air transport in the seventies: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into civil 
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responsibility, was made clear by Edmund Marshall in response to an answer given when 
enquiring on process: 
In your answer you state that “such proposals in the first instance are for local 
authorities and other local interests concerned, advised as necessary by the Civil 
Aviation Authority”. Considering the size of Yorkshire and Humberside, I am left 
wondering which exactly are the local authorities and other local interests 
concerned… Furthermore, what happens after “the first instance”? To whom should 
local authorities submit their proposals? Finally, is the Civil Aviation Authority’s role, 
even in the first instance, one of active participation or merely one of giving advice 
when requested?849 
 
The clarification received did little to make overall institutional responsibilities clearer. It 
stated that the ‘local authorities’ should put forward any planning application ‘in light of 
advice from the [CAA]’ whilst emphasising the Authority’s role was primarily for advising 
on national airports policy.850  
As it was, the CAA would involve themselves in the debate over a ‘Yorkshire airport’ from 
their inception. Frank Thompson, head of the Economic and Statistics Division at the 
Authority, sought to immediately dampen any imminent realisation of regional aspirations 
over the plans for a national strategy that would shortly be undertaken. His attitude 
expressed May 1972 – questioning ‘the rationale of a Yorkshire Airport on national 
airport planning grounds’ alongside indicating two years would be the minimum expected 
time necessary to formulate the plan – appears to have been indicative of the CAA’s 
aspirations to bring a more rationalised pattern of airports and air services across the UK 
that had been advocated in planning circles since the previous decade.851 Indeed, this 
immediate position was admitted to represent Thompson’s ‘philosophy’ in a paper 
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circulated more two years later, with the air transport industry in the ‘doldrums’ and 
following the government’s abandonment of Maplin.852 It was a view that DTI would 
stridently endorse, indicating to the DOE when the issue was raised in relation to regional 
airports in November 1974 that: 
‘…We have got to get away from the line of thinking that expects each region to 
have within its boundaries its own major airport. The regional airport for Yorkshire 
and Humberside should probably be East Midlands or Manchester, or Tees-side or 
a combination of all three’.853 
 
IV 
The changing cultural context experienced in the 1970s, the increasing rejection of 
modernity by citizens, the proliferation of post-materialistic and the increasing 
privatisation and marketisation of politics at this time, were perhaps most strongly 
emphasised in the popular response to airport expansion. Marc Augé’s exploration of the 
production of ‘non-spaces’ through the processes of ‘supermodernity’ highlighted the 
increasing importance of history and particularism in identity formation that arose from 
this. At the heart of Augé’s thesis is the role of transport as a ‘non-place’; the apotheosis 
of which is air transport and the airport.854 The inclusion of road travel, motorways and 
the motor car in the multiplication of non-places faces significant contention from not 
only from the cultural pervasiveness of ‘automobility’, particularly in Britain, but also from 
the role of motor companies Wright identifies in the instrumentalisation of place through 
use of the landscape and history in the 1980s.855 
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Despite increasing use being made of them, airports held no such connection in this 
reimagining of regional identity based on place. The sense of airports as non-places, and 
additionally the political need for any new development to inhabit non-places was 
perhaps best illustrated by the Maplin Sands decision for the third London airport. Andy 
Beckett emphasised the sparse and indistinct nature of the Foulness site, describing it 
as ‘a great smooth maze of mudflats and grey-brown horizon the size of central London, 
gleaming dully as an old hubcap off the coast of Essex near Shoeburyness’.856 Indeed, 
the attack on the recommendations of the Roskill Commission – most notably in Colin 
Buchanan’s note of dissent – was done in supposed defence of identity against the 
encroachment of super-modernity; what Peter Hall summarised as ‘…preservation of the 
national heritage, in particular its traditional landscapes, is a sacred trust for present and 
future generations’.857 Similar concern for the protection of broader based issues of 
identity, amidst the overarching environmental concern, was apparent in many of the 
protests against the Cublington and Stansted options at the time.858  
If Maplin could be described as non-place, the same was certainly true for the Balne 
Moor site favoured in the 1972 study. The physical description of the site itself by the 
consultants emphasised the featureless, and hence ahistorical and non-relational 
location – characterised primarily by the major roads it would be serviced by: 
The site at Balne Moor lies in flat open country in the centre of the Vale of York and 
is particularly suitable for airport development. It is situated 9 miles from either 
Doncaster or Selby and lies across the A19 linking these two towns. Access to the 
projected M62 motorway would be 4 miles to the north of the site. There are no 
obstructions in its proximity which could represent a hazard to flying… The 
Ordnance Survey grid reference point closest to the centre of the runway would be 
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SE572173…. In our outline plans we have allowed for a parallel taxiway, a terminal 
building with a floor or 35000m2… , a multi-storey car park for 5,000 cars, a cargo 
building and apron, a general aviation terminal, a maintenance area, a fire station 
etc.859 
 
In these descriptions can be seen the tenets of this supermodernity, places removed 
from anthropological space, codified and classified by institutions rather than 
individuals.860 
A concern for environmental factors on a regional level was a primary part of the 
assessments of the optimal place to site an airport in Yorkshire and Humberside, which 
was not just about access and immediate economic concerns. The Thorne Waste site 
was, as Edmund Marshall (MP for Goole) pointed out to the House, ‘…there, on the map, 
as a bald patch of nothing in a featureless countryside – a stretch of sour, waterlogged 
land lying low to the south of Goole’.861 Careful maps and calculations were formed on 
the sites advocated to try and minimise the noise nuisance experienced by those in the 
vicinity of the airport. This was somewhat complicated in the 1972 METRA study in which 
the four sites offered different scales of noise problem: either relatively more people 
would be subjected to “Very Annoying” to “Unacceptable” levels of noise (Balne Moor 
Site) or significantly more would experience “A little annoying” to “moderately annoying” 
disturbances (Wintersett).862  
In 1974, West Yorkshire County Council (WYCC) bemoaned the difficulties facing them 
and their ‘regional neighbours’ over reconciling their own commissioned study with the 
CAA’s Central England Study, which had ‘totally different recommendations’, though both 
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were carried out by the same independent consultants.863 The view of the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Economic Planning Council on airports in their 1975 strategy review 
appeared to signal a diminished enthusiasm for major regional solution to the area’s air 
transport needs. The expansion of Manchester and East Midlands airports as advocated 
by the Civil Aviation Authority was confirmed ‘as being the best solution for main air 
passenger services in the region’. However, the nature of the overall assessment of the 
state airport provision in Yorkshire and Humberside suggested that this was an 
acceptance of circumstances, rather than an ideal situation: 
We recognise that the air services situation in the region which we envisage for the 
next 10 years or so is far from perfect, and we are aware of the view that the 
possession of a proper regional airport is needed for stimulating industrial 
development in the region. Nevertheless, after detailed consideration over many 
years, and with the benefit of three sets of consultants’ reports on the air service 
requirements of the region we are convinced that our views are a realistic 
assessment of what is practical in present circumstances.864 
 
Inglehart has argued extensively that since the 1960s increasing affluence amongst 
western societies has witnessed a perceptible and fundamental shift in political culture 
from immediate economic concerns to more quality of life based issues, including 
environmentalism.865 British Airports Authority (BAA)’s optimistic figures on Heathrow’s 
capacity up to 1986 provided ammunition for those opposing the development of Maplin 
as a third London airport.866 Within Yorkshire, calls for a new airport – rather than 
continued extension of the runway despite its increasing redundancy – were countered 
by the prohibitive upfront expense of a long-term regional alternative;867 with one 
speaker to the WYCC declaring ‘go to your electors and tell them a new regional airport 
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will be built at a cost of something about £100m’.868 Airport development options that 
limited overall cost and time took precedence, as ultimately no officially agreed or 
statistically ‘legitimate’ alternatives were produced. 
Public resistance to potential extension of airports, or of new airport sites, was 
compounded by the growth of environmental concerns, for example the orchestrated 
campaigns of the North West Essex and Herts Preservation Association and the 
‘Defenders of Essex’.869 The expansion of established airports became increasingly 
politically sensitive, with Manchester airport indicating in 1973 to the CAA that noise 
levels were the most the public were likely to tolerate.870 In examining Yorkshire, the 
residents around Yeadon successfully formed their own Leeds-Bradford Association for 
the Control of Aircraft Noise with 1,500 reputed members by 1969, and played a 
significant part in the government’s rejection of the proposed runway extension.871  
Despite the calls for adequate airport services that came from commercial and industrial 
interests, such chambers of commerce and the Trades Union Congress (TUC),872 the 
response of the wider public was ambivalent. The local response to a proposed new 
Yorkshire airport in 1972 was reportedly ‘indifference’.873 Reference to ‘the air traveller’ 
in Roskill and other reports indicated that such people were still very much the minority, 
and leisure travel was not predicted to expand;874 the Airport Committee in West Riding 
in 1972 said that they were against investment for the purposes of ‘inessential travel’.875 
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Even into the early 1980s in Britain, the majority view remained that ‘air travel is only for 
the rich’.876 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
I 
The mid-1970s onwards finally saw the formalisation of what had been served as implicit 
government policy towards regional airport for the previous decade or so. With the 
Department of Trade finally publishing consultation plans in 1976 on how a national 
airports strategy would relate to regional airports in they made clear the stance of the 
CAA in relation to two key areas: 
 First, the CAA in their various advice to Government do not consider the cases 
 have been made for new airports in, for example, North Cheshire, the North 
 Midlands or Yorkshire and Humberside. The Government see the force of the 
 arguments that led the CAA to their conclusions.877 
 
At the same time it was made clear that the Government would now support a new 
proposal for Leeds/Bradford Airport’s runway to be extended to be able to accommodate 
larger jet engines, in part because the airport’s small runway saw again the threat of 
obsolescence. Following the consultation document, the Government’s White Paper on 
Airports Policy was finally published in 1978. It demonstrated the effect on national 
policy attitudes the abandonment of Maplin four years previous, in stating in the 
assumptions that above all the massive amount of investment undertaken could not be 
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ignored and neither could environmental considerations, especially ‘the impact of aircraft 
noise on areas surrounding airports’.878 It argued that Manchester Airport should serve 
as the Category A (or ‘international gateway’) airport for Central England, and that 
The Government does not consider the demand in Yorkshire and Humberside to be 
such as to justify the massive expense which would be involved in the provision of a 
new airport in the region.879 
 
Again support was forthcoming for an extension of the runway to allow Leeds/Bradford to 
fully serve as a Category B ‘regional’ airport; providing feeder services to the larger  hub 
airports of the South East. Given this support the local authorities would again put 
applications for planning permission to extend the runway, gaining in the process 
enthusiastic support from industrial bodies such as the YHDA, who argued that  
The sooner the Leeds/Bradford proposed runway extension issue is resolved the 
sooner Yorkshire and Humberside can look forward to the future confident that our 
region will be adequately served by one of the TOP 5 second tier international 
airports in the country.880 
 
One of the major objectors to these proposals would be YAHADA, who would continue to 
make the case for major Yorkshire Airport at Thorne Waste, despite communications 
from MPs and other interested parties asking them to cease, as ‘exhaustive research’ 
had led to the point where there was now no other feasible option.881 In September 
1983, with the runway extension granted for the Leeds/Bradford site, the remaining 
members of YAHADA agreed to wind the association up, having ‘failed to achieve their 
aims’ due to ‘the politics of air transport’.882  
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II 
The experience of Yorkshire and Humberside in relation to regional airports from post-
war to the end of the 1970s as briefly documented in this core sample highlights a 
number of themes and issues evident with regards to both regionalism and 
contemporary British history. Again, as in other areas of public life there could be seen to 
be a genuine fostering of regional action amongst local authorities and other bodies 
towards a true region-wide solution to regional issues. It also highlighted the distinct 
consciousness towards the regional geography and regional transport infrastructure for 
Yorkshire and Humberside that authorities and industrialists demonstrated elsewhere. In 
the attitudes taken by local authorities there could be seen also to be the broad 
Yorkshire tradition of restraint in the provision of services and resources, determining 
that air transport should primarily be for commerce and industry rather than for leisure 
purposes. 
The central import of a regional airport in the 1960s and early 1970s again highlights 
the adoption of high-modern, technocratic led planning assumptions by various interests 
in Yorkshire and Humberside, and the premium placed on objective and scientific 
expertise. This was demonstrated by the commissioning of three consultants reports into 
regional airport needs and the heed paid to these by various regional interests. The spur 
to action provided by private individuals also again emphasises the importance of 
regional identity in spurring regional action in Yorkshire and Humberside demonstrates 
mobilisation of regional politics and lobbying through means similar to those observed 
elsewhere in twentieth-century politics by new political historians. 
Finally this chapter highlights the inherent constraints placed upon regional action by 
national and institutional constraints. The ambiguous separation between national and 
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local responsibilities for provincial airports provided no easy means through which 
regional action could be mobilised. The inherent centralism, and the increasing aversion 
to planned modernity in the 1970s, all added to these constraints.  More any other 
aspect of transport, and arguably any other public policy, air transport presented to the 
British government what Habermas has termed ‘the field of crisscrossing organised 
interests’.883 The global nature of the air transport industry, the volatility generated by its 
economic sensitivity and rate of technological advancement, all created constraints and 
contingencies that hindered the British government’s ability to forecast the future pattern 
of airports. 
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Chapter 5: Cultural Regionalism: Regional Arts 
Associations in Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Humberside, 
c .1963-c .1994 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
I 
This chapter explores the work of the Regional Arts Associations (RAAs) formed in 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire in the 1960s. Associated to the Arts Council of Great Britain 
(ACGB; Arts Council England (ACE) from 1994) at a national level, and to the areas’ local 
authorities, the RAAs have played a significant role in the patronage of the arts and 
cultural policy regionally. Though this chapter is titled ‘Cultural Regionalism’, it is 
important to make clear the context in which ‘culture’ is being used here. The literary 
turn within history and the social sciences has reinforced the idea that culture, as 
representing the expression of constructed individual or collective forms of beliefs 
informing behaviours, is intrinsic to all forms of investigation.884 This examination of 
regional arts administration thus provides a potentially rich seam for exploring the 
dynamics of both regionalism and regional identity. Like the EPCs and other planning 
bodies discussed in previous chapters, RAAs were encouraged by the centre and were 
quasi-representative, while their key actors and membership were drawn mainly from 
their constituent local authorities. Unlike the bodies previously discussed, however, the 
RAAs’ geographical boundaries and intended purpose were less centrally dictated, and 
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instituted more from within the regions themselves.885 The North Eastern Association for 
the Arts (later Northern Arts), formed through the initiative of local authorities in 1961, 
may have become what Vall calls ‘the blueprint for regional cultural policy’,886 but this did 
not preclude significant regional variation beyond the basic form, as will be discussed 
below. Furthermore, as bodies with significant influence and agency in promotion of 
cultural activities, the RAAs had great potential for setting the agenda for the content of 
both internal and external regional identity. Though (in some cases) far from truly popular 
organisations, the Regional Arts Associations are interesting bodies through which to 
explore the two interrelated themes at the heart of this study. 
Examining the narrative of arts administration is also significant to the study of historical 
discourses of change in national culture in post-war Britain. The politics of the arts, and 
in particular the politics of the Arts Council, has been a fertile source of discussion. The 
expansion of funding for ACGB from the early 1960s onwards was heavily linked to 
debates surrounding modernisation, national decline, and an increasingly affluent 
society. The arts establishment in the 1970s has been cast as either presiding over 
‘cultural closure’ and retrenchment, or – in hindsight – participating in expanding and 
innovating forms of cultural expression (much as recent reassessments of the decade 
have argued it precipitated a ‘marketplace for ideas’ in popular and political culture).887 
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Similarly, the uses of art and culture in the 1980s, and the demand for the arts to show 
accountability and ‘value for money’, has underpinned discourse on the cultural politics 
of Thatcherism and New Labour.888 
Though regional cultural policy has seen some general discussion in the context of these 
broader debates, with the exception of the North East and Merseyside there have been 
few concerted studies of the politics and organisation of the RAAs.889 A specific focus on 
Yorkshire and Humberside appears to offer a particularly interesting case study. In 
contrast to other more northerly RAAs, whose boundaries were similar to that of their 
Standard Planning Region, two bodies existed in this region until the implementation of a 
more uniform structure for art administration in the early 1990s. The Lincolnshire Arts 
Association (LAA), covering the entirety of the historic county, was established between 
1963 and 1964; and Yorkshire Arts (covering the West Riding, East Riding and southern 
parts of the North Riding) was eventually established in 1969. As discussed here, both 
RAAs would pursue considerably different models for artistic patronage – a situation in 
part due to their particular geographical context. The formal creation of Humberside as a 
local authority in 1974 brought with it upheaval in these two regional institutions, and 
the eventual creation of a Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts Association the following 
year. 
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II 
In examining the work of the two RAAs, this chapter primarily focuses on the nature of 
the institutions themselves, rather than on the specific content produced by those artists 
as supported by the associations. Discussions of the political and/or geographical nature 
of such content have been developed in other works, though there is a significant 
amount still to be done on this subject.890 The cultural and contextual reflexivity of this 
art has been well noted: ‘art was subject to external and historical forces – it reflected 
society but it also reflected upon society and influenced people’s ideas and behaviour, 
consequently, it was a minor social force in its own right’.891  
This chapter will first consider the origins of the two RAAs serving the region of Yorkshire 
and Humberside, and how the distinctive shapes of each organization formed in their 
first years of operation to the early 1970s. It will argue that the differences in the two 
associations were reflective of distinct regional identities linked to broader cultural 
concerns and perceived inheritances. It will then consider the debates surrounding the 
eventual decision in 1975 of the newly formed Humberside County Council to 
disassociate itself from Yorkshire Arts, and instead become associated in its entirety with 
the Lincolnshire Association. It will then finally document how each Association 
developed under the new arrangements into the 1980s, in the context of increasing 
national interference and changing policy concerns (particularly the greater emphasis on 
community arts and private sponsorship); a context in which Yorkshire Arts would broadly 
thrive in comparison to its Lincolnshire and Humberside counterpart. 
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Though Lincolnshire has been previously discussed in passing, mainly in the context of 
its northerly and north-easterly parts that would become part of Humberside’s 
administrative county in 1974, it features more prominently in this chapter due to the 
nature of the RAA that administered the area. Largely geographically rural, and 
predominantly politically Conservative (both at national and local authority level, save its 
few urban enclaves), Lincolnshire provides a useful comparison for examining questions 
related to national and regional identity. As argued here, political regional incompatibility 
was more complex than the simple reactionary historical enmity and retrenchment that 
some suggest informed British cultural politics.892 
 
5.2 Lincolnshire Arts Association, c.1963-71 
 
I 
The creation of what would become the Lincolnshire Association for the Arts (LAA) has 
not received any significant academic attention, unlike the three regional associations 
that preceded its formation. The foundations of the Association share some similarities 
with its predecessors, but also some marked ideological contrasts. Most distinct is the 
context of the LAA. In discussing its north eastern counterpart, Vall has noted that ‘the 
urban dynamics of the north east and the dominance of these cities by northern 
Labourism undoubtedly played a part in facilitating support for a project that became 
anchored in the language of economic modernisation’.893 This led to an organisation that 
sought to reshape external impressions of a region mainly consisting of ‘slag heaps and 
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grime’.894 The physical, economic and political geography of Lincolnshire provided the 
obverse context, the county being largely rural, agricultural and sparsely populated – the 
major conurbations being the cathedral city of Lincoln, and the industrial towns of 
Grimsby and Scunthorpe. As a result, the cultural impetus for founding an arts 
association in the county had less to do with cultivating a ‘modern’ image, and was more 
conservative in emphasis. 
The driving force behind seeking action on a ‘county region’ basis was a conservationist 
one, with the importance of ‘heritage’ stressed above all else. In December 1963, a 
conference entitled ‘Lincolnshire Past, Present and Future’ was convened in Lincoln, and 
was attended by around 350 delegates representing the county’s local authorities and 
other interests. The chief instigator for this endeavour was Captain Jeremy Elwes, a local 
councillor in Brigg and resident in the seventeenth-century country house Elsham Hall. 
The Elwes family were notable landowners in Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire, and 
had a strong history of patronage within the arts. Jeremy’s grandfather, Gervase Elwes 
had, against his family’s wishes and status, become a professional baritone in the early 
twentieth century.895 He had established in Brigg an annual music festival, with one of its 
primary aims being the preservation of local folk song.896 The family had also 
unsuccessfully tried to use Billing Hall in Northamptonshire as a home for ‘indigent 
musicians’.897 
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Elwes’ own transcript of his speech given at the conference demonstrates the 
importance of (Catholic) religious convictions, but also his desire to increase the 
available sources of patronage in heritage in addition to the arts: 
Obviously our first priorities as citizens and Councillors, should be the “Christian 
approach, our families, freedom from hunger, housing the aged and sick, education 
and maintenance of services. BUT, we must not forget our heritage and with it the 
arts. We look up to God. We look up to Her Majesty the Queen and I believe we look 
up to the arts and all things beautiful. (Throughout the ages beauty and Christianity 
have gone hand in hand). We suggest that our heritage and the arts should be 
maintained and enriched by a partnership – first the citizens, industry, big farming 
enterprises, and the trade unions, with the other partner the local Government and 
the National Government. We think that at the moment, a few private citizens have 
too heavy a burden, and the other partners are not pulling their weight.898 
 
Though the paucity of patronage toward cultural provision by local authorities and other 
county stakeholders were undoubtedly an important factor in Elwes’ invocation to action, 
the strongest theme of his speech was an anxiety over the loss of traditional identity 
amidst economic modernisation. Central to this concern was the physical environment, 
evident by the conference’s keynote speaker, John Betjeman. His own speech focused 
on the building of supermarkets within towns, the widening of roads, and the deleterious 
effects of such decisions made by civil servants.899 The supposed threat to the physical 
beauty of Lincolnshire was an aspect of Elwes’ speech, as he warned, ‘All of our unspoilt 
Villages will change their character, unless foresight and good taste is applied’: 
To the men of the WOLDS, the character of your Villages is at stake, seek that good 
advice from Architects with a feeling for the County and its history. Watch out for 
piecemeal demolition; ONE GLARING PEPPERPOT BUNGALOW can ruin an unspoilt 
village.900 
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The perceived threat to Lincolnshire’s heritage was not constrained to the built 
environment. Its cultural inheritance, the county’s identity and history were also 
apparently at stake. Elwes commented that ‘… it’s essential that every school should 
teach local history,’ and further indicated that the creation of an arts association would 
worthwhile 
if it encourages Lincolnshire inhabitants to stop calling each other “strangers” and 
to work for our heritage as a team; YOU WILL not go home after “SO MUCH HOT 
AIR” but with a feeling of something definite achieved for the greatness of our 
home County.901 
 
As such, though much was taken structurally from the north eastern example – Arthur 
Blenkinsop, crucial in the founding of Northern Arts, was involved in these early 
discussions – the content of the Lincolnshire Association reflected a very different 
cultural regionalism.902 The constitution of the North Eastern Association for the Arts that 
was initially put forward as a model was not adopted on the grounds that it did not give 
proper allowance to the work of voluntary organisations within the county.903 This distinct 
emphasis was highlighted in a subsequent draft constitution produced by the steering 
committee formed at the 1963 conference, ‘the Lincolnshire Association to Protect the 
Heritage of the County and promote the arts’.904 The twelve objects proposed in the 
initial constitution reflected many of the desires to maintain and promote formal cultural 
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tastes,905 as was the case in the North East and for the Arts Council as a whole;906 the 
concern for the county’s ‘beauty’ and ‘preservation of the County heritage’ were also 
included.907 
The formation of the Lincolnshire Association was relatively swift. A constitution was 
approved by the steering committee by August 1964, and an inaugural meeting 
scheduled for 3 November, with the Lord Lieutenant Lord Ancaster agreeing to serve as 
chairman. In writing to the thirty-nine local authorities in the county, Elwes gave an 
indication of the likely future work the association would take. This again demonstrated 
the idea that the association was to have a role beyond the general promotion of the 
arts, and would seek to either preserve or promote a particular rural Lincolnshire identity; 
Elwes stated that assistance would be given to the Campaign for the Preservation of 
Rural England to promote ‘good design, good planning and the preservation of our 
heritage’, and that occasions would be promoted to mark particular anniversaries within 
the county.908 In the end, some 120 people were reported to have attended the meeting, 
and to have done so with ‘a good deal of enthusiasm for the project’.909 And despite 
some minor tensions, the councils themselves were generally cordial towards the 
establishment of the Association: ‘after sundry skirmishes by Skegness asserting their 
individuality, Scunthorpe being their usual truculent selves and Grimsby asserting their 
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special size and status in the County, the Constitution was duly adopted’, with Elwes as 
the first Chairman and Ancaster as the honorary President.910 
By mid-1965, the LAA had twenty-seven contributing authorities, whose subscriptions 
totalled a fairly respectable £14,000; a figure comparable to that raised by Northern Arts 
in its initial year.911 The Executive Committee consisted of a single representative from 
each County Council; a single representative for the two county boroughs and 
Scunthorpe Borough Council; a representative of the remaining borough councils; and 
two representatives each for all the remaining UDCs and RDCs. 
Despite the ostensibly positive attitude displayed by the White Paper towards the 
establishment of Regional Arts Associations, the Arts Council’s approach towards the 
newly formed Lincolnshire Association remained highly cautious and conditional. The Arts 
Council declared themselves unable to attend the inaugural meeting of the new 
association, and were clear to Elwes that no funds would be available in advance, a 
decision that seemed conscious. When it became clear that the association had 
sufficient support to be viable, Nigel Abercrombie reported to the Arts Council’s AGM that 
‘the speed and efficiency with which the Lincolnshire Association has come into being 
affords good evidence that it fully deserves our support’, but at the same time made 
clear the limits of this support: 
At present the Arts Council will be co-operating by giving subsidies of over £10,000 
a year for professional work in Lincolnshire, and by a grant of £2,000 for 1965/66 
to the Association itself. The scale and pattern of our assistance in the future will 
depend (so far as our funds allow) on the development and quality of the 
Association’s own work, not upon any doctrinaire theory or upon any rigid 
precedents.912 
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The issues of geography and of professional quality were the two major concerns of the 
Arts Council. Concerns regarding the former were made explicit in a letter to the 
Department of Education and Science in December 1965, where it admitted that ‘…[the 
Arts Council] were doubtful whether it was desirable for Arts Associations to be set up on 
a county rather than a regional basis’; the exception was made, as the county in question 
was ‘a large area that is served by three county councils, and a comparatively isolated 
one at that’.913 In the early stages of the Lincolnshire proposals, the Council had liaised 
with the secretary of the Midlands Arts Association, whose prognosis of the venture had 
been less than positive, calling an initial draft of the constitution ‘a rather vague and 
wordy document’.914 Despite the more modest means and objectives of the Midlands 
Arts Association, it appeared that the Arts Council had ideally envisaged a more 
comprehensive body covering this geographical area.915 
The LAA’s initial work was impressive, demonstrating the enthusiasm of the committee 
members and a clear sense of regional space. The structure of the Association, 
alongside the executive committee, involved the creation of six panels; Communications 
(including television, radio and public relations), Drama, Music, Visual Arts, Written and 
Spoken Word, and Heritage (including architecture). The members of the panels were 
appointed on recommendation by the executive committee, and by March 1965 had 
already undertaken ‘a vast amount of work’.916 The Drama panel sought to arrange its 
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own festivals and form a theatre company for the county that would give performances in 
the larger towns. 
Three particular aspects of the LAA’s work focused on an active role in curating arts 
projects, and in attempting to be genuinely ‘regional’ in scope. The result of these 
measures would appear to enforce the idea that, rather than facilitating forms of artistic 
expression in the county, the Association would paternalistically provide these services. 
The first policy enacted was the creation of a transport subsidy scheme, established in 
1964, which took its cue from a similar scheme already operated by the Midlands Arts 
Association. Providing subsidised travel to groups of eight people or more was seen as a 
major strategy in increasing quality of life in the county, with assent given to subsidise 
events further afield, such as to theatres in Nottingham, Leicester or Sheffield.917 Though 
only a modest amount of the Association’s expenditure,918 it was held up by the LAA as a 
key aspect of their work for the whole region.  
The second action was to systemise the informal local liaison committees that had been 
established by the Association. The LAA had been working with an unspecified number of 
these bodies, but from 1968, most likely in light of promotional issues regarding the 
Association’s work (see below), it insisted that these committees ‘must be (a) 
representative of the arts and heritage in the area, and (b) able to provide the local 
services required by the Arts Officer’.919 The formalising measure was seen as necessary 
to maintain the cooperation of local authorities, and eventually it was decided that a £10 
grant be given to cover the running costs of these voluntary committees. Many of the 
larger towns had committees by 1970, although no such committees had been 
established in more remote areas. 
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The most interesting innovation made by the LAA – and one that elicited great 
enthusiasm from ACGB and other arts organisations, such as the Gulbenkian Foundation 
– was the establishment of a mobile arts exhibition unit. Again originating from an 
awareness of the rural nature of the county, and consequently the lack of facilities for 
visual arts exhibitions, (taking inspiration from the United States)920 in late 1965 the 
Association sought funding for a vehicle that would allow for specially designed 
exhibitions to be displayed around the county. In October 1966, the Arts Council agreed 
to fund the purchase of a Land Rover and caravan as a special project ‘on the basis that 
it was a pilot for the whole country’.921 The caravan purchased had previously been used 
to display and demonstrate electrical products. By the end of the first year of its 
operation the ACGB’s Regional Arts Officer had declared ‘the project is worthwhile and 
worth doing properly’, noting interest in the project from other rural parts of the country 
such as East Anglia. It was also made plain to the LAA that high priority should be given 
to the project in their budget allocations. The result of this endeavour was the assent for 
the LAA to commission their own purpose-built unit – which would become known as the 
‘Art Mobile’ – which, at a cost of £15,000, began touring Lincolnshire in 1969 (see figure 
5.1). 
The particular utility of the mobile art projects pursued by the LAA was both in the 
outreach it provided to the youth of the county, and in offering a relatively cheap solution 
to a lack of galleries and other arts resources. It was reported that 153 schools had 
requested visits in 1968, and to which Association gave priority to ‘the small schools in 
the country villages, where there are not facilities for static exhibitions’.922 Ambitions for 
the mobile gallery were considerable. A paper presented to the Museums Association 
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Conference declared that ‘the Lincolnshire Association say that they hope that the Art 
Caravan will become as familiar to Lincolnshire people as the mobile library service’.923 
Despite these ambitions, and the enthusiasm of national stakeholders, the service was 
not an unmitigated success (see below). The Art Mobile would also exacerbate existing 
tensions around the overheads of the LAA. The Assistant Art Director post, filled in early 
1970s, became little more than a glorified driver. 
The social attitudes underpinning the objectives of the LAA were broadly in keeping with 
those of the ACGB in general, which since its institution under the control of Keynes had 
equated culture with ‘high’ Western culture.924 The LAA took an active role in curating 
and organising artistic endeavour, rather than merely channelling funds, thus acting to 
arbitrate cultural tastes. The Association’s commitment to increase accessibility to the 
arts for the young held in it a moral dimension. The proper use of leisure time, and the 
utility of art in dissuading the ‘younger generation’ from crime, were themes consistently 
present in Elwes’ communication with other bodies. When attempting to garner interest 
from private sources to sponsor artistic events, deterring the young from ‘breaking up the 
seaside’ featured among the ‘principles’ of the Association: 
We are particularly concerned with the younger generation and this question of 
boredom as a result of increased leisure time. We try and encourage them to have 
a continuity of interest in the arts and heritage of the county when they leave 
school. 
 
Though ostensibly expressing an interest in unlocking the creative energy of young 
people, the LAA remained largely prescriptive in the types of art it promoted. The 
composition of the panels continue to draw on established figures in the arts, from 
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traditional backgrounds. The services provided by the Association were deemed ‘For 
Young People’ rather than in collaboration with them.925 
From the initial wariness that was exhibited towards a ‘county’ association, the ACGB’s 
position towards the Lincolnshire body softened somewhat following its establishment. 
The formation of a North West Arts Association, taking the boundaries of the Standard 
Planning region as its own, matched by Northern Arts in their region, raised the question 
of whether Lincolnshire Arts should either be amalgamated or divided between the East 
Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside. In their correspondence, the Council re-
emphasised what they saw as the value of indigenous initiative, but also the merit that 
an attachment to the historical county had for Lincolnshire Arts: 
We have always recognised that regional associations will tend to coincide with the 
regions defined for economic and other governmental processes: but we have 
never been persuaded that this is necessarily in all cases very sensible. Arts 
associations are concerned with aspects of community life which have nothing to 
do with economics. In the case of Lincolnshire, where I have always understood 
that the factor of county loyalty is very powerful the result of following the 
boundaries of the New Standard Regions would be to amalgamate Lindsey with the 
East and West Ridings of Yorkshire, while allocating Holland, Kesteven, and Lincoln 
itself, to the East Midlands.926 
 
Despite the fairly impressive advances of the LAA in their early stages, the Association 
faced problems in its relationship with the Arts Council and the local authorities. On a 
national level, the Arts Council’s own national rules and responsibilities produced 
tensions with the encouragement of local initiative. The issue of heritage, and the extent 
to which this fell under the ambit of the Arts Council, was a particular point of contention 
from the beginning of the LAA. Almost all explicit mention of ‘heritage’ was removed from 
the constitution prior to the inaugural meeting of the Association, as the Charity 
Commission had indicated they were ‘not aware of any grounds on which the promotion 
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of the preservation of a heritage can be regarded as charitable’.927 The eventual 
constitution subtly changed to instead promote, for example, ‘study of customs and 
traditions in Lincolnshire’.928 Despite this, the Association was defiant of its mission in its 
own administration, still referring to itself as an association ‘for the Arts and Heritage of 
Lincolnshire’.929  
 
II 
Such a situation led to arguments with the Arts Council about the proposal to create a 
Museum of Lincolnshire Life. In the mid-1960s, public funding for museums – rather 
than being the responsibility of the ACGB – was channelled through both the Treasury 
and the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works. The Arts Council’s charter instead 
defined its role as support for the ‘living arts’.930 Proposals to establish a museum 
showcasing traditional, mostly agricultural life in the county (and crucially to practical 
craft demonstrations) had been one of the central impetuses for Elwes in creating the 
LAA, and was a prominent feature of his first speech in 1963. As part of this, the Old 
Barracks situated close to Lincoln Castle were acquired, seen as perfect for ‘a 
Lincolnshire Life Museum’.931  
The Museum took up most of the heritage panel’s time over its first year, with the panel 
deciding that the LAA itself would act as the promoter and appoint a museum curator to 
bring in ‘objects of historical value’.932 The main exhibition was ambitiously planned to 
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represent life in the county from the reign of Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II. The types of 
objects sought by the Association for the museum indicate how the organisation 
perceived and constructed the county’s identity. Amongst the most desired items were 
traditional agricultural tools, material related to animal husbandry, dyking and drainage, 
and poaching.933 The first craftsman to begin work in the Old Barracks was a silversmith 
whose work was featured in the Association’s Art Caravan exhibition, and who produced 
brooches for the LAA’s women members and to present to visitors of the Association. 
On the appointment of a curator, however, the scale of the challenges facing this venture 
became apparent. In the midst of heightened funding constraints in the summer of 
1966, the heritage panel were informed by the curator that a much greater financial 
commitment would be required than envisaged to bring about the proposals they had in 
mind; with the capital costs alone estimated to be between £150,000 and £200,000.934 
Central to the strategy adopted by the Association was an appeal to the Arts Council, who 
were entirely resistant to any diversion of funds to this venture. No part of the grant to 
the LAA was to be used ‘directly or indirectly to subsidise this museum and its activities’. 
This was clearly and forcefully expressed: 
I think this ought to be clearly understood because I understand that your exhibition 
touring unit [Art Mobile] may be used to transport exhibition objects from the 
museum; and this might fall outside the scope of the original purpose for which the 
unit was acquired with the help of Arts Council money.935 
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That the museum endeavour was seen to fall outside the terms of the Arts Council’s work 
was a point of apparent frustration for Elwes, who complained about the rigid definition 
of what constituted ‘living art’ in a direct appeal to Jennie Lee after a visit in April 1967: 
‘We want to show many artistic crafts being practiced in a historical background as well 
as exhibitions and a film centre. This is why we feel it is impossible to separate the arts 
completely from the historical background as regards to capital and finance’.936 
The LAA also found themselves at odds with the Arts Council over amateur pursuits. The 
ACGB’s position was to give explicit support for professional artists and the upholding of 
professional standards. From an early stage, the LAA was reminded that ‘the [Arts] 
Council’s funds are not to be used for amateur productions’. The distinction was one that 
was treated cautiously by the LAA, and the difficulties inherent within the ACGB’s charter 
were emphasised in a 1969 policy document: 
In London the distinction is no doubt a clear one, but in a region like Lincolnshire 
the division between amateur and professional is by no means simple: in many 
instances it is impossible to make such a distinction.937 
 
The tensions over allocation of funds belied the larger problem facing the Association in 
its assumed task of curating artistic output and heritage in the county. Though all but 
three of the local authorities were contributors to the LAA by 1968, its financial and other 
resources fell well short of what had been hoped for. The initial £2,000 that was offered 
in direct grant to the LAA by the Arts Council was disappointing, and Elwes was quick to 
inform the Council that ‘a very large mental note’ had been made of the purported 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
some of the collection has been on view in a travelling exhibition mounted in the Association’s Art 
Caravan…’: Lincolnshire  Association: Diary of Events, July-August 1967. 
936 ACGB 111/10/1 Elwes to Lee, 18 April 1967. Eric White clearly wrote ‘nothing to do with us’ 
in the margin of the ACGB copy of the letter. 
937 ACGB 111/10/2 ‘The Lincolnshire Association: The next five years,’ June 1969. 
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£50,000 in grant given to the North East.938 By the end of the first year of operations, the 
LAA informed the Arts Council that £20,000 would be required to produce what was 
considered to be ‘not a particularly ambitious’ programme of events; only half this 
amount was ultimately granted. When the Association had been founded in 1964, it 
expected that the available budget would be around £50,000. But even though the value 
of the ACGB’s grant had increased to £20,000 by the early 1970s, the LAA’s budgets 
had to be very quickly revised downward. 
As with the proposals for the Lincolnshire Life Museum and support for amateur arts, 
these financial constraints were compounded by controls on how money could be spent. 
Despite the Association’s enthusiasm, by March 1966 the Secretary General admitted 
that ‘the stage has been reached when it cannot be handled by the present staff’.939 This 
was by no means an issue that was unique to the LAA; in 1970, the Directors of all the 
RAAs were informing the new Conservative Minister for Art Lord Eccles that 
the main difficulty in increasing staff was that the local authorities objected to more 
than a small percentage of the RAA’s budgets being spent on administration. They 
wanted their grant to be spent on activities, not staff – not accepting that staff were 
necessary to promote and support activities.940 
 
The extensive work of the LAA left a toll on the active members of the panels and 
stretched their administrative resources. The Chairman of the Communications Panel 
stood down from his position in April 1970, as he felt that it could only be satisfactorily 
undertaken by a full-time paid officer.941 A heated exchange took place earlier that year 
when the ACGB demanded updated accounts from the Association, to be told that ‘the 
only assistance is given by an accountant who works one half day per week, most of his 
                                                            
938 ACGB 111/10/1 Elwes to White, ‘Lincolnshire Association’, 2 March 1965. 
939 ACGB 111/10/2 ‘Notes from Secretary General to be read with Agenda at Meeting’, 1 March 
1966. 
940 ACGB 111/10/2 ‘Note of a meeting with the Directors of Regional Arts Associations,’ 29 
October 1970. 
941 ACGB 111/10/2 Communication Panel Minutes, 9 April 1970. 
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work is to some extent retrospective and it is consequently quite difficult to provide an 
immediate accounting picture’.942  
From its inception, the Arts Council held the view that the majority of provincial artistic 
and cultural endeavour should be the responsibility of the local authorities, a position 
reinforced by the efforts to establish the NEAA in the early 1960s.943 As has been noted 
above, the initial misgivings of the ACGB regarding the size and scope of the LAA were 
cautiously mitigated by the endorsement given by the vast majority of the councils in the 
county. By the 1970s, the Association had managed to gain subscriptions from the more 
hesitant southerly district councils around the Wash.944 Such developments, however, 
did not mask increasing tensions with and amongst the larger urban associate 
authorities, and what they themselves received on their contributions from the LAA. 
When the Association was formed, the suggested subscriptions were a farthing rate from 
the county boroughs and 1/8 d. rate from the county councils and district councils; the 
intention being to generate £25,000 from the local authorities alone.945 By 1967/68 
only £18,354 of this total was being contributed – the largest amounts coming from 
Lincoln and Grimsby – and this amount would decline as the councils came under 
pressure in an adverse economic climate. There was also an increased conditionality to 
continued support from the larger authorities: in early 1969, Cleethorpes and 
Scunthorpe agreed to maintain their current level subscription for the forthcoming 
financial year but, as Scunthorpe declared, ‘they required a statement at the end of the 
season to show the extent to which Scunthorpe had benefited by its subscription’.946 
Grimsby CB’s representative also made plain that their continued contribution would be 
                                                            
942 ACGB 111/10/2 MacDonald to Abercrombie, 12 January 1970. 
943 Robert Hutchison, The Politics of the Arts Council (London, 1982), 121-123. 
944 ACGB 111/10/2 Executive Committee Minutes, 20 January 1970: At this time Horncastle 
UDC and both East Elloe and Spilsby RDCs would make financial contributions to the Association. 
945 ‘Association Hopes for £25,000 from Rates’, Lincolnshire Echo, 5 December 1964. 
946 ACGB 111/10 Executive Committee Minutes, 14 January 1969; Executive Committee 
Minutes, 11 March 1969. 
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considered alongside their own claim for additional representation on the Association’s 
Executive Committee: in 1971/72 Grimsby decreased its subscription by £1,000, and 
instead used the grant for the Grimsby Community Centre.947 
Though issues with the content of promoted events (see below) were a factor in such 
wrangling, at the heart of these tensions lay the issue of the perceived centralism of the 
LAA’s activities around Lincoln. Such contentions were by no means unique within the 
RAAs; Northern Arts, Vall notes, had a strong concentration of its artistic resources 
around the Tyne at the expense of the Tees.948 Though Lincoln was indeed favoured to 
an inevitable degree by the LAA (on account of it having a cathedral, the Association’s 
‘headquarters’ in the Old Barracks, and the county’s only repertory theatre), the work 
undertaken showed reasonable sensitivity to regional needs. The Association’s 
abandonment of the film theatre for the Museum of Lincolnshire Life was ultimately 
decided as it could not be justified within the regional remit. When facing entrenched 
local authorities, Elwes as Chairman emphasised that facilities dictated that ‘some 
imbalance in the geographical spread of expenditure was inevitable. The transport 
subsidy scheme was designed to assist in the problem’.949 
Though despite some (not unique) issues faced by the LAA within Lincolnshire, the LAA’s 
ambiguous remit and relationship to other regional bodies generated significant 
ambiguities. The LAA showed both an enthusiasm towards broader regional co-operation, 
but also a wariness to it. Prior to the formation of the Standing Conference of Regional 
Arts Associations, Elwes had pressed Patrick Abercrombie for a broadly similar body, but 
in doing so clearly indicated that he aimed to ‘entice artistic occasions of national or 
international importance to their respective regions’. In this conception, artistic 
                                                            
947 ACGB 111/10 Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 17 November 1969. 
948 Vall, Cultural Region, 110. 
949 ACGB 111/10 Executive Committee Minutes, 29 July 1969. 
  304 
production was to be firmly indigenous to each region, with co-operation existing as a 
means to increase available finance and exposure.950 The Director Clive Fox would echo 
a similar arms-length sentiment in the LAA’s five year policy document in 1969: 
Lincolnshire people by tradition place emphasis on qualities of self-sufficiency and 
independence, qualities that are often reflected in attitudes to art. While these in 
themselves are a source of strength, carried to an extreme they can be detrimental 
to artistic development.951 
 
Despite such declarations of independence, the limitations imposed by the cultural 
infrastructure of the county led to certain actions that seem to go against this sentiment. 
Not having a university in the county in the 1960s led the LAA instead to invite 
representation on its Council from the universities of Nottingham and Sheffield. The LAA 
also paid a subscription to the Eastern Authorities Orchestral Association, in addition to 
that of the local authorities in Lincolnshire, for the promotion of orchestral concerts in 
the county. Eric White wrote with bemusement to the LAA in May 1967 on noticing in the 
Midlands Association for the Arts annual report that ‘the Lincoln Association [sic] has 
been welcomed as one of their new members and included in the list of member 
organisations’.952 
 
III 
The distinctive cultural policies the LAA pursued and supported in its formative years 
demonstrated a particular regional imagining that speaks to larger historical discourse. 
Though the heart of the LAA’s work was to increase the financial and practical artistic 
resources of the county, the type of art they sought to increase access to was significant. 
                                                            
950 ACGB 111/10/1 ‘Jeremy Elwes: Inter-regional Co-operation’ JGGPE/M/34/25, 12 June 1968. 
951 ACGB 111/5/3 ‘The Lincolnshire Association – The Next Five Years: A Policy’. 
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Though the members of the Association bemoaned what they saw as ‘partisan 
considerations’ from local authorities towards a Lincolnshire-wide organisation, the 
society’s focus had distinct political dimensions.953 The LAA bore some striking 
similarities in its motivations to Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers’ and Listeners’ 
Association (NVALA), which in their 1970 campaign to raise standards in broadcasting 
was declaring that, ‘as our national institutions are founded on… Christian concepts, so 
NVALA reflects… the values in our national heritage’.954 Within the LAA’s objective to 
increase access and investment in the arts lay a distinct moral dimension, likely linked to 
the Christianity of Elwes955 and other prominent members such as the Subdean of 
Lincoln, Canon Binnall. The LAA’s preoccupation with the potential deviance of modern 
youth, and concerns over the use of leisure, mirrored those of the NVALA.956 Beyond 
merely upholding traditional professional artistic standards, the LAA went further in what 
it sought to influence: when proposals for local commercial radio were put forward by the 
Heath government, the Communications Panel made clear their desire to uphold high 
artistic standards against popular tastes: 
The panel would like to underline the fact that it thinks it is essential that there 
should be a commercial radio authority set which would have defined standards 
providing limits for mass programmes and specific times for minority 
programmes.957 
 
                                                            
953 ACGB 111/10 Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 14 August 1969. 
954 Lawrence Black, ‘There Was Something About Mary: The National Viewers’ and Listeners’ 
Association and Social Movement History’, in Crowson, Hilton and McKay (eds.), NGOs in 
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956 Black, ‘There Was Something About Mary’, 195. 
957 ACGB 111/10/2 Communications Panel Minutes, 27 July 1970. In addition to this the panel 
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Accusations of anything less than complete moral rectitude in any of the LAA’s work was 
taken seriously. The Drama Panel declared ‘very strongly that every care should be taken 
to ensure that the type of production toured in the county was not likely to cause offence 
or invoke adverse criticism’.958 Accusations towards the Lincolnshire Writers magazine 
that ‘the contents of some of the issues were either of a low moral standard of were 
meaningless’ were strongly rebutted by  the shocked Chairman of the Literature Panel: 
‘he did not feel the Association had published anything offensive’.959    
Due to its status as an actively commissioning and promoting body,960 the LAA’s art and 
heritage activity gives a perspective on local constructions of the identity of the county. In 
contrast to contemporary tensions within Northern Arts as to whether the ‘importing’ of 
metropolitan culture or the promotion of local vernacular production was more 
pressing,961 the LAA’s work was unequivocally in favour of the latter. A preference for 
local artists ran throughout their work in 1960s and into the 1970s; the Literature Panel 
in particular – whose Lincolnshire Writers publication accepted only ‘strictly residential 
contributors’ – focused primarily on publishing volumes such as 21 Lincolnshire Folk 
Songs, and self-producing records of these songs and Tennyson poem readings.962 The 
first three exhibitions created for the Art Mobile included ‘Painting in Lincolnshire Today’ 
and ‘Embroidery in Lincolnshire Today’, demonstrating a similar emphasis.963 
                                                            
958 ACGB 111/10/1 Drama Panel Minutes, 17 March 1970; it is worth noting however that in 
1971 Lord Eccles as Minister for Art, though having no official say in what clients were supported 
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1986), 227. 
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961 Ibid., 103-105. 
962 ACGB 111/10/1 Literature Panel Minutes, 19 February 1969. 
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The exhibits that were planned and displayed at the Museum of Lincolnshire Life also 
clearly demonstrate the LAA’s specific conception of the county. The museum’s pastoral 
and rural themes were further emphasised by the choice to exhibit the work of Boston-
born early-twentieth century painter William Bartol Thomas, whose work evoked the low-
lying estuarine fenland around the Welland estuary, and market-town scenes from his 
native Boston.964 Of particular interest in the Museum were two exhibitions held shortly 
after its opening, one dedicated to ‘Lincolnshire Links with North America’, and another 
entitled ‘Links to Australia’ (assisted and visited by the Deputy High Commissioner for 
Australia).965 The projection of a region within an international context appears to locate 
Lincolnshire within a particular conception of national identity, one with colonial 
connotations, aligned with particular national declinist strands, similar to the traditional 
identity of the Conservative Party in the 1960s.966 This particular impulse was seemingly 
promoted by the Sir John Dudding, who succeeded Elwes as Chairman in late 1970, and 
who stated that ‘Lincolnshire’s historical contacts with overseas countries provide a 
theme that we should continue to develop, and thereby boost tourism in this County’.967 
The interpretation of such measures within the literature on heritage and the uses of 
history, as well as discussions on the politics of art, is complex. In some respects, the 
activities of the LAA indicate a commodification of heritage as a means to promote 
establishment values.968 These developments also significantly prefigured the ‘heritage 
panics’ in the two decades that would follow. Crucially, within broader national cultural 
politics, the LAA’s work aligns with the national self-image of ‘southernness’ – what 
Russell describes as the ‘Southern metaphor’, where: 
                                                            
964 ACGB 111/10/1 Heritage Panel Minutes, 8 December 1969. 
965 ACGB 111/10/1 Executive Committee Minutes, 21 April 1970. 
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… Britain is romantic, illogical, muddled, divinely lucky, Anglican, aristocratic, 
traditional, frivolous, and believes in order and tradition. Its sinful excess is ruthless 
pride, rationalized in the belief that men are born to serve.969 
 
To simply see these activities – and the Association itself – as deeply reactive to modern 
cultural developments would be overly negative. As Black has indicated with regards to 
the NVALA, rather than being entirely reactive to modern cultural trends towards post-
materialism, their actions can be seen as of agents of post-materialism.970 Though 
television and the proliferation of mass media were somewhat problematic for the LAA, 
the Association attempted – with little direct success – to engage the BBC, Anglia and 
Yorkshire Television in the Association’s work. In pushing unsuccessfully for the 
Association to construct a film theatre at its headquarters, Elwes indicated his own 
amenability to the idea that the facility could ‘be used for films of a wider taste, 
particularly foreign films not seen in the County’. The LAA’s interest in emphasising 
Lincolnshire’s internationalism could also be interpreted as portraying the county and/or 
region’s global links, and as an effort to foster the kind of cultural tourism that would 
form the basis for later post-industrial regional regeneration: the Curator of the Museum 
was supported by the Heritage Panel to attend a course on folk museums in Northern 
Sweden. It is also worth noting that, despite the dominance of the pastoral image in the 
Association’s work, subjects such as nuclear power were considered as possible topics 
for museum exhibitions. This supports the argument that heritage serves to provide a 
sequence, as a means to validate the present; the work of the LAA was a more contested 
use of culture and heritage.971 
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In its active curation of the county’s artistic output, the LAA set out an imagined cultural 
region based on the cultural proclivities of a rather narrow set of local actors. To some 
extent this was a source of a particular strength for the Association, but this arrangement 
limited its ability to respond to changing artistic and cultural priorities. The cultural 
representation of the Lincolnshire region they produced was complex, but on the whole 
conservative; rural; distrustful of technocratic practices; and if not wholly backward-
looking, demonstrative of a reverence for the past over more progressive artistic trends 
(modernism, avant-gardism, or counter-culturalism, for example). In its work, though, the 
LAA challenged conventional distinctions between art, culture and history, a 
comparatively radical position demonstrated in the difficulties faced in obtaining funding 
for its marquee projects. The LAA as it existed in the early 1970s consciously attempted 
to be truly ‘regional’ in its actions, consistently invoking the ‘imagined community’ of the 
historic county. 
The LAA’s work had limited popular purchase with county audiences. Projects such as 
the Museum for Lincolnshire Life and the Art Mobile more often than not failed to gain 
hoped-for interest. Museum revenue in the first year of its operations was little more than 
half what had been predicted in the LAA’s budgets; it received a rather modest 2,330 
visitors within the first six months of opening.972 The report on the first year of the Art 
Mobile showed that where a ready-made audience, such as a school or local history 
society, did not exist, even ‘…conventional advance publicity was evidently a waste of 
time. In the large village of Ancaster for example, the day’s visitors were a policeman, a 
villager, and his dog’.973 Though the rather marginal status of the RAAs was not 
uncommon, the problems of publicity and visibility seemed acute in Lincolnshire, with 
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promotion and membership drives being a constant preoccupation. The strength of the 
LAA’s identity was therefore of particular importance to its continued functioning. 
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Figure 5.1 Image of new LAA ‘Art Mobile’, taken from The Lincolnshire Association, A Mobile 
Exhibition Service – The First Year (1971). 
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5.3 Yorkshire Arts Association, 1966-71 
 
I 
In contrast to the relative ease of establishing a centralised regional arts body in 
Lincolnshire, the creation of a Yorkshire arts association had a far more complex and 
difficult birth. But, crucially, the distinct Yorkshire approach to creating a new form of 
regional arts administration further emphasises the cultural and ideological trends in 
Yorkshire regionalism noted elsewhere in this study. Whereas the founders of the LAA – 
particularly Jeremy Elwes – appealed to sentiment and the need to preserve a shared 
cultural heritage, the founders of the Yorkshire arts body approached the issue of arts 
provision as a practical, rational and semi-scientific process. This further emphasises 
Guy Ortolano’s point that the ‘two cultures’ controversy of the 1960s was about the 
relationship between art and science, and not a disciplinary dispute.974 If the LAA was in 
part more indicative of the ‘radical liberalism’ embodied by F.R. Leavis,975 the approach 
to arts in Yorkshire was certainly more akin to C.P. Snow’s ‘technocratic liberalism’.976 
That art in Yorkshire at this time was imbued ideologically with such technocratic 
modernism was embodied by the establishment of the ‘Harrogate Festival of Arts and 
Sciences’ in 1966.977 In a similar manner to the Greater London Arts Association, the 
initial energy for a regional arts body in Yorkshire came from the Council of Social 
Service.978 The Yorkshire Council for Social Services (YCSS) was the archetypal product 
of the technocratic, scientific approach to social work and campaigning that emerged in 
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the late 1950s and early 1960s. Established in the region in 1963 and composed of a 
large variety of official, voluntary and professional interests, its purpose was to act as ‘an 
advisory, research and development body for the social services in the County of 
Yorkshire’.979 Having identified the development of creative and artistic activities as a 
key feature of their work, and in light of national cultural policy encouraging the creation 
of RAAs encapsulated in A Policy for the Arts, the first action the YCSS undertook was to 
produce a thorough survey of arts provision in Yorkshire. When the report was published 
in 1966, Arts in Yorkshire was admitted by the working party’s chairman – Hull councillor 
and future mayor Lionel Rosen – to be 
…a preliminary enquiry rather than a definitive study. For reasons set out in this 
report it was impossible adequately to cover the whole of this vast field and the 
conclusions we have arrived at and recommendations we have made must 
obviously be tentative.980 
 
Despite these admitted technical shortcomings, the approach adopted by the working 
party during the eighteen months taken to compile the report was one that viewed art as 
an objective commodity, seeking to demonstrate its value (or lack thereof). Art for 
Yorkshire included an evaluation of the average attendances of the county’s largest civic 
theatre, and the potential barriers people saw as preventing them from attending 
traditional artistic production.981 A dispassionate discussion was included under the 
heading ‘Is Art Necessary?’ that inferred that 
from a strictly utilitarian point of view, Art is necessary for our industry and 
commerce. Standards of design can only be maintained through the Fine Arts… In 
Yorkshire good design is essential for the cloth and fabrics industry. The Arts are 
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necessary for the embellishment of homes, offices and work places and the design 
of the utensils we use.982 
 
The conclusions reached by the report were less emotive than those motivating the 
beginnings of the LAA. An arts policy for Yorkshire was advocated, but with an 
acknowledgement that ‘at the time of writing… we are in the throes of a credit squeeze 
and a halt in capital expenditure’ which might prove unpropitious for ‘ambitious 
schemes’.983 The main recommendation of Council was for the formation of a Yorkshire 
Association for the Arts, based upon the model instituted in the North East. Eight objects 
were suggested which, in contrast to those that underpinned the work of the LAA, spoke 
of ‘the Arts’ in a universal manner rather than advocating a particular brand; the title of 
the report – Art for Yorkshire – emphasising this in itself. Amongst broadly similar objects 
to the LAA (of increasing awareness and funding sources, for instance), it was suggested 
that a prospective association would ‘sponsor research on subjects such as audience 
attendance and the transition from art education in the schools to artistic activity in adult 
life’.984 A marked difference from the proposals leading to the creation of the LAA was a 
much more modest suggested amount of local authority funding. One-thirtieth of the 
product of a penny rate – an amount projected to produce a sum of £20,000 – was 
proposed, significantly less than that requested by the Lincolnshire authorities. Rather 
than ideal, this was an amount deemed ‘realistic… bearing in mind the varying financial 
demands being made upon local authorities’.985 
During these initial discussions, the YCSS maintained close communication with the 
ACGB, whose enthusiasm for a Yorkshire association was much greater than had been 
the case in Lincolnshire two years previously. The Arts Council looked favourably on the 
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report, and agreed to fund its publication. Their only major concern at this stage were the 
funding arrangements, Assistant Secretary Eric White stressing to the YCSS that 
I realise that such an income [£20,000 p.a.] would probably be sufficient to enable 
the newly formed Association to get off the ground; but, in view of the inevitable 
difficulty in persuading all local authorities to become contributors in the first year 
or two, do you think it is wise to fix the proportion of a penny rate so low?986 
 
Nevertheless in early 1966 the initial portents were good. The West Riding of Yorkshire 
County Council (WRCC) convened its own working party meeting in April, attended by the 
major local authorities of West Yorkshire, the East Riding and Hull, which approved the 
YCSS’s draft constitution and recommendations, subject to approval from the local 
authorities. Crucially, however, the initial contributions suggested were lower than even 
the YCSS indications; £3 per 1,000 population for an estimated £12,790. It was 
envisaged at this stage an association would be operative at some point in early 
1967.987 The momentum was maintained in August at a meeting convened by the 
YCSS’s working party to discuss their report at the inaugural Harrogate Festival. In 
attendance were various members of Yorkshire’s artistic establishment; representatives 
from the three county councils and major cities; and Sandy Dunbar and Ronald Aitchison, 
secretaries of Northern Arts and the LAA respectively. 
But it was not long before the inherent difficulties in agreeing a consensus across the 
region surfaced. On 1 November 1966, the working party updated the ACGB on its 
present position. Though both the WRCC and ERCC, seven of the county boroughs,988 
and the majority of the district councils had declared themselves favourably disposed to 
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the proposals, Sheffield and Leeds had still not made a formal decision.989 The support 
received was also conditional, with concerns raised particularly over the management 
and financing of the association. The ERCC were particularly adamant that greater 
accountability should be built into an association: it was suggested that ‘contributing 
Authorities should have some means of ensuring that the funds freely disposable by the 
Association are reasonably employed’, and that the contribution rate should be set as a 
maximum.990 
The reluctance of the key county boroughs of Leeds and Sheffield to participate in 
negotiations would essentially lead to an impasse that would persist over the next year. 
Several issues contributed to this. The financial contribution being demanded, though 
relatively modest, was a stumbling block for Sheffield, who gained some support for the 
proposal to employ a voluntary rather than a professional Director.991 Leeds’ Alderman 
Watson indicated that the reluctance to increase public-funded support was based on 
the fact that ‘numerically, culture and the arts generally were a minority interest’. 
Additionally, the authorities in Sheffield would find themselves seeking reassurances 
over the next two years that grant aid for the city would not be reduced by the ACGB as a 
result of joining a regional institution.992  
This continued lack of resolution became an increasing issue for the ACGB, who were 
receiving growing queries from across the region, and from other Associations such as 
Northern Arts. In October 1967, Sandy Dunbar voiced frustration at the lack of any 
information about a Yorkshire association with which to negotiate the possibility of 
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including the North Riding within the boundaries of his own Association.993 The YCSS for 
their part continued to try and revive the idea, proposing to hold ‘a Forum entitled 
“Patronage of the Arts in Yorkshire”’ which it was hoped would bring together individuals 
and authorities concerned with arts production, who would ‘be able to give impetus, both 
to the establishment of an association and eventually to its policy-making, since they 
would be represented in the management of the association’.994 The ACGB strongly 
backed the idea, but it took almost a year to be arranged. The forum took place on 22 
June 1968 at the University of York, and was promoted as ‘a unique occasion, at which 
patrons, artists and others concerned for the Arts will be meeting together for the first 
time to discuss their common interest in an open forum’. The chairman for the occasion 
was Lord Feversham, at the time only twenty-three years old. Speakers included ACGB 
Chairman Lord Goodman, and both Sandy Dunbar and Jeremy Elwes. Almost all the 
major local authorities, and other cultural organisations such as the county’s five 
universities, the Yorkshire Post, and the newly-formed Yorkshire TV were present. 
In a later summary of the forum’s discussions, Dunbar would remark to Feversham that 
though I must confess that there were moments where I felt the Forum was going 
to be vitiated by the prevarications and in-fighting of the local authorities, my 
general impression was that the Forum was a great success.995 
 
From the summaries of the discussions that took place, rather than increasingly cultural 
activity and resources for their own sake, an appeal to the potential economic and social 
benefits of arts patronage and a regional association had the most resonance. Dunbar 
himself had made plain that the 40 per cent of the £3-4 million raised and spent by 
Northern Arts during its lifetime would not have come to the region unless they had taken 
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action themselves, noting that, ‘unless you are prepared to help yourselves, you will not 
get help from the nation in the form of money or advice’.996 Similarly the economic 
imperative underpinned Feversham’s concluding remarks, emphasising 
how much Yorkshire needed to catch up with the other areas of the country to 
maintain its growth. The growth of the arts had to be considered within such larger 
considerations, not least because of the importance of encouraging young people 
to stay or come to live and work in Yorkshire.997  
 
Indeed, the recommendations that emerged from the Forum were that the ACGB, local 
authorities and sponsors should meet informally in September at the offices of the 
YHEPC. This meeting was agreed as a prelude to a further meeting in Bradford, when the 
proposal ‘to establish a Yorkshire Association for the Arts’ would finally be considered.998 
It was unanimously agreed by the fourteen major authorities to establish a steering 
committee to bring forth proposals.999 After some continued debate around the terms of 
its establishment, and one year on from the Forum, the Yorkshire Arts Association (YAA) 
would finally hold its inaugural meeting in the Guildhall in York on 21 June 1969. Its 
‘Area of benefit’ would cover the whole of the West and East Ridings, York, and the 
southern parts of the North Riding not covered by Northern Arts.1000 The annual financial 
contributions requested were set at £3 per 1,000 population for the county councils and 
boroughs, and only three guineas from the district councils.1001 
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II 
Though the protracted and difficult birth of the YAA was in itself significantly different to 
the LAA, the approach taken to the arts by the new association – both structurally and 
ideologically – was even more so. Constitutionally, the YAA was much more of a 
facilitating body than its Lincolnshire counterpart; its crucial objects, beyond the general 
aims to maintain standards and increase accessibility, were to ‘co-operate’ with and ‘co-
ordinate’ the efforts of its member authorities and artistic bodies.1002 This was a 
conception that crucially pointed to a fundamental feature of the YAA and the particular 
expression of regional identity it reflected, one that acknowledged the heterogeneity of 
its region. Despite the suggestion in the 1966 YCSS report, and protestations by artistic 
elites such as Quentin Bell, that Yorkshire was ‘a cultural backwater with no taste’, this 
appears to have been overstated. Though the YCSS had suggested that it was 
‘deplorable that there are no Arts Centres in Yorkshire worthy of the name’,1003 a study 
commissioned by the YAA in 1971 indicated there were at that point six arts centres.1004 
The YAA was able to co-opt several national names into its four artistic panels (Visual 
Arts, Music, Drama, and Literature), including provincial ‘New Wave’ author Stan 
Barstow,1005 playwright and television scriptwriter Alan Plater, and prolific playwright and 
director Alan Ayckbourn.1006 
The vitality of local activity in Yorkshire, in comparison to the more sparsely populated 
Lincolnshire – where, as noted above, considerable local effort was needed to establish 
centralised local liaison committees – was demonstrated by the existence of numerous 
                                                            
1002 ACGB 111/5/1 Yorkshire Arts Association, Constitution. 
1003 ACGB 111/5/1 The Arts in Yorkshire: Report of a Working Party sponsored by the Yorkshire 
Council of Social Service, March 1966. 
1004 ACGB 111/5/2 Sandra Browne, ‘Feasibility study for a projected tour of a season of arts 
events in the eastern half of Yorkshire’ (1971). 
1005 Cooke, A Sense of Place, 14, quoting Stuart Laing, Representations of Working-Class Life 
(Basingstoke, 1986). 
1006 ACGB 111/5/2 Executive Committee Minutes, 3 March 1970. 
  320 
local organisations, such as the local arts councils in Brighouse, Rotherham and Halifax. 
Indeed the extent of enthusiasm for artistic patronage set the YAA on a ‘collision course’ 
with the ACGB. Lord Feversham noted that the YAA were receiving ‘worthwhile 
applications… much more numerous than even I had anticipated’ within months of their 
inauguration, which stretched their initially meagre financial resources.1007 
Following the Arts Forum in September 1968, Feversham and Clarke held an amicable 
but enlightening discussion with Rotherham CBC, in which the local authority provided a 
thorough analysis of why the negotiations had broken down over the previous two years. 
Of particular note was the observation that: 
It was taken for granted that a highly centralised setup – completely contrary to 
Yorkshire social and cultural proclivities – was the best, simply because this had 
been adopted in areas such as the North-East and Lincolnshire where conditions 
are completely different, in that they include no existing cultural centres of the 
importance of Leeds and Sheffield and no major arts festivals of the importance of 
Harrogate and York.1008 
 
Such a stance did not mean that Rotherham were opposed to a Yorkshire-wide 
association – on the contrary, they declared themselves ‘enthusiastically in favour’ – but 
they preferred a decentralised structure.1009 This was certainly something that the YAA 
sought to promote in its approach early on. A meeting was held in June 1970 with 
representatives of nine such associations and councils to discuss their relationship with 
the Association, and how they could be used in the planning of events.1010 From this 
meeting, the YAA would agree that ‘strong and effective local arts councils could play an 
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increasingly important role in the Association’s plans and that efforts should be made to 
assist them’.1011 
The desire to support a more locally-based structure of arts policy in Yorkshire went hand 
in hand with a much greater emphasis on amateur forms of regional art than was the 
case in other regions, particularly Lincolnshire. To some extent this reflected the 
traditions of the region. Lord Feversham as Chairman acknowledged the YAA’s 
indebtedness to this tradition in an article written for the programme of the Leeds 
Triennial Music Festival in April 1970, about an ‘artistic renaissance’ in Yorkshire: 
In this exciting atmosphere the Yorkshire Arts Association has an important role to 
play in servicing established activities and encouraging new ones. Primarily it will 
be concerned with professional work but in this it must build on the foundations of 
Yorkshire traditions in the Arts. A great love of Yorkshireman for music, expressed 
most powerfully through the tradition of choral societies and brass bands. The 
miner, with hands roughened from cutting the coal at the pit face, was not 
equipped to play the violin so he sang and blew brass. He made what music he 
could and what a creative force he has proved with it music, music which has been 
described as a ‘muscle music with hair on its chest’.1012 
 
Though this invocation of a particular community and a particular form of artistic 
production was rather romanticised, it hit on a discernible trend in Yorkshire for 
community based arts production. Community theatre in Leeds was noted as particularly 
vibrant.1013 But local initiatives within the urban areas of the West Riding were not 
culturally homogenous; an article in the Guardian noted that St. George’s Hall in 
Bradford played host to ‘concerts from our own century’s newcomers, the people from 
Pakistan and Eastern Europe,’ alongside more traditional brass band fare.1014 Support 
for smaller, community based, non-professional endeavours was a key feature of the 
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YAA’s work. Alongside grants to the region’s repertory theatres and bodies such as the 
Northern Sinfonia Orchestra, numerous modest grants and guarantees were given to 
choral and concert societies, local festivals, music clubs and welfare organisations.1015 
The type of artistic content sponsored was generally broad in scope. 
This diverse policy was testament to the lack of an overarching artistic regional vision in 
the forming of the YAA – unlike that provided in their respective regions by the innovators 
of the RAAs such as Arthur Blenkinsopp1016 or Jeremy Elwes – but also to the approach 
of the Association’s first ‘Administrator’ Michael Dawson (the title of Director was 
opposed, due to fears over its inferred centralisation). In the YAA’s own retrospective, 
Dawson was described by Feversham as having ‘a wide knowledge of the arts and... a 
born animateur. Very much against paperwork, he believed the more you were out of the 
office the better. He was ideal for the earliest stages of development’.1017 The role had 
received over 70 applications, and longlisted candidates came from a variety of arts 
organisations including the Gulbenkian Foundation, British Film Institute, the BBC and 
the RSC.1018 Dawson himself was the Chief Officer of the Greater London Arts 
Association, and was eventually chosen over four shortlisted candidates including the 
Assistant Education Officer for Leeds.1019 He provided the Association with a 
metropolitan perspective, one that was general rather than indigenous to the region 
itself. 
Dawson’s initial experiences in Greater London undoubtedly informed his less traditional 
approach to arts administration. According to Sam Wetherell, the self-professed 
‘community arts’ movement had emerged in Central London in the late 1960s, with 
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several projects becoming ‘experimental sites for non-professional artists trained in 
different media’.1020 The official acceptance of aspects of avant-gardism by the ACGB 
was slow in materialising, but by the early 1970s the Council was beginning to route very 
small amounts of money to such projects, through the New Activities Committee, then 
the Experimental Projects Committee, foreshadowing developments to come.1021 One of 
Dawson’s first actions was to bring about ‘the establishment of an Experimental Arts 
Fund ‘to encourage new and unclassified activities’, for which initially £500 was set 
aside, and it was agreed that approval for expenditure should be given directly by the 
Executive of the YAA rather than the individual panels.1022 
Dawson’s attitude to the arts, and that of other members of the YAA, would go beyond 
the embrace of the non-traditional artistic forms, leading the organisation to have a 
distinctly different approach to morality. In stark contrast to conservative nature of the 
LAA’s output, the Administrator made his opinion clear that ‘advanced and even 
controversial material should be encouraged if the Arts to be seen in Yorkshire were to 
be comprehensive’, an opinion that was not subject to any recorded dissent from the 
YAA’s members.1023 As a validation of the progressive nature of this aim, this position 
brought the Association into active conflict with other members of the political and arts 
establishment, most notably the Arts Minister Lord Eccles, whose own sensibilities and 
desire for censorship have been noted previously. In 1970, the literature panel made the 
decision to provide a grant of £450 to Seaview Publications of Barnsley. Two resulting 
publications – the ‘alternative’ magazines Styng and Sad Traffic – would lead the area’s 
Labour MP Roy Mason to complain both directly to Dawson and to Education Secretary 
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Margaret Thatcher about their content. With the work resolutely defended by Dawson, 
Eccles attempted to take it above the Administrator, and appeal to Lord Feversham and 
the YAA’s Council in the hope of a climb-down. Though veering away from explicit 
censorship, he remarked that ‘having looked at these magazines, my personal opinion is 
that Mr Mason’s complaint is justified; I find no artistic merit in them’. He also noted that 
I am trying to obtain increases in public funds for Regional Arts Associations and in 
this endeavour I have to consider the opinion of a great many people… no one 
expects an Arts Association to vet in advance the productions of its clients; all that 
Mr Mason or anyone else can ask is that the continuance of a subsidy shall be 
judged in light of past performance.1024 
 
The reply received from Feversham was a defiant one, which noted that in respect of Sad 
Traffic 
The Executive first took note of the fact that its Literature Panel had unequivocally 
recommended continuing support at the time of the publisher’s second application 
for grant-in-aid, indicating that in the Panel’s view at least the magazine has been, 
to date, worthy of public support; that it has literary merit. 
 
Though it appears Styng did not continue to be funded, the YAA – through their Chairman 
– demonstrated their autonomy and defence of creative expression against any potential 
infringement by moral sensibilities. 
 
III 
This was part of the YAA’s broader perspective and ideology noted in the initial Report of 
the YCSS – the ‘technocratic liberalism’ that sought to apply a cultural of 
professionalism, modernism and an embrace of the social sciences to the arts.1025 From 
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very early in its existence, the Association engaged in economic planning, preparing five 
year budgets for aspects of its work in contrast to annual proposals of the LAA’s panels. 
Although the expansion and professionalization of the social sciences in the 1960s 
increasingly sought an empirical base to be an ‘objective and rational study of everyday 
issues’, Savage argues that the field shows a prevailing interest in ‘culture’ in burgeoning 
publications such as New Society.1026 As evidenced by the 1966 Report, such an 
approach was demanded within Yorkshire; this is also seen in responses to the abortive 
attempts to form an association before 1969. The approach to art within Yorkshire 
accorded with the wider discourse of economic and social planning in the minds of local 
officials. The Chairman of the Doncaster Arts & Museum Society wrote to the ACGB, 
drawing an association between economic regional policy and increased regional spend 
on the arts, and appealing that Doncaster would serve as ‘an ideal “arts development 
area”’ for the Council to consider.1027 Rotherham also tellingly suggested that ‘the 
establishment of an operational structure should await empirical and unprejudiced 
review of needs, possibly undertaken by a firm of management consultants…’.1028  
The YAA immediately adopted a professional and objective approach. In light of ACGB 
enthusiasm for the Art Mobile project run by the LAA, and other initiatives such the South 
Western Arts Association’s work with Beaford Arts Centre, the YAA encouraged the 
incumbent Administrator to institute similar schemes in Yorkshire. In response, Dawson 
replied: 
My own feeling is that before rushing to set up a touring theatre company, a mobile 
art gallery or whatever, a great deal of investigation is necessary to discover 
whether such ventures would be viable both from an economic and sociological 
point of view. Ideally, I would like to sponsor a research project to examine all the 
problems presenting the arts outside the main centres, in the hope that this would 
                                                            
1026 Savage, Identities and Social Change, 115-116. 
1027 ACGB 111/5/1 Scowcroft to Chairman ACGB, ‘Doncaster and the Arts’, 4 December 1968. 
1028 ACGB 111/5/1 Clarke to Abercrombie, ‘Yorkshire’, 19 September 1968. 
  326 
produce a series of recommendations to guide the Association over the next five 
years.1029 
 
The preference for carrying out feasibility studies, and the use of professional 
consultants to do so, was visible across the Association’s business, such as in devising 
an approach to organised fund-raising, and in the strategy towards publicity.1030  
In taking this approach, the YAA’s officials showed an understanding and embrace of the 
increasing consumerist culture and politics of ‘affluence’ that NGOs and political parties 
alike had been coming to terms with in the 1960s and 1970s.1031 The appointment of an 
‘Administrator’ rather than a ‘Director’ was not only symbol of this; explicit within the job 
specification was the requirement for ‘proved administrative ability or business acumen’. 
Dawson’s comprehensive memorandum, ‘Publicising the Arts’, began: 
During the last 50 years enormous strides have been made in the promotion of 
consumer goods, and today there can be very few manufacturers that do not rely 
on professional advertising to sell their products. Agencies now use extremely 
sophisticated techniques to market commodities of even the most trivial nature 
and it is against competition of this sort that the arts have suffered.1032 
 
The range of measures put forward by Dawson included the potential use of a dedicated 
design studio, a Marketing and Public Relations Officer, and local campaigns to stimulate 
potential audiences for artistic activities. A fundraising drive aimed at raising £60,000 
from the private sector annually by 1978/79 was central to efforts to grow the overall 
budget and influence of the YAA.1033 Again, this systematic pursuit was in stark contrast 
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to that of the LAA, where the members of the Communications Panel bemoaned a lack of 
visibility without a strategy to combat this problem. 
However, the professional, modernist impulses of the YAA do not necessarily speak to 
the success of the Association as a regional institution, or to a thriving public patronage 
for the arts. The commercial approach taken by Dawson was largely dictated by the 
strictures of the local authorities, whose aversion to spending on what was perceived as 
a sectional interest is noted above. The subscriptions received from the major authorities 
were miserly in comparison to those paid elsewhere; in 1972/73, the subscription 
contributions of Leeds and Sheffield to the LAA totalled £2,264 and £2,367 respectively, 
as part of an overall £20,092 contribution for all local authorities.1034 This compared to 
the £3,000 contribution made by Grimsby CBC to the LAA in the same year.1035 The YAA 
initially only had three paid members including Dawson and a secretary, and both the 
Association and the ACGB came up against local authority obstinacy over their 
commitment to professional artists. The region’s repertory theatres were particularly 
starved of funds in light of the economic squeeze, which the authorities claimed as 
reason for their reluctance to offer support; the YAA became a convenient scapegoat in 
such matters. One such example was the WRCC’s refusal in mid-1970 to provide 
financial assistance to the Harrogate Theatre ‘on the grounds that the County Council 
makes a contribution annually to the Yorkshire Association’.1036 
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5.4 Humberside and the Regional Arts Associations, 1972-
1976 
 
I 
The autonomy afforded to regional actors to set up their own structures and policies for 
establishing RAAs meant that by the early 1970s, the Standard Planning Region for 
Yorkshire and Humberside was served by two arts associations with significantly different 
approaches, expertise, and ideological and cultural underpinnings. A highly centralized 
body had emerged in Lincolnshire over a number of years, with an active role in 
promoting a distinct, particular brand of pastoral and conservationist regional culture. Its 
Yorkshire counterpart, covering a much more diverse area, was less of a promoting body 
in itself, more progressive in the type of artistic output it was willing to support, and – 
although by no means only a clearing house for funds – a decentralized body, employing 
a more technical support approach to the arts. Both had distinctly different partnerships 
with their local authorities, with the LAA much more dependent on its constituent 
authorities. For a population of 800,000 across the County, the Lincolnshire authorities 
in 1972/73 contributed £21,250 of a total budget of £60,000 to the LAA. This 
contrasted with only £20,450 in local government contributions towards the YAA’s 
budget of £106,000 for the same year.1037 But this integral relationship between the 
RAAs and the local authorities inevitably necessitated a re-evaluation of their boundaries 
following proposals to reform local government in England. The impending creation of 
Humberside after the Local Government Act of 1972 brought about a county council split 
between the two regions. 
                                                            
1037 YHEPC, Yorkshire and Humberside Environmental Progress Report, 1966-1973, 52. 
  329 
The implications of local government reorganisation were of concern for the LAA since 
the publication of the Redcliffe-Maud White Paper in 1969. Proposals to bring about the 
formal institution of provincial councils, with Lincolnshire being divided across three 
different provinces, prompted an impassioned and robust statement by the Association, 
emphasising many of the core features of the Association: 
These proposals seem to ignore the fact that Lincolnshire possesses a long and 
strong historical tradition of being one county… The Lincolnshire tradition may well 
be strong enough to live on, however much the map may be changed by central 
government, but nevertheless it can only live on in a weakened condition. The 
Association believes that the retention of Lincolnshire as one county with one 
heritage is a worthwhile aim for which to put up a vigorous fight.1038 
 
As Chief Regional Officer for the ACGB, Patrick Abercrombie was quick to quell these 
fears, remarking to the LAA that ‘…he felt sure that it would be necessary to organise 
[provincial arts administration] on the basis of the status quo’.1039 It was clear however 
that if the proposals were to lead to any upheaval, Elwes and others in the LAA’s 
hierarchy wished the expand its boundaries to take in areas similar to the region as 
currently conceived, both geographically and culturally. His preferred course of action 
was to open discussions with Fenland and Huntingdonshire to the south of the 
region.1040 
Prior to the eventual local government reorganization from November 1971 (see Chapter 
3), the Corporation in Hull had a rather complex relationship with the arts. In his 1967 
book North Country, Graham Turner had been particularly damning about the city, 
claiming that in stark contrast to Liverpool, ‘culturally, Hull does seem to be something of 
a dead end. The intellectuals certainly complain that they are asked to exist on very thin 
                                                            
1038 ACGB 111/10 ‘The Lincolnshire Association: Draft Statement on Report of Royal Commission 
on Local Government in England’, 11 March 1976. 
1039 ACGB 111/10/1 Executive Committee Minutes, 14 August 1969. 
1040 ACGB 111/10/2 Coordinating Committee Minutes, 6 May 1970. 
  330 
gruel’.1041 Some thirty amateur societies were also engaged in various forms of music, 
and literary and film clubs. Shortly after the publication of the report, professional artistic 
life was increasingly bolstered. When completed in 1970, Hull Arts Centre played host to 
Alan Plater and Barry Hanson, the future script editor for BBC English Regions Drama.1042 
Hull Truck Theatre, formed from humble beginnings in 1971, would later rise to national 
prominence under the artistic direction of John Godber.1043 
The rather uneven pattern of artistic provision within the city was matched by the rather 
reticent attitude toward public patronage by the Corporation, an attitude that was subject 
to political tensions. Despite several people affiliated with the city being integral in the 
establishing the YAA – and despite the Labour Group voting to join – a change in control 
saw the Conservative-led City Council choose to defer joining the Association on financial 
grounds.1044 The council was also reluctant to contribute to the capital costs of the Hull 
Arts Centre, despite £10,000 bring raised privately and £5,000 given in grant by the 
ACGB. The lack of local cooperation (despite national support) drew the ire of the ACGB, 
who pleaded that ‘the centre will not only be a most valuable institution for Hull and the 
neighbourhood but a milestone in the development of theatre and the arts in Yorkshire, 
with important repercussions in the rest of the country’. In the end, the ‘the princely sum 
of £250’ was donated by the Corporation to the establishing of the Arts Centre,1045 and it 
was not until mid-1970 that they joined the YAA. 
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II 
The LAA had strongly resisted suggestions about broadening their size and scope. When 
it became clear in November 1971 that Humberside would become a political reality, the 
Association immediately sought assurances from the Arts Minister that no changes of the 
size of the LAA would result, making its operations now in a ‘mini-Lincolnshire’ seemingly 
unviable.1046 Both the Minister and the ACGB were quick to assure both Clive Fox and 
John Dudding that administrative changes would not dictate changes to the regional 
structure. Nigel Abercrombie was clear that he did not think the changes would cause 
immediate problems, noting 
I do not see how the new county can have any real corporate individuality until the 
Humber Bridge is built, and during the interim period I fail to see any reason why 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire should not contrive to divide Humberside into two 
parts…1047  
 
With these promises, and both RAAs keen to maintain their existing arrangements and 
infrastructure, the issue brought discussion but little investment of time into possible 
changes. In 1973, when the issue of how the new administrative county would fund two 
separate associations was raised, the LAA agreed with Neil Duncan (by then ACGB 
Regional Development Director) that ‘in the short term, a formula acceptable to both 
Associations should be worked out… with regard to their financial and operational 
differences, and different stages of development’.1048 In response to this, both RAAs 
prepared a joint statement released to the press in May, emphasising both their 
commitment to the existing structure, and that this would not be detrimental to provision 
in Humberside: 
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The Lincolnshire Association and Yorkshire Arts Association are agreed that in the 
short term, and until the Humber Bridge is completed, the two Associations should 
continue to service [Humberside] on the basis of existing boundaries, with close 
contact and co-operation to ensure the best possible provision for the people of 
Humberside. Both Associations are also agreed that when the Humber Bridge is 
built, the situation should be reassessed.1049 
 
The only immediate change made by either association was a name change. In the 
Chairman’s message in his association’s annual report, John Dudding noted that there 
was ‘no doubt that much of our strength has been derived from the fact that the area 
which we serve is one geographic county with common ideas and traditions’, but 
acknowledged that ultimately – as a body in close cooperation with local government – 
the change in status must be recognised: 
The Council has therefore recommended that the name of the Association, in full 
shall be: The Lincolnshire and South Humberside Association for the Arts and 
Heritage. This is a bit of mouthful, and in practice the shortened form will be used: 
LINCOLNSHIRE & SOUTH HUMBERSIDE ARTS.1050 
 
Though it looked like this issue had been resolved, when the new Humberside County 
Council came into existence in 1974 it was immediately apparent this was not the case. 
The potential crisis did not emerge from any major issues with the content of the cultural 
and artistic support of either association; it was a political and financial issue. When 
negotiations were opened to determine the relative size of Humberside’s contribution to 
each RAA, the £10,200 set aside by the county’s leisure committee (intended as £7,500 
to the LAA, and £2,700 to the YAA respectively) was well below the estimates of both 
bodies (the LAA due to their funding structure were also demanding an additional £6,000 
from the District Councils). Ultimately £3,240 in additional funding was found for the 
YAA, but Clive Fox informed the ACGB ‘through unofficial lines of communication’ that 
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this was not an arrangement Humberside were prepared to continue beyond the 
financial year. The matter was set to be resolved in October 1974.1051 This turn of events 
was an alarming one for the ACGB, with Neil Duncan adamant that the ‘danger’ of 
Humberside ‘trying to go it alone… should be avoided at all costs’.1052 
This concern appears to have distinctly influenced the guidance of the regional officials 
of the ACGB. In contrast to a previous policy of remaining remote in regional matters, 
Duncan wrote a detailed summary of the Arts Council’s views to Humberside. The two 
alternatives advocated were either that ‘Humberside County should join with Lincolnshire 
in an expanded Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts Association’, or ‘the present division 
should remain for the time being’. Other alternatives such as joining the YAA in toto, or 
becoming an ‘Areas Arts Association’ affiliated to either RAA, were actively 
discouraged.1053 This pressure for a rapid resolution from the centre was likely 
influenced by the need to maintain the support of larger local authorities, as across the 
country arts contributions were decreasing as shares of the RAAs’ budgets. 
The move by Humberside towards the LAA had important consequences in light of the 
Association’s core foundational conception of a particularly strong historical identity and 
tradition within the county. It appeared that the LAA itself was rather unconscious of the 
potential changes. The centrality of political concerns to the thinking of the Humberside 
officials was demonstrated by Chris Cooper of ACGB, who wrote to Neil Duncan on the 
decisive meeting: 
The move towards Lincolnshire was being put with considerable emphasis without 
my contribution so I found it embarrassing, but found it politically right to continue 
to “sit on the fence”. YAA attracted a great deal of criticism and LAA were regarded 
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with [sic], although I suspected Humberside intend to dominate them, not just join 
it. The realities of this had not, I felt, been appreciated by Clive Fox. For instance, 
there was talk of a majority of Humberside Councillors on L&SHA and moving 
offices to Grimsby or Scunthorpe. They threw me out before they made a final 
decision but I hoped they might ask LAA for more exact details as to what changes 
LAA would make before commitment was fully made.1054 
 
In December 1974, the county council’s decision that it would join the LAA as a whole 
was greeted by the ACGB as most welcome news.1055 But this was not the successful 
resolution they had hoped for. Not only had the YAA protested the speed with which 
Humberside County Council had acted, but the decision reached was sharply at odds 
with its most important district councils, most notably Hull. Angered by a complete lack of 
consultation, the officials in Hull were determined they should remain in Yorkshire, due 
to not only an excellent record of past assistance, but ‘also a feeling of shared identity 
with other parts of the region which is unlikely to be engendered in the proposed 
Humberside/Lincolnshire link-up and there appears to be no justification for this to be 
disturbed’.1056 Rather than being the straightforward transfer the ACGB wished, in early 
1975 three district councils (Hull, Beverley and North Wold) stood in defiance of 
Humberside County Council in seeking to maintain their affiliation with the YAA, who 
backed their claim.1057 Confronted with such a dilemma, Duncan wrote to the ACGB 
Secretary-General asking simply, ‘where do we go from here?’: 
In the past the Arts Council has always taken the line that determination of regional 
arts association boundaries is a matter to be decided by the appropriate local 
authorities and regional arts associations. However, we have never before had a 
situation where the local authorities in the same area are determined to contribute 
to different regional arts associations.1058 
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Attempts to bring the different authorities together, as well as the various arts 
organisations supported by the RAAs, were unsuccessful. With the threat of the 
withdrawal of the County Council’s financial support for the arts, it was eventually agreed 
that their decision would be upheld. In forming the new Lincolnshire and Humberside 
Arts (LHA) in April 1975, the constitutional arrangements as initially drafted provided an 
equal balance between Humberside and Lincolnshire county councils, each having four 
members and one member on the Council and Management Committee respectively.1059 
However, it was ultimately agreed that an additional member should be appointed to the 
Management Committee from Humberside.1060 
The decision by Humberside to join the LAA was considered highly detrimental to the arts 
in the sub-region, as evidenced by the response of the Yorkshire body. A request by Hull’s 
District Council to remain an affiliate member was reluctantly denied by the YAA’s 
finance committee on the technical grounds that it would be ‘improper’. The minutes of 
the Executive Committee recorded that 
Several of the members of the Executive regretted the consequences of this 
decision which would effectively sever our connection with the North Humberside 
area, but it was generally agreed “that in the circumstances” nothing more could be 
done.1061 
 
The YAA, given the resources at its disposal, deemed it necessary to make the break 
absolute, sending letters to all the organisations it had supported in North Humberside 
that future requests would need to be run through the enlarged Lincolnshire Arts.1062 
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III 
The divergent approach of the two RAAs persisted beyond this change in boundaries. The 
upheaval within the LHA meant that its process of expansion, and the ruptures and 
animosities this laid bare, had significant consequences for its forward development. 
Even with the addition of North Humberside to Lincolnshire, the LHA was still the 
smallest of any RAA by population, catering for some 1,350,000 people.1063 The 
animosity between the LHA and Hull City Council, following their frustrated attempt to 
remain in the YAA, was immediately palpable. In June 1975, the authority forced the 
cancellation of a reception planned with Yorkshire TV as they were not willing to hire the 
Guildhall to the Association, and it was noted that no city council members would attend 
a reception held elsewhere.1064 The LHA remained as centralised and prescriptive in its 
practices as it had been from its institution, though its committee structure was 
streamlined in 1974.1065 It concentrated its efforts primarily on the direct promotion of 
professional activities, such as touring activities and cultural events centred on Lincoln. A 
degree of the initial energy and impetus fuelled by the Museum for Lincolnshire Life was 
removed when the endeavour was passed over to the new Lincolnshire County Council 
as part of its statutory museum service. The venture was finally admitted to have 
outgrown the LAA’s financial resources. What had been the panel with the largest budget 
in the LAA was by 1975/76 only allocated an estimated spend of £5,000 in a budget of 
£165,500.1066  
Other ventures had breathed new life into the conservationist and heritage activities of 
the Association, and this cultural output was implicitly imbued with these notions of 
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regional culture. This was most notably the case with the Matthew Flinders Festival 
celebrating the bi-centenary of ‘the man who named Australia’. The Festival included – 
amongst other things – a biography of Flinders published by the Association; exhibitions 
on Flinders and of Australian artists, including one for the Art Mobile; a specially 
commissioned ballet toured through Lincolnshire by Northern Dance Theatre; and music 
events including a performance by the Sydney Symphony Orchestra. Though the 
Lincolnshire Association had handed over control of the museum, its focus was instead 
shifted to the living arts, as a Regional Crafts Centre was opened in September 1974 
close to the Lincoln Cathedral. Fellowships in glassmaking, weaving and bookbinding had 
been established to support this venture, and in addition to selling their wares the LHA 
used the premises to promote their own books and records.1067 
Clive Fox as Director remained ebullient about the utility of this continued approach, 
remarking of the Association’s policy in the evidence supplied to the Redcliffe-Maud 
Enquiry into the Arts that: 
the academic objection to this promotional policy by the theoreticians outside the 
region used to be that it would stifle local initiative and lead to undesirable 
bureaucratic decisions on the selection of events people could receive. Over ten 
years of practice, there has been no evidence to support this objection. 
 
This attitude was a telling one. Given the tensions with the North Humberside authorities 
and organisations, the approach taken to arts administration by the LHA was remarkably 
un-conciliatory. Rather than seeking to learn from the best practice that had already 
been developed in their sub-region by cultural producers on the north bank, the LHA 
sought quickly to transplant its own regional culture wholesale onto the new region. The 
Arts Development Officer and the Director quickly moved to try and find suitable 
premises in either Beverley or Hull to establish a Craft Centre in North Humberside; it 
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also moved to establish local liaison committees in a similar form to those already in 
place in Lincolnshire; and a second mobile exhibition was quickly commissioned to serve 
the wider area. Very little, if any, consultation appears to have taken place about either 
the forms of cultural production or changes in regional cultural administration that 
should take place in light of the restructuring. 
In contrast to the structure operated by the LHA, in the mid-1970s the YAA continued to 
develop along the lines established in its first four years of operation. With its emphasis 
primarily on support, rather than on direct promotion of artistic output, the YAA 
increasingly sought to fight pressures to change their model. This stirred up particular 
tensions between the centre and the regional organisation. Lord Feversham, who in 
1974 was chairman of the RAA’s Standing Conference, was particularly vocal about not 
being treated as a colleague by the ACGB, more ‘that one is some kind of orange three-
headed Martian with antennae sprouting from the forehead who has just landed by flying 
saucer in Green Park’.1068 Against these frustrations and the perceived elitism of the 
ACGB, the YAA began to try and assert its credentials to both regional and national 
stakeholders. The YAA’s Drama Panel would draw the ire of the ACGB Drama Director 
over the suggestion that elected representatives should form part of the Arts Council’s 
panel structure, who robustly responded that  
none of the people at that meeting has ever served on the [ACGB] Drama Panel, so 
cannot know either its strength or indeed its weaknesses, and seem unaware of 
the pros and cons of the non-representative system… I would never expect the Arts 
Council’s Drama Panel to discuss the composition of a RAA’s Panel or the way in 
which it was appointed.1069 
 
Indeed, the YAA would claim itself to be more democratic not only through its local 
authority representation, but also through the local forms of art it supported. 
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Organisations such as the Leeds Arts Forums became places of ‘high… lively and 
sometimes very emotional’ debates about ‘”fine arts” and “community arts”’.1070 
The major metropolitan areas’s low subscription rates to the YAA was generally a point of 
contention for the ACGB. The local authorities however sought to defend themselves 
against any claim of impropriety, deeming comparisons to other RAA areas unjust. The 
unofficial rule employed by the ACGB towards the RAAs had been to roughly match the 
subscriptions of the authorities once an association had shown its viability. In the 1970s, 
the proportion of the RAAs’ budgets that was made up of the ACGB’s contribution 
increased as local authorities fought with their own severe economic problems. Even by 
these standards, though, Neil Duncan complained in October 1974 that the ACGB grant 
to YAA of £97,467 was only supported by £22,990 from the local authorities, and that 
budgeting 20% of the Association’s income from local government moving forward was 
‘not satisfactory in the context of the theoretically equal partnership’.1071 In late 1976 
the ACGB again expressed ‘grave concern’ to the YAA in a letter from the Finance 
Director. It was noted that £117,000 was contributed to Northern Arts from Tyne and 
Wear County Council, in addition to a further £55,742 from the district authorities in 
1975/76. With members of the YAA taking exception to this criticism, in response the 
Yorkshire authorities produced figures showing that the direct spend from local 
authorities for the forthcoming financial year would amount to around £4 million.1072 The 
structures employed by the YAA meant that, more than any other RAA, they were able to 
open up private sources of finance ‘…because the work of the Association is rooted firmly 
in the local needs it can appeal to local pride and enterprise, attracting industrial and 
commercial support that it would be inappropriate for a government or local government 
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agency to seek’.1073 Privately, the ACGB hierarchy had to acknowledge that the ‘YAA are 
certainly the most alive of all the Associations as far as fund raising is concerned at the 
moment’.1074 Though the metropolitan counties, especially in West Yorkshire, had their 
disagreements with YAA over its work and the financial commitment it sought, all major 
authorities continued to subscribe and be actively involved in its running. 
As a regional body, the YAA continued its initial motivations, seeking to commodify 
culture and bring in support from private means as much as possible. In 1974, the 
Yorkshire and Humberside Development Association acknowledged that art and other 
cultural forms were integral to broader economic and social aims by offering membership 
to the Association. Looking to expand their resources in this period, the Association also 
looked into the potentialities of creating its own commercial radio programmes as 
‘saleable commodities’.1075 Richard Phillips, as the YAA’s Music Officer, demonstrated a 
keen sense of the promotional and commercial potentialities of the region’s endeavour; 
when businessmen in the York area showed interest in promoting a stringed instrument 
competition in early 1976, his suggestion instead was that they hold ‘a great jamboree of 
mediaeval and baroque music geared for the tourist industry to use York and district’s 
outstanding architectural heritage with some masterclasses and concerts using top 
international string players’.1076 The Association continued to support research in 
potential audiences and feasibility studies for various types of projects, including using 
students from Trinity and All Saints College of Education in Leeds to conduct a survey of 
the readership of the YAA’s monthly magazine The Month in Yorkshire. 
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In this vein, the YAA also continued its established trend of diversifying and expanding 
the breadth of artistic endeavours it supported. A ‘Film and Television Panel’ was added 
to the existing panel structure in March 1973, with ambitious plans, including a script-
writing fellowship backed by Yorkshire Television (YTV).1077 Though (unlike the LAA) not 
having heritage projects at its core, the Association employed an architectural research 
worker – describing herself obdurately in The Times as ‘not a preservationist’ – on a two 
year project to catalogue and draw public attention to industrial buildings.1078 The 
experimental art fund continued to be a feature of the YAA’s provision, and it remained at 
this time the only RAA to make available such funds. 
In attempting to assert some independence from the ACGB, pursuing experimental forms 
and an active policy of dispersing funds to local and community groups, the YAA does not 
appear to have been the subject of the same tensions as existed with other northern 
RAAs. Northern Arts as a body concentrated on its ‘safe havens’ of culture, such as the 
Northern Sinfonia and its literary magazine Stand.1079 The YAA of the mid-1970s, though 
smaller as a region, had fostered an inclusive, diverse range of interests and activities. 
The Association not only sought to promote local initiatives and support the work of the 
local authorities, but also – for the most part – continued to cultivate a professional and 
commercially minded approach; both for artists and arts organisations within the region. 
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5.5 Changing Regional Arts Policy, 1976-1994 
I 
From the late 1970s onwards, significant changes took place in both national and 
regional arts administration, and in the priorities and attitudes adopted towards public 
cultural policy. These developments firstly emerged from what Hewison called the 
‘devolutionary spirit’ of the late 1970s.1080 They were also part of a move to greater 
democratise access to artistic funds, and to create greater accountability from arts 
bodies and artists themselves. What is apparent however is that policy trends from the 
centre towards greater devolution to the regions paradoxically lessened the scope for 
cultural autonomy for the RAAs, whose activities were not in line with these national 
trends. Clive Gray has argued that despite the implied support for much of 
decentralisation, the processes concerning the relationship between the ACGB and the 
RAAs since the late 1970s instead brought an increasing integration into central 
control.1081 In examining the two RAAs covered by this chapter, this process had different 
implications for the different associations, rather than being uniform in its effects. The 
new geographical boundaries of the Lincolnshire Association, with the addition of North 
Humberside, also brought with them issues related to functional compatibility and 
administration. 
In the 1980s, Thatcherism brought an increasing drive by central government for 
instilling an ‘enterprise culture’ in the arts, as was consistent with the broader libertarian 
critique of the post-war British state and civil society. Despite a supposed substantial 
increase in funding for the arts and museums during the 1980s, Hewison has argued the 
decade saw only a one per cent increase in the Arts Council’s budget in real terms, 
                                                            
1080 Hewison, Culture and Consensus, 174. 
1081 Clive Gray, The Politics of the Arts in Great Britain (Basingstoke, 2000), 135-139. 
  343 
including a cut of £1 million in 1980 that saw the Council withdraw all funding from forty-
one nationally supported companies.1082 Alongside these cuts, The Glory of the Garden 
(1984) report saw responsibility for regional theatre devolved to the RAAs; precipitating 
almost ‘perpetual crisis’ due to the ‘tightening grip of market forces’.1083 As with other 
areas of the public sector, the RAAs were increasingly subject to accountability 
procedures in this period, with the requirement to show value for money due to a 
backlash from professionals in private and commercial enterprises.1084 The Association 
of Business Sponsorship for the Arts was founded in 1976, and central policy from the 
late 1970s was increasingly oriented towards greater private patronage in the arts.1085 
Similar to this formalising processes brought about by political changes in this period, 
artistic output itself was subject to increased commercial pressures. In artistic terms, 
increasing globalisation resulting from increased ease of communication served to make 
art less bound by place, more ‘deconstructed’ and universal.1086 In television, Cooke 
argues that by 1981-82 the ‘golden age’ of English regional drama had been eclipsed a 
shift towards a ‘global broadcasting culture’, with the commercial stations especially 
producing more content with overseas markets in mind.1087 Both trends served to make 
art more global, and less place dependent. Though Snell has argued that the 1970s and 
1980s saw a significantly expanded output of what could be considered British ‘regional 
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novels’, he notes the predominantly ‘urban’ nature of this work, and a growing 
concentration on London.1088  
 
II 
 
The LAA’s founding principles, deeply rooted in the cultivation of a particular formal and 
pastoral identity, had already been tested in the early 1970s. The changes to the 
boundary of the Association in 1975, and with it the creation of the LHA, were not the 
only challenges to its particular identity. The broadly prescriptive, moral and elitist 
tendencies of the LHA sat problematically with the economic and social changes of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. These changes brought new strong social movements, 
which Walker argues the more radical strands of artistic production sought to both 
promote and critique.1089 But though the 1970s have been argued to represent ‘a 
marketplace for ideas’ amidst a constant sense of crisis, the LHA maintained the 
involvement of many of the same members from its earliest years until the RAA’s 
dissolution in 1991, with Clive Fox remaining the Director throughout, and past chairmen 
such as Ian Fraser, Clixby Fitzwilliam, Jeremy Elwes and Sir John Dudding remaining on 
the management committee. 
At the national level, a desire to more clearly define the ambiguous relationships of the 
RAAs grew in earnest in 1976, with the publication of Lord Redcliffe-Maud’s report 
Support for the Arts in England and Wales. The main findings and recommendations 
were that the primary providers of arts should be local authorities, with a diminished role 
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for the RAAs.1090 Though praising the moves towards greater devolution from the ACGB 
to the regional level, the report was critical of the ‘conservative’ nature of some of the 
RAAs, and their lack of ‘high calibre’ staff.1091 The central principle underpinning Support 
for the Arts’ reasoning was the requirement for art institutions, such as ACGB and RAA, to 
operate at ‘arm’s length’ to provide artists with creative freedom.1092 Such 
recommendations were particularly at odds with the LHA model, where ‘most energy’ was 
spent on direct promotion, with only ‘a minor part of their budgets [given] as grants to 
others to do such work’.1093  
In addition to growing issues related to national political and cultural change, the 
broadening of the LAA’s boundaries to include Humberside created organisational 
problems that proved difficult to solve, and would combine with these other concerns to 
play a significant role in the restructuring of the administrative machinery of the LHA. The 
implied desire of Humberside County Council to gain control over the Association played 
out in a number of ways almost immediately after the amalgamation. As early as January 
1976, the Association received a letter from Humberside intimating that the county 
represented something of an ‘afterthought’ in their creation of a ‘Lincoln’ Theatre 
Company.1094 The LHA’s efforts to bring about liaison committees, later referred to as 
Area Arts Associations, were generally unsuccessful in North Humberside. In July 1980, 
of the twelve affiliated local organisations, only two were located in the newer areas of 
Association (South Holderness and Goole) and neither was in the major centres.1095  
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This rather tense relationship would simmer over the early 1980s, and bring about 
radical and profound change to the institutional framework of the LHA, if not necessarily 
to its personnel. With Humberside County Council becoming Labour controlled in 1981, 
the Leisure Services Department opted to withdraw the grant to the Association in full. 
Though the County Council’s stance was a combative one, the response of the LHA and 
its Director was equally so. Clive Fox was blunt in informing the ACGB’s Regional Director 
David Pratley that ‘this latest fit of Welsh pique is sad, but largely irrelevant’, and was 
also rather pointed in referring to Humberside’s Labour majority as ‘their Party’.1096 Much 
to the consternation of the ACGB, the LHA were more than prepared to treat these 
ruptures as an irritating distraction, reducing Humberside’s representation on the 
Council and suspending its representatives from the management committee.1097 The 
ACGB was forced to act on what it saw as a ‘profoundly worrying’ course of events, with 
Pratley making clear to the Chairman that ‘…the Arts Council would simply not be 
prepared to fund an RAA which was willing to pursue such an isolationist role from its 
local authorities’, and demanding a resolution.1098 
Ultimately, what ensured that the LHA was able to retain the support of Humberside were 
the constitutional changes introduced in 1982.1099 The increasing incompatibility of the 
association’s structure and activities within the context of shifting national focus and 
constrained public finances for cultural pursuits had seen a forced change in policy. In 
1979 the LHA introduced annual block grants to the region’s arts centres and area 
committees. With the need for a significant reduction in the RAA’s budget in the early 
1980s, the LHA handed the exhibition, gallery and craft services it ran to both 
‘independent agencies’ and the local authorities as part of a transition ‘…from a 
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promoting role to one of funding backed up by advisory, marketing and information 
services’.1100 The panel structure was also altered from being committee-based to ‘a 
system of Consultants’ – whereby these specialists would discuss all areas of arts policy 
– justified as a means of improving ‘productivity, quality and depth of advice’ to 
supported bodies.1101 Very quickly, the language of the LHA’s work, and the focus on 
financial concerns, became more aligned with national discourse. In September 1982 
the Assistant Director emphasised the need for both greater marketing and an increase 
in the professionalism of local arts provision as a means to expand capacity: 
It is [LHA’s] policy to encourage and support the development of the arts either by 
helping suitable organisations to appoint professional staff, or by helping the local 
authorities to strengthen their own establishment. Experience has shown that local 
commitment in either of these ways can release considerable additional funds for 
arts activity…1102   
 
III 
A key feature of the Lincolnshire Arts Association had been the ‘regionality’ of its artistic 
content, and how a distinct regional identity had been aligned with a particular 
conservative strain of artistic culture. Broader national policy changes would continue to 
have an effect on the work of the LHA, most notably the increasing interest in heritage 
and conservation. Though springing from a decade’s preparation, the European 
Architectural Heritage Year in 1975 saw a significant upswing in the funds allocated at a 
national level to heritage projects, but also a broadening of the definition of what was 
encompassed by heritage.1103 The supposed ‘heritage panic’ of the late-1970s and 
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1980s was driven, Mandler argues, not only by aristocratic concerns over the nation’s 
stately homes but a broader ‘crisis of confidence’ brought about by the economic and 
political instability of the time. The greatest increase in the membership of conservation 
organisations like the National Trust came at this time in the 1970s, and these lobbies 
drastically increased the professionalization of their operations.1104 As heritage activities 
became an increasingly mainstream concern, and as the greater devolution of funding 
continued, the importance placed by the LHA on this particular sphere of action 
continued to dwindle. Though continuing to run fellowships subjects such as church art 
research, and support small conservation activities such as the erection of road signs in 
the village of Donington to commemorate the birthplace of Matthew Flinders, the LHA’s 
expenditure on heritage represented barely two per cent of the Association’s overall 
budget by the late 1970s.1105  
The reorganisation of the Association’s structure saw it decide in 1981 that ‘pure’ 
heritage should no longer be pursued by a regional arts association.1106 The same 
process saw the LHA relinquish the sites through which it could promote its own heritage 
activities, such as the Regional Craft Centre in Lincoln. By 1983, the annual report noted 
that with only seven small grants given by the LHA, and after the completion of a 
fellowship in clock restoration, ‘heritage activities’ would no longer be treated 
separately.1107 The panel ceased to exist, and the direct provision of craft fellowships 
                                                            
1104 Mandler, ‘The heritage panic’, 62-63; Hilton et al., Politics of Expertise, 112. 
1105 ACGB 103/211 Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts Fourteenth Annual Report 1978-79 
(1979), 21. 
1106 ACGB 103/211 Management Committee Minutes, 5 October 1981. 
1107 Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts Eighteenth Annual Report 1982/3 (1983), 11. 
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was by September 1986 described as a feature of the Association’s work from ‘the now 
distant past’.1108 
A clearly defined sense of a regional culture, rooted in the rural landscape, had been at 
the heart of the LAA’s identity since its inception. The erosion of this sense of place was 
by no means a process that was complete: the LHA’s two mobile exhibition vehicles and 
the subsidy offered for transport to events continued, but were relatively diminished as 
elements of the Association’s work. The perceptible cultural tensions introduced by the 
inclusion of the urban setting of Hull into the LHA’s work was demonstrated in a written 
collection – mostly verse – entitled Look North: A Collection of writing from and about 
North Humberside, published by the Association in 1978. The collection was in many 
aspects synonymous with the Association’s work up until that point, most notably in the 
invocation of a strong heritage for the area; including extracts describing parts of the 
East Riding and Beverley from Michael Drayton, John Taylor, Andrew Marvell, Daniel 
Defoe and Anthony Trollope amongst others. More contemporary contributions evoked 
market towns, agriculture, dykes and fenland, images common to the identity fostered by 
the founders of the LAA. However, the need to provide geographical authenticity to this 
collection meant the inclusion of poems inspired by Hull or by Hull based writers. Against 
the pastoral images of ‘the speckling of the grass by wind/The waterlights of leaves, an 
old grey horse’1109 were juxtaposed the social realities of ‘Tattoo-shops, consulates, grim 
head-scarfed wives’;1110 ‘The city of disuse, a sink, a place’;1111 and a poem explicit in its 
location and imagery: 
                                                            
1108 The Regional Development Plan for the Arts in Lincolnshire and Humberside (1987), 
Appendix III. Quoted from a note of meeting between the LHA and the Crafts Council, 1 
September 1987. 
1109 Taken from C.J. Driver, ‘Fenland’, in Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts, Look North: A 
Collection of writing from and about North Humberside (Lincoln, 1978), 26. 
1110 Taken from Philip Larkin, ‘Here’, in Look North, 25. 
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‘This is an ugly town,         
  Perched on the land uneasily,      
   Spewed up from the muddy estuary,    
    Festooned by cobweb cranes’.1112 
 
The introduction of aspects of more urban, ‘northern’ realities, though perhaps as argued 
by Sean O’Brien a more idiosyncratic inspiration in Hull,1113 meshed uneasily with the 
imagery and the sensibilities the LHA had been founded on. The opening up of the 
Association to artists linked to Hull University and broader cultural perspectives had 
immediate effects on an Association that had long sought to be indigenous in its 
production. For example, Proof – the LHA’s new writer’s magazine – was transferred to 
Norman Jackson of Hull in 1977, ‘thus giving the Northern part of the region its say in the 
shaping of future issues of the magazine’.1114 As editor, Jackson would broaden the 
guest contributions to writers such as Saul Bellow, introducing more cosmopolitan 
cultural sensibilities.1115 Also tellingly, besides Bellow and one other guest contributor, 
Ted Hughes, only one contributor was not from Hull and the surrounding area in the 
1978 issue.1116 
The national trends and economic realities that led the LHA away from its promoting 
activities would also see a gradual reduction in cultural activity with a particular regional 
focus, and a move towards a more globalised artistic output with less sense of place. 
Exhibitions such as ‘Toil – An exhibition of labour on the land’, prepared for the art 
mobile in 1977, gradually ceased to be organised. A progressive change of emphasis 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1111 Taken from Douglas Dunn, ‘Sunday Morning Among the Houses of Terry Street’, in Look 
North, 39. 
1112 Taken from Vera Wyse, ‘Hull’, in Look North, 32. It is worth noting in a collection of poems 
and prose relating to ‘North Humberside’, ‘Humberside’ is only referred to once, Cathie Harman’s 
‘Autumn on Humberside’ and in terms not particularly endearing. 
1113 O’Brien, ‘The Unknown City’, 146. 
1114 Proof: A Magazine of New Writing, No. 9 (1977), quoted from editorial by retiring editor Gerry 
Wells. 
1115 Proof: A Magazine of New Writing, No. 12. (1978). 
1116 Ibid. 
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was even evident in the publications of the Association. The annual reports of the early 
years of the LAA had included images of items from the Museum of Lincolnshire Life, 
alongside photographs of the coastal and pastoral landscapes from across Lincolnshire 
(and also the North Wolds following the creation of the LHA). By the mid-1980s, the 
images featured in the annual reports – with some occasional exceptions – made no 
reference to the geography of the region, focusing instead on artists and participants in 
productions, including more modern elements than previously, such as electronic 
musicians. The loss of the complexity of locality in the imagery and activities promoted by 
LHA mirrored in some ways the trends shown in the economic promotional activities of 
the YHDA. In this instance however, it was a marginalization and peripheralization of the 
rural within the regional body in favour of more urban cultural imagery and production 
centred around Hull. 
  
IV 
A further policy change was a general shift in focus from concentration solely on formal, 
professional activities, towards the sphere of ‘community arts’. Though this began to 
come into focus in the 1960s,1117 increased interest in this area of artistic expression 
was in part a product of the economic, social and cultural issues of the 1970s, and in 
many respects was predominantly an urban problem. In 1974 the report Community Arts 
was issued by the ACGB in response to the number of grant applications the Council was 
                                                            
1117 Olivia Turnbull suggested that A Policy for the Arts (1965) had the main agendas of 
‘participation, access and community provision’ despite the tensions this caused with the ACGB’s 
founding principles: Quoted in Ian Brown, ‘“Guarding Against the Guardians”: Cultural Democracy 
and ACGB/RAA Relations in the Glory Years’, in Dorney and Merkin (eds.), The Glory of the 
Garden, 31; John Willet’s study of arts provision in Liverpool, Art in a City (1967), had also argued 
of the need to set art ‘in a new framework: that of a modern community’s interests, plans and 
needs’ despite being largely ignored by the corporation: Bryan Riggs, ‘Radical Art City?’ in 
Belchem and Riggs (eds.), Liverpool, 74-75; also see Wetherell, ‘Painting the Crisis’, 238-240; 
Walker, Left Shift, 40-43. 
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receiving for community based projects, and was given increasing further impetus by 
Naseem Kahn’s The Arts Britain Ignores (1976) which highlighted the lack of funding for 
the artistic and cultural endeavours of ethnic minorities.1118 In 1975 the Community Arts 
Committee was established by the ACGB and, following the devolutionary impetus given 
by the Redcliffe-Maud report, some forty per cent of funding for these activities had been 
devolved to the RAAs.1119 The precise definition of community arts was a point of 
contention, though it broadened the considerations of what should be funded away from 
judgements of artistic standards towards community engagement. Generally leftist in 
perspective, the content of such projects was contentious in being inherently 
political,1120 but also drew criticisms such as being ‘poor art for poor people’; being more 
seen as welfare art or ‘teenagers painting walls’ due to the increasing involvement in the 
late 1970s of the Manpower Services Commission (MSC).1121 
This shift in national focus in the priorities of the ACGB had implications for both of the 
RAAs in Yorkshire and Humberside. As noted previously, the YAA had from its creation 
embraced more experimental and controversial forms of artistic expression. Even in the 
early 1970s it had provided support for projects such as the community theatre group 
Welfare State, and for the early establishment of Hull Truck Theatre. Through its 
particular structure, the Association had already developed the means through which to 
effectively encourage, administer and oversee the proliferation of community projects in 
the 1980s, requiring application forms for grant aid to be submitted that required 
evidence of an organisation’s financial planning and competence, as well as detailed 
                                                            
1118 Walker, Left Shift, 130-136. 
1119 Bart Moore-Gilbert, ‘Introduction: Cultural closure or post-avantgardism?’, in Moore-Gilbert 
(ed.), The Arts in the 1970s, 15; Laing, ‘Politics of culture’, 44. 
1120 Hutchison, Politics of the Arts Council, 52; Hélène Hamayon-Alfaro, ‘Empowerment through 
the Arts: Community Arts in Belfast in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Cécile Coquet-Mokok and Trevor 
A. Le V. Harris (eds.), Crafting Identities, remapping nationalities: the English-speaking world in 
the age of globalization (Newcastle, 2012), 42. 
1121 Walker, Left Shift, 132; Vall, Cultural Region, 112-116. 
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justifications for spending and clear outcomes.1122 A demand for a degree of self-
sufficiency, and the continued distance maintained by YAA in relation to the projects it 
supported, was demonstrated by the Association Director Roger Lancaster’s assertion in 
1987 when discussing if the RAA should become more involved in fund-raising for 
clients: ‘…the only organisations responsible for the survival of projects must been the 
projects themselves, that the association would do what it could do to assist’.1123 
As noted previously, the strength of the YAA in part came from the adoption of a 
metropolitan sensibility. The policies adopted by the Association remained similar to 
practice in the Capital, demonstrated in this support of community arts. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s the GLC and Greater London Arts Association were the most active 
agencies in stimulating community arts engagement.1124 In 1984 the Association 
brought forward the proposal to run open Community Arts Panel meetings to open up 
accessibility and bring about true public engagement; it was noted that ‘the [Greater 
London Arts Association] was the only other RAA holding “open” community arts panel 
meetings’. That the YAA looked to be assertively politically progressive alongside its 
business-minded practices was also reflected in its attempts to provide for ‘ethnic arts’. 
In March 1981, an open meeting was held by the community arts panel, with the 
resolution that an advisory group should be formed with representation from all the 
panels ‘because many of the ethnic arts activities reflected the broader multi-cultural 
nature of our society and were not the sole responsibility of the Community Arts 
Panel’.1125 The acknowledgement of the cultural diversity of the region also reflected a 
                                                            
1122 See, for example, ACGB 103/209/3 ‘Application for Financial Assistance for Community 
Arts’, 1985 version. Questions on the application included: ‘If there is a management group how 
is it made up and what is its relationship to workers and users?’; ‘Does the organisation have a 
separate bank account and treasurer?’; ‘What are you aiming to achieve as a result of this 
activity?’. 
1123 ACGB 103/195 Combined Arts Policy Group Minutes, 18 November 1987. 
1124 Hewison, Culture and Consensus, 238-242; Wetherell, ‘Painting the crisis’, 248. 
1125 ACGB 103/209/1 Community Arts Panel Minutes, 17 March 1981. 
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general drive from the local authorities to embrace multiculturalism in West and South 
Yorkshire. The YAA’s published retrospective highlighted many examples of the support 
given by local government to such endeavours, such as Leeds City Council to the city’s 
West Indian Carnival, or Rotherham’s support to Indian storytelling and writing 
workshops.1126  
In stark contrast to the work in Yorkshire, the highly centralised structure to arts 
provision and conservative attitudes to acceptable forms of artistic promotion exhibited 
by the LHA, despite their protestations to the contrary in the mid-1970s, had a 
significantly detrimental effect on community action. An internal paper in 1982 made 
clear the situation: 
LHA first became involved with community arts activity in 1978. At the time the Arts 
Council of Great Britain had a community arts sub-committee and directly funded 
most of the community arts groups in the country, although it was beginning the 
process of handing this responsibility to the Regional Arts Associations our region 
was unique in having no clients funded by the Arts Council – not that any had been 
turned down, none had applied.1127 
 
In some respects this can be seen as a product of the region’s dispersed population, or 
the broad ideology that had underpinned the LAA’s formation in the 1960s; but it was 
also a product of the particular form regional arts administration had taken in the area. 
The response of the LHA to this problem was emblematic of the Association’s culture; 
Although we were aware of that community arts activity should stem from a 
demand being articulated by a particular community, we felt that this region was in 
a vicious circle [sic]: until the people of the region could see examples of 
community arts in practice, a demand would not arise or at least would be slow in 
coming.1128  
 
                                                            
1126 For example, Ian Charles in Van Riel (ed.), The Arts in Yorkshire, 102; Nita Basu Chaudhuri in 
Ibid., p. 42. 
1127 ACGB 103/211 ‘Community Arts in Lincolnshire and Humberside’, October 1982. 
1128 Ibid. 
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Community arts projects were established with the local authorities in Hull and Spilsby, 
and the LHA offered a fellowship for a community arts worker before employing a 
Community Arts Advisor in 1981.1129 The issue of ‘quality’ with regards to community arts 
was also an issue for the LHA, with the implication that the management advisers of the 
Association had issues with this; quality was discussed ‘at some length’ at a meeting in 
May 1984, with the point acknowledged that ‘one cannot simply apply the standards 
used for other work’.1130  
Despite the work of the Community Arts Advisor to stimulate growth in field, including 
forming a ‘Community Arts Forum’ with its own newsletter trying to promote local arts 
projects, an ACGB representative reported in late 1985 that there was some interest in 
community schemes ‘but no large local groundswell’ and intimated a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for the subject among the advisers.1131 There was, however, some evidence 
of eventual success in this field; the LHA by its final year in 1990 was providing direct 
grant aid of almost £100,000 to five community projects in Hull (Artlink) and Lincolnshire 
(Boston, Stamford, Gainsborough and Lincoln Arts Centres), as part of a total spend on 
community projects of around £250,000, equating to twenty per cent or so of the LHA’s 
annual budget.1132  
In a practical sense as well, the lack of the cultural and ethnic diversity in comparison to 
the older industrial areas that had seen substantial Commonwealth immigration prior to 
the 1971 Immigration Act may have also contributed to spontaneous community arts 
projects being less forthcoming within the Lincolnshire and Humberside. Ready-made 
                                                            
1129 ACGB 103/211 Chris Buckingham ‘General Arts in Lincolnshire and Humberside’ [dated 
1983]. 
1130 ACGB 103/211 File record of consultants’ discussion, ‘General Arts’, 10 May 1984. 
1131 ACGB 103/211 Stote, Report of meeting of Management Committee and Management 
Advisers, 18 November 1985. 
1132 Taken from Lincolnshire & Humberside Arts, The 25th Annual Report, April 1989 – March 
1990 (1990), 23-28. 
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constituencies for community arts already existed in areas of with large ethnic 
communities, whether strong networks had formed from the early 1970s in the face of 
increasing white nationalism.1133 ‘Cultural concern’ for these communities, both from the 
left (as in the case of the GLC),1134 and from the right (following the Brixton and Toxteth 
riots that saw money ‘pour’ into ‘ethnic projects…’),1135 added impetus to activities such 
as community arts and made them national priorities. Difficulties in reconciling these 
national priorities with the regional demographic culture of the area encompassed by the 
LHA again posed problems for the RAA, in comparison to the YAA. 
 
V 
The late 1980s would see the culmination of the changes regional arts administration 
that would see the RAAs reduced in number and renamed RABs. Hewison suggests that 
this period saw the apogee reached of the efforts of central government to recast arts 
producers as ‘cultural industries’, and to demand greater value for money from artists 
and regional associations through policies such as ‘challenge funding’, which made arts 
grants conditional on local authorities matching  ACGB grants.1136 Greater emphasis was 
demanded on the marketing of arts events, and the national model moved towards 
seeking increased sponsorship from commercial interests.1137 On both counts, the YAA  
found itself well equipped to meet these challenges given that these components had 
been features of the association since its establishment. As with the industrial promotion 
                                                            
1133 Paul Gilroy, There Aint No Black in the Union Jack (London, 1987), 119-120. 
1134 Walker, Left Shift, 135-136. 
1135 Camilla Schofield, ‘’A nation or no nation?’ Enoch Powell and Thatcherism’, in Ben Jackson 
and Robert Saunders (eds.), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), 108-109. 
1136 Hewison, Culture and Consensus, 255. 
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of the region, discussed in chapter 2, had leaned heavily on marketing expertise, so had 
the organisation of the YAA.  
Despite some acknowledgement of the potential stifling of innovative artistic 
endeavours, such as what was termed ‘risk’ books by one of the coordinators of the 
community publishers Yorkshire Arts Circus, YAA demonstrated a keen sense of the 
exigencies of the ‘marketplace’ for art in the 1980s.1138 Perhaps reflective of the time in 
which it was written, one of the longest chapters of contributions to the association’s 
retrospective focused on finance, and was titled ‘Even the tea interval was sponsored by 
somebody’.1139 It reflected the variety of corporate sponsors the association had 
attracted and the variety of events it had attracted sponsorship, such as a modernist 
concert by students at Bretton College in Wakefield ‘sponsored by a major bank’.1140 
Much as with the attempts in regional industrial promotion discussed in chapter 2, the 
YAA worked within the national arts structure to promote their artists and to identifying 
opportunities for patronage for them, but whilst also demanding a degree of financial 
rectitude from the artists themselves. A draft policy paper sent to the ACGB in 1986 
demonstrated that, beyond the broad objectives to support art for all and wider the 
scope of artistic production in Yorkshire, the YAA saw its prime roles as ‘development 
agency’; ‘planning agency’; and ‘service agency’. In terms of the financial criteria 
employed for grant aid, the association also made clear that ‘success in involving other 
appropriate agencies’ and ‘the effort to maximise self-generated and earned income’ 
were crucial factors.1141  
This was taken further the following year, as the association’s council prepared a paper 
for its various policy groups setting out an assertive marketing strategy that prioritised 
                                                            
1138 Van Riel, The Arts in Yorkshire, 97. 
1139 Ibid., 91-104. 
1140 Ibid., 93. 
1141 ACGB/103/195 ‘Yorkshire Arts - Policies in Practice, second draft’, August 1986. 
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‘the customer led’ approach; noted YAA was working with ACGB towards ‘systematic use’ 
of ‘qualitative market research’ with close links to ‘consultants and advisors’; and 
emphasised that future marketing should pay close heed to the ‘image’ of the 
association as part of the need ‘to be developing new partnerships with industry and 
commerce’.1142 All such policy initiatives had followed by the Yorkshire body since the 
1970s but were strengthened by the climate of the late 1980s as the more mixed and 
promotional approach aligned with national priorities. In contrast, again, LHA struggled to 
adapt to a more market oriented approach to the work of regional arts patronage, one 
that demanded greater financial accountability and development of additional revenue 
streams. But in contrast with the tightening management structures elsewhere, ACGB 
had to press several times to be given either the policy documents, or the meeting 
minutes from the LHA. When the policy papers were eventually supplied, the deputy 
director admitted rather noncommittally that ‘some were written a little while ago and 
details would need amending, but in general terms they are accurate’.1143 Amongst their 
criteria for eligibility were commitments to ‘efficiency’ in production but no mention of 
either revenue generation nor efforts by the artists to secure their own funding.1144 
Despite seeing from the early 1980s there was a need for their function to move towards 
marketing and financial stimulus, this adjustment was still a difficult one for the LHA.  
When the RAAs were compelled to produce development plans in the mid-1980s by the 
ACGB, the LHA already had a review of its activities underway with a view to presenting ‘a 
more persuasive case for arts investment’.1145 The plan did nod to the supposed 
importance of the creative industry, most notably in job creation, economic regeneration, 
and tourism. But more importantly it stressed that ‘the primary case for the arts remains 
                                                            
1142 ACGB/103/195 ‘Questions of Marketing, Image and Advocacy’, October 1987. 
1143 ACGB/103/188 Buckingham to Warr, ‘Arts Council : Combined Arts’, 28 July 1986. 
1144 ACGB/103/188 ‘Policy’ n.d. 
1145 HHC L709 (5) DUP, ‘The Regional Development Plan for the Arts in Lincolnshire and 
Humberside’ (1986), 3. 
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a social one. The arts can give pleasure, offer new experiences and a better 
understanding of the world in which we live, and help personal development and 
expression’.1146 In addition to this, the role of ‘the commercial and private sector’ was 
figured less in terms of its marketing potential and and more in terms of the 
philanthropic considerations, for example, the development of a major retail complex in 
Hull city centre that led to an extension of the Ferens Art Gallery.1147 Indeed, LHA found 
themselves openly critical of national policy; stating of the ‘Glory of the Garden’ policy 
that ‘its introductory thrust expressed admirable principles for regional development 
outside London’ but that it ‘took a predominantly urban view of development 
opportunities, and sadly omitted many of the key rural issues which are of importance to 
this region’.1148 When in its final year the LHA did enter into a more formal corporate 
partnership with the private sector, this was again an arrangement distinct to the region, 
as the first RAA in Britain ‘to launch a professionally-staffed BiA [Business in the Arts] 
regional service’. A manager of this service was seconded from British Gas, and Clive Fox 
in his Director’s report saw this as an opportunity ‘to make a major impact of the last of 
the strategic objectives of the 1987 Development Plan’.1149 Though corporate 
sponsorship was still only a fraction of the funding provided through all RAAs by the early 
1990s, that the accounts for 1989/90 indicated just less than £10,000 had been raised 
from sponsors – against an budget of over £1.4 million – demonstrated how little the 
LHA had been able or willing to countenance private finance.  
In October 1991, the recommendations of the Wildings Report on the relationship 
between the RAAs and the ACGB were finally endorsed. The report had argued that 
significant administrative savings could be gained from a rationalisation of the RAAs and 
                                                            
1146 Ibid., 6-8. 
1147 Ibid., 15. 
1148 Ibid., 9. 
1149 Lincolnshire and Humberside Arts, The 25th Annual Report, April 1989-March 1990 (1990), 
3: ‘acting as ‘marriage broker’ between business executives and arts organisations’. 
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their recasting as Regional Arts Boards (RABs). In such circumstances it was inevitable 
that the LHA would be abolished, and the area of its jurisdiction absorbed into another 
board area. As it was, Humberside was subsumed into the Yorkshire and Humberside 
Regional Arts Board (which encompassed the county and the old borders of the YAA), and 
Lincolnshire joined with what had been Eastern Arts. It was ultimately a culmination of 
the standardising and centralising policy directions that had gripped regional arts policy 
across the 1980s and which had a similar impact on local government during the 
decade. In the introduction to the final annual report, the chairman of LHA George Cooke 
summarised not only the external pressures that saw his association subsumed, but also 
the intra-regional pressures: 
…I recognise that wider national considerations must at times override regional and 
local preferences. I recognise too that the political and other differences within our 
region didn’t exactly strengthen our case for either whole region merger or status 
quo. I just think it is very sad, particularly in the arts, that being very good though – 
relatively – small is not good enough.1150 
 
The new system saw ACGB funding for all regionally based arts schemes and projects 
devolved to the RABs, with an increased emphasis on regional accountability in both how 
these funds were allocated and administered. Though the new Yorkshire and 
Humberside Arts Board saw that they had many strengths in the links they had fostered, 
merging the interests of Humberside into their existing structure were still problematic; 
as was the ‘confusion of identity as to what YHA is’. Much of the new direction accorded 
with what had already been ongoing with the YAA: the first principle of the new board 
stated that the ‘YHA will be a policy led development agency for the arts based on a 
partnership approach within a broad cultural context’.1151 The consultation exercise 
carried out in November 1991 noted that the new geographical boundaries posed 
                                                            
1150 Ibid., 1. 
1151 ACGB/108/45 ‘B5.5 Planning for the Arts’, December 1991. 
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challenges to the cosmopolitan order. Two fears identified in consultations in Hull were 
the ‘imposed, centralised, bureaucratic structure… not representative of the range of 
communities in the region’; and the potential ‘marginalisation of Humberside’.1152 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This examination of the region’s arts associations demonstrates again the 
interrelatedness of relational and geographical conceptions of region. In contrast to 
Harvie’s contention, we not only see the operation of distinct cultural forms in these 
regional institutions, but also assertive and distinct regional political action.1153 Though 
both the LHA and the YAA were semi-official public bodies, they developed distinctive 
institutional frameworks representative of their geographical and political cultures. The 
Yorkshire body was both decentralised and generally cosmopolitan in its outlook and 
artistic production; whereas the Lincolnshire body was paternalistic and rural, invoking 
heritage and a distinct form of Lincolnshire culture. The LHA however struggled not only 
to integrate into a more urban setting with the inclusion of Hull and North Humberside, 
but also found it difficult to continue to exist within its particular structures within an 
increasingly centralised, formalised and professionalized context. 
In cultural terms – as with the other chapters across this thesis – regional arts action 
demonstrates the complexities of the relational power structures of the regional, and 
how they are deeply grounded in traditional social organisations and the physical 
environment. The diversity of Yorkshire and Humberside makes it exemplary in 
discussing debates on national identity, which have been characterized by North/South 
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divide, and the two cultures controversy of the 1960s. Yorkshire's forging of a 
cosmopolitan, modern identity has both interacted with and been contested by its more 
rural, conservative character. These debates are continuing to play out now within an 
increasingly fractured political climate. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Which “Yorkshire First”? 
Regionalism and Regional Identity in Yorkshire and 
Humberside in perspective 
 
 
 ‘We just thought people in Yorkshire hated everyone else, we didn’t realise they  
 hate each other so much…’ 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron, 11 September 2015.1154 
 
I 
Though causing minor news headlines when picked up off-record on a microphone that 
Cameron was wearing prior to delivering a speech in Leeds, this pronouncement 
produced virtually no public consternation. In fact the more prevalent response was a 
concession of the statement’s truth from, for example, the leader of the West Yorkshire 
Combined Authority, and iconic Yorkshiremen in Dickie Bird and Geoffrey Boycott. 
Journalists from across the political spectrum even sought to add context to Cameron’s 
statement, including an opinion piece from the Guardian’s North of England Editor 
proclaiming he ‘had a point’: 
It’s not that surprising. Pit a bunch of Yorkshire folk against outsiders and they’llall 
chunter on about how chuffing brilliant God’s Own County is. Put a Bradfordian, a 
Sheffielder, a Yorkie and a Leeds lad in the same room, however, and they’ll argue 
about their football teams, the relative quality of their beer, the beauty of their 
landscape and women, and everything in between. Often all that will unite them is a 
shared disdain for Hull.1155 
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The contemporary political situation which had led to Cameron’s comments provided 
little counter to these generalisations. In the wake of the Scottish Referendum and the 
promise of greater devolved powers to the Scottish Government, the Conservative 
government was seeking to promote greater devolution in England through divesting new 
powers, budgets and responsibilities to elected mayors. The first of this new wave of ‘City 
Deals’ had been signed with political leaders in Greater Manchester in November 2014. 
Almost a year later, despite Yorkshire being integral to chancellor George Osborne’s 
‘Northern Powerhouse’ industrial strategy, no similar deal was forthcoming from the 
region; a situation that prompted the Prime Minister’s tongue-in-cheek frustrations.1156  
Though the authorities in South Yorkshire did eventually submit a proposal that received 
ministerial approval and – as of time of writing – remains the only City Deal in the area 
(pending a legal challenge that has delayed mayoral elections until 2018), a number of 
competing proposals emerged that carved Yorkshire up in a number of ways. These 
include proposals advanced by the York, North Yorkshire and East Riding Local 
Enterprise Partnership (LEP) for a mayoral region encompassing these areas;1157 a Leeds 
city-region that would also include York, Craven, Harrogate and Selby along with West 
Yorkshire; more ambitious plans for a ‘Greater Yorkshire’ that would bring the remaining 
areas of North, West and East Yorkshire together; and even tentative plans from a 
Labour MP and former leader of Leeds City Council for one mayor for the whole of 
Yorkshire and the Humber.1158 
                                                            
1156 Len Tingle, ‘Yorkshire’s dash for devolution poses problems,’ BBC News, 4 November 2015, 
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1157 City of York Council, ‘A Devolution Proposition for City of York, North Yorkshire and East 
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In one sense, the impasse in Yorkshire generated by the lack of consensus would appear 
to reinforce the notion that – in Yorkshire and Humberside – regionalism has been and 
continues to be the ‘the dog that never barked’. The complexity of these negotiations are 
as much an expression of (multiple) regional conceptions, not a lack thereof; the 
exemplar of the power of ‘Yorkshire’ as an identity, and as a contested regional ‘brand’; 
and of the uneasy interactions between regional institutions across Yorkshire and the 
Humber and with central government. One of the major barriers to the signing of a 
devolution deal has been the Conservative government’s resistance to countenancing 
the ‘Greater Yorkshire’ region; with Jake Berry, the Northern Powerhouse Minister 
imploring the LEPs and local authorities to focus their efforts instead on cities.1159 
More fundamentally, the actual constitution and function of the devolutionary proposals 
has been as much a source of resistance as the exact geography. In an exercise run by 
the Sheffield University’s Crick Centre, thirty-two citizens chosen from across the local 
authorities recommended – based on evidence placed in front of them by a number of 
proponents and critics of devolution – an elected regional assembly to serve the whole of 
the Yorkshire and Humber region, and one that would be elected by proportional 
representation.1160 Though admittedly marginal, political lobbying groups have been 
formed to advance the notion of a ‘Yorkshire parliament’ that would adopt the ancient 
historical boundaries advanced by the Yorkshire Ridings Society and other organisations 
since the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Yorkshire Devolution Movement established in 
2012.1161 Most notable of all in these alternative voices is the Yorkshire Party. 
Established as Yorkshire First in order to contest the 2014 European Election, the party 
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has stood candidates in local and national election contests on a platform of 
campaigning for the eventual establishment of a Yorkshire parliament ‘directly elected 
via a fair voting system’.1162 In its principles, the Yorkshire Party describes itself as 
representing ‘pragmatic’ centrism, and in its most recent manifesto reasserted a 
commitment to its candidates political independence: 
The Yorkshire Party trusts our elected representatives to act on behalf of their 
constituents without the need for a party whip or outdated political dogma. Your MP 
will be free to bring their own perspective to the issues of the day, challenging and 
scrutinising legislation, spending, and government policy on your behalf.1163 
 
The Yorkshire Party only stood 21 candidates and polled 21,000 votes in the 2017 
General Election, and currently has no sitting councillors (unlike, for example, Mebyon 
Kernow in Cornwall, or the North East Party). However, in its three years of existence, at 
the time of writing it has rapidly increased its share of the vote in the elections it has 
stood in, and appears established enough that it will, in the short term, be a fixture of 
regional politics across Yorkshire. 
 
II 
These recent debates stand as evidence not of the paucity of political regionalism in the 
Yorkshire and Humberside area, but instead of the complex and fractured nature of its 
mobilisation. Rather than an absence of political regionalism, as claimed by Harvie, this 
thesis has argued that in post-war Yorkshire and Humberside there has been a 
consistent articulation of plural regional identities and regional purposes, whose 
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formation, construction and mobilisation has been consistent with other trends in 
contemporary politics related to increasing affluence, consumerism, class dealignment 
and postmodern constructions of place and identity. 
Contrary to the general academic consensus that English regionalism has ‘never barked’ 
politically, in the period under consideration – in Yorkshire and Humberside - there has 
been a range of regional action and expression produced from various bodies (often with 
a loose conception of regional boundaries), which have taken disparate forms reflecting 
the broader trends in British politics towards the ‘privatisation of politics’, post-
materialism (to some extent) and complexity in expression.1164 This is evident when 
examining non-official and peripheral archival material and organisational histories, and 
when taking into account other trends that have observed within modern British politics 
by historians such as Matthew Hilton and Lawrence Black. Constructions and 
articulations of the region, however, are complex and contingent: as is much the case 
with single issue groups and non-governmental bodies.  
The fractured nature of regionalism in England has been a difficult issue partly due to the 
historical legacy of centralisation within the state. Regional policy-making and 
articulation of regional identity has had to contend with distinctively England 
centre/locality dynamics, which have often been played out through imagined 
geographies employed by governmental and non-governmental bodies and processes. 
This thesis demonstrates that regional spaces such as Yorkshire and Humberside 
provided a prism through which broader ideological debates surrounding national 
decline, national renewal, and national conservation played out in the post-war years. 
This significant pluralism is testament to the continued power of regional identities. As 
such, regionalism and regional identity have been constructed much more in response 
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to, and been influenced by, contemporary economic and social considerations than has 
previously been suggested by historical studies of spatial identity, that have put much 
firmer emphasis on tradition and history in these constructions.1165 The multitude of 
regional interests articulated in this thesis are reflective of this.  
As demonstrated in chapter 2, this approach allows for an exploration of the limits of 
agency of regional bodies in both producing and reflecting certain regional images. In 
Yorkshire and Humberside, apparent diversity in landscape, industry and social 
formation could be both a strength and weakness of regionalism and regional action. 
Regionalism more broadly, rather than empowering peripheral areas, has tended to 
replicate and exacerbate existing informal ‘geographies of power’;1166 Hull remained 
peripheral within the context of regional institutions and campaigns, despite attempting 
to appropriate the discourse. Peripherality is both relational and geographical, based on 
real space and postmodern constructions of space. Humberside has been less able to 
tap into more selective regional imagery in an increasingly globalized world.  
Regions, as both grounded in the physical environment and also in relational power 
dynamics, and as negotiated through contingent and complex relationships, are 
therefore best considered through a multi-dimensional approach as offered by these 
‘core samples’. This model has been used as ‘the sites and hosts of different debates’ on 
that have ranged from general to highly specific;1167 it proves apt for regions too, not only 
in capturing their ’slippery’ or ‘kaleidoscopic’ nature in geographical terms, but also  in 
interlaying temporal and political terms.1168 On Humberside for example, as discussed in 
chapter 3, regional space and imagery could be employed both as a symbol of unity and 
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a symbol of spatial and temporal division, with campaigners for the abolition of 
Humberside seeing the Humber Bridge as both ‘unnatural’ and an anachronism. 
As this thesis has highlighted, the organisational structures through which Yorkshire has 
processed regional action demonstrate significant continuities and particular regional 
forms. The stability of the almost federal relationship forged between the regional 
coordinating body in both the Yorkshire and Humberside Development Association and 
Yorkshire Arts in chapter 2 and 5 respectively are both indicative of the particular 
associational culture of Yorkshire. The structures of these organisations have stood in 
contrast to those of other regions such as the North East and Lincolnshire, where 
regional formations tended to be much more centralised in form. Where this has been 
complicated is in the assertiveness and independence occasionally demonstrated by Hull 
and Humberside. As chapter 3 demonstrates, this is both forged by the physical 
separation and peripherality of this part of East Yorkshire, but also the psychological 
effect this has on claiming independence, separatism and dominance in regional 
institutions; as shown, for example, in the seeking of local solutions to air transport 
requirements.  
Heritage has been instrumentalised and commodified throughout the processes explored 
in this thesis, not only for the tourist gaze as part of place marketing, but emergent from 
a self-assertive construction of identity that straddles traditional ideological lines. These 
forms of production of heritage and tradition could be both complimentary and 
oppositional to more modernist constructions of space and region. As such, regions have 
a distinctly temporal, as well as spatial, dimension.  
As this thesis has highlighted, the 'region' – and, specifically, that of Yorkshire and 
Humberside – is conceptually vital for observing the major economic and social changes 
from the late 1950s until the early 1990s in Britain. It was in this space that the onset of 
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industrialization was managed and negotiated; it was also in this space that the precepts 
of statist, modernist technocracy in the 1960s were continually contested from the mid-
1970s by a burgeoning 'marketplace for ideas'. These debates were forged not only by 
the changes witnessed in this period, but also the continuities. Though in some ways this 
thesis affirms Bulpitt's broad theory of the disintegration of the 'dual polity' between 
centre and periphery, as highlighted in chapter 4 there were limits to the agency that 
either centre and periphery possessed to bring about fundamental change. Additionally, 
from the late 1960s there was a rescaling of the state and the increasing construction of 
postmodern space based on a handful of images.1169 On a regional scale established 
hierarchies were resilient, shaped by relational and spatial power dynamics that were 
informed by real locational geographies. For example, Humberside's liminal and 
peripheral status within Yorkshire and Humberside, and within England more broadly, 
was both a product of real and imagined geographies and their reflexive interaction in 
historical and contemporary social formations.1170 
 
III 
This thesis suggests several productive routes for further enquiry. The importance of 
local geographical particularism and its interactions with both national and regional 
contexts as a dimension of modern British history is exemplified in Stefan Ramsden’s 
recent monograph Working Class Community in the Age of Affluence. Ramsden’s chosen 
community for critiquing the historical and sociological conceptions of ‘traditional’ 
working class communities and their supposed decline in the 1950s and 1960s is 
Beverley. But the focus on class as the dominant dimension of identity in his oral 
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historical study appears deeply problematic.1171 His argument that the ‘fact that the 
town’s working-class population was relatively undisturbed by urban reconstruction 
allows a greater appreciation of the extent to which other changes associated with the 
age of affluence impacted on community life’1172 somewhat neglects the fact it was 
relatively undisturbed by other aspects of change, such as Commonwealth immigration 
(which Ramsden himself emphasises as a driver of increasing cultural pluralism 
nationally in this period).1173 Though Ramsden frequently refers to the East Riding of 
Yorkshire, practically no substantive mention is made of Humberside and its effect on 
identity, even in a full chapter devoted to ‘identity and place’. In seeking to refute certain 
space-myths, Ramsden creates his own space-myths through the axis of class. The 
strong local identities this case study explores speak more to the interactions of the 
community of the East Riding with regional, national and global changes from the latter 
half of the twentieth century, explored in part within this thesis. Academic abstraction 
from place, whether through the ‘locationless logic’ of modern social research methods, 
moralistic ‘cosmopolitan sensibilities’,1174 or perhaps most likely the undoubted reflexive 
relationship between both, often means absence of a nuanced interpretation of spatially 
contingent social structures, what Phythian-Adams terms the ‘the environing cultural 
context’ of a locality’s ‘own specific topographic, historic, demographic and economic 
circumstances’.1175 As has been seen in this thesis, these abstracted conceptions of 
regions have in themselves brought about expressions of local and regional identity in 
opposition. 
Ramsden’s study does however tellingly include a chapter on a theme that has been 
implicit across all the chapters within this thesis, and something that would serve as an 
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vital dimension of any future research on regionalism and regional identity in Yorkshire 
and Humberside: associational life. Not only was the variety of associational life notably 
dense across the area, but the willingness and determination to collaborate, or to be 
seen to collaborate, on a region-wide (or at least county-wide) basis appears to have 
been remarkably strong. Yorkshire and the Humber was not alone in this; Colls has 
stated of the ‘bourgeois civic’ or middle class that it would be wrong to underestimate 
the importance of their association in regional identity,1176 and indeed their vitality in the 
North East has been touched upon in this thesis. However, Yorkshire is consistently 
remarked on for its number of associations, and the effectiveness of their region-wide 
coordination. A fuller exploration of the YCSS, or other associations like it, with a 
consideration of the social structures of Yorkshire and Humberside would therefore 
provide an additional dimension to the regionalism and regional identity discussed within 
this thesis.  
Another area that has not been explored in depth in this thesis – as highlighted in the 
introduction – is the interaction of other forms of identity with the regional; most notably 
gender and race. The primary actors in the core samples discussed have been almost 
exclusively male and almost exclusively white. This in itself may point to the normative 
and white ethno-centrism of regional identity and its mobilisation as regionalism, and in 
doing so affirms some of the more relational accounts of regional spatial production. 
Indeed, in places the reproduction of these power relations has been visible in the 
documentary evidence: the YHEPC coordinating group, when seeking feedback to the 
regional review, decided that ‘women’s organisations’ need not be specifically 
approached, since women’s interests should be covered by the other organisations [to 
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be consulted], most of which had women members’.1177 Though rather paternalistic in 
their approach, the YAA did however in the late 1970s and 1980s seek to promote 
cultural and ethnic diversity of West and South Yorkshire. This research has indicated 
some contrasts and similarities with other English regions in this regard, but has not 
done so in anywhere near enough depth to provide authoritative conclusions. Scottish 
nationalism, in contrast with Englishness and also traditional conceptions of minority 
nationalism, has consistently been allied with liberal-inclusivity,1178 but the extent to 
which this has permeated regional identity has proved less certain, when it has been 
considered. The intersectional relationship between these different forms of identity 
deserves fuller exploration.  
Additionally, a broader area of future research partially highlighted by chapter 3 is the 
urgent need for increased historicism of recent political trends in England. Heightened 
academic interest in the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has emerged from their electoral 
success in local and European elections in the 2010s, and with it their increasing vote 
share in Northern England and Wales. Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin’s analysis of 
the social and political trends in UKIP’s rise has persuasively highlighted a general 
alignment in their supporters with ‘assertive nationalism, social conservatism and 
Euroscepticism’, and the socio-economic effects of recent events such as the 2007/8 
Financial Crisis. This analysis’ central focus on UKIP as a political party however provides 
little in the way of context or historical antecedent prior to the establishment of the Anti-
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Federalist League in 1991.1179 As this thesis has highlighted, the core agitators in 
campaigns to abolish the 1974 counties in favour of ‘traditional’ local government units 
shared many of the ideological tenets articulated by UKIP. Through a strong appeal to 
identity politics aligned with conceptions of local ‘heritage’ and perceived threats to this, 
these campaigners were able to forge support for their causes across a broad 
constituency of the traditional political spectrum. Indeed, some direct corollaries can be 
drawn, such as future UKIP MEP Patrick O’Flynn’s involvement in anti-Humberside 
lobbying as a Hull Daily Mail journalist. 
Additionally the means of mobilisation of this broader support has reflected wider 
changes in political organisation towards more privatised, values-based and single issue 
forms of association propagated by NGOs. Such populism rooted in place, and in 
historical constructions of place, comes into conflict with what Robinson has seen as the 
strong ‘presentism’ and convergence in ‘temporal attitudes’ of the mainstream political 
parties; attitudes that prize ‘novelty, modernity and timeliness’.1180 Not only would a 
fuller exploration of these campaigns, and their construction of the local as it relates to 
the national, help to inform historical narratives around radical right wing populism, but it 
would also help to develop a greater understanding of the role of spatially defined 
identity politics in post-war Britain. Similar recent trends in left wing radicalism would 
also suggest the validity and utility in this approach. 
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